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Programs in the presence of nondeterminism or underspecification may mask
the presence of insecure information flow between variables. This may re-
sult in the refinement paradox when such programs are refined to a de-
terministic implementation. Hence nondeterministic programs that satisfy
possibilistic security properties like Generalised Noninterference (GNI) may,
on refinement, fail corresponding deterministic security properties such as
Noninterference (NI).
We propose in this thesis an automatable information flow analysis frame-
work to capture information flow between variables and flag flows that
breach information flow policies defined as a multi-level secure lattice-based
system. We separate the problem of satisfaction of the refinement relation
from the problem of preservation of security properties of interest at every
refinement step, and focus on the latter problem.
We formalise our core analysis on standalone B Machines, develop the
proof obligations of the framework, and introduce security conditions that
must be satisfied to guarantee secure information flow between the vari-
ables within a single B machine (Chapter 3). We show that our analysis
is more robust than standard flow-insensitive security type systems like
the one developed by Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [76], since our analysis is
flow-sensitive, i.e., responsive to information flow. For example, our frame-
work correctly analyses a program whose overall flow is secure as secure,
even when some of its subprograms may be insecure, whereas [76] will er-
roneously classify such programs as insecure, a problem commonly termed
false negative. We also show the correctness of our framework in Chapter 3.
A natural sequel to our core information flow analysis of standalone B
Machines is an extension of the framework to analyse structured B Machines,
i.e., information flow arising from the use of B structuring mechanisms such
as SEES, INCLUDES, etc (Chapter 4).
The third major part of the thesis (Chapter 5) involves the analysis of
information flow between the variables in a hypothetical case study using
the C++ implementation of the information flow analyser formalised in the
preceding chapters. We also discuss our intuitions on future extensions.
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It used to be the case that many software professionals in the industry fo-
cused on the functional requirements of software systems almost to the ex-
clusion of nonfunctional requirements like confidentiality. Hence, confiden-
tiality, and computer security mechanisms in general, were sought as add-on
components to already developed software systems. In the last decade or
so, however, a growing number of software professionals have started to
incorporate some form of confidentiality properties, usually security-typing
frameworks, into the development process. Examples include JIF (an exten-
sion of Java that supports information flow and access control), SIF (Servlet
Information Flow, that does for servlets what JIF does for java objects). We
present in this thesis the theoretic foundations on which our research into
Confidentiality Properties and the B Method is based, and a practical frame-
work for building confidentiality respecting software systems. Using the B
Method, we illustrate with a case study how existing knowledge in the area
of confidentiality properties can be harnessed in the specification and devel-
opment of software systems in order to guarantee that these properties are
preserved at every step of the development process.
1.1 Setting
A statement made by Dorothy Denning in May 1976 is as valid now in
2011 as it was back then. The author wrote in [50] that ‘The primary dif-
ficulty with guaranteeing security lies in detecting (and monitoring) all flow
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causing operations.’ Hence, a major research problem we intend to address
in this thesis is: ‘the analysis of information flow to the end of monitoring
and detecting possible insecure flows within B developments based on defined
confidentiality policies’. To simplify this problem, we propose a decoupling
of the problem of preservation of confidentiality properties from the prob-
lem of preservation of the refinement relation. Thus, rather than constrain
the classical refinement relation, thereby overhauling the foundations of this
traditional software development framework, we extend the software devel-
opment process with an additional step which analyses specifications and
their refinements for insecure flows of information. This ‘plug-in’ approach
means that if a refinement of a system satisfies the classical refinement rela-
tion, and our framework analyses the system and adjudges it to have secure
flows of information, then we can conclude that such a system is, with re-
spect to the defined confidentiality policy, a secure refinement of the original
specification. This notion is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
It is worth pointing out that our approach here, in principle, is akin to the
notion of Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD), an engineering
approach whereby the secondary requirements of software systems are sepa-
rated from the primary business logic concerns and built as separate modules
to be integrated with the primary systems. At the source code level, this en-
gineering paradigm is referred to as Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP)
[83]. For example, in the development of a system for storing and manipu-
lating employee records, access and change requirements may affect several
parts of the system. So rather than entangle these requirements in different
parts of the source code thereby making traceability and future modifica-
tion more difficult, in AOP such concerns (termed cross-cutting concerns)
are separated from the primary system requirement of bookkeeping and in-
dexing of the employee records. However, because AOP is employed only at
the level of source code, whereas the scope of the B Method, which we em-
ploy in our work, cuts across all levels of the software development process,
we did not employ AOP in our research.
A core part of our work involves an extension of the flow logic analysis
formalism introduced by Clark et al in [36] to the B Method. Since our
framework is built on the Generalised Substitution Language (GSL) of the
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B Method, we illustrate our work with examples, for the most part, written
using the B Abstract Machine Notation (AMN). Although other formal spec-
ification languages were considered, our reasons for choosing the B Method
are discussed in Section 1.2. First, we prec´ıs information flow security, show-
ing the limitations of current general approach towards attaining it.
Information flow theory deals with the transfer of information from one point
(source) to another (destination) via some media or virtual communication
channel. Given the pervasive nature of computer-based information today,
the need to protect electronic data, and associated resources from acciden-
tal and/or malicious modification, leakage and damage is more important
than ever. This is the primary objective of computer security . The US
National Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Glossary 2000 defines
computer security as “measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability of Information system assets including hardware,
software, firmware, and information being processed, stored, and communi-
cated” [112].
Information flow security is an aspect of computer security requiring that
secret information is not inadvertently leaked to unauthorised observers, of-
ten referred to as adversaries. Generally, we say information flows from an
“entity”1 E1 to another “entity” E2 if the value of E2 is modified, or influ-
enced in some way by E1 (or by an entity derived from E1). Information flow
could be represented graphically as shown in Figure 1.1, where I1 denotes
information flow from source s through a communication channel, c, and I2
denotes information received at destination, s′. Ideally, we desire that the
adversary’s knowledge of any secret in I1 is not increased by his legitimate
observations of I2 at s
′ in all runs of the system.
Information flow security is often treated as a confidentiality property2, and
this could be described informally as:
à The prevention of unauthorised access to secret information explicitly,
1We use the term ‘entity’ to describe all logically identifiable objects such as variables,
components, files, stored values, segments, etc. in a software system
2Confidentiality properties are also referred to as secrecy (when associated with data
or information) or privacy properties (when described as a user requirement).
17
Figure 1.1: Information flow
and
à The prevention of unauthorised persons from learning or deducing
transmitted confidential information by covertly observing the be-
havioural patterns of the system, e.g., timing behaviour, input and
output behaviour, resource usage, and/or termination or otherwise of
a process based on information publicly available to them.
The INFOSEC Glossary [112] defines confidentiality as: “assurance that in-
formation is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or devices”.
Thus we need to be able to guarantee that confidential information remains
confidential from one end of the system to the other (i.e., end-to-end se-
curity). Confidentiality therefore requires that secret information does not
flow into output receptacles visible to public (or unauthorised) observers.
The constraints or restrictions imposed on information flow to ensure the
confidentiality of sensitive (or secret) information within software systems
are termed confidentiality properties [19].
However, many software systems in use today depend on what Gary Mc-
Graw [93], [94] termed a “penetrate and patch” (p&p) approach to security
whereby piecemeal solutions (patches) are provided to fix “known” vulner-
abilities in software, much like patching leaks in a vessel. This inevitably
weakens the structure of the original program thereby resulting sometimes
in system instability. Ghosh et al [59] concurs with [93] who notes that to
avoid the problems sometimes caused by these patches, many users are of-
ten reluctant to apply the patches, as long as they have a ‘working ’ system.
Furthermore, a software system is only as secure as its last known vulnera-
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bility, hence, there is an ever-present danger of unknown vulnerabilities in
software systems. Often, a number of vulnerabilities go unnoticed for a long
time because adversaries exploiting such vulnerabilities will obviously not
be inclined to report them to the developers.
It must be noted that many vulnerabilities, for example language-based flaws
like buffer overflows, can be prevented by the use of strict formal develop-
ment methods like the B Method. Strict formalisms, however, cannot deal
with information flow related ‘security holes’ in software systems. Conse-
quently, rather than spinning round and round in the ‘penetrate and patch’
carousel, which at best only deals with symptoms, we believe it is much bet-
ter to deal with the underlying problem by thinking about ways of building
end-to-end confidentiality respecting software systems from inception step-
by-step through to implementation.
In the following section, we present the reasons why we consider work on the
preservation of confidentiality properties in a formal software development
environment such as the B Method a necessary and beneficial endeavour.
1.2 Motivation
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights [46], the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998 [47], [13], the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(US) [52], Copyright laws, Design Rights, Intellectual Property Rights [43]
. . . all these constitute “constraints” on governments, individ-
uals and organisations to ensure protection of the confidential
information they hold about other individuals and/or organisa-
tions.
As the world is becoming increasingly dependent on computers, more and
more data are becoming digitised, stored on computers, and manipulated
in ever more ingenious ways, hence the need to seek better ways of preserv-
ing the confidentiality of such information from end to end in a software
system cannot be overemphasised. That the protection and preservation of
personal information held on individuals by governments and organisations
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is important can be seen from people’s indignation and government officials’
embarrassment at the recent spate of leaks of such information by wikileaks.
Another motivation for our work is the need for a formal engineering ap-
proach to specification and refinement of software systems that allows prac-
titioners to model provably correct and secure programs before actual devel-
opment takes place, thereby reducing undue reliance on testing and valida-
tion after program construction. This will make the software development
process much more like other engineering fields where such an approach is
the norm. For example, rather than build a bridge and then test it’s load
resistance, a civil engineer will produce formal drawings and models which
are then tested as a simulation of the real bridge. Researchers like Burgess
[35], Ghosh et al [59], and McGraw [93] discussed the importance of such an
engineering approach to software development. This approach makes sense
both technically and economically. It is more cost effective to spot and fix
secure information leaks early on in the development process than to dis-
cover these later-on during the testing or deployment phase, for example,
in the traditional waterfall software development model. Gilb and Graham
[60], among others, claim it could be up to 30% cheaper in time and cost
to inspect and fix software problems (confidentiality, in our context) earlier
than later [45]. The information flow analysis framework introduced in this
thesis provides such a formal engineering approach to the specification and
refinement of confidentiality sensitive software systems, with particular fo-
cus on B developments.
One reason we decided to use the B Method is because of the need for solu-
tions to be simple enough for it to be readily adopted by practitioners (many
of whom lack advanced mathematical training) in the industry, without com-
pletely overhauling well-established development frameworks. Banach and
Poppleton [17], in the context on software retrenchment 3, stressed the need
not to impose “an alien development discipline on an already well-established
engineering milieu”. They argued that “engineers with an established track
record of successful development are seldom sympathetic to the suggestion
3Retrenchment (introduced by Banach and Poppleton) simply is the opposite of refine-
ment; “loosely-speaking the strengthening of the precondition and the weakening of the
postcondition” [18], [16], [137]
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that all their familiar working practices . . . be abandoned in favour of a way
of working forced implicitly by . . . ”[17] some formalism. The B Method is a
well-known formal specification method based on set theory, and it is famil-
iar to many industry practitioners and academics. That many researchers
are increasingly conscious of the need for solutions to be simple is pointed
out by Finklestein and Kramer in [55], and Denning in [50]. Benjamin Aziz
in [14], [138] stressed the need for integration of formal methods into indus-
trial solutions, as exemplified by the ‘EU FP7 project CONSEQUENCE’,
which delivered “a data-centric information protection framework based on
data-sharing agreements” [136]. Hence, defining our information flow analy-
sis framework on B GSL semantics, rather than on a toy imperative language
as is commonly done in the literature, and developing an analysis tool that
can be integrated into the formal development process of B machines fills a
need in the industry. Another motivation for using the B Method is the ava-
ialability of well-known industrial tools such as the B Toolkit, ProB, Atelier
B, etc, for simulating and validating B Machines.
Our motivation for automating the information flow analysis framework lies
in the fact that it minimises the risk of human error and reduces labour,
training and time investment in manually analysing information flow at ev-
ery step of the development process. This we believe is more cost-effective
and allows for consistency of results, as developers only have to learn how
to use the information flow analysis tool to check for insecure flows in their
development rather than learn the rigorous formal analysis framework.
We employ a lattice structure to formalise security policies that map pro-
gram variables into security classes, following Denning’s approach in [50].
Lattices are special types of sets, so it is only natural to use a set-based
formal method like the B Method for our analysis and supporting examples.
This, of course, is not to say that specification and/or programming lan-
guages not based on set theory cannot be used. In summary, the simplicity
of the B Method, its expressive power and compatibility with security lat-
tices, its use of familiar set-theoretic approach, availability of commercial
tool support and increasing popularity in industry makes the method our
formal specification language of choice [68], [123].
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Consequently, we summarise below the motivation for our work, based on
the belief that practitioners need to build confidentiality properties into
software systems from an early stage of the software development life cycle
and to ensure that such properties are preserved through refinement(s) to
implementation:
à The storage and manipulation of large amounts of sensitive confidential
information on computer systems;
à The interconnection of countless disparate systems in an ever-expanding
maze of internetworked systems through the internet, some of which
cannot be trusted;
à Readily exploitable confidentiality related flaws in many existing soft-
ware systems, which could cause significant loss of reputation, com-
petitive advantage, customer revenue . . . and even life! [13];
à Present “penetrate and patch” approach cannot deal with the threat
posed by adversaries, identity thieves, terrorists, the ‘wikileaks’ of this
world, etc;
à The potential effect of human error when information flow is analysed
manually;
à The need to satisfy government laws and regulations such as the Data
Protection Act, Freedom of Information Act, etc;
à The need to develop simple, cost-effective, yet powerful and secure
solutions that can be readily assimilated into industry and academia.
Having discussed the reasons we have chosen to carry out this research work,
we now present the aims and objectives of the thesis in Section 1.3 below.
1.3 Aims and Objectives of Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to extend existing theories on the subject of confi-
dentiality properties to formulate an automatable information flow analysis
framework to enable developers using the B Method to assure end-to-end
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secure information flow within their developments.
To accomplish our stated aim, we identify the following objectives:
à A study and review of relevant possibilistic security properties in the
literature;
à A study and review of the notion of programs, specifications and refine-
ments used in the literature, and limitations of the classical refinement
relation;
à A study and review of the B Method, with examples to show that
formalism does not automatically translate to security;
à Information flow analysis of systems developed using the Generalised
Substitution Language of B Machines;
à Introduction of security conditions for a multi-level secure system, us-
ing a lattice structure;
à A B development case study automatically analysed for secure infor-
mation flow using our C++ Implementation of the information flow
analysis framework introduced in this thesis;
We present in Section 1.4 the problem addressed in this thesis and the re-
search methodology used to deal with it.
1.4 Research Methodology and Plan
We present in this section the research method employed in our work as
well as our research plan, which sets out the road map for accomplishing
the aims and objectives presented in Section 1.3.
1.4.1 Research Methodology
The problem we address in this thesis is how to assure end-to-end secure in-
formation flow within systems developed using the B Method. The research
methodologies we employ include reviews, action research, and case-studies.
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We investigate possibilistic confidentiality properties in the literature; exist-
ing notions of programs, specifications and refinements; and we present an
introduction to the B Method. We present a detailed discussion of this part
of our research in Chapter 2 of the thesis. We also employ Action Research
[9] methodology, which consists of an iterative spiral of steps involving plan-
ning, action, and a review of completed actions with a view to improving
the process. We follow our review of existing work in the literature with a
discussion of the pros and cons of existing approaches to the preservation
of confidentiality properties through refinement (Section 2.3.5.5). We then
break the problem of preservation of confidentiality properties through re-
finement into two distinct concerns that must both be guaranteed from one
development step to another, namely: the preservation of the refinement
relation, and the preservation of the confidentiality properties of interest.
We discuss this in Chapter 3.
We adopt the notion of refinement in the B Method, which corresponds to
set inclusion of the behaviours of the refined system in the behaviours man-
ifest by the original specification, hence we concentrate only on the second
strand of the problem stated above, i.e., the preservation of confidentiality
properties of interest. To do this, we develop a flow-logic based analysis
of information flow between parts of the system state and introduce secu-
rity conditions that, if satisfied, guarantee that such a system satisfies the
confidentiality property of interest. We apply these conditions first to Gen-
eralised Noninterference and Noninterference and review the results with a
view to optimising the analysis (Sections 3.5 - 3.8).
Our action research method corresponds to Stephen Corey’s (1953) view of
“Action Research” as “the process by which practitioners attempt to study
their problems scientifically in order to guide, correct, and evaluate their
decisions and actions”[40] in a disciplined self-reflective fashion. Earlier,
Kurt Lewin (1947) defined the same approach as “a three-step spiral pro-
cess of (1) planning, which involves reconnaissance; (2) taking actions; and
(3) fact-finding about the results of the action”[40]. Hence we aim to use
the results of our reflective research process to seek an optimal information
flow analysis framework that will be robust enough to handle all possibilis-
tic definitions of security in the literature. This leads to our discussion of
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analysis of information flow using monotone frameworks in Section 3.8.
To demonstrate how our analysis framework can be utilised in the indus-
try, we employ the case-study research methodology. Using the B Method,
we introduce a system development methodology that enables us to analyse
the flow of information between the variables within standalone B machines,
refinements and implementations, as well as information flow between vari-
ables within structured B machines. The case-study serves as a proof of con-
cept that demonstrates the practicality and functionality of our information
flow analysis framework. We present the detailed case-study in Chapter 5.
In the following subsection, we present the roadmap for this research work.
1.4.2 Research Plan
To meet the objectives set out in Section 1.3, we plan to realise the following
broadly defined outcomes and deliverables, and it is on these deliverables
that the table of contents of this thesis is based. Our main contributions
are listed as items v, vi, and vii below:
i. Introduction and motivation;
ii. Relevant confidentiality properties;
iii. Programs, refinements and relevant confidentiality-preserving refine-
ments;
iv. Benefits and Limitations of existing confidentiality-preserving refine-
ments;
v. Information flow analysis of standalone B machines, refinements and
implementations;
vi. Information flow analysis of structured B machines, refinements and
implementations;
vii. A case study: Flow respecting developments in B;
viii. Conclusions and further work.
We now follow with an overview of the layout of the thesis in Section 1.5.
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1.5 Structure of Thesis
We structure this thesis roughly on the objectives set out in Section 1.3,
following the research plan in Subsection 1.4.2.
Following this introduction, we present in Chapter 2 a detailed literature
review of existing work on which our work is based. The chapter is divided
into three main sections. The first section (Section 2.2) deals with a review
of relevant possibilistic confidentiality properties in the literature. The sec-
ond section, (Section 2.3), deals with the notion of programs, specifications,
and refinements in the literature that we adopt in our work, while the third
section, (Section 2.4), presents a brief introduction to the B Method.
In Chapter 3, we present one of our main contributions, which is a frame-
work for analysing intra-machine flows, i.e., the flow of information between
variables within standalone B Machines. This chapter presents the core the-
oretic basis for much of the subsequent work in the thesis, for example, the
inter-machine information flow analysis in Chapter 4, and Flow Respecting
Developments in B presented in Chapter 5. We also present in Section 3.7 a
hypothetical example that illustrates a key advantage of our flow-sensitive
information flow analysis over the flow-insensitive ones in the literature,
namely: the ability to correctly analyse a secure program secure even when
it contains insecure sub-constructs. We conclude the thesis with a summary
of our accomplishments so far, a discussion of further work and recommen-
dations.
In the meantime, we turn our attention in Chapter 2 to a detailed review of






In this chapter we present a number of confidentiality properties in the
literature that are relevant to this thesis; the definitions of programs, speci-
fications and refinements that we adopt, and we discuss the difficulties asso-
ciated with ensuring that confidentiality properties satisfied at earlier stages
of the software development process are not lost at later refined stages. We
focus first on existing work in the field of security properties, discussing
the strengths and limitations of the different security properties presented
(Section 2.2). We follow with a discussion of definitions of programs, spec-
ifications and refinements in the literature (Section 2.3). We conclude this
chapter with an introduction to the B Method, showing that even the use
of such a strict formal specification language as the B Method does not
in itself guarantee that security properties satisfied in earlier stages of the
development process will be preserved in later (refined) stages (Section 2.4).
2.1.1 Confidentiality
The aspect of information flow security we concentrate on in this thesis
is Confidentiality (aka Secrecy), hence subsequent unqualified references to
‘security’ here is synonymous with ‘confidentiality’. The US National Infor-
mation Systems Security (INFOSEC) Glossary [112] defines confidentiality
as: “Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons,
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processes, or devices”. Simply put, confidentiality properties define the re-
quirement that secret information is not read or learned by unauthorised
persons, processes, objects or devices either directly or indirectly from per-
mitted observable patterns in multiple executions (or traces) of a program.
Generally, in a Multilevel Secure System (MLS) 1, a system preserves the
confidentiality of a secure entity if the initial value of the secure entity (i.e.,
the secret object) cannot be learned or deduced from the final values of en-
tities classified lower in the MLS ordering.
The notion of confidentiality can be formally defined using trace semantics
whereby a trace t is a finite sequence of events in an event system. Given
that E denotes a set of events, l1, l2 ∈ E are both low-security events, and
h ∈ E is a secret event. We consider two traces to be equivalent from the
low security observer’s viewpoint, denoted ≈L, if and only if the observer
cannot deduce whether or not a high security event occurred in the system.
Writing interleave({l1, h, l2}) to denote all possible executions of program
S involving the events l1, h, l2 in any order (i.e., interleave({l1, h, l2}) is a
subset of all traces of S, denoted traces(S)), the notion that all executions
preserve the confidentiality of h can be formalised as follows:
∀t ∈ traces(S), h is secure iff∀t1 ∈ interleave({l1, h, l2}), ∃t2 ∈ interleave({l1, l2}) ⋅ t1 ≈L t2
This notion is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.1, which depicts two dif-
ferent sets of execution sequences of the program S, the first, traces(S1)
includes a high input event h, whereas the second, traces(S2) only involve
low security input events l1, l2. For the confidentiality of the high input
event, h, to be preserved, the low output events l′1, l′2 in both sets of traces
must be low-equivalent, i.e., unaffected by the presence or absence of h.
Having introduced the notion of confidentiality as the aspect of information
flow security discussed in this work, we now drill deeper into this concept by
1A Multilevel Secure System is a system where the event space (in an event system)
or the variables defining the state space (in an input-output system) is partitioned into
various security levels, such as ‘unclassified’, ‘confidential’, ‘secret’, ‘top secret’, for exam-
ple in the Bell-LaPadula policy used for data confidentiality, or the Biba Integrity policy
used for the protection of data integrity.
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Figure 2.1: Output Events Indistinguishable from Adversary’s Observations
discussing the confidentiality properties in the literature that are relevant
to our work. This is the subject of Section 2.2.2.
2.2 Confidentiality Properties
By the term Confidentiality properties, we refer to the attribute of software
systems that secret (or confidential) information does not end up in the
public domain. Hence, in the context of this work, confidentiality really is
an Information Flow Security property, and generally, such flows could be
either direct or indirect [36]. Transitive flows resulting, for example, from
sequential composition are referred to as indirect flows. To illustrate, given
that x, y, z are variables, ‘∶=’ denotes that the variable on the left hand side
is updated by the value of the expression on the right hand side, and ‘;’ de-
notes sequential composition, within the program ‘x ∶= y+1 ; z ∶= x’, y flows
into x and x flows into z. Consequently, there is an indirect flow of infor-
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mation from y into z. Direct flows are classified as either explicit or implicit
flows [36], [50], [111]. Explicit flows of information are flows resulting from
assignments (or simple substitutions, in B parlance), function updates, I/O
statements and/or value-returning procedure calls [50]. For example, given
that x ∶= y + z, the flows from y and z into x are explicit flows. Conversely,
a flow is implicit when the value of a variable can be deduced as a result
of its use in control flow conditions or guards, for example, when a secret
variable is used as a loop guard (or condition) thereby having the updated
variable(s) and termination of the program dependent on such a variable
[36].
Implicit flows are further subdivided into local and global flows. When infor-
mation about the initial value of a variable can be learned or inferred due to
dependencies arising when the variable is used in the guard of a conditional
(e.g. IF statement) or a guarded substitution, the resulting flow is referred
to as a local flow. Consider the program:
x ∶= 0 ; (if y = 4 then x ∶= 1 else skip end)
In this example, whichever branch of the IF statement is executed, some
information about the initial value of y can be learned. An observer can
learn that y ≠ 4 if the final value of x is 0, and he can learn that y = 4 if the
final value of x is 1. Hence, in either case, an implicit flow of information
occurs within the local IF statement.
Implicit global flows occur as a result of information flowing from variables
used in the guards of while loops or protected substitutions to all subsequent
substitutions in the program. Given, for example, the program:
while (y < 5) do x ∶= z − 1 end ; z ∶= 7
Clearly, whenever this program terminates (i.e., the value of z is 7), the
observer can conclude that the initial value of y is greater than or equal to
5. On the other hand, if the program fails to terminate, the observer can
conclude that the initial value of y is in fact less than 5. Hence the use of a
secret variable in a while loop guard implicitly leaks some information about
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the initial value of the secret variable via the termination behaviour of the
loop to all subsequent program points after the while loop. So in our exam-
ple, z depends implicitly on y due to global flow from the condition y < 5
to z in the subsequent substitution z ∶= 7. This in an implicit global flow
because the effect of the flow is not limited to the immediate (or local) while
loop wherein the guard occurs; rather, it affects all subsequent subprograms
within the program.
In the context of this work, we deal with both direct and indirect flows.
However, we exclude some types of covert flows2 such as flows resulting from
the monitoring of timing behaviour (i.e., timing flows) and resource usage.
We deal with the area of security described in the literature as possibilis-
tic security properties. Possibilistic security properties encompass security
properties that characterise information flow constraints on nondeterminis-
tic systems, and do not employ the mathematical concept of probabilities,
but rather deal with secrecy in the context of ‘sets of possible observations’
arising from ‘sets of possible executions’ of a program. The intuition be-
hind possibilistic security properties is that if the sets of possible initial and
final states of a transition are sufficiently large, it becomes difficult for an
observer to deduce with certainty the initial state(s) responsible for any par-
ticular transition. In the following subsection, we address the notion that a
specification captures a confidentiality property.
2.2.1 Expressing that a Specification captures
a Confidentiality Property
Basically, confidentiality entails the control of who sees what during com-
putation. The ‘who’ in this context could be a system user, a process or
other communicating objects within a computer system. The objective is
to prevent unauthorised persons, processes, or objects from accessing or
deducing information classified as secret. We say that a specification cap-
tures a confidentiality property when, for all possible animations (or runs)
of a specification, there exists no possible trace of the system that allows
unauthorised persons, processes, or objects to learn the initial value of any
specified secret information. In effect, we say such a specification has the
2unintended information flow arising from the ‘side-effects’ of program execution.
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‘quality ’ or ‘attribute’ of security as presented here. Using the term ‘entity’
in this work to denote something that exists in its own right in a software
system and not merely as part of a bigger thing, e.g., a variable, file, or other
system resources, we can semi-formally state that:
A specification satisfies a security property when the specification
in question represents mathematically, for all possible runs of the
system, the absence of information flow from a secure entity to
a public entity through some valid, albeit maliciously contrived,
run of the specification.
It has been shown in the literature that capturing a security property is
no easy task [111]. It is even more difficult to guarantee that a security
property defined at some stage of the software development process is pre-
served through refinement(s) to later stages, as we shall be showing later
in this chapter. In the following section, however, we discuss confidentiality
properties in the literature that are relevant to this thesis.
2.2.2 Relevant Confidentiality Properties
Design details are often left out in the early, more abstract stages of the soft-
ware development process since the primary aim is to capture the essence of
what the system is required to do and not how the task is to be done. Thus
an initial state of the abstract system may correspond to a number of possi-
ble final states, such that the final state of any particular transition cannot
be determined from any given initial state. This concept is, referred to as
Nondeterminism (or in B Method parlance, Underspecification). The aim of
the software development process, in general, is to gradually refine away the
nondeterminism within a specification until a deterministic implementation
is reached, i.e., a specification that cannot be further refined. Consequently,
the confidentiality properties we consider relevant to our work are those that
relate to Nondeterministic systems, e.g. Generalized Noninterference in the
abstract case, and that translate to a corresponding deterministic property




Noninterference was introduced as a definition of security, i.e., a security
property, in the early 1980s by Goguen and Meseguer [61], [62]. The authors
formalised what it means for a set of users (or processes, or variables) to be
“noninterfering with” another set of users (or processes, or variables), i.e.,
the notion of information not flowing from a high security user to a public
user, using a simple general automaton3. Even until today noninterference is
still the main way of defining security, although further interpretations and
extensions of noninterference have been made over the years, for example to
make it work with nondeterministic and possibly nonterminating systems,
or to make the property composable (or hook-up) [91].
We define our interpretation of NI in this thesis in terms of sets of vari-
ables, rather than users. A system satisfies the Noninterference property
if a change in the input value of a high security variable does not affect
any future low-security state of the system. Thus, a low security entity’s
knowledge of the system remains unchanged notwithstanding any action or
inaction of a high security entity within the system [131]. Suppose that l is
a low security variable with initial value l1, and h is a high security variable
with values h1, h2. For a system in which these variables are defined to sat-
isfy Noninterference, a change in the initial value of h from h1 to h2 must
not affect the final value l′1 of l. This system is noninterfering in the sense
that the final value of a low security variable is not modified or interfered
with by the initial value of a high security variable. This general notion of
noninterference is illustrated in Figure 2.2, where /↝ denotes ‘does not flow
into’, or ‘does not interfere with’.
Given that Ide denotes the set of variables in a program, S, with the variable
space partitioned into a set of low security variables, L, and a set of high
security variables, H. And suppose Val denotes a set of variable values, we
define a system state, σ, as a function σ ∶ Ide → Val. We write Σ to de-
note a set of states, i.e., Σ ⊆ P(Ide×Val). Let S be the set of substitutions
(or commands) that can modify the system state on variable input. Out
denotes the visible variable outputs on termination of the system, whereas
3An automaton is an abstract mathematical model for a (finite) state machine used
for solving computational problems.
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Figure 2.2: Noninterference Illustration
L stands for the set of security classes to which the variables in Ide are
mapped. In automata theory, an automaton (or system) requires a transi-
tion relation which moves the automaton from one state to another when
the input string (or sequence) satisfies some acceptance condition. Hence,
modifying the definition in [62] to relate to variables rather than users, we
define a transition relation, trans, and an output relation, out as follows:
trans ∈ Σ × Ide × S →Σ
out ∈ Σ × Ide→Out
Notice that trans accepts a state, a variable of interest, and a substitution
as inputs and moves the automaton to a new state. The intuition behind
this is that only one variable may be modified in a system state at each
step-wise transition. The functional out, on the other hand, constructs an
output Out in a state with respect to a given variable of interest.
Given that z ∈ Ide and s ∈ S, an input string sequence or word, denoted
w ∈ ⟨(z, s) ∣ (z, s) ∈ (Ide×S)⟩, wherein (z, s) ∈ w is written, for example, as:
w = ⟨(z0, s0), (z1, s1), . . . , (zn, sn)⟩
We write W = (Ide×S)∗ to denote the set of all possible sequences of pairs
in the input string or word, w, i.e., {w ∣ w ∈ (Ide × S)∗}.
We define a run or animation of the automaton on an input word, w =
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⟨(z0, s0), (z1, s1), . . . , (zn, sn)⟩ ∈W, as a sequence of states σ0, σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ
where σ0 is the start state, and for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have:
σi = trans(σi−1, (zi, si)) for all subsequent states. This requires an exten-
sion of trans to consume words or sequences. This extension we write as
trans∗ ∈ Σ ×W, which yields the state resulting from applying the inputs
one after another in a sequence. (Note: we assume intermediate states are
not visible, and not saved internally.) Formally, given that + denotes se-
quence concatenation, and assuming that ws ∈ W and w = ws+(z, s), we
define trans∗(σ0,w) recursively by cases as follows:
trans∗(σ0,w) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ0, if w = ⟨⟩
trans(trans∗(σ0,ws), (z, s)), if w = ws+(z, s)
We write [[w]] to denote the system behaviour in terms of the sequence
of runs of the system on input string w, i.e., [[w]] = trans∗(σ0,w), and[[w]]z denotes the output on z after executing automaton on w, i.e., [[w]]z =
out([[w]], z). Writing wH to denote the word derived from w by eliminating
all pairs (z, s) such that z /∈ H, i.e., wH = w − ⟨(z, s) ∣ z /∈ H⟩, we formally
define wH structurally by cases as follows:
Given that ws ∈W and w = ws+(z, s):
wH =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⟨⟩, if w = ⟨⟩
wsH , if w = ws+(z, s) ∧ ⟨(z, s) ∣ z /∈ H⟩
wsH
+(z, s), if w = ws+(z, s) ∧ ⟨(z, s) ∣ z ∈ H⟩
We now present our interpretation of the noninterference property intro-
duced in [61] in definition 1 below:
Definition 1 (NI). Given that Ide = H ∪ L and H ∩ L = ∅. For all z ∈ L
in all animations of all substitutions of interest, we say that H does not
interfere with z, written H /↝ z, iff for all w ∈W :
[[w]]z = [[wH]]z
This interpretation of noninterference basically corresponds to the notion
that the output sequence on a set of runs of a system remains unchanged,
from the standpoint of a low security variable, on deletion of high security
variable inputs. Note that the same can also be said of insertion of high
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security variable inputs into a word or sequence.
Example:
We illustrate our interpretation of Goguen and Meseguer’s Noninterference
with the following example program, denoted S1.
IF p = q THEN




We assume the variable we are interested in monitoring for information
flow in the program is x. Given three input values to x respectively as
x0 = 5, x1 = 7, x2 = 0, the pointwise input word to S1 with respect to x, de-
noted w, becomes ⟨(x0, S1), (x1, S1), (x2, S1)⟩, i.e., ⟨(5, S1), (7, S1), (0, S1)⟩.
Now, suppose Table 2.1 describes the states of S1 corresponding to w.
Initial State Variable Values
σ0 x0 = 5, y = 1, v = 7, p = 1, q = 1
σ1 x1 = 7, y = 2, v = 5, p = 1, q = 0
σ2 x2 = 0, y = 3, v = 1, p = 0, q = 0
Table 2.1: Initial states of S1
Given that σ′ ranges over final states after each transition, the pointwise
transition relation, trans, on w using the values given in Table 2.1 with
respect to x is given below:
trans(σ0, x, S1) = σ′0,
trans(σ1, x, S1) = σ′1, and
trans(σ2, x, S1) = σ′2
We can then derive the the values of the final states after each transition as
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depicted in Table 2.2.
Initial State Variable Values
σ′0 x0 = 8, y = 1, v = 7, p = 1, q = 1
σ′1 x1 = 0, y = 2, v = 5, p = 1, q = 0
σ′2 x2 = 4, y = 3, v = 1, p = 0, q = 0
Table 2.2: Final states of S1
Thus the output sequence with respect to x, denoted [[w]]x is ⟨8,0,4⟩.
Given that some other program S2 with input word w2 = ⟨(z, S2)⟩ is com-
posed with S1, such that the input word to the composite program is w
+w2,
i.e., w+(z, S2). For the composite system to be noninterfering with respect
to x, given that z ∈ H is a high security variable, we require that:[[w]]x = ⟨8,0,4⟩ and [[w+(z, S2)]]x = ⟨8,0,4⟩.
This illustrates that the insertion of a high security variable input value af-
ter a sequence of inputs does not interfere with any observable low security
variable output of the system.
For a multilevel secure (MLS) system, noninterference can be interpreted as
follows:
Given that L = ⟨L,≤⟩ is a multilevel security lattice;
A function, classify ∈ Ide→ L maps variables to their respective
security classes;
And for any l ∈ L, we define a downward inclusion ordering on the
variable space, which collects the set of variables with security
classification less than or equal to l. This intuitively collects the
variables that may be read by variables with security classification l
or higher:
Given that x ∈ Ide, k ∈ L, and classify(x) = k, the downward inclusion
ordering, ↓x, is defined as:
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↓x = {z ∈ Ide ∣ classify(z) ≤ k}.
Similarly, an upward exclusion ordering is defined, which collects the set
of variables with security classes higher than the security level of
interest. Formally, the upward exclusion ordering with respect to
x ∈ Ide, denoted ↑x is defined as:
↑x = {z ∈ Ide ∣ classify(z) ≰ k}
Hence, we say a system is MLS secure iff ∀l ∈ L:
if x, y ∈ Ide and classify(x) = l,
then y ∈ ↑x implies y /↝ x
The interpretation of NI described in this section is illustrated in Figure 2.3,
which shows that a change in the input value of high security variables does
not impact the output on low security variables. In the figure, we depict
three runs Sr1, Sr2, Sr3 of the system S. The first run has no input from a
high security variable; the second has a secret input h1; and the third run
has the secret input changed to h2. L denotes a set of low security variables,
and a fixed input is passed to each of the variables in L in all three runs of
S. In all three runs of S, the output visible to a low security observer on
l′ must all be equivalent. In other words, the output visible to low security
observers are consistent in all runs of the system, whatever the input string
passed to the system. This corresponds to what Zakinthinos and Lee termed
a Low Level Equivalent Set LLES [84].
McLean in [98] points out that Noninterference deals with some of the lim-
itations of access control (e.g., by handling covert flows and read and write
dependencies better than access control mechanisms) and that Noninterfer-
ence states a security requirement rather than a method for meeting that
requirement. While this is useful in itself in that it expands our understand-
ing of security properties, developing methods for enabling programs meet
this requirement is even more beneficial. This is one of the main motiva-
tions behind our work on the development of a framework for analysing B
Machines to ensure that the operations defined in the machines meet the
38
Figure 2.3: Illustration of Noninterference ‘Semantics’
Noninterference property4.
Beneficial though Noninterference has proved to be, it is not without its
limitations, some of which are discussed below.
à Zakinthinos and Lee in [84] noted that ‘Goguen and Meseguer’s origi-
nal definition of Noninterference was only applicable to deterministic
systems’. Sabelfield and Myers in [111], and McCullough in [91] are
some other notable experts to corroborate this claim. Hence this in-
ability to handle nondeterministic information flow where the output is
not necessarily a function of the input sequence, i.e., different outputs
may result from the same input sequence is a limitation of noninterfer-
ence. For example, the tossing of a coin may result in a ‘head’ in one
instance, and a ‘tail’ in another, hence the output is not a function of
the input.
à Inability to handle interrupts and nontermination. The former fol-
lows because noninterference is defined in terms of inputs and outputs,
without recourse to concurrency or multitasking [91]. The simple fact
4We hope in the future to be able to extend the framework to analyse machines satis-
fying other possibilistic security properties in the literature.
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that if a program aborts, no output is guaranteed means that nonin-
terference does not account for nontermination.
à Composability is only possible under extremely impractical assump-
tions such as that all buffers are unbounded, and that there must be no
merging of outputs (as in parallel processing of inputs, thereby losing
the benefits of parallel processing) [90], [91].
à Another documented limitation of noninterference in the literature is
that it is too restrictive, and it does not take account of information
release whereas many real world systems are intended to leak some
kind of information. Flow sensitive information flow analysis frame-
works such as the ones introduced by Hunt and Sands [75], Amtoft
and Banerjee [8], and Clark et al [36], all of which are precursors to
the approach in this thesis mitigates against this limitation of nonin-
terference. We do not explore this limitation in detail because the area
concerns declassification, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Consequently, a more generalised form of NI, termed Generalized Nonin-
terference, that deals with nondeterminism, and corresponds to NI in the
deterministic case, was introduced by McCullough in [89] as an extension to
Sutherland’s earlier work on Nondeducibility [131], and this is the subject
of the following section.
2.2.2.2 Generalized Noninterference (GNI) and
Weak Noninterference (WNI)
If for every valid trace (sequence of inputs and outputs) of a system and
every possible alteration to that trace (such as by deleting or inserting high
security inputs) the set of possible low security futures after the modification
is equal to the set of possible low security futures before the modification,
then the system is said to satisfy the Generalized Noninterference property
[89][90]. Hence, a low security observer cannot, by observing the set of pos-
sible low security futures, rule out any possible input sequence involving
high security variables. GNI extends NI into the realms of Nondeterministic
and Interruptible systems, where the outputs may depend as much on the
interleaving of the inputs and outputs as on the sequence of inputs.
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To formalise GNI, we lift the definition of NI given in definition 1 (on the
effect of some input sequence on the observable future values of low security
variables) to the effect of sets of sequences of inputs on sets of observable
future values of low security variables. To that end, we assume a set of in-
put sequences, W ⊆ (Ide×S)∗, defined as W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn}. Similarly,
W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩ means W followed by the singleton input sequence ⟨(x, sh)⟩.
We write [[W]] to denote the set of all runs of the system on W with each
run starting at σ0, i.e., ∀w ∈ W, trans∗(σ0,w). This could be expanded
as [[W]] = {trans∗(σ0,w1), trans∗(σ0,w2), . . . , trans∗(σ0,wn)}). Corre-
spondingly, we write [[W]]z to denote the set of observable future values
of z for all runs of the system on W, i.e., ∀w ∈ W, [[W]]z = out([[w]], z).
Finally, we write WH as an extension of wH defined earlier in section 2.2.2.1
as: WH ≜ ∀w ∈ W ⋅wH .
Definition 2 (GNI). Given a system S with Ide ⊇ H ∪ L and H ∩ L = ∅.
Suppose sh ∈ S is a substitution that updates a high security variable. For
all x ∈ H and all z ∈ L, we say that S satisfies GNI with respect to x, i.e.,
H does not GNI-interfere with z, written H /↝GNI z, iff for all W ⊆W:
∀[[W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩]] , ∃[[W′]] ⋅ [[W′]]z = [[W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩]]z
This definition simply states that given any possible set of runs on any set
of valid input strings (high security variables inclusive), i.e. [[W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩]],
it is always possible to construct another set of runs on sets of low security
input variable strings only, [[W]], that yields a consistent set of observable
output values with respect to the set of low security input strings W. Hence,
by observing [[W]] and (for all z ∈ L) [[W′]]z, the low security observer is
unable to determine whether there was an initial high security variable input
to S or not, i.e., he cannot tell whether the output he is seeing is produced
by [[W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩]] or [[W]].
Figure 2.4 illustrates the notion of GNI presented in Definition 2. This shows
that a set of sequences of low security inputs, W, followed by a sequence
of high security input(s), ⟨(x, sh)⟩, (shown in dotted lines to indicate input
sequence is hidden or secret) yields an output, [[W, ⟨(x, sh)⟩]]z, consistent
with the output of a set of sequences of inputs with the hidden input se-
41
Figure 2.4: Illustration of GNI ‘Semantics’
quence removed, [[W]]z.
Although GNI makes Noninterference more useful by dealing with sets of
possibilities and nontermination, GNI also has its limitations. For exam-
ple, it is generally not composable especially for systems with feedback, i.e.,
two-way communication between processes and it could suffer the infamous
refinement paradox, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.5.2.
A somewhat similar extension of NI into the realms of Nondeterminism is
Weak Noninterference WNI, which allows the removal of all high security
inputs without impacting the low security behaviour of the system [87]. Re-
call from the notation defined earlier that ∀z ∈ Ide and s ∈ S, an input
string sequence is given as w = ⟨(z0, s0), (z1, s1), . . . , (zn, sn)⟩. We extend
this notation by defining dom(w), for use in our interpretation of WNI, as:
dom(w) = {x ∈ Ide ∣ (∃s ∈ S) (x, s) ∈ w}
Definition 3 (WNI). We say a system S satisfies Weak Noninterference
with respect to some input on x if and only if for every input sequence to
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S, from the view of some variable y with security classification lower than
x’s, there is another input sequence on y, which exhibits the same visible
behaviour (output) as the input on x.
∀w ∈W, ∃w′ ∈W ⋅ ∀x ∈ dom(w),∃y ∈ dom(w′) ⋅ y /∈ ↑x ∧ [[w]]y = [[w′]]y
This is a formal way of saying that the set of possible behaviours of a system
with respect to some variable remains unchanged even when the inputs on
high security variables in the system are removed.
One advantage of WNI is that responses to inputs are not assumed to be in-
stantaneous (i.e., delays can be handled securely) [87]. Following from that,
termination is not assumed. This is the main difference between WNI and
Strong Noninterference (SNI) because SNI is termination-sensitive whereas
WNI is not. Trivially, though, SNI implies WNI, i.e., any system that sat-
isfies SNI also satisfies WNI, but not vice versa. For example, two program
statements are equivalent (in both SNI and WNI) if they both halt or both
diverge at equivalent values. If one statement halts (or diverges) while the
other does not, however, the two statements are equivalent under Weak
Noninterference, but not under Strong Noninterference. Since Strong Non-
interference is less useful than GNI and WNI in that it prevents systems
that are obviously secure such as update flows (i.e., low writing to high),
and it permits intuitively insecure systems [62], we will be employing the
intuitions behind GNI and WNI rather than SNI in our work.
McCullough in [89], [90] further extended his earlier work on GNI in order
to overcome some of its limitations. This resulted in the security property:
‘Restrictiveness’, which is the subject of the following section.
2.2.2.3 Restrictiveness (RES)
Restrictiveness is a hook-up (or composable) security property that is viewed
by some as a stronger version of Noninterference, sometimes classified as
Strong Noninterference [91]. This is a further development of McCullough’s
work on GNI [89] and Sutherland’s work on Nondeducibility [131] neither
of which are composable. McCullough argued that although a system sat-
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isfying either GNI or Nondeducibility guarantees that a variation in high
security input does not interfere with future low security behaviour, a pair
(or composition) of a high security input followed immediately by a low
security input is not guaranteed to have the same effect. Hence RES was
introduced to make security properties “Hook-up”, i.e., composable by re-
stricting messages so that insertion of a new high security output before or
during the sequence of inputs after the first change in high security input is
rejected [38]. McCullough asserted that it is sufficient for a state machine
to satisfy the following conditions for it to be restrictive with respect to a
set of low security events.
à The machine is input-total, i.e., for all reachable states in a system,
every possible input must be able to transition the system from at least
one state to another [56], i.e., there is to be no blocking on inputs.
Given that Σ denotes the set of states in the system, EI denotes the
set of input events, and
e→ denotes state transition by input event e,
the notion of input totality is defined using state transition system
notation as shown in Formula 2.1 below [87].
∀σ ∈ Σ ⋅ ∀e ∈ EI ⋅ ∃σ′ ⋅ σ e→ σ′ ∧ σ′ ∈ Σ (2.1)
Formula 2.1 is based on the notion that every state set, Σ, of a system
may always be extended with an input event, e, if the system is input-
total [84]. Hence a system that is input-total is also closed with respect
to all inputs satisfying the property.
à When two processes correspond to the same low security state, there
is an equivalence relation between the states of both processes. Given,
for example that HI,HO,LI,LO denotes set of high-level inputs,
high-level outputs, low-level inputs and low-level outputs respectively;
S1, S2 denote instances of the system under consideration, and ≡L de-
notes ‘low-level equivalence’. Using the notation introduced here, the
conditions for this low-level equivalence relation are summed up in the
following statements, namely:














Figure 2.5: Restrictiveness Condition ∀lI ∈ LI
 ∀li ∈ LI ∧ S1 li→ S′1, if S1 ≡L S2 then∃s ∈ S′2 ⋅ S′2 ≡L S′1 ⇒ S2 li→ S′2 - - see Figure 2.5
 ∀ho ∈ HO ∧ S1 ho→ S′1, if S1 ≡L S2 then∃s ∈ S′2 ⋅ S′2 ≡L S′1 ∧ ∃ho′ ⋅ S2 ho′→ S′2 - - see Figure 2.6















Figure 2.6: Restrictiveness Condition ∀ho ∈ HO
Although RES is composable and deals with Nondeterministic systems, in-
terrupts and nontermination, it unfortunately is not preserved when the
Nondeterminism is refined away to get a deterministic implementation of
the system. This is a problem we will address in Chapters 3 and 4 of this
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thesis. In the meantime, we will now review Sutherland’s Nondeducibility
in the following section.
2.2.2.4 Nondeducibility (ND)
Sutherland in [131] proposed Nondeducibility to capture the essence that a
low security user should not be able to deduce or learn to a high level of
certainty anything about the activities of high security users by observing
events legitimately visible to him (i.e., the low security user). Thus, for
every trace of the system, there is a second trace, from the low security (l)
user’s view, which contains only the input and output traces of events with
security classification lower than or equal to l. Sutherland’s framework is
based on a function mapping a set of possible worlds or traces to a set of
values, V. To enhance comparison with our language-based, program anal-
ysis approach to the prevention of insecure flows (Chapter 3), we re-present
Sutherland’s Nondeducibility as functions on ‘sets of states’ rather than ex-
ecution sequences (or traces).
Definition 4 (ND). Given that Σ denotes the set of system states, and
let Ide and Val be the set of variables and the set of values respectively.
Ide is partitioned into H ⊆ Ide and L ⊆ Ide corresponding to the set of
high security variables and the set of low security variables respectively. We
define the set of possible worlds as Σ ⊆ P(Ide → Val). We say that a
system fails Nondeducibility if and only if for all states where valuations of
low security variables are unchanged, there exists a valuation of high security
variables that affects the low security observations of the system.
Note: For simplicity, we write σ(x) ∪ σ(y) to denote a set containing the
values of the variables x and y in the state σ. We say a system S fails ND
if:
∀σ ∈ Σ ⋅ ∀x ∈ L Given that: y1 ∈ H ∧V ⊆ Val,
if σ(x) ∪ σ(y1) = V then ∃y2 ∈ H ⋅ y1 ≠ y2 ∧ σ(x) ∪ σ(y2) ≠ V (2.2)
The formal definition in Formula 2.2 above shows that a change in the value
of a high security variable is deducible since σ(x) ∪ σ(y1) = V ⇒ ∃y2 ∈
H ⋅ σ(x) ∪ σ(y2) ≠ V. One consequence of this formal definition is that it
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shows ND as a ‘one-way’ property, i.e., it only constrains read-ups5. Thus
safe flows, e.g. auditing flows (read-downs6 from H to L) and update flows
(i.e., write-ups7 from L to H) are disallowed [38].
As pointed out by McCullough in [90], ND is weaker and more general than
NI in that a system that satisfies ND would also satisfy NI (but not vice
versa). Furthermore, ND is a possibilistic security property and it does not
require systems to be uninterruptible and deterministic as NI does. How-
ever, the same author pointed out that a system that satisfies GNI also
satisfies ND, making GNI an even weaker property than ND. Much like
GNI, however, Nondeducibility also is not preserved under composition.
2.2.2.5 Nondeducibility on Strategies (NDoS)
Introduced by Wittbold and Johnson [81] as an extension of Nondeducibil-
ity, Nondeducibility on Strategies was formalised to overcome some of the
limitations of Nondeducibility, namely:
à Solving the problem of implicit flows due to cooperating strategies be-
tween two entities to leak information via side-effects of system be-
haviour rather than leakage through deduction based on input strings.
This is a problem not handled by Nondeducibility, where a system
that is ND secure on a set of input strings may fail ND on a set of
transmitter input strategies.
à Sutherland’s Nondeducibilty property is designed to work with sys-
tems without feedback. This is another limitation addressed by [81]
in NDoS.
NDoS is formalised on a synchronized state machine8 where the transmitter
and the receiver may collude on strategies designed to leak secret infor-
mation without such information being directly deducible from transmitter
input strings. For example, a transmitter may intentionally cause some
5Read-Ups - ability of an object to read or deduce information at higher security levels
6Read-Downs - ability of an object to read or deduce lower security information
7Write-ups - ability of an object to write information to higher security objects
8Synchronized state machine - defined in [81] as a state machine wherein the inputs,
the outputs and the state transitions are synchronised.
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system violations, such as buffer overflows as a cue to the receiver that a
secret action has taken place. So when the receiver observes such violations
(which are often caught as exceptions), he can deduce that a high event has
occurred, not because of having been directly able to deduce such informa-
tion because of transmitter input string, but rather because he is able to
deduce the information via transmitter strategy. This way, secret informa-
tion could be noiselessly transmitted to a low security observer. Intuitively,
a strategy is a scheme (pre-arranged between sender and receiver) that allows
secret input to be deducible as a collection of functions of a given history
of the system’s inputs and outputs. Hence, a strategy maps history to the
next inputs. This is the weakness often exploited by Trojan Horse attacks.
Given that U denotes a user process; IU,OU denotes set of inputs and set
of outputs respectively to the user process U . Let pi denote a strategy.
Formally, a strategy could be defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Strategy). Given that ι range over counting numbers up to
n, i.e., 1 ≤ ι ≤ n, a strategy of length n for a user process U is a sequence of
n functions, pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) such that:
piι ∈ (IU ×OU)ι−1 → IU
Given that λ denotes the low security user’s view of length n, the authors
defined NDoS as shown below:
Definition 6 (Nondeducibility on Strategies). A synchronized state ma-
chine is NDoS iff, for any n, the low security user’s view, λ, of length n is
consistent with any high transmitter strategy, pi, of the same length n.
This definition is based on the intuition that whatever view of the system
the low security user has, he is unable to rule out any strategy of the high
security user. Despite the many benefits of NDoS over ND, though, NDoS
still has its own limitations. For example, as acknowledged even by its pro-
ponents [81], NDoS still suffers from the difficulties of combinatorial theories.
We proceed in the next section with our review of O’Halloran’s Noninference,
and it’s extension by McLean to Generalized Noninference.
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2.2.2.6 Noninference (NInf) and Generalized Noninference (GN)
O’Halloran introduced the notion of Noninference in [116] as a means of
ensuring high security activity is not inferable by low security observers.
The intuition behind NInf is that high security activity is not inferable by
low observers if both activities are separated, one from the other. Using the
trace semantics in which NInf was originally defined, the idea is that the
removal of all high security activities from any trace of the system yields a
trace that is itself also a valid trace of the system. In other words, the trace
of a system satisfying NInf is closed under a function that removes all high
security activities from the original trace set. This intuition corresponds
in our state-based framework to stating that the removal of all valuations
of high security variables from the set of all valid system states yield some
valid system states that are low-equivalent to the original set of states. Re-
call that we defined the set of all possible input strings of a system S asW = (Ide × S)∗. We hold that S is low-equivalent on input strings to some
set of runs of the system that are consistent with the observable runs of the
system with respect to a low security variable. We formalise this notion,
denoted ≈L as follows:
Given that w ∈W and for all (z, s) ∈ w such that z ∈ L,
w ≈L w′ ≜ w,w′ ∈W ∧ [[w]] = [[w′]]
We give a formal definition for NInf in terms of ≈L below:
Given that w ∈W, z ∈ L and x ∈ H, we write w ∈≈L iff∃w′ ∈W ⋅ [[w′]]z ∧ w′H = ⟨⟩ ∧ [[w′H]]x = ⟨⟩
The main problem with Noninference is that it is simply too strong since
it disallows output on high security variables, [[w′H]]x. Thus, it does not
account for information flow from a low security object to a high security
object, i.e., it blocks safe flows like write-ups. NInf is somewhat like Sepa-
rability in its strict separation of high security activities from low security
activities, hence it also has many of the limitations of Separability. Like
Noninterference, NInf also lacks the capability to deal with Nondetermin-
istic systems. Hence McLean in [97] extends this property, calling the new
(extended) property Generalized Noninference (GN). Rather than seek to
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eliminate all high security activities, GN only requires that when high secu-
rity inputs, HI, are removed from any trace, the resultant trace must be a
valid trace as well as be equivalent to the low security values of the original
trace. This corresponds in our state-based framework to stating that the
removal of all valuations of high security inputs from the set of all valid
system states yields some valid system states that are low-equivalent to the
original set of states. One of the improvements of GN over NInf is that flows
from low security objects to high security objects are captured, hence GN is
weaker than NInf in that the state space captured by GN is larger than that
captured by the latter, i.e., NInf implies GN but not vice-versa. A formal
definition of GN is given below.
Given that w ∈W and z ∈ L, we write w ∈≈L iff∃w′ ∈W ⋅ [[w′]]z ∧ w′H = ⟨⟩
Notice in our characterisation of GN that only input sequences involving
high security variables, w′H are disallowed. We now turn our attention, in
the following section, to the notion of ‘Separability’.
2.2.2.7 Separability (SEP)
In the the late 1970s / early 1980s, the mathematical concept of Separability
was employed in the design of secure operating systems [126],[127], whereby
a process is said to be Separability secure if it can be constructed as a parallel
composition of separate components with disjoint alphabets. Because such
components do not synchronise on events (since alphabets are disjoint), there
clearly is no chance of any kind of information flow between them. In process
algebra talk, using Hoare logic [73], we denote by αP the alphabet (i.e.,
possible events) of a process P . Assuming αP is partitioned into {A,B},
and there are sub-processes PA, PB with αPA = A and αPB = B, then,
writing P ∥∅ Q to denote the parallel composition of processes P and Q
with no synchronisation of events, we reference Jacob’s definition in [79]
that P is separable with respect to {A,B} only if P = PA ∥∅ PB. Formally,
writing ⋐ to denote ‘sub-process of’, we state the notion of Separability as:
∀P ⋅ (PA, PB) ⋐ P ⋅ (αPA ∩ αPB = ∅)⇒ P = PA ∥∅ PB (2.3)
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The Separability Formula in 2.3 simply states that “a process is Separa-
ble if it is equivalent to a parallel composition of sub-processes with disjoint
alphabets”. Hence, every possible sequence of high security events is possi-
ble with any observation by a low security adversary [84]. This definition
shows that rather than being a security property guaranteeing the absence
of secure information flow between system states, SEP is more like two or
more non-communicating, non-synchronising systems, which do not allow
any possibilistic flow of information between high security objects and low
security objects. Before we define our representation of SEP, we first define
our representation of the notion of Low Level Equivalent Set (LLES) intro-
duced by [84]. Recall that we write w ∈ W to denote a word or sequence.
Suppose for any w ∈ W, wL denotes w with only the set of low security
events retained, i.e. wL = w − ⟨(z, s)∣z /∈ L⟩. Given a system S, we write
LLES(w,S) to denote the set of words with the same low security events
as w in the same order, i.e.:
LLES(w,S) = {u ∣ (u ∈W) wL = uL}
Using our notion of LLES defined above, Zakinthinos and Lee’s definition
of Separability in [84] could be formalised as shown in Formula 2.4 below.
This simply states that no behaviour can be ruled out with the occurrence
of any high security event.
∀w ∈W ⋅wL ∈ LLES(w,S) ∧ ∀u, v ∈W ⋅ u+v ∈ LLES(w,S) ∧
vH = ⟨⟩, ∀α ∈ H ⋅ (t ∈W ⋅ u+⟨α⟩H = tH)⇒
u+⟨α⟩+v ∈ LLES(w,S) (2.4)
Notice that vH = ⟨⟩ indicates that the word v has no high security events,
whereas u+⟨α⟩H definitely has at least one high security event, α. This defi-
nition of SEP, as pointed out by [84], requires that all high level outputs be
possible in all runs of a system.
The fact that Separability rejects even secure flows from low security ob-
jects to high security objects is one of its primary limitations. In a sense,
SEP is both too weak and it gives no guarantee of Noninterference, and too
strong in that it prevents intuitively safe flows [84]. Hence, in as much as
Separability does not allow any interaction or information flow whatsoever
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between low security and high security entities, it is the strongest and least
useful of all Confidentiality properties, as it could be employed only in very
limited situations.
In the following section, we present the notion of Perfect Security Property
in the literature and show its relationship with Separability.
2.2.2.8 Perfect Security Property (PSP)
Separability has been touted as an example of perfect security in that it
allows no interaction between low and high security objects [84]. To over-
come some of the limitations of Separability, Zakinthinos and Lee [84] intro-
duced the notion of Perfect Security Property, which involves a weakening of
the separation between low and high security objects such that information
could flow up from low security objects to high security objects, but not
down in the opposite direction [99]. The intuition behind PSP is that an
observer with knowledge of the system specification cannot, by observing
the non-secure information in the system, draw any conclusions about op-
erations in the secure domain of the system, i.e., when a high security event
occurs, the low security view of the system is always consistent with some
possible low level event output, so that from the latter’s viewpoint, it is as
if nothing has occurred in the secure domain of the system.
With a slight modification of the definition of Separability given in Formula
2.4, we present below a formal definition of PSP.
∀w ∈W ⋅wL ∈ LLES(w,S) ∧ ∀u, v ∈W ⋅ u+v ∈ LLES(w,S) ∧
vH = ⟨⟩, ∀α ∈ H ⋅ u+⟨α⟩ ∈W ⇒ u+⟨α⟩+v ∈ LLES(w,S) (2.5)
The crucial difference between [84]’s definition of SEP and PSP is that while
the former is dependent only on high security events (i.e., definition retricted
to H), the latter depends on all event sequence.
Mantel in [99] extended the concept of PSP in [84] by employing State Event
Systems (abbreviated SES) and used this concept to formalise two unwind-
ing conditions which, if satisfied by local instances of an event system,
52
would guarantee that PSP is also satisfied. The set of states from which an
event is permitted to execute then becomes the precondition, whereas the
postcondition is defined as a function from the precondition to the set of
possible states resulting from execution of the event. This makes it easier
to prove PSP as it is formalised in terms of local events rather than sets of
events [99], [84].
Before detailing how SES works, however, [99] introduced a definition of
security as a flow policy on a set D of domains of security classes. The
various flows the policies are based on are itemised below:
à Noninterference, denoted ‘ /↝’, is defined as /↝⊆ D×D meaning that for
all H,L ⊆ D, H /↝ L means that no information flow is allowed from
H to L.
à ‘↝V ⊆ D×D’ expresses visible information whereby given that H,L ⊆ D,
the authors write L ↝V H to mean that information in domain L is
visible to H.
à Don’t care Deducibility. We use this phrase to describe the author’s
flow condition that for all H,L ⊆ D, information shall not flow from
H to L, although we do not care if information in H can be deduced
from information visible to L. Where ↝N⊆ D ×D, this flow condition
is written as H↝N L,
With these flow conditions, [99] then defined a flow policy as a tuple
(D,↝V ,↝N , /↝). Hence to define a flow policy that specifies flow conditions↝V and /↝, while assuming the condition ↝N is empty, [99] used notation
of the form SL,∅,H 9.
Given that Σ denotes a set of states; ΣI ⊆ Σ denotes set of initial states;
TR ⊆ Σ × E × Σ denotes the set of transitions of the event system from
one state to another as a result of the execution of an event or sequence
of events, E. E denotes a set of events; I ⊆ E, O ⊆ E denotes input and
output events respectively. A state event system is configured as a quintuple(Σ,ΣI,E, I,O,TR). Where σ ∈ Σ denotes a system state, we denote by
9We shall come across similar notation (i.e., oscL,∅,H) later when discussing unwinding
conditions
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σ′ ∈ Σ the next state after a transition from σ, and write reachable(σ) to
mean that the system is able to reach state σ. Using set difference notation,
we write E/H to denote the set of events in E with events in H removed.
And for consistency, we write ≈L⊆ Σ×Σ as a binary operation describing an
equivalence relation between states to denote the notion that both states
are indistinguishable from the low security user’s view of the system. We
now present the two unwinding conditions defined by [99] as follows:
Definition 7 (Unwinding Condition 1). Any execution of a high security
event in a reachable system state of a SES resulting in a new state should
not be detectable by a low security user’s observation of both the initial and
final states of the system, i.e., l locally respects H [100], [99].
This first unwinding condition (Definition 7) could be represented formally
as given in Formula 2.6 below, where we use Mantel’s notation lrH , abbre-
viation for ‘l locally respects H’, to denote the unwinding condition:
lrH ≜ ∀(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ,∀h ∈ H,((reachable(σ1) ∧ ⟨σ1, h, σ2⟩ ∈ TR)⇒ σ1 ≈L σ2) (2.6)
The second unwinding condition defined by Mantel is particularly interesting
as it can be seen that it mirrors the semantics of the classical refinement
relation. Notice this in Definition 8 below and the graphical representation
in figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Output and Step Consistent (osc) Condition illustration
Definition 8 (Unwinding Condition 2). If two abstract states, σ1 and σ2,
of a state event system are related by the relation ‘≈L’ and the system is
54
transitioned from σ1, to another state σ
′
1, then there must exist a possible
implementation σ′2 such that σ′2 simulates σ2 and the relation ‘≈L’ holds
between σ′1 and σ′2.
Formally, this condition could be represented, using another of Mantel’s
notation oscL,∅,H (coined from the phrase output and step consistent ), as
shown in Formula 2.7 below.
oscL,∅,H ≜ ∀(σ1, σ′1, σ2) ∈ Σ,∀l ∈ E/H⋅(σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ ⟨σ1, l, σ′1⟩ ∈ TR)⇒(∃σ′2 ∈ Σ ⋅ ⟨σ2, l, σ′2⟩ ∈ TR ∧ σ′1 ≈L σ′2)
(2.7)
Formula 2.7 basically shows that if a low security event occurs in some state,
then it must also occur in all low equivalent states (≈L) for the system to be
output and step consistent with the defined security policy. Subsequently,
[99] introduced two refinement operators that could be used to preserve
information flow properties through refinement. We discuss these refinement
operators, their benefits and limitations in Section(2.2.3).
2.2.2.9 Equivalence Relations based Noninterference (ERN)
In this section we present a number of confidentiality properties that are
based essentially on the notion of equivalence relations on sets of system be-
haviour with respect to the low security observer’s view of system properties
via permitted system behaviour.
Bisimulation-Based Nondeducibility on Composition (BNDC)
The notion of Bisimulation-based Nondeducibility on Composition (BNDC)
was introduced by Focardi and Gorrieri [57] as a characterisation of Non-
interference in the Security Process Algebra10 (SPA) calculus. The basic
notion of BNDC is that a system C is BNDC if a low security user’s view of
the system is not modified when the system is composed with any high secu-
rity process. The key intuition is to detect and prevent apparently innocent
high security processes (Trojan horse processes) from maliciously leaking
secure information to a public observer.
10Security Process Algebra: A variation of Milner’s Calculus of Communicating Systems
(CCS) [106] used to specify multilevel secure systems by partitioning the set of visible
actions into high and low level actions.
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There are two primary strains of BNDC, namely: Strong BNDC (SBNDC)
and Persistent BNDC (P BNDC). SBNDC is an information-flow security
property that requires, for all reachable states, that the low security user’s
view of the system before a high security action is executed in composition
with a low security action must be the same as after the high security event is
executed. P BNDC goes one step further by requiring the BNDC property
for processes in dynamic contexts, i.e., contexts that can be reconfigured at
runtime [29]. Both types of BNDC are compositional with respect to the
parallel operator, but it is well known that they are not compositional with
respect to the Nondeterministic choice operator. Hence they cannot be used
to specify systems designed using the B Method where the Nondeterminis-
tic choice operator is a main feature. To overcome this limitation, Bossi et
al [28] introduced an extension to P BNDC, which they termed Composi-
tional P BNDC (CP BNDC). The primary benefit of CP BNDC is that
it is fully compositional in that it is compositional, not only with respect to
the parallel operator, but also with respect to the Nondeterministic choice
operator.
For consistency with our work, and to make the notion of BNDC more
understandable, we present the syntax and semantics of SPA, using the
operational semantics of ‘Labeled Transition System’ (LTS) using language-
based syntax rather than trace-based process algebra representation. This
would also make it easier to overcome the problem of avoiding the universal
quantification on high level processes in the SPA characterisation of BNDC
[28]. Further we present the characterisation of BNDC using bisimulation-
like equivalence relations.
Given that C denotes a process; Z denotes a constant that must be associ-
ated with a definition Z ≜ C. We use ξ to denote the set of all processes,
and as SPA requires, ξ is partitioned into ξH and ξL respectively denoting
sets of high level processes and low level processes. C/H means process C
executed with all high security sub-processes removed. We use A to denote
the set of all actions (both internal and visible actions), and while we use a
to range over A, we employ υ to range over the set of visible actions, which
we denote as V. Given that I stands for the set of input actions while O
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Syntax Description
C ∶∶= skip Empty process∣ Z Constant∣ SELECT a THEN C END Prefix∣ C1[]C2 Nondeterministic Choice∣ C1 ∥ C2 Parallel Composition∣ ξ/υ Restriction on visible action∣ ξ[f] Relabeling
Table 2.3: SPA Syntax, using Language based characterisation
stands for the set of output actions, then clearly the set of visible actions,V = I ∪ O. We write υ ∈ V to range over the set of visible actions. Using
τ to denote internal actions, it follows that A = V ∪ {τ}. To distinguish
between input and output actions, we add an overline to the character to
denote an output action, e.g., we write a, b, . . . to mean input actions and
a, b, . . . to mean output actions. We define a function on the set of actions
as f ∶ A → A, and represent the notion of the possibility of zero or more
transitions as (→)∗. Finally, we write aÔ⇒ to denote the notion that a se-
quence of zero or more transitions terminate in a reachable state. With this
notation, we present the SPA syntax in Table 2.3, and a definition of Weak
Bisimulation with which BNDC is developed in Definition 9.
Definition 9 (Weak Bisimulation). For all a ∈ A, a relation R ⊆ ξ × ξ over
processes is a weak bisimulation, denoted ≈w, if (C1,C2) ∈R implies:
1). If C1
a→ C ′1, then ∃C ′2 ⋅C2 aÔ⇒ C ′2 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
2). If C2
a→ C ′2, then ∃C ′1 ⋅C1 aÔ⇒ C ′1 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
We can now define BNDC as follows:
Definition 10 (BNDC). Given that C ∈ ξ, and Ch is a high security process,
C ∈ BNDC ⇐⇒ ∀Ch ∈ ξH ⋅ C/H ≈w (C ∥ Ch)/H
Definition 10 basically states that whenever a low security observer cannot
distinguish whether a process is executed in composition (parallel only) with
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a high security process or not, for all possible high security processes, such
a system is said to be BNDC. Following from this, we follow through with
the definitions of P BNDC and SBNDC in the literature.
The notion of P BNDC was introduced by Focardi and Rossi [58] as a means
of analysing systems in dynamic environments, based on the intuition that
a system C is P BNDC if it never reaches insecure states - hence the term
‘persistent ’ is based on the notion that all reachable states are always secure.
Semi-formally, Given that C ∈ ξ, we write:
C ∈ P BNDC ⇐⇒ ∀reachable(C ′) from C, C ′ ∈ BNDC (2.8)
To avoid the problem of the universal quantification in the semi-formal For-
mula 2.8, [28] defined P BNDC as a weak bisimulation up to H. Writing
aÔ⇒/H to denote a generalisation of the terminating transition relation aÔ⇒
on the set of low security observable actions, whereby:
aÔ⇒/H = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
aÔ⇒ if a /∈ H
aÔ⇒ or τÔ⇒ if a ∈ H (2.9)
we give the authors’ characterisation of weak bisimulation up to H as fol-
lows.
Definition 11 (Weak Bisimulation up to H). A binary relation R ⊆ ξ × ξ
over processes is a weak bisimulation up to H [106] if ∀a ∈ A, (C1,C2) ∈ R
implies that:
1). If C1
a→ C ′1, then ∃C ′2 ⋅C2 aÔ⇒/H C ′2 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
2). If C2
a→ C ′2, then ∃C ′1 ⋅C1 aÔ⇒/H C ′1 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
Given that ≈/H stands for the relation ‘weak bisimulation up to H’, two
processes C1,C2 are thus related, written C1 ≈/H C2, if ∀a ∈ A, (C1,C2) ∈R.
Hence:
C ∈ P BNDC ⇐⇒ C ≈/H C/H
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Focardi and Rossi [58] pointed out that the notion of SBNDC introduced
by [57] is subsumed by their formulation of P BNDC. i.e.,
SBNDC ⊆ P BNDC ⊆ BNDC.
SBNDC requires that the low security observer’s view of the system appear
to be the same both before and after the execution of a high security action.
This implies that every state reachable from a secure system is itself secure,
and this notion is defined as a ‘weak bisimulation up to H with no internal
action’, since termination is assumed. Given that ≈0/H denotes weak bisim-
ulation up to H with no internal action, this equivalence relation is defined
as follows.
Definition 12 (Weak Bisimulation up to H with no τ). A binary relationR ⊆ ξ × ξ over processes is a weak bisimulation up to H with no internal
action if ∀a ∈ A, (C1,C2) ∈R implies that:
1). If C1
a→ C ′1, then ∃C ′2 ⋅C2 aÔ⇒0/H C ′2 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
2). If C2
a→ C ′2, then ∃C ′1 ⋅C1 aÔ⇒0/H C ′1 ∧ (C ′1,C ′2) ∈R;
Thus
C ∈ SBNDC ⇐⇒ C ≈0/H C/H
To overcome the limited compositionality of earlier strains of BNDC, Bossi et
al [28] introduced the notion of Compositional BNDC, abbreviated CP BNDC.
CP BNDC is fully compositional in the sense that it is compositional with
respect both to the parallel composition operator and the Nondeterminis-
tic choice operator. This derives from the definition of a new observational
equivalence termed, weak bisimulation up to H with at least one τ . This
allows actions from H to be matched by one or more internal actions, τ , un-
like the case of SBNDC where such internal actions are not allowed. UsingÔ⇒+/H to denote this equivalence relation, the definition of CP BNDC is
given below:
Definition 13 (CP BNDC). Given that C ∈ ξ, CP BNDC can be char-
acterised as a bisimulation in terms of ≈+/H , namely:
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C ∈ CP BNDC ⇐⇒ C ≈+/H C/H
Following from the definitions of P BNDC and CP BNDC, it can be seen
that while there is no direct relationship between SBNDC and CP BNDC,
CP BNDC is a special variant of P BNDC. Hence, the authors noted the
following relationship between P BNDC and CP BNDC.
CP BNDC ⊆ P BNDC ⊆ BNDC
A generalisation of security properties introduced by Alur et al [6], param-
eterised on equivalence relations and somewhat similar to BNDC is dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.5.4, Inferable Properties based Secrecy Refinement. In
the meantime, we continue with our literature review as we discuss some
language-based Noninterference properties in Section 2.2.2.10 below.
2.2.2.10 Language-Based Confidentiality Properties
In this section we present a number of confidentiality properties in the liter-
ature that we term language-based confidentiality properties for the reason
that the authors employed programming language concepts in their formal-
isation of secrecy. We begin with Bicarregui’s framework based on read and
write frames.
Read/Write Frame based Confidentiality Property
Bicarregui in [23] proposed a way of extending the B Method’s Gener-
alised Substitutions to incorporate the semantics of read and write frames in
model-oriented specification in order to preserve the confidentiality of secret
state variables. In this context, the read frame of a program statement (or
substitution) is the set of all program variables read on execution of the
substitution in a specified state. Conversely, the write frame is the set of
all variables written to during the execution of the substitution in a spec-
ified state. Given two program statements (Generalised Substitutions) S1
and S2, let ‘∥’ denote parallel composition of the substitutions, ‘;’ stands
for sequential composition of the substitutions, and let ‘⊑’ denote “is re-
fined by ”. On the relevance of read frames, the author pointed out that a
necessary condition for S1 ∥ S2 to be refined by S1;S2 is that S2 does not
depend on S1, neither does it read any variable written by S1, (i.e., ‘the read
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frame of S2’ and ‘the write frame of S1’ are disjoint sets). Hence, writing
reads(S), writes(S) to denote, respectively, the read frame and write frame
of the Generalised substitution S, we have:
S1 ∥ S2 ⊑ S1 ; S2 ⊆ reads(S2) ∩ writes(S1) = ∅.
The author used an example involving substitution to a boolean variable x
to show that, by the classical refinement semantics, x could be refined by
x ∶= true, x ∶= false, x ∶= x, x ∶= ¬x, or for some other boolean variable y,
x ∶= y. He then suggested that by specifying a do not read this constraint on
substitutions to x, such that x is not allowed to read any variable, one could
prevent interference through substitutions like x ∶= y. The author’s main
thrust in this paper is to partition the state space with the aid of termina-
tion conditions and meaning relations in such a way that only refinements
that satisfy these constraints are accepted as valid. Thus, the resulting set
of valid refinements is a subset of the refinements admitted by the classical
refinement relation. This framework, however is not sufficient to guarantee
Noninterference generally, especially in dealing with Nondeterministic sub-
stitutions and termination-sensitive Noninterference [23].
In formalising the ‘Do Not Read This’ framework, [23] used Dijkstra’s weak-
est precondition semantics. Thus we provide a fleeting introduction to the
notion of weakest precondition semantics (wp) here. Given a program S,
and a predicate Q, the weakest precondition under which S is guaranteed
to establish the predicate Q as postcondition is the predicate that uniquely
captures the largest set of initial states from which S can execute to es-
tablish Q. Continuing with the notation here, the weakest precondition is
commonly denoted as [S]Q or wp(S,Q). It is worth pointing out here that
wp requires that the program under consideration terminates. (A detailed
discussion of wp will be presented later in Section 2.3.4.) It is understand-
able, therefore, that Bicarregui in [23] wrote ¬[S]¬(σ = σ′) to denote the
notion that: given that σ,σ′ are program states, it is not the case that the
program S terminates in some state that does not satisfy the postcondition
σ = σ′.
The semantics of substitutions is enriched with notions of read and write
frames. Given that F denotes the set of all variables in scope, R ⊆ F is
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the set of variables in the read frame, W ⊆ F denotes the set of variables
that can be written to, i.e., the write frame, and S is the body of the gener-
alised substitution, a substitution is captured as a quadruple (F,R,W, S).
A ‘meaning relation’, M, formalised as a predicate set on the states of a
substitution, S, is defined as: ‘if the body of a substitution terminates suc-
cessfully, then it must be the case that both the state before and the state
after the substitution belong to the state space spanned by F ’. (Note thatM corresponds to a relation on states, which yields the set of all possible
state transitions [22]). Thus, if Σ denotes the state space spanned by F,
σ ∈ Σ, σ′ ∈ Σ ranges over the state before and the state after the substitution
respectively, and using weakest precondition notation, the author defined M
as follows: M ≜ {(σ,σ′) ∈ Σ ×Σ ∣ ¬[S]¬(σ = σ′)}
The author represented noninterference semantics in terms of read / write
frames by devising a condition whereby the initial values of write-only vari-
ables variables may only influence their own values and those of other write-
only variables, but may not influence the final values of read variables. Writ-
ing MR to denote the meaning relation with respect to the read frame of
program S, and given that σ[S]R denotes the the read frame of S in state
σ, [23]’s noninterference condition could be represented as:∀σ1, σ2 ⋅ σ1 MR σ2 ⇒ σ1[S]R = σ2[S]R
Clearly, from the foregoing, any final value of read variables possible from
any start state is consistent with any other final value from any other start
state. Hence, in this context, the substitution, S, does not read the values
of variables in F − R, and given that writeF−R denotes the least refined
substitution which has F −R as write frame, it follows that writeF−R only
affects variables in the set F −R, i.e., writeF−R does not interfere with R.
Consequently, [23] reasoned that whatever behaviour was possible for S from
a given state, will also be possible if preceded by the execution of writeF−R
[23]. This condition was then formalised as:
S;writeF−R ⊑ writeF−R;S
Assuming the meaning of the substitution writeF−R is ΞR, and writing
readsM(R,M) to denote the condition for not reading outside R, the au-
62
thor summarised his characterisation of this nonintererence condition as:
readsM(R,M) ≜ ΞR;M ⊆M; ΞR
A termination condition describes the notion that the substitution respects
the read frame and captures the condition under which the substitution is
guaranteed to terminate [22]. This is formalised as a constraint on the rela-
tional image of a set T of variables, i.e., the set T is read frame respecting
if it is a cylinder in the state space. Given that (∣T ∣) denotes the relational
image of T , the read frame respecting termination condition, readsT (R,T ),
is formalised as:
readsT (R,T ) ≜ ΞR(∣T ∣) ⊆ T
The author then used the meaning relation along with the termination con-
dition to define three compliance conditions for Noninterference, namely:
subst, writes, and reads. These conditions are defined in terms of the(T ,M) pair ranging over all valid refinements of the substitution, written
as (T ,M) ∈ Do, where Do denotes the set of all valid refinements. The first
condition, subst, ensures the substitution terminates with a read respecting
meaning; writes ensures that the write frame is adhered to; and reads en-
sures that the read frame is respected.
These conditions could be expressed as:
subst(F,R,W,S)(T ,M) ≜ T ⊇ [S]true ∧ M ⊆ ¬[S]¬(σ = σ′) (2.10)
writes(F,R,W,S)(T ,M) ≜M ⊆ ΞF−W (2.11)
reads(F,R,W,S)(T ,M) ≜ ΞR;M ⊆M;ΞR ∧ ΞR(∣T ∣) ⊆ T (2.12)
And the set of all interpretations satisfying the conditions is given as:
S =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(T ,M) ∈ Do
RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
subst(F,R,W,S)(T ,M)∧ writes(F,R,W,S)(T ,M)∧ reads(F,R,W,S)(T ,M)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.13)
Notice these conditions all depend on the (T ,M) pair. Consequently, the
approach in [23] requires that termination is guaranteed. Although this
would suffice for many practical systems, this limitation could be exploited
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by a strong adversary to implicitly leak information through a substitu-
tion’s termination behaviour. For example, consider the substitution below,
where h holds a secret and l is a public variable, and loop is a substitution
that never terminates.S ≜ if h = l then loop else skip end
Clearly this substitution may or may not terminate (i.e., termination is not
guaranteed), hence the first part of the conjunct in subst(F,R,W,S)(T ,M)
is not guaranteed to hold. Consequently, an adversary could deduce due to
this implicit information flow resulting from termination behaviour whether
h = l or not.
Using the notions of read-respecting substitution described in [23], Bicar-
regui illustrated how the problem of badly formed substitutions such as
x ∶= x could be filtered out of possible refinements of boolean substitutions.
Given that x, y ∈ {0,1}, and . . .(F,R,W, S) ≡ ({x, y}, {x}, {y}, y ∶= 0[]y ∶= 1)
The most general (T ,M) satisfying the read-respecting refinement condi-
tions are calculated to be:
Termination set for {x, y}, T = {(0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}
And the meaning relation of S is:
{(0,0)↦ (0,0), (0,0)↦ (0,1), (0,1)↦ (0,1),(0,1)↦ (0,0), (1,0)↦ (1,0), (1,0)↦ (1,1),(1,1)↦ (1,1), (1,1)↦ (1,0)}
Notice that the value of x remains unchanged in all transitions of the system,
hence the read frame constraint for {x} is respected, and other refinements
possible by the classical refinement relation, particularly refinements like
y ∶= x, y ∶= y or y ∶= 1 − y, are not admissible. Our flow-logic based frame-
work discussed in Section 3.6 reveals some interesting parallels between our
work and Bicarregui’s read and write frame based framework [23].
Next up for review is the semantics based information flow security intro-
64
duced by K. Rustan M. Leino and Rajeev Joshi[80], which we here term
‘program equality property ’.
Program Equality Property (PEP)
Joshi and Leino in [80] presented a semantic characterisation of information
flow security in a system operating on public and private variables. Their
framework seeks to ensure that observations of the public variables before
and after execution do not reveal any information about the initial values of
the private variables. Hence they introduced a definition of security based
on program equality (i.e, equality of two program terms with respect to the
set of possible observations of low security observers). In this definition,
HH stands for the program: “assign an arbitrary value to h”, which the
authors termed ‘harvoc on h ’; S denotes a program statement; ≐ stands for
program equality, meaning that the LHS11 and RHS12 of ≐ are equal (with
respect to the set of possible low-security observations of both programs),
provided the program S does not depend on the initial value of h, which is
the variable holding the secret. ‘;’ denotes sequential composition. Using
this notation, a program is defined as secure if Formula 2.14 holds.
S is secure ≜ (HH;S;HH ≐ S;HH) (2.14)
The LHS of Formula 2.14 means that an arbitrary value is assigned to h
before S is executed, and the final value of h is thereafter discarded. The
RHS, on the other hand executes S, and then discards the final value of h
resulting from execution of S by doing ‘harvoc on h’. In both cases, the
observer is unable to deduce the initial value of h by observing the initial
and final values of the low security variables. Note that assigning HH after
execution of S in both cases indicates that only the final value of the low
level variables, not h, is required. This in itself could limit the usability
of the authors’ framework. For example, where a program needs to output
the final value of h, the HH requirement will overwrite such high security
values. However, one major advantage of the authors’ framework is that
it is not tied to any particular program syntax or semantics, hence it can
be used to reason about any programming construct with clearly defined
11LHS - Left Hand Side of an operation
12RHS - Right Hand Side of an operation
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semantics.
The authors used relational semantics to justify Formula 2.14 and to show
how their framework relates to other notions of secure information flow in
the literature. The notation used include σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 to denote program
states; h, k denotes ‘high-security variable’ and ‘low-security variable’ re-
spectively; σ1.h and σ1.k respectively denotes the values of h at σ1 and k at
σ1. A relation R that relates an initial state σ1 to a final state σ′1 is written
as: σ1⟨R⟩σ′1. The identity relation denoted Id is defined for all σ1 and σ2
as: σ1⟨Id⟩σ2 ⇔ σ1 = σ2.
Hence, the relational semantics of HH could be expressed as
∀(σ1, σ2), σ1⟨HH⟩σ2 ≜ σ1.k = σ2.k (2.15)
Formula 2.15 above basically shows that whatever an adversary knows about
the initial value of h at state σ2 (i.e., the final value of h) by observing both
the initial and final values of k (i.e., σ1.k and σ2.k) is no more than what he
knew about h at the initial state σ1. Subsequently, writing (∀j ∶ rj ∶ tj) to
denote ‘for all values of j satisfying the range r.j, the term or (statement)
t.j holds’, and {j ∶ r.j ∶ t.j} to denote ‘the set of all elements of the form
t.j defined on j ranging over r.j’, the following derivation of the definition
of secure information flow was developed in line with existing definitions in
the literature.
S is secure ≜(∀σ1, σ2 ∶ σ1.k = σ2.k ∶ {σ3 ∶ σ1⟨S⟩σ3 ∶ σ3.k} = {σ4 ∶ σ2⟨S⟩σ4 ∶ σ4.k}) (2.16)
This security condition could be read to mean: ‘given that the values of k
in start states σ1 and σ2 are equal, then if the program S executes from σ1
to get to state σ3, it must be the case that there is a state σ4 such that S
executes from state σ2 and gets to state σ4, and the value of k in σ3, (i.e.,
σ3.k), is equal to the value of k in σ4, (i.e., σ4.k). Clearly, this corresponds
to many of the equivalence relations based notions of secrecy in the litera-
ture [111].
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We pre´cis Dijkstra’s weakest precondition (wp) semantics in the preceding
subsection of Section 2.2.2.10. Since Joshi and Leino [80] used both the
notions of weakest precondition semantics and weakest liberal precondition
(wlp) semantics in their work, we present an abridged introduction to wlp
here. The notion of weakest liberal precondition semantics is an extension of
wp by the same author into the realms of partial correctness. Weakest lib-
eral precondition is predicated on the largest set of initial values from which
a program S, if it terminates, is guaranteed to satisfy the postcondition Q.
wlp is commonly formally denoted as wlp(S,Q).
The secure information flow definition could also be presented in Djikstra’s
weakest precondition logic [80]. Writing wp.S.p to mean the ‘weakest pre-
condition’ under which the predicate p holds (i.e wp.S always terminates in
a state that satisfies p), and wlp.S.p to denote the ‘weakest liberal precon-
dition’ under which, if S terminates, the predicate p is satisfied, [80] show
that secure information flow definition on hypothetical programs S1 and S2
could be represented as
S1 ≐ S2 ≡ (∀p ∶∶ [wlp.S1.p ≡ wlp.S2.p] ∧ [wp.S1.true ≡ wp.S2.true]) (2.17)
Now, taking S1 to be the LHS of Formula 2.14, i.e., HH;S;HH, and S2
to be the RHS, i.e., S;HH, the secure information flow definition can be
rewritten by simply substituting for S1 and S2 in Formula 2.17, giving:
HH;S;HH ≐ S;HH ≡(∀p ∶∶ [wlp.(HH;S;HH).p ≡ wlp.(S;HH).p] ∧ [wp.(HH;S;HH).true ≡
wp.(S;HH).true]) (2.18)
Since the program HH assigns an arbitrary value to h, it follows that what-
ever the value of h in S, the predicate p must be satisfied. Hence Formula
2.18 could be simplified by replacing HH with ∀h in all its occurrences,
resulting in the form presented in Formula 2.19 below.
HH;S;HH ≐ S;HH ≡(∀p ∶∶ [ [∀h ∶ wlp.S.[∀h ∶ p] ] ≡ wlp.S.[∀h ∶ p] ]) ∧ [ [∀h ∶ wp.S.true] ≡
wp.S.true] (2.19)
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For simplicity, expressions of the form [ [∀h ∶ q] ≡ q], termed “h-cylinders”
or cylinders, was denoted by Cyl. [ [∀h ∶ q] ≡ q] indicate that q satisfies
Cyl in as much as the value of Cyl does not depend on h. This assertion is
written as q ∈ Cyl. Thus, expressing Formula 2.19 in terms of cylinders the
result becomes:
S is secure ≡ (∀p ∶ p ∈ Cyl ∶ wlp.S.p ∈ Cyl) ∧wp.S.true ∈ Cyl (2.20)
Recall from notation stated earlier that p ∈ Cyl is the range of the quantifi-
cation over p, and wlp.S.p ∈ Cyl is the term of the quantification. To make
Formula 2.20 amenable to automated verification, [80] used the logic notions
of conjunctive 13 and disjunctive 14 spans to reduce the quantified expression
in the first part of the conjunct on the RHS. By so doing, the quantification
over predicates in Formula 2.20 is reduced to a first-order logic characteri-
sation of the program equality definition in terms of cylinders. Taking f to
be a universally conjunctive predicate transformer, X to denote any set of
predicates and A.X the conjunctive span over subsets of X, the following
theorem was formulated by the authors:
(∀p ∶ p ∈X ∶ f.p ∈ Cyl) ≡ (∀q ∶ q ∈ A.X ∶ f.q ∈ Cyl) (2.21)
The need for this rewriting is the intuition that it is easier to deal with pred-
icates in first-order logic than high-order quantifiers. Also, expressing the
predicate as universally conjunctive (or disjunctive) is tantamount to break-
ing a difficult problem into smaller ones that could be solved individually
and then composed to provide a solution to the original problem. Extend-
ing the conjunctive and disjunctive span logic to the simplified case where
the predicate transformer, wp.S, is known to be deterministic, given that
K is the set of all possible values of k, the program equality definition was
transformed to:
S is secure ≡ (∀K, wp.S.(k =K) ∈ Cyl) (2.22)
We will, in Section 3.6, show how our framework relates to Joshi and Leino’s
13Conjunctive span - the set of predicates obtained by taking conjunctions over subsets
of a set of predicates
14Disjunctive spans - the set of predicates obtained by taking disjunctions over subsets
of a set of predicates
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program equality property. In the meantime, we follow with a discussion of
the system model (introduced by [50]) based on the mathematical notion of
lattices.
Lattice Model Approach to Confidentiality (LM)
Denning and Denning [51], [50], building on the work of Bell and LaPadula
[21], introduced a mathematical framework for program certification cen-
tered on a lattice structure derived from the security classes such as described
in [21]. The authors, [51], presented this work as an Information Flow Model ,
FM , formulated in terms of a quintuple of a set of logical storage objects15,
denoted LSO ⊆ {a, b, c . . .}, a set of processes, denoted P ⊆ {p, q, r . . .}, a
set of disjoint security classes, denoted SC ⊆ {A,B,C . . .}, and two binary
operations on SC, namely: the class combining operator , denoted ⊕, and
the flow relation, denoted →.
The class combining operator specifies, for any pair of operand classes, the
resulting class of a function, f , on values of the operand classes. And ⊕ is
both commutative and associative. Given, for example, that a, b, c ∈ LSO
and that a, b, c ∈ SC such that f(a) = a, f(b) = b, and f(c) = c. Then the se-
curity class of the assignment statement d ∶= a+b+c is given as d = (a⊕b)⊕c,
or d = a ⊕ (b ⊕ c). Since SC is intended as a universally bounded lattice16,
the set SC is closed under ⊕. The last component of the tuple, the flow
relation, is a relation between security classes defining the notion that the
left operand flows into the right operand, i.e., →∈ SC × SC. Hence, A → B
means that information stored in a LSO associated with the security class
A flows into LSOs associated with the security class B. For consistency17,→ is transitive, i.e., if A → B and B → C, then both policies imply A → C.
With this brief introduction to the building blocks of the flow model intro-
duced in [51], we present below the flow model:
FM = ⟨LSO,P,SC,⊕,→⟩
15Logical storage objects are logical information receptacles or references to the recep-
tacles, e.g., files, segments, objects, program variables, even users, etc. This is akin to our
notion of entities earlier in this chapter.
16A universally bounded lattice is a structure composed of a partially ordered set, a
greatest lower bound, and a least upper bound.
17Consistency in this context requires that flows implied by a permissible flow should
also be permitted by the flow relation [51].
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The last three components of FM form a universally bounded lattice L ≜⟨SC,→,⊕⟩ partially ordered on →. Thus, ⟨SC,→,⊕⟩ has the following prop-
erties, namely:
à SC is finite;
à ⟨SC,→⟩ is a partially ordered set;
à {∃L ∈ SC ∣ (∀A ∈ SC) L → A} is a lower bound of SC [48]. Dually,
there also exists an upper bound, i.e., {U ∈ SC ∣(∀A ∈ SC) A→ U};
à The least upper bound operator on SC corresponds to the class com-
bining operator, hence ⊕ is also used to denote the least upper bound
of SC. This is because when two or more classes are combined, the
classification of the resulting composition corresponds to the security
class of the component with the least classification.
The authors noted that the lattice structure could be either linear, e.g., the
type commonly used in government: unclassified, confidential, secret, and
top secret, or it could be a composite, nonlinear ordering on a finite set of
properties of interest, or a combination of both. We give a graphical illus-
tration of a linear lattice below.
unclassified Ð→ confidential Ð→ secret Ð→ top secret
Given that fin, med, crm denotes ‘financial’, ‘medical’, and ‘criminal’
records respectively, we illustrate a nonlinear lattice defined on the set of
personnel records, X = {fin,med, crm}, with ∅ and X being the greatest
lower bound, and the least upper bound respectively in Figure 2.8. The au-
thors coined the terms ‘explicit ’ and ‘implicit ’ flows, which we described in
Section 2.2. A static program certification mechanism was then introduced
and compared with run-time or dynamic enforcement mechanisms. The
approach is to incorporate this mechanism into the analysis phase of a com-
piler for a high-level language. The disadvantage of this is that the analysis
may need to be repeated to adapt it to another language. Our approach
to overcome this limitation is to separate the flow analysis phase from the
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Figure 2.8: Non-Linear Lattice
program-specific analysis phase of a compiler, and from the problem of re-
finement, hence there is no need to re-do the analysis to adapt it to another
language. The intuitions behind the certification mechanism are:
i. The security classification of an assignment statement is updated to the
least upper bound, ⊕, of the security classes of the variables flowing
into the assigned variable. For example, given that a, b, c, d ∈ LSO,
a, b, c, d ∈ SC, f(a) = a, f(b) = b, f(c) = c, f(d) = d, and S ≜ d ∶=
a + b ∗ c, d is computed to be d = a ⊕ b ⊕ c. Hence, d is secure if and
only if (a⊕ b⊕ c)→ d.
ii. The security classification of a conditional structure (e.g., an IF. . .
THEN . . . ELSE construct) is calculated to be the greatest lower
bound, ⊗, of the variables in the structure. Thus, given the statement
S ≜ if c = 0 then a ∶= 0 else b ∶= 1 end, the security class of the
statement is computed to be (a⊗ b⊗ c), and it must be the case that
c→ (a⊕ b⊕ c).
Another limitation of the certification mechanism in [51] is that it does not
take account of Nondeterminism, and it is not clear how to guarantee that
valid refinements are secure on removal of Nondeterminism in the implemen-
tation. Further, although the examples provided are useful in helping the
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reader understand the intuition behind the mechanism, no rigorous proofs
of correctness were given. These problems we seek to address later in Sec-
tion 3.4 of this thesis. We present in Table 2.4 a comparison of the static
program certification mechanism in [51], [50], and the dynamic ones in the
literature.
An extension of Denning and Denning’s work to type systems was developed
by by Volpano, Smith and Irvine. This is the next subject of our review.
Type-Based Approach to Confidentiality
Volpano et al in [76], [130] introduced a framework of type inference rules for
making judgements about the flow of information within software systems
developed in a procedural programming language. This work is a formula-
tion of Denning’s lattice-model approach [51] as a type system that can be
regarded as having the Noninterference property, if soundness of the system
is established. The authors developed their typing system based on the gen-
eral intuition behind Noninterference, namely: ‘a high security input can
be modified without affecting the output visible to a low security observer.’
The type system is fundamentally a three-layered system: the first layer
constitute the security levels referred to as the τ types in a partially ordered
set ⟨τ,≤⟩; the second are the expression types called the pi types, and lastly
the phrase types, denoted by ρ. The ≤ ordering is extended to a subtype
relation ⊆ over ρ. Variables that could be read are typed as τ var while
output (or write-only) variables (including variables assigned to), termed
acceptors are typed τ acc. Only variables with security classification less
than or equal to τ are allowed to flow into any variable of type τ var or
τ acc. A command type is of the form τ cmd, and intuitively, only assign-
ments to variables with security classification greater than or equal to τ are
allowed in τ cmd. Thus, the subtype relation is contravariant or antimono-
tonic with respect to command types, i.e., if τ ≤ τ ′, then τ ′ cmd ⊆ τ cmd
[76]. We find this intuition easier to comprehend by means of our contrived
geometric representations in Figure 2.9.
From Figure 2.9 we can see that whenever τ ≤ τ ′, then τ cmd could ‘write
up’ to τ ′ cmd, hence with respect to what could be written, it is clear that




 Updating an object’s class may  Execution of program is
remove the object from the low guaranteed to be secure
security user’s view. This could before hand. Not so with
cause implicit flows. dynamic mechanisms.
 Impractical: many real world  Does not use up system
objects and most users often resources at runtime since
have fixed classification. checks are done before execution.
 Often specified in terms  Can be specified in terms
of low-level hardware of high-level language
instructions structures
 Run-time mechanisms may be  Language implementation
able to trap ‘bad behaviour’ defects e.g., ‘array out of
e.g. ‘exceptions’ in a program. bounds’, ‘division by 0’, etc.
could pose problems.
 Hardware malfunction does  Hardware malfunction during
not impact mechanism, since run-time could make statically
certification is done during certified programs insecure.
program run-time.
 Dynamic mechanisms are tied  Incorporating mechanism into
to the language in which it is the compiler analysis phase
written. ties it only to the language
of the development.
 Adversary may intentionally  Since certification is done
cause security violations to trigger before execution, intentional
implicit information leaks. security violations cannot occur.
Table 2.4: Certification Mechanisms: Static v. Dynamic
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Figure 2.9: Geometry of security class ordering and subtyping
τ cmd, but not vice versa. Hence τ ′ cmd ⊆ τ cmd.
Security typing judgments are made using two finite functions, namely:
identifier typing, denoted γ, which maps identifiers to types of the form
τ, τ var, τ acc; and location typing, written λ, which maps memory loca-
tions to τ types. Thus, the γ judgement γ ⊧ e ∶ τ acc means the phrase
type e is an acceptor with security type τ , and γ ⊧ c ∶ τ cmd means the
phrase type c is a command with security type τ . We could also write the
above statements as γ(e) = τ acc or γ(c) = τ cmd respectively. Location
typing follows a similar convention. The authors [76], [130] defined their
type system on a core imperative language with the following notation and
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syntax.
The variable ` range over memory locations; x range over identifiers; while
n range over integer literals. e (primed, subscripted or plain) stands for
expressions; p is a phrase; c denote commands; letvar denotes the allocation
of a location in memory, with the deallocation shown by specifying the scope
of the location using the keyword in; and similarly, letproc denotes the
allocation and deallocation of a procedure. With this notation, the core
imperative language and type structure is presented below.
(Phrase) p ∶∶= e ∣ c(Expr) e ∶∶= x ∣ n ∣ ` ∣ e + e′ ∣ e − e′ ∣ e = e′ ∣
e < e′ ∣ proc(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c(Comm) c ∶∶= e ∶= e′ ∣ c; c′ ∣ e(e1, e2, e3) ∣ while e do c ∣
if e then c else c′ ∣ letvar x ∶= e in c ∣
letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c′
Thus the three-level type structure employed in the core imperative language
is given below, given that s ranges over security classes.
τ ∶∶= s
pi ∶∶= τ ∣ τ proc(τ1, τ2 var, τ3 acc) ∣ τ cmd
ρ ∶∶= pi ∣ τ var ∣ τ acc
The security typing system allows variable types to be changed or updated
as needed. The notation γ[x ∶ ρ] means the security type of the identifier x
is updated to ρ. Generally, judgements are written in the form
λ;γ ⊧ p ∶ ρ. With the notation given thus far, the authors [130] formulated a
number of security type inference (or judgement) rules, which we reproduce
in appendix B. The authors then introduced two lemmata to capture the
notions of simple security and confinement originally formulated by Bell and
LaPadula [21].
Lemma 1 (Simple Security). If λ;γ ⊧ e ∶ τ , then ∀` ∈ e, λ(`) ≤ τ , and for
every x free in e, γ(x) ≤ τ .
Lemma 2 (Confinement). If λ ⊧ c ∶ τ cmd, µ ⊧ c⇒ µ′, dom(λ) = dom(µ),
and ` is a location assigned to in c, then λ(`) ≥ τ or µ(`) = µ′(`)
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Finally, the authors [130] introduced some principal types designed to doc-
ument all possible types of a program.
Flow-Sensitive Type-Based Approach to Confidentiality
The type-based approach to confidentiality exemplified by [76] is flow insen-
sitive in the sense that the security types of variables remain ‘fixed’ through-
out program execution. Referencing Hankin and the Nielsons [64], Hunt and
Sands in [75] noted that a key difference between flow insensitivity and flow
sensitivity is: given two distinct operations C1,C2, the result of analysing
C1;C2 is the same as C2;C1 in flow insensitive frameworks whereas the re-
sults are different in flow sensitive analysis systems. That is, the order of
execution is not taken into consideration in flow insensitive systems, thus
all sub-programs must be secure for the analysis of the operation to be ad-
judged secure. Using similar intuition, Amtoft and Banerjee in [8] noted the
imprecision of flow-insensitive type systems, showing that: given that l is a
public variable and h a secret variable, such systems adjudge the program
l ∶= h ; l ∶= 0 as insecure, a notion often termed false positive (i.e., judging a
secure program as insecure). In reality, the final value of l does not depend
on the initial value of h although the sub-program l ∶= h is insecure. Clearly,
strict flow-insensitive type systems cannot distinguish between l ∶= h ; l ∶= 0
and l ∶= 0 ; l ∶= h. Flow-sensitive analysis frameworks, on the other hand,
can distinguish between such programs, and will correctly judge the latter
as insecure and the former as secure. Well-known flow-sensitive information
flow analysis frameworks reviewed here include [8], [36], and [75].
Amtoft and Banerjee [8] formalised the notion of information flow in terms
of independence of variables. Given that T denotes a set of traces, [l#h]
denotes that the current value of variable l is independent of the initial
value of the variable h, T# denotes a set of independencies, the logic lan-
guage introduced by [8] was defined on a finite abstraction of a (possibly
infinite) set of independencies with subset inclusion. Intuitively, l is inde-
pendent of h iff, for constant values of l in two sets of traces, any change in
the initial value(s) of h in either trace, does not change the current value
of l. The authors defined a Hoare-type logic of the form {T#} C {T#1 }.
That is, given the precondition T#, and assuming termination of program
C, C satisfies the postcondition T#1 . Given that Ide denotes an infinite
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set of variables, an independence is defined as a set of [l#h] pairs, i.e.,
T# ∈ independ = P(Ide × Ide). The authors write Cmd to denote com-
mands, with alternation and loop conditions termed Context, since the
assignments / updates within such commands can only be made in the con-
text of the control conditions.
A trace t ∈ Trc associates each variable with its initial value and its current
value, i.e., t ∶ Ide → Val × Val. Given two traces t1, t2; and writing x= to
denote that the current values of the variable x are equal in both t1 and t2,
and writing =x to mean that the initial values of all variables other than x
are equal in t1 and t2, it is adjudged that[x#y] ⊧ T ⇔ ∀t1, t2 ∈ T ⋅ t1 =y t2 ⇒ t1 x= t2, x ≠ y and
T# ⊧ T ⇔ ∀[x#y] ∈ T# ⋅ [x#y] ⊧ T
Using trace semantics, where [[C]](T ) denotes the set of traces resulting
from the execution of command C from initial set T (or in the case of ex-
pression E, [[E]](T ) denotes the set of traces resulting from the evaluation
of E, given the initial values of the free variables in E (written FV (E)) ),
[8] assumed the existence of a function [[E]] ∶ Trc→Val which satisfies the
property: ∀x ∈ FV (E) ⋅ t1 x= t2 ⇒ [[E]](t1) = [[E]](t2)
Independencies are then computed using the function
sp ∶ Context × Cmd × Independ→ Independ
Thus given G ∈ Context, C ∈ Cmd, T# ∈ Independ, sp(G,C,T#) yields
a postcondition T#1 such that G ⊢ {T#}C{T#1 } holds and T#1 is the largest
set that makes the judgement hold [8]. That is, T#1 is the largest set such
that if T# ⊧ T then T#1 ⊧ [[C]](T ).
Using the Amtoft-Banerjee flow independence analysis framework, we ex-
tend the example in [8] to illustrate the fact that flow sensitive type systems
distinguish between programs such as l ∶= h; l ∶= 0 and l ∶= 0; l ∶= h, assuming
in both cases that T#0 , the set of initial independencies, is {[l#h], [h#l]}.
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C1 ≜ l ∶= h; l ∶= 0:{ {[l#h], [h#l]} } l ∶= h { {[h#l], [l#l]} } and{ {[h#l], [l#l]} } l ∶= 0 { {[h#l], [l#l], l#h]} }∴{ {[l#h], [h#l]} } l ∶= h; l ∶= 0 { {[h#l], [l#l], [l#h]} } holds.
Writing T#1 for {[h#l], [l#l], [l#h]}, we can see from the results above that
sp(∅,C1, T#0 ) computes T#1 and T#0 ⊆ T#1 , hence l ∶= h; l ∶= 0 is adjudged
secure.
C2 ≜ l ∶= 0; l ∶= h:{ {[l#h], [h#l]} } l ∶= 0 { {[l#h], [h#l], [l#l]} } and{ {[l#h], [h#l], [l#l]} } l ∶= h { {[h#l], [l#l]} }∴{ {[l#h], [h#l]} } l ∶= 0; l ∶= h { {[h#l], [l#l]} } fails.
Writing T#2 for the final postcondition, {[h#l], [l#l]}, we can see from
the results above that sp(∅,C2, T#0 ) computes T#2 and T#0 ⊈ T#2 , hence
l ∶= 0; l ∶= h is adjudged insecure.
For iterative commands [8] employs fixed point computation to compute
sp(G,C,T#), in much the same way as Clark et al in [36].
The flow independence analysis framework introduced by [8] has the ad-
vantage of being able to judge more programs secure than flow-insensitive
type systems such as the one introduced by Volpano et al [76]. Also any
program that is well-typed in a Volpano et al system can also be judged
secure in the Amtoft-Banerjee framework. As acknowledged by the authors,
however, their approach, similar to Clark et al’s though it is, is not termi-
nation sensitive. Thus, it will only work on the assumption the adversary
cannot observe nontermination. This is one key advantage the Clark et al
framework has over the Amtoft-Banerjee system.
Clark et al in [36] introduced a flow-sensitive and termination sensitive in-
formation flow analysis framework for a simple core imperative and Algol-
like language, using a flow logic approach similar to the Hankin-Nielsons
approach in [64]. The syntactic and semantic definitions of the categories
within the core imperative language is also similar to the one pioneered by
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Nielson and Nielson in [115], [114]. For example, the notion of Free Vari-
ables, of an expression E, denoted FV (E) in [36], is akin to that defined in
[115] where it is defined as the set of variables occurring in E, inductively
defined formally as follows, where n denotes a natural number, x is a vari-
able, and E1,E2 are expressions.
FV (n) = ∅
FV (x) = {x}
FV (E1 +E2) = FV (E1) ∪ FV (E2)
FV (E1 −E2) = FV (E1) ∪ FV (E2)
FV (E1 ∗E2) = FV (E1) ∪ FV (E2)
FV (E1/E2) = FV (E1) ∪ FV (E2)
Since confidentiality properties often deal with the relationship between the
initial values of secret variables and the final values of public variables, [36]
used big-step (or natural) semantics in formalising the semantics of their
core imperative language. Thus, for each statement in their language, the
authors specified the relationship between the initial state and the final
state, using the following notation. A program state, i.e., a set functions
mapping each variable to a value, is denoted σ,σ′, σ′′, etc., a statement is
represented as S,S1, S2, . . . , Sn, the notion that a statement execution termi-
nates is denoted by ⇓, and writing ‘void’ after a program terminates indicate
that there is nothing left to be executed after that particular statement ter-
minates. This corresponds to the null or empty statement. Given that v
is an integer value, the notion of variable update, written σ[x↦ v] denotes
that only the variable x is updated in state σ, and x thereafter has the
value v. The value of a variable x in state σ is written as σx. A statement
configuration, written S,σ indicates that the statement S is in state σ. 0, 1
denotes the boolean values False, True respectively. Using a labeled transi-
tion system, where ` range over statement labels, [36] defined the semantics
of their core imperative language as a set of inference rules, as shown below:
skip`, σ ⇓ void, σ
E,σ ⇓ v, σ(x ∶= E)`, σ ⇓ void, σ[x↦ v]
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S1, σ ⇓ void, σ′ S2, σ′ ⇓ void, σ′′(S1;S2)`, σ ⇓ void, σ′′
b, σ ⇓ 1, σ S1, σ ⇓ void, σ′(if b then S1 else S2)`, σ ⇓ void, σ′
b, σ ⇓ 0, σ S2, σ ⇓ void, σ′(if b then S1 else S2)`, σ ⇓ void, σ′
b, σ ⇓ 0, σ(while b do S)`, σ ⇓ void, σ
b, σ ⇓ 1, σ S, σ ⇓ void, σ′ (while b do S)`, σ′ ⇓ void, σ′′(while b do S)`, σ ⇓ void, σ′′
S,σ[x↦ 0] ⇓ void, σ′(new x.S)`, σ ⇓ void, σ′[x↦ σx]
Clark et al [36] defined three functions that were later used in the formulation
of the security conditions for their information flow analysis framework.
Given that Ide and Lab are restricted to the variables and labels appearing
in the statement; X̂ defines the set of variables assigned to; D̂ defines the
set of pairs of variables where the first variable in the pair depends on the
second ; and Ĝ defines the set of variables that may affect the termination
of the statement. The special metavariable ● is used to denote that a loop
has been encounterred, and hence there is the possibility of nontermination.
The authors then denoted a set of variables, possibly containing a variable
that may cause the program to fail to terminate by Ide, i.e., Ide = Ide∪{●}.
The definition of the functions are given below:
X̂ ∈ Assign = Lab→ P(Ide)
D̂ ∈ Dep = Lab→ P(Ide × Ide)
Ĝ ∈ Global = Lab→ P(Ide)
Since the information flow analysis framework in [36] is extended and dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis, we skip the details here, and
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present below the security conditions derived from the work, and an exam-
ple showing how a simple While statement can be analysed down to the
least fixpoint using the framework.
Security Conditions: Given that L,H denote sets of low and high security
variables respectively. On analysis, a program C` is adjudged secure iff
à H ∩ Ĝ(`) = ∅, and
à ∀x ∈ L⋅ /∃ y ∈H ⋅ xD̂(`)y
Fixpoint Analysis Example: Given the labeled program below where
p, f are secret variables whereas q and x are public variables, we present the
fixpoint analysis result using the Clark et al flow-logic framework in
Table 2.5.( while x < 3 do( if (p = q) then( f ∶= 1 )`6
else( f ∶= 2 )`5 )`2 ;( ( x ∶= f + 1 )`4 ;( q ∶= x − 1 )`3 )`1
end )`0
Applying the security conditions given above to the analysis result presented
in Table 2.5, it is clear that the program is not secure with respect to the
given two-point security lattice wherefor variables are partitioned into sets of
high and low security variables H and L respectively. The variables p, f ∈H
are high security variables, and q, x ∈ L are low security variables.
From table 2.5, Ĝ(`0) = {f, p, q, x}
Thus H ∩ Ĝ(`0) ≡ {p, f} ∩ {f, p, q, x} ≠ ∅∴ Flow is insecure (by the first security condition).
Similarly, by the second security condition:
x ∈ L and D̂(`0) ⊇ x↦ f , i.e., xD̂(`0)f . But f ∈H.




Labels X̂ Ĝ D̂ Ĝ D̂ Ĝ D̂
`0 {f, q, x} {x} {f ↦ x, q ↦ x, {f, {f ↦ x, q ↦ x, {f, p, {f ↦ x, q ↦ x,
f ↦ p, f ↦ q, p, f ↦ p, f ↦ q, q, x} f ↦ p, f ↦ q,
q ↦ f, q ↦ p, q, q ↦ f, q ↦ p, q ↦ f, q ↦ p,
x↦ f} x} x↦ f, x↦ p, x↦ f, x↦ p,
x↦ q} x↦ q}
`1 {q, x} ∅ {q ↦ f} {x} {q ↦ f} {f, p, {q ↦ f, q ↦ p,
q, x} q ↦ x}
`2 {f} ∅ {f ↦ p, f ↦ q} {x} {f ↦ p, f ↦ q, {f, p, {f ↦ p, f ↦ q,
f ↦ x} q, x} f ↦ x}
`3 {q} ∅ Id[q ↦ x] {x} {q ↦ x} {f, p {q ↦ x, q ↦ p}
q, x}
`4 {x} ∅ Id[x↦ f] {x} Id {f, p {x↦ p, x↦ q}
q, x}
`5 {f} ∅ Id[f ↦ ∅] {x} {f ↦ p, f ↦ q, {f, p {f ↦ p, f ↦ q,
f ↦ x} q, x} f ↦ x}
`6 {f} ∅ Id[f ↦ ∅] {x} {f ↦ p, f ↦ q, {f, p {f ↦ p, f ↦ q,
f ↦ x} q, x} f ↦ x}
Table 2.5: (Flow) Fixpoint Computation of a simple while construct
Hunt and Sands in [75] introduced a novel dynamic security typing frame-
work whereby the security types of variables are allowed to change (or ‘float ’)
during computation, depending on the security type of information flowing
into them. The authors follow the lattice-based approach introduced by
Denning and Denning [51], and show that a universal type system could be
built by using the universal lattice based on the flow lattice P(Ide), i.e., the
powerset of the variables in the system. Hence they concluded that their
universal type system subsumes other type systems in the literature since
all possible typing in all possible lattices could be derived from one principal
typing in the universal lattice [75]. They then show how their dependence-
based approach could be transformed into the independence-based Amtoft-
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Banerjee framework [8], or flow-insensitive types like Volpano, Smith and
Irvine’s [76].
Assuming Ide denotes a finite set of variables; L denotes a finite security
lattice defined on P(Ide); type environments Γ,Γ′ associate variables to the
security lattice by means of the function Γ,Γ′ ∶ Ide→ L. Given a command
C, and a security type p ∈ L, secure flow judgements have the form
p ⊢L Γ{C}Γ′. Intuitively, Γ records the security levels of variables in scope
before execution of C, while Γ′ records the security levels of those variables
after C terminates, with the constraint that no variable with a security level
lower that p is modified by C.
Hunt and Sands [75] used equivalence relations to define the noninterference
condition that for all t ∈ Γ, and given the derivation Γ{C}Γ′, the final value
of a variable x with type t = Γ′(x) may depend only on those variables y
with initial types Γ(y) ⊑ t. This equivalence relation on stores (with respect
to security type t ∈ Γ), denoted =Γ,t, relates stores which are equal on all
variables having type u ∈ Γ where u ⊑ t. Thus, given that σ, ρ denote stores,
then
σ =Γ,t ρ ⇔ ∀x ⋅ Γ(x) ⊑ t⇒ σ(x) = ρ(x)
This equivalence relation is then used to define one of the requisite condi-
tions for the semantic relation p ⊧L Γ{C}Γ′ to hold. These conditions, the
first of which corresponds to the notion of ‘Assignment Freedom’ in [36] are:
1. ∀σ,σ′, x ⋅ ⟨C,σ⟩ ⇓ σ′ , Γ′(x) /⊒ p⇒ σ′(x) = σ(x)
2. ∀t ∈ L, C ∶ (=Γ,t)⇒ (=Γ′,t).
The authors then introduced an algorithmic variant of their universal type
system, which could be used in iterative fixpoint computation of the least
fixed point of a monotome function on a finite lattice.
To facilitate a comparison of the universal type system with the Amtoft-
Banerjee framework, Hunt and Sands in [75] translated both systems to a
comparable notational system defined as mappings. ∆,∆′ ∶ Ide → P(Ide)
is used to range over type environments only in the universal system, while∇,∇′ ∶ Ide → P(Ide) is used to range over type environments only in the
Amtoft-Banerjee system. Since by set isomorphism the cartesian product of
two sets A,B, i.e., A×B approximates to the pointwise mapping A→ P(B),
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a set of independencies, T# ∈ P(Ide × Ide), in the Amtoft-Banerjee frame-
work can be represented as Ide → P(Ide). Thus an Amtoft-Banerjee sys-
tem C with Context G can, without loss of generality, be translated into
G ⊢ ∇{C}∇′. Using pointwise reverse inclusion, G ⊢ ∇{C}∇′ holds iff∀x ∈ Ide ⋅ ∇(x) ⊇ ∇′(x). Since both the set of independence relations and
the set of dependence relations between variables in Ide partition the vari-
able space, clearly, for each ∆, there is a corresponding ∇ such that ∇(x) is
the complement of ∆(x) and vice versa. Thus, [75] concluded that their uni-
versal flow type system is a DeMorgan dual of the Amtoft-Banerjee system.






Figure 2.10: De Morgan Dual: Dependence and Independence Analysis
introduced by Hunt and Sands has all the advantages of the Amtoft-Banerjee
framework. In addition, because it is based on dependence relations between
variables rather than independence (as in the Amtoft-Banerjee framework),
it admits a simpler and more straightforward correctness proof than the lat-
ter, wherein non standard trace semantics was employed [75]. However, like
many other type systems in the literature, [75] has the limitation of only
dealing with a simple imperative ‘While’ language, with no consideration
for nondeterministic commands, for example. In fact, a direction for further
development identified by Hunt and Sands [75] in conclusion of their work is
to extend the framework to cover a richer language with methods, pointers,
interprocedural variable independencies, et cetera. Hence, the system is lim-
ited with respect to application to real world specification / programming
languages.
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We conclude our discussion of security properties in the literature with a
summary of the limitations of existing possibilistic security properties in
Section 2.2.3 below.
2.2.3 Limitations of Existing Confidentiality Properties
In this section we summarise the limitations of existing confidentiality prop-
erties, some of which we have discussed under the respective properties. We
also show the motivation for our approach to solving the problem of the
preservation of security properties from specification through to implemen-
tation. These limitations include:
à Property not preserved through step-wise refinement to implementa-
tion. Some of the security properties that suffer from this limitation
are GNI, WNI, Restrictiveness, ND.
à Property not compositional . This limitation affects NI, GNI, WNI,
P BNDC, S BNDC.
à Property applies only to deterministic non-interruptible systems. The
security properties that manifest this limitation include NI and Read-
Write frame based NI.
à Property offers no guarantee of absence of information flow . Exam-
ples of properties with this limitation include Separability and Restric-
tivenes.
à Property based on impractical assumptions (e.g., no feedbacks), hence
has limited usability . Examples include NI, GNI.
à Property provides no clear indication of how information flow is to be
prevented . This weakness is found in the formulation of such properties
as NI, Nondeducibility, Separability.
à Property permits intuitively insecure systems. Example is ND
à Property unnecessarily restrictive (e.g., by preventing flow from low
security objects to high security objects), hence less usable. Examples
are SNI, ND, RES, SEP.
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Clearly, many existing security properties are plagued with many limita-
tions. In addition, the abundance of different formalisms, often using dif-
ferent notations and frameworks makes it even more difficult to lift these
theoretical work into the realms of implementation in industry. Although
the authors in [97], [84] and [6] introduced general frameworks that attempt
to capture all possibilistic security properties in one framework, these works
for the most part offer theoretical comparisons through their frameworks,
rather than a clear direction on a practical application in industry. Conse-
quently, we aim to bridge this gap by using a language-based framework that
is simple enough to be readily employed in industry, yet powerful enough to
characterise the intuitive ‘semantics’ of confidentiality properties, without
the luggage of limitations hanging around existing frameworks. The intu-
itive notions of security we desire are summed up in the following statements:
à A high security object must not write to any object that could be read
by a low security object;
à The activity, or lack thereof, of a high security object must not cause
any effect on low security objects’ possible future views of the system.
à A low security object must not be able to read any object to which a
high security object writes.
à A low security object must not be able to learn anything about high
security activity through covert means such as termination behaviour,
timing, resource usage, etc.
Before proceeding to present the solution we propose, however, we will in
the following section discuss the meaning of programs, specifications and
refinements that we adopt in this work. We also discuss therein the infamous
Refinement Paradox.
2.3 Programs, Specifications and Refinements
The terms ‘programs’, ‘specifications’, and ‘refinement ’ have been used to
mean different things in Computer Science. To avoid any ambiguity, we give




As pointed out by Morgan in [107], the term ‘program’ traditionally denotes
a collection of instructions (code) to a computer, written in some precisely
defined syntax (form) and semantics (meaning) constituting the language,
e.g., Java, C++, Haskell, etc. In this view, programs are written for the
computer to interpret and use; hence they could be difficult for the human
mind to grasp. In this meaning of program, the program text itself (e.g. the
java statement: ‘System.out.print(“Hello World!”);’ does not qualify as a
program; it becomes a program when it executes such that it transforms the
system from one state to another. This notion of program could be depicted
as shown in Figure 2.11.
Program ExecutionInput State Output State
Space
Figure 2.11: Semantics of a program (Imperative view)
Intuitively, in the view depicted in Figure 2.11, a program can be described
as a contract between the programmer and the computer, which requires
the computer to move the system from one state to another, provided the
programmer provides the computer with the necessary environment and
preconditions. However, a program could also be viewed as a specification
of the requirements of the said contract between the computer on the one
hand and the programmer on the other, or between the programmer on
the one hand and the client on the other. In this meaning a program is
concrete, where it formulates a contract between the programmer and the
computer, and abstract, where it formulates a contract between the client
and the programmer. We expand further on this in the following section.
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2.3.2 Specifications
In its simplest form, a specification could be viewed as a contract between a
client and a programmer stipulating what is required of the programmer to
fulfil the contract, as well as the client’s obligations. For example, the client
guarantees that the user inputs satisfy the preconditions of the specifica-
tion (e.g. ensuring that inputs are non-negative) whereas the programmer
ensures that the postconditions are satisfied on output, given the correct
inputs (e.g., the outputs are the square roots of the inputs) [31]. The client
may even be the system analyst, designer, or another programmer.
The view taken by Morris in [110] is that a specification is a program, which
may or may not be implementable, but have “constructs and notions that
admit ease of expression”. In this viewpoint, when a specification is not
implementable, it is regarded as an abstract program, whereas when it is im-
plementable, it is regarded as a concrete program, or simply, program [107].
An abstract program merely stipulates what the program is to do, whereas
a concrete program specifies how a program is to do what is expected of
it. Generally, a system specification begins as an abstract statement of the
terms of the said “contract”, which is then refined in successive steps until
a more efficient and concrete program is developed. This process is termed
the “refinement process” or “step-wise refinement”.
Another view of specification presented, this time, by Hehner in [72] is that
a specification is the expression of computer behaviour as a Boolean ex-
pression whose variables represent quantities of interest such as initial state
and final (or next) state. These boolean expressions are then expected to
satisfy required properties of interest. (It is worth noting that formalising
computer behaviour as a Boolean expression with respect to properties of
interest makes it possible to formally derive proof obligations on correctness
of the program). In this viewpoint, a specification is said to be satisfiable or
feasible (or correct) if it is possible for the Boolean expression to evaluate
to true (i.e., there exists at least one final or next state resulting from some
initial state); otherwise, the specification is unsatisfiable or infeasible. Gen-
erally, a specification is said to be deterministic, if there is only one possible
solution satisfying it. Hence the solution of a deterministic specification is
a function of the initial state from which it is derived. On the other hand,
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where a specification is satisfied by more than one possible solution, it is
considered nondeterministic. In this case, the solution is not a function of
the input state. For example, the toss of a fair coin may yield ‘head’ on one
occasion and ‘tail’ on another; so the result (head or tail ) is not a function
of the toss of the coin since a toss of a fair coin maps to two possible values.
In this thesis we adopt Morris’ [110] view that specifications are abstract
programs, with the understanding based on Hehner’s conception in [72] that
where such programs are deterministic, they could be viewed as functions
mapping a set of possible initial states to a set of possible final states. More
details of our view of refinements are discussed in the following section.
2.3.3 Refinements
The refinement process involves the application of design decisions to an
abstract program (or specification) in ‘successive steps’ until the abstract
program is transformed into a more efficient and implementable concrete
program, i.e., a program that is ‘at least as good as’ the original abstract
program. Thus whatever transformation is made by the concrete program
can also be made by the abstract one. Given that Σ denotes the set of all
states in a program, S; σ ∈ Σ ranges over before states while σ′ ∈ Σ ranges
over after states. We write σ
s→ σ′ to mean that the state of the program S
is changed from σ to σ′ on execution of S. We define the behaviour of S,
denoted JSK, as a set of before/after pairs that capture all possible transi-
tions of S from all possible start states to some final states, i.e.:JSK ≜ {(σ,σ′) ∣ (σ ∈ Σ ∧ σ′ ∈ Σ) σ s→ σ′}
Writing (σ1, σ′1) ≡ (σ2, σ′2) to mean that σ1 = σ2 ∧ σ′1 = σ′2, we write Q to
denote the property that:∀(σ2, σ′2) ∈ JS2K, ∃(σ1, σ′1) ∈ JS1K ⋅ (σ1, σ′1) ≡ (σ2, σ′2).
And let ⊑ denote ‘is refined by’, meaning in S1 ⊑ S2 that program S1 is
refined by program S2. Note that Q basically stipulates that any behaviour
manifest by S2 must be a possible behaviour of S1. We write P ⊢ Q to
denote that ‘the property Q follows logically from the property P ’ [92], [68].
Given that pre[S1] means the precondition that must be satisfied for S1 to
be executed; pre[S2] for S2. With this notation, the refinement relation can
89
be formalised as shown in Formula 2.23 below.
S1 ⊑ S2 ⇔ pre[S2] ⊢ Q (2.23)
An alternative formal representation of the refinement relation is given in
Formula 2.24 below.
S1 ⊑ S2 ≜ JS2K ⊆ JS1K (2.24)
Notice that the notion of refinement presented in Formula 2.23 means “for
S2 to be a refinement of S1, all states reachable by S2 must also be reachable
by S1, and all behaviours displayed by S2 must also be possible behaviours
of S1”, i.e., the property Q holds. Hence the set of behaviours of S2 can
be formulated as a subset of the set of behaviours of S1 with respect to
the property of interest as shown in Formula 2.24. From the foregoing we
can see that the traditional notion of refinement entails preservation of total
correctness18 [54].
We say a refinement relation R is defined for programs S1 and S2 if for
all behaviours (σ2, σ′2) ∈ JS2K, there exists some (σ1, σ′1) ∈ JS1K such that
σ1, σ
′
1 ≡ σ2, σ′2. Thus we write S1RS2, or (S1, S2) ∈ R to mean that S1 and
S2 are related by the refinement relation R whereby S1 is refined by S2.
Another way of expressing the same idea is that S2 simulates S1. Writing
S1 ⋅σ1 to denote that S1 is in state σ1, (and similar notations for S2’s states)
we illustrate the refinement semantics in Figure 2.12.
A specification is expected to be logically consistent, e.g., where the spec-
ification consists of predicates over some universe (or set of states), it is
impossible to derive both some proposition and its negation (i.e., a contra-
diction) from the union of all its refinements. With respect to many security
properties, however, this is not always the case as we will show later on in
Section 2.3.5.
18Total Correctness - two programs are considered equivalent under total correctness if
both are guaranteed to terminate, producing the same sets of results, when executed from
the same set of initial states.
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Figure 2.12: Semantics of Refinement S1RS2
2.3.4 Weakest Precondition Logic (wp)
The weakest precondition (wp) predicate transformer introduced by Dijk-
stra [53] in the mid-1970s is imbued with the semantics of total correctness
[54], which formalises only outcomes that a program guarantees would be
realised, or would not abort. We use the notation wp(S1,Q)19 to denote the
predicate that defines the largest set of initial states from which the program
S1 is guaranteed to establish the postcondition Q. An abort substitution - a
substitution that terminates abnormally and usually suddenly without fin-
ishing naturally, written wp(abort,Q) = False, is a substitution in a state
outside the weakest precondition for the program of interest. Formally, a
program S2 is a refinement of another program S1 if and only if the post-
condition Q is guaranteed to be established under the given precondition.
wp logic on refinement can be formalised as shown in Formula 2.25.
S1 ⊑ S2 ≜ ∀Q ⋅wp(S1,Q)⇒ wp(S2,Q) (2.25)
19An alternative notation for the weakest precondition for a program S1 to establish
the postcondition Q is written as [S1]Q.
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We illustrate wp logic on a typical substitution S in figure 2.13, where σ












Figure 2.13: Graphical Illustration of wp Semantics
that there may be other valid preconditions outside the weakest precondi-
tion that satisfy program S, but do not yield the postcondition Q, e.g. σ1
in Figure 2.14. A call, for example, to operation abort after S has started to
execute may or may not yield the postcondition Q although the precondition
for S may be satisfied. Thus, to avoid such unpredictability, wp semantics
require that all programs terminate, and so it corresponds to total correct-
ness [113], [20].
However, because wp can only be used to transform predicates for terminat-
ing programs, Dijkstra introduced another predicate transformer, weakest
liberal precondition (wlp), that can deal with partial correctness semantics,
although this never caught on like wp. Whereas wp requires that all pro-
grams terminate and establish the postcondition, wlp only requires that all
terminating programs establish the postcondition, thereby allowing the pos-
sibility of some programs not terminating [53], [54], [107]. Hence, under
wlp, a program S2 is a refinement of another program S1 if and only if the
postcondition Q is established under the given precondition whenever S2
terminates, i.e.,
S1 ⊑ S2 ≜ ∀Q ⋅wlp(S1,Q)⇒ wlp(S2,Q) (2.26)
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We illustrate wlp logic on a typical substitution S in Figure 2.14, where we
use Ts to denote Termination set, and Q∧Ts captures the set of terminating
programs that establish the postcondition Q. Notice here that σ1 satisfies








Initial States Final States
wlp(S, Q) Q ∧ Ts
σ′4
Figure 2.14: Graphical Illustration of wlp Semantics
Dunne et al in [54] combined wp and wlp semantics to produce what they
termed General Correctness semantics. For consistency, we use the conven-
tional notations of wp and wlp, employed earlier in this section, to represent
the notion of General Correctness, where GC(S1) denotes general correct-
ness with respect to S1:
GC(S1) ≜ wp(S1, true) ∧ wlp(S1,Q) (2.27)
Having discussed the notion of refinement in terms of set containment, re-
lational semantics and weakest (liberal) preconditions, we now turn our
attention to the problem of confidentiality refinement paradox in Section
2.3.5.
2.3.5 Semantics of Classical Refinement
We mentioned in Section 2.3.3 that the refinement process is concerned
with improving on an abstract program, in successive steps until an imple-
mentable one is realised. Generally, refinement could be either algorithmic
refinement in which case a state transformation may not be involved; or data
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refinement where state variables are transformed [123]. Whichever type of
refinement is considered, though, a refinement in its ‘classical semantics20’ is
considered valid if either of two actions (or, trivially, no action as in S1 ⊑ S1)
is performed on an abstract program, namely:
à Reduction or removal of nondeterminism, for example, a nondetermin-
istic program P > Q could be refined by the (less) nondeterministic
program ‘CHOICE P ∶= Q + 1 OR P ∶= Q + 2 END’ or with the
deterministic program BEGIN P ∶= Q + 1 END;
à Weakening of precondition, for example by reducing the assumptions
and / or constraints necessary for the program to run. It should be
noted that weakening the precondition in a specification favours the
client, as he gets more usability from the system, whereas weakening
the postcondition makes the programmer’s job lighter. For example,
given that PRE stands for ‘precondition’, the precondition
PRE n > 10 END could be weakened to PRE n ≠ 0 END.
In this thesis, we will be considering refinement as a reduction of nonde-
terminism (or Underspecification in B terminology). Thus in Subsection
2.3.5.1, we discuss in more detail the notion of refinement as a reduction of
Nondeterminism.
2.3.5.1 Reduction of Nondeterminism
The primary concern of an abstract program is to capture the client’s re-
quirements, usually in a framework understandable and verifiable by the
client, as documented by the requirements analysis phase of the software
development process. Thus, as pointed out in Section 2.3.2, this develop-
ment stage is concerned with the ‘what ’ rather than the ‘how ’ of the pro-
gram. Consequently, design and implementation issues are not dealt with,
but rather what the program is required to do is formalised at this stage.
It makes good sense therefore to allow a measure of non-determinism by
formalising only the potential behaviours of the system (underspecification)
at this stage, leaving design and implementation concerns until later. This
allows the implementer the freedom to choose among multiple possible im-
20Classical refinement semantics - conservative extension of refinement.
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plementations.
Since an abstract program is not implementable, and on its own cannot fulfil
the client’s requirements, to fulfil the client’s requirements the developer has
to refine the abstract program systematically until an ‘at least as good as’
and implementable version is realised. So during this stepwise refinement
stage, the question of how the program is to achieve the client’s objectives;
its interaction with hardware and its environment; fault-tolerance, secu-
rity, etc are considered. In addition, the designer now has to make choices
between possible implementations allowed by the abstract program until
he gets a program that is deterministic (usually, but not always), imple-
mentable, and hopefully satisfies the requirements. Semantically, therefore,
the concrete program can be viewed as a subset of the abstract program
in the sense that whatever behaviour is allowed by the concrete program
is necessarily allowed by the abstract program. Below is an example of a
valid refinement by the semantics discussed here, assuming SA denotes a
Nondeterministic generalised substitution (or assignment statement) at the
abstract level; SC denotes a deterministic substitution at implementation;[] denotes ‘Nondeterministic choice’; and j, k are simply variables.
(SA ≜ j ∶= k + 3 [] j ∶= k + 7) ⊑ SC ≜ j ∶= k + 7 (2.28)
Note, though, that certain interactive systems may require the preservation
of Nondeterminism down to implementation, by providing multiple solutions
from which one could be either chosen nondeterministically or in response to
the environment. Haugen and Stølen [65] distinguished between this form
of nondeterminism, which they termed Explicit Nondeterminism because
it captures mandatory behaviour, and Underspecification, which only for-
malises potential behaviour. On explicit Nondeterminism, the authors gave
the example of a lottery system where each lottery ticket has the possibility
of winning some prize, hence every behaviour manifested by the different
tickets must be implemented for the system to be fair.
2.3.5.2 Confidentiality Refinement Paradox
In the process of refinement it is important that properties of interest such
as correctness, safety, etc, be preserved by the new and “better” versions of
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the system as one moves down the refinement tree towards an implementable
program. With security properties, though, it is well known that they are
generally not preserved through refinement. One key reason for this is that
when an abstract specification allows nondeterminism by underspecification
it may satisfy certain security properties like GNI, WNI, etc, but when the
potential behaviours are refined away to get a deterministic implementation,
the implementation tends to fail the corresponding deterministic security
property such as NI. This situation whereby a system specification that on
implementation loses a security property that it satisfies at the abstract level
is termed confidentiality refinement paradox . We highlight this problem by
a simple example, namely:
Consider an abstract specification intended to arbitrarily select
a number from the set of natural numbers, and assign this to
a variable h, and we desire the number thus assigned to h to
remain a secret.
Given that n ranges over the set of natural numbers N, in the specification,
SA, we then formulate SA as:
SA ≜ PRE n ∈ N THEN h ∶= n END (2.29)
Notice in Substitution 2.29 above that it is impossible to deduce the value
stored in h by the program because of the nondeterminism arising from the
assignment of an arbitrary number, n, which range over a large set, in this
case, the set of natural numbers. By the semantics of classical refinement,
however, since 7 ∈ N, a valid refinement of Substitution 2.29 is:
SC ≜ BEGIN h ∶= 7 END (2.30)
Clearly,
SA ⊑ SC , since J(h ∶= 7)K ⊆ J(PRE n ∈ N THEN h ∶= n END)K (2.31)
Notice that unlike the abstract specification in Substitution 2.29, the con-
crete refinement given in Substitution 2.30 is no longer secure, because the
value assigned to h can be learned by an adversary that has access to the
program text. This is one example illustrating that confidentiality proper-
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ties is generally not preserved through refinement.
We will in Section 2.4 present an example using a formal specification lan-
guage, The B Method, to show that even the precision of formalism does
not in itself guarantee the preservation of confidentiality properties. In the
following section, however, we present a summary of the limitations of the
traditional refinement semantics.
2.3.5.3 Limitations of the Classical Refinement Relation
Semantics
We summarise below the limitations, with respect to security properties, of
the classical refinement relation:
à The classical refinement relation was formalised mainly with the preser-
vation of functional program properties based on linear temporal logic
in mind, with little consideration for security properties, which are
properties of multiple runs or traces of the system [6], [97];
à It is virtually impossible to capture security properties and preserve
them through refinement to implementation using the classical refine-
ment relation alone;
à Classical refinement relation assumes total correctness thereby factor-
ing out the possibility of non-termination. Thus one cannot prevent
covert flows due to termination behaviour while using the classical
refinement relation alone;
à It is difficult to formalise dynamic/interactive behaviour using tradi-
tional refinement mechanisms such that changes in security classifi-
cation of variables could be correctly propagated from specification
through to implementation, because interactivity may introduce ad-
ditional visibility between variables that may leak secure information
while not breaching the classical refinement relation.
In view of these limitations, clearly there is a need to ‘do something ’ to
empower developers to be able to securely refine software systems. A few
researchers like Mantel [99], Alur et al [6], Ju¨rjens [82], Seehusen and Stølen
[129], and Carroll Morgan [108], [109] have proposed some extensions to the
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classical refinement relation. These proposals are discussed in the following
section.
2.3.5.4 Existing Confidentiality-Preserving Refinement Frameworks
Mantel’s Refinement Operators for PSP.
Mantel in [99] introduced a couple of refinement operators for Perfect Se-
curity Property, PSP. This is one of the major works that we know on
Confidentiality-preserving refinement frameworks. Recall that the author
gave two unwinding conditions (see Formulae 2.6 and 2.7 in Section 2.2.2.8),
satisfaction of which is sufficient proof that the refinement also satisfies PSP.
Thus the aim of the refinement operators introduced in [99] is to constrain
state-event systems such that only refinements that satisfy these unwind-
ing conditions are considered to be valid. The two refinement operators
introduced in this work [99] are refine and refine. Given that Σ,E,SES
denotes set of states, set of events, and state-event systems respectively, each
of these refinement operators take three parameters, namely:
à The system to be refined formalised as a SES;
à A set of state-event pairs, DS ⊆ Σ × E, some of which would be
disabled during refinement; and
à The unwinding relation ≈L ⊆ Σ ×Σ
While refine disables some, possibly not all, of the state-event pairs in DS,
refine disables all state-event pairs in DS, possibly along with some pairs
external to DS.
To disable either high-level or low-level state-event pairs, the functions
Hdisable, Ldisable, and Ldisable are used in constructing the refinement
relations introduced by the author. Given that TR ⊆ Σ ×E ×Σ denotes the
set of transitions of a state event system from one state to another as a result
of the execution of an event or events; DSH ⊆ Σ×H denotes the set of high
level state-event pairs (Σ×H); DSL ⊆ Σ×L denotes the set of low level state-
event pairs (Σ ×L); the new transition relation on the state-event systems,
denoted disable and disable are functions constructed from three parame-
ters TR,DS, and ≈L. Writing Hdisable(TR,DSH) the author defines the set
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of transitions TR with DSH disabled. Mantel’s notion of secure refinement
relation is built on the functions, Hdisable, Ldisable, Ldisable, disable and
disable, formally defined as follows:
Function 1 (Hdisable). disables all high level state-event pairs in all system
transitions, as shown formally below
Hdisable(TR,DSH) = {(σ1, e, σ2) ∈ TR ∣ (σ1, e) ∉DSH}
Function 2 (Ldisable). For all states {σ′∣(σ′, l) ∈ DSL}, disabling l in σ′
requires that l be disabled also in all low-equivalent states, i.e., all states{σ ∣ σ ≈L σ′}. This notion captured by Ldisable is depicted formally below.
Ldisable(TR,DSL,≈L) = {(σ1, e, σ2) ∈ TR ∣ (σ1, e) ∉DSL ∧¬∃(σ′1, σ′2) ∈ S ⋅(σ1 ≈L σ′1 ∧ (σ′1, e, σ′2) ∈ TR ∧ (σ′1, e) ∈DSL)}
Function 3 (Ldisable). For all states σ′ ∣ σ′ ≈L σ, a low level event l
may only be disabled if (σ, l) ∈ DSL and (σ′, l) ∈ DSL. The equation below
formally captures this notion.
Ldisable(TR,DSL,≈L) = {(σ′1, e, σ′2) ∈ TR ∣ (σ′1, e) ∈DSL ⇒∃σ1, σ2 ∈ S ⋅(σ1 ≈L σ′1 ∧ (σ1, e, σ2) ∈ TR ∧ (σ1, e) ∉DSL)}
Function 4 (disable). This function is basically a conjunction of both Hdisable
and Ldisable as shown in the following formula.
disable(TR,DS,≈L) = Hdisable(TR,DSH) ∩ Ldisable(TR,DSL,≈L)
Function 5 (disable). Similarly, this function is a conjunction of both
Hdisable and Ldisable as shown in the equation below
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disable(TR,DS,≈L) = Hdisable(TR,DSH) ∩ Ldisable(TR,DSL,≈L)
Using the functions given above, [99] proposed the two refinement relations
given in equations(2.32 and 2.33) below.
refine(SES,DS,≈L) = (Σ,ΣI ,E, I,O, disable(TR,DS,≈L)) (2.32)
refine(SES,DS,≈L) = (Σ,ΣI ,E, I,O, disable(TR,DS,≈L)) (2.33)
Notice the correlation between these definitions and the configuration given
in Section 2.2.2.8.
Ju¨rjens’ Secrecy-Preserving Refinement
Jan Ju¨rjens in [82] presents work towards a framework for stepwise devel-
opment of secure systems using a notion of secrecy to be preserved by tra-
ditional refinement operators. The author pointed out that because many
proposed security properties in the literature are properties of sets of traces,
rather than properties of traces, these properties are often not preserved
under refinement. Subsequently, [82] argued that developing secure systems
for such properties in a stepwise manner requires to redo security proofs at
each refinement step. Thus, verifying such properties at specification level
may not necessarily guarantee that the property will be satisfied at the im-
plementation level.
The author made a distinction between the two types of Nondeterminism,
namely: Underspecification, whereby details may be left out in early phases
of system development, and Unpredictability, which is a vital part of the
functionality of a system, and is used for security, e.g., selection of keys
or passwords. Since providing security through underspecification is akin
to providing security by obscurity, [82], nondeterministic choice of func-
tional importance is recommended for specifications that require security-
preserving refinement, rather than the conventional nondeterministic choice
operator, which does not distinguish between underspecification and unpre-
dictability. A similar point was made by Morgan in [108], [109].
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The secrecy property considered in [82] relies on the notion that a process
specification preserves the secrecy of a piece of data d if the process never
sends out any information from which d could be derived, even in interaction
with an adversary. As acknowledged by the author, this is a less fine-grained
notion of secrecy property as those based on equivalence relations, and hence
may not prevent implicit flows.
The author modeled secrecy on communicating processes interacting by
transferring sequences of data values over unidirectional FIFO communi-
cating channels. Processes are viewed as collections of programs that com-
municate synchronously (in rounds) through channels, with the constraint
that for each of its output channels c the process contains exactly one pro-
gram pc that outputs on c. The intuition captured is a description of a value
to be output on the channel c in the n + 1th round, computed from values
on channels in the nth round [82]. Given that I ⊆ Channels is a set of
input channels, O ⊆ Channels is a set of output channels, L ⊆ Channels
is a set of local channels used to store local state between execution rounds,
and c ∈ O ∪ L is an output on channel c, a process is defined as a tuple
P = (I,O,L, (pc)c∈O∪L).
A stream processing function f ∶ StreamI → P(StreamO) is defined as a
mapping from streams to sets of streams. And given that i = 1,2, O1∩O2 = ∅,
I = (I1 ∪ I2)/(O1 ∪O2), and O = (O1 ∪O2)/(I1 ∪ I2), the composition of two
stream-processing functions fi ∶ StreamIi → P(StreamOi) is defined as
f1 ⊗ f2 ∶ StreamI → P(StreamO)
Since the binary composition operator ⊗ is both associative and commuta-
tive, [82] defined a generalised composition operator⊗i∈I fi over a set {fi ∶ i ∈
I} of stream-processing functions. A process P = (I,O,L, (pc)c∈O) is then
modeled by a stream-processing function [[P ]] ∶ StreamI → P(StreamO)
from input streams to sets of output streams. The author’s notion of secrecy
is then defined in terms of stream-processing functions as follows.
Given that IP ,OP are sets of input and output channels respectively of the
process P ; IA,OA are similarly sets of input and output channels of process
A. SA ⊆ Secret,KA ⊆ Keys are, with respect to process A, sets of secrets
and keys respectively, and [[A]]r denotes the composite stream function of
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A. A process P is adjudged to leak a secret m ∈ Secret∪Keys if there is a
process A with IA ⊆ OP , IP ⊆ OA and m /∈ SA ∪KA such that [[P ]]⊗ [[A]]r
may eventually output m. Otherwise, P preserves the secrecy of m. Notice
that the input to the adversarial process A, IA, is a subset of the output
of P , and the output of A, OA, is fed into the input of P , IP . That is, P
preserves the secrecy of m if no adversary can find out m in interaction with
P . The author then defined their refinement property, where ↝ denotes “is
refined by”, as follows.
For processes P and P ′ with Ip = Ip′ and Op = Op′ ,
P ↝ P ′ if for each s ∈ StreamIP , [[P ]](s) ⊇ [[P ′]](s).
This refinement property is adjudged secure under the following conditions
- P ′ preserves the secrecy of m iff P preserves the secrecy of m and
P ↝ P ′.
- For any C ⊆ StreamOP × StreamIP , P ′ preserves the secrecy
of m assuming C iff P preserves the secrecy of m assuming C.
Inferable Properties Based Secrecy Refinement (IBS)
Alur et al in [6] proposed a formal and general simulation-based proof tech-
nique for refinement that also takes into account the notion of secrecy as
one of the properties of interest to be preserved in a software system. The
attacker model employed is that the observer knows the specification of the
system but can only see a subset of the traces of the system from which
he may be able to make inferences about secrecy properties. Using a stan-
dard labeled transition system, the authors formalised their notion of secrecy
based on three parameters, namely: an equivalence relation (used to capture
what observers could discern about the system) on runs of the system; the
properties to be kept secret; and the set of all runs of interest.
Intuitively, an implementation is a secure refinement of a specification if for
every run r of the implementation, there is a run r′ of the specification such
that the observer cannot distinguish r′ from r, and for every property that
the observer can deduce from r in the implementation, it is the case that
such properties are also deducible from the run r′ of the specification. The
authors strengthened the refinement notion of trace inclusion, whereby a
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program P is said to be refined by a program Q if and only if [[Q]] ⊆ [[P ]],
or P simulates Q. They in effect discard some behaviours that satisfy the
classical refinement relation but does not satisfy their framework. Their
secure refinement framework is akin to the notion of bisimulation in the lit-
erature because it is reflective. That is, for Q to be a secure refinement of P ,
it must be the case that both programs are bisimilar in the sense that: for Q
to refine P , P must simulate 21 Q; and for the refinement to be secure, the
simulation must be reversible, i.e., Q, (the refinement) must also simulate P
(the original specification). It should be noted, though, that this backward
simulation is not in itself sufficient to guarantee secure refinement. The
authors suggest instead that the behaviours of the implementation must be
a subset of the behaviours of the original specification, while at the same
time the specification must simulate the implementation.
Given that Q denotes a set of states; I ⊆ Q denotes a set of initial states; L
a set of labels; and δ ⊆ Q×L×Q is a transition relation on the set of states.
A labeled transition system (LTS), T , is defined as a tuple (Q,L, δ, I). A
run r = q0l0q1 is a sequence of alternating states and labels where q0 ∈ I and∀i 0 ≤ i < ∣r∣⇒ (qi, li, qi+1) ∈ δ, and R(T ) denotes the set of all runs of the
LTS T . A property α ⊆ R(T ) is a state property if and only if it, i.e. α,
depends only on the last state of a run. Using a tripartite domain {⊺,,m}
corresponding to True, False, maybe respectively, the property models the
observer’s knowledge of the system as an equivalence relation on the set of
runs, and the property α is not secret if the observer can conclude that α
holds or not. However, whenever the observer is unable to conclude whether
α holds or not, then the the property is considered secret. Thus using the
equivalence relation ≡ ⊆ R(T )×R(T ) to denote the observer’s knowledge of
the property α after run r, the authors defined a function termed Inferable
Properties, IP , as follows:
IP (r,α,≡) = ⊺ ⇔ ∀r′ ∶ r′ ≡ r⇒ r′ ∈ α
IP (r,α,≡) =  ⇔ ∀r′ ∶ r′ ≡ r⇒ r′ /∈ α
21P simulates Q means that whatever behaviour exhibited by Q must be a possible
behaviour of P , i.e., it must be possible for P to ‘do anything that Q can do’.
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Otherwise, IP (r,α,≡) =m
The first two cases indicate the observer is able to learn something about
α after the run r, whereas the third case shows the observer is unable to
learn anything about the property α after the run r, hence it is only in this
instance that the system can be adjudged secure with respect to the prop-
erty of interest. To apply this framework to Noninterference, the authors
first formalised the notion of Noninterference as a functional equivalence ≈f
on system inputs and outputs. This derives from the intuition that Non-
interference implies that ‘the execution of a program from two states that
share the same input values of low security variables manifest behaviours
indistinguishable from the observer’s view. PSP is similarly modeled as an
equivalence relation ≈psp on the set of possible traces observable to the low
security observer. Given that ⊑ denotes ‘is refined by’, ≤ is a partial ordering
on the observer’s knowledge, IP , of some properties of interest, we can say
of two programs Tspec and Timp that: Tspec ⊑ Timp if for each run r of Timp,
there is an equivalent run r′ of Tspec such that the observer can deduce less
about the properties of interest from observing Timp execute r than from
observing Tspec execute r
′.
Formally, Tspec ⊑ Timp ⇔ IP (r,α,≡) ≤ IP (r′, α,≡).
With some interesting examples, [6] showed how some existing security prop-
erties can be formalised in their framework and argued that their framework
is general enough to capture all possibilistic security properties in the liter-
ature. However, they noted that their work fall short of providing designers
with a tool that can help them transform programs in such a way that
secrecy properties are preserved through refinement. This is one area we
address in our framework presented in Section 3.4. For now, we review the
confidentiality-preserving refinement framework introduced by Banks and
Jacob [19], modellled using Hoare and He’s Unified Theories of Program-
ming (UTP) .
Confidentiality-preserving Refinement for UTP.
Banks and Jacob in [19] introduced a novel way of encoding confidentiality
properties using Hoare and He’s Unified Theories of Programming (UTP).
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They devised conditions for verifying that system designs do not leak secret
information to untrusted users. This work also proposed how the derived
confidentiality conditions can be combined with the traditional notions of
refinement to yield refinement relations suitable for ensuring that systems
are securely implemented. Unifying Theories of Programming deals with
program semantics. It shows how denotational semantics, operational se-
mantics and algebraic semantics can be combined in a unified framework
for the formal specification, design and implementation of programs and
computer systems [71], [145]. The formal representation of the UTP is a
relational calculus expressed as predicates over an alphabet or a set of ob-
servational variables (i.e., all information about a program’s execution that
is visible to observers) of the UTP.
The authors described an observation of a UTP predicate S as any predicate
that maps each variable in the alphabet of S to a single value, such that S
is satisfied by that mapping. The authors distinguished between two classes
of observation, namely: a system-level observation, and an interface-level
observation. A system-level observation of a UTP predicate S describes all
possible behaviour of S, whereas an interface-level observation of S, disjoint
from a system-level observation, describes a user’s observation of the sys-
tem. Given that s denotes a list of variables s1 . . . s2, s
′ stands for the list of
variables s′1 . . . s′2, and let Φ be a system-level observation of S. The notion
that Φ is satisfied by exactly one valuation of the system-level variables, and
that Φ is an actual observation of S is captured in the following predicate.(∃1s, s′ ●Φ) ∧ [Φ⇒ S]
A predicate that formalises a user’s interface to a system by defining a total
relation (or function, in deterministic settings) from system-level observa-
tions to interface-level observations is termed a view. Banks and Jacob, [19],
insisted that views associated with different users share no interface-level ob-
servational variables, and that a view should not restrict the domains of the
system-level observational variables. Given a system-level predicate S, and
a view V , the interface-level observations that can be made by monitoring
the behaviour of S through V (i.e., the image of S as projected through V ),
denoted P(V,S) is encoded in the following formula:
P(V,S) ≜ ∃s, s′ ● V ∧ S
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Given that H denotes a high-security user whereas L denotes a low-security
user, S is considered secure if, for any observation of S that L can make, L
is unable to deduce confidential information about H. This requirement is
parameterised on the restriction predicate and the closure requirement. The
restriction predicate, R, is defined over H’s observational variables denoted
uH , u
′
H , i.e., the space of H observations featuring confidential activities.
Thus, a H observation is only classed confidential if and only if it appears in
R. The closure requirement, Q, is a predicate relating confidential H obser-
vations in R to alternativeH observations that are not classed as confidential
[19]. Whenever Q relates a confidential activity ψ to a non-confidential ac-
tivity
∼
ψ (both in H) such that ψ and ∼ψ are indistinguishable to L, the
authors say
∼
ψ is a cover story for ψ. It is necessarily assumed then that the
domain and co-domain of the relation encoded by Q are disjoint, i.e., cover
stories cannot themselves be classed as confidential. Given that H and L
denote the views of H and L respectively, R is a restriction and Q a closure
requirement over H, the notion of confidentiality properties, denoted pi, in
the paper is captured as a tuple pi = ⟨H,L,R,Q⟩. Consequently, a system
S is said to satisfy a confidentiality property pi = ⟨H,L,R,Q⟩ if and only if
the following formula holds.
[P(L ∧H,S) ∧R⇒ (∃ ∼uH , ∼u′H ● P(L∧ ∼H,S) ∧Q)] (2.34)
The notion that, for every H activity ψ in a system T classed as confidential
by R with respect to the confidentiality properties pi, all the cover stories
related to ψ by Q that are present in S must also be present in T is captured
by writing S ⊴pi T , which is formally defined as:
S ⊴ T ≜ P(L∧ ∼H,T ) ⊑ P(L ∧H,T ) ∧R ∧P(L∧ ∼H,S) ∧Q (2.35)
Following from that, [19] proposed a confidentiality preserving refinement,
denoted ⊑cppi , with respect to the confidentiality property pi as:
⊑cppi T = S ⊑ T ∧ S ⊴pi T (2.36)
Maintaining Information Flow Security under Refinement
One of the key contributions of Seehusen and Stølen in [129] is the prob-
lem of maintaining information flow security during the refinement process,
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which they dealt with via a schema they formulated for specifying secure
information flow properties that are preserved by their notion of refinement.
The authors modeled the input-output behaviour of systems by finite se-
quences of events called traces. A set of events is denoted E . An event
is viewed as either the transmission or reception of a message, and given
that k,m denotes a kind and a message respectively, an event is formally
described as a pair (k,m). An event kind is either a message transmission,
denoted !, or a message reception, denoted ?. Given that a1 is a transmitter,
a2 is a receiver, and s denotes a signal, a message is formalised as a triple(a1, a2, s). Given that ⊑ denotes the standard prefix ordering on sequences,
[129] required that the semantics of a system specification be a prefix-closed
set of traces, i.e., where t, t′ are traces and A is a set of traces,(t ∈ A ∧ t′ ⊑ t) ⇒ t′ ∈ A
Given that P(A) denotes the powerset of A, i.e., P(A) = {X ∣X ⊆ A}; a trace
is written as ⟨e1, e2, . . . , en⟩, and an empty trace is written as ⟨⟩. The pro-
jection of a trace t on a set of events E, denoted t∣E , is derived by deleting
all elements not in E. The authors described information flow security (a
restriction on information flow between two observers) as a flow policy and
a secure information flow predicate, also termed security predicate. WhereO is a set of observers and o1, o2 are individual observers, the flow policy is
formally defined as a relation ↛⊆ O ×O. Thus, the flow policy (o1, o2) ∈↛
means information shall not flow from o1 into o2. Security predicates are
defined in terms of what observers can perceive. Hence, an observer o of a
trace t may only perceive information in t with all events not in o deleted,
i.e, given that E.o denotes the set of all events that can be observed by o,
the authors write t∣E.o. Thus, given that E denotes the set of all events, the
events that can be transmitted (or received) by o is formally defined as:
E.o ≜ {(k, (a, a′,m)) ∈ E ∣ (k =! ∧ a = o) ∨ (k =? ∧ a′ = o)} (2.37)
To prevent implicit flows, the authors employed the notion of low-level in-
distinguishability, whereby two traces t and t′ are considered indistiguishable
from a low-level user, L’s point of view, written t ∼I t′, if and only if the set
of all events that can be observed by L (E.L) in t is equal to that which can
be observed by L in t′. Formally, this is defined as:
t∣E.L = t′∣E.L.
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This notion of indistinguishability was then used to construct a low-level
equivalent set LLES, a notion introduced in [84]. Thus, given a specification
Φ, L may, from an observation t ∈ Φ, construct a LLES and infer that some
trace in the LLES has occurred, but not which one. In this framework, the
LLES is formally defined as:{t′ ∈ Φ ∣ t ∼I t′}
Seehusen and Stølen [129] illustrated the requirement that any LLES that
L can construct be closed with respect to some criteria with the following
example:
Example: Let Φ = {⟨⟩, ⟨l1⟩, ⟨h1⟩, ⟨h2⟩, ⟨h1, l1⟩, ⟨h1, l2⟩, ⟨h2, l2⟩}, and assume
that L may only observe l1 and l2 and that h1 and h2 are high-security
events. Given a security definition that L may not, with certainty, be able
to infer from his observation of low-security events that a high-security event
has occurred, an observation of l1 is secure because L may infer that either⟨l1⟩ or ⟨h1, l1⟩ has occurred, but cannot, with certainty, infer that ⟨h1, l1⟩
has occurred. An observation of ⟨l2⟩, however, is insecure because from
this L can deduce that either ⟨h1, l2⟩ or ⟨h2, l2⟩ has occurred. Thus, in ei-
ther case, L can infer with certainty that a high-security event has occurred.
From the example above, it is obvious that a specification
Φ′ = {⟨h1, l2⟩, ⟨h2, l2⟩} refines Φ, but as discussed in the example, Φ is inse-
cure. A secure specification is formalised based on Mantel’s Basic Security
Predicates (BSP) [101]. BSP demands that for any trace t of the specifica-
tion Φ there must be another trace t′ such that t ∼I t′ from L’s view, and
which fulfills a closure condition Q, the closure requirement of BSP. This is
formally defined as follows.
A specification Φ satisfies the basic security predicate, BSPQR(Φ) for re-
striction R and closure Q iff
∀t ∈ Φ ⋅R(Φ, t)⇒ ∃t′ ∈ Φ ⋅ t ∼I t′ ∧Q(t, t′) (2.38)
Notice there is a touch of unpredictability with respect to L’s inference when-
ever he observes l1 in the example above. Hence the closure requirement,
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Q, may be viewed as the security predicate’s requirement for unpredictabil-
ity, since refinements that remove traces which provide this unpredictability
may make the refinement insecure (refinement paradox ). Thus, [129] intro-
duced a new notion of refinement whereby a distinction is made between
underspecification and unpredictability. This allows underspecification with
respect, for example, to data refinement to be refined away, while never
completely removing unpredictability via what is often termed property re-
finement [33], [32]. This notion of unpredictability is captured by defining
a prefix-closure on the set of traces. That is, given that Ω denotes a system
specification (or a set of trace sets), where each trace set φ is termed an
obligation, and Ω̂ = ⋃Φ∈Ω Ω, it is required that for all traces t, t′
t ∈ Ω̂ ∧ t′ ⊑ t ⇒ t′ ∈ Ω̂
Hence this notion of refinement requires that a system Ω′ is a refinement of
another system specification Ω, written Ω↝ Ω′, iff(∀φ ∈ Ω ⋅ ∃φ′ ∈ Ω′ ⋅ φ′ ⊆ φ) ∧ (∀φ′ ∈ Ω′ ⋅ ∃φ ∈ Ω ⋅ φ′ ⊆ φ)
Given a specification Ω, a restriction R, and a closure requirement Q, the
authors subsequently redefined their notion of basic security property given
in Formula 2.38 as follows, asserting that Ω satisfies BSPQR(Ω) iff
∀t ∈ Ω̂ ⋅R(Ω̂, t) ⇒ ∃φ ∈ Ω ⋅ ∀t′ ∈ φ ⋅ t ∼I t′ ∧Q(t, t′) (2.39)
Consequently, the notion of secure refinement introduced by [129] was for-
malised as
Ω↝ Ω′ ∧BSPQR(Ω) ⇒ BSPQR(Ω′) (2.40)
Carroll Morgan’s Ignorance-preserving Refinement
Carroll Morgan in [108], [109] modeled the concept of secrecy as an ad-
versary’s ignorance of concealed information. The author also introduced
an extension to the classical refinement relation based on identifying and
reasoning about an adversary’s ignorance of hidden data. Programs are
assumed to have their state space partitioned into a visible part v and a
hidden part h. A weak adversary with knowledge of program text and the
ability to see initial and final values of v was initially assumed. However,
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using Gedanken experiments 22, [109] argued that if refinement is allowed,
one is forced to assume that the adversary can see both program flow and
intermediate values of visible variables. One such experiment shows that if
the program v ∶= h; v ∶= 0 is to be refined, then it is possible for the value in
h to be leaked into v through a series of simplification stepwise refinements
as shown below, where T denotes the set of possible values of h and v:
v ∶= h; v ∶= 0 = (v ∶= h; v ∶= 0); v ∶∈ T= v ∶= h; (v ∶= 0; v ∶∈ T )= v ∶= h; v ∶∈ T , and
v ∶ h; v ∶∈ T ⊑ v ∶= h; skip= v ∶= h
Hence, the observer can learn the value of h in the intermediate program
v ∶= h. Writing ⊓ to denote an atomic23 nondeterministic choice operator,
Morgan shows, using the program h ∶= 0 ⊓ h ∶= 1, that an observer could
hypothetically observe program flow, as depicted below:
h ∶= 0 ⊓ h ∶= 1 = (h ∶= 0 ⊓ h ∶= 1); v ∶∈ T= (h ∶= 0; v ∶∈ T ) ⊓ (h ∶= 1; v ∶∈ T )⊑ (h ∶= 0; v ∶= 0) ⊓ (h ∶= 1; v ∶= 1)= (h ∶= 0; v ∶= h) ⊓ (h ∶= 1; v ∶= h)= (h ∶= 0 ⊓ h ∶= 1); v ∶= h
Consequently, the author concluded that a strong adversary must be mod-
eled, who knows at every program counter what program steps have oc-
curred, and what the values of the visible variables are after each program
step, not just the initial and final values.
A program’s global state is assumed to comprise both current visible v and
current hidden h variables, and a history sequence p of the program counter.
The possible runs of a system are considered to be all sequences of global
states that could be produced by the successive execution of atomic steps
from some initial state v0, h0. Conceptually, in knowledge-based reasoning,
22In Physics, a Gedanken experiment is a hypothetical (“thought”) experiment which
is possible in principle and is analysed (but not performed) to test some hypothesis. It is
also known as thought experiment [95].
23An atomic program is a program that can be executed in a single indivisible step, and
changes the program counter when executed.
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an observer knows all possible runs of a system, but is ignorant of how runs
are interleaved.
Hence, if an observer knows a fact in a run of the system starting from a given
global state, it must be the case that he knows that fact in all other possible
runs of the system from the start state. Thus, if the current state of a system
S is (v, h, p), then the set of all possible states associated with the current
state is the set of all other triples (v, h1, p) that S could also have produced
from v0, h0. [109] writes this equivalence relation as (v, h, p) ∼ (v, h1, p),
and introduced a set-valued shadow variable H to hold all possible values
of h in all those other runs the adversary considers ∼-equivalent to (v, h, p).
Ergo the abstraction to (v, h,H) is represented as:
v = last.v ∧ h = last.h ∧ H = {h′∣(v, h′, p) ∼ (v, h, p) ⋅ last.h′} (2.41)
A key assumption here is that the shadow knows the set of all possible val-
ues of h. Using a language-based approach, [109] added H, the shadow of
the hidden variable h, to the language semantics in much similar way as
Joshi and Leino used the so-called “Havoc on H ”, denoted HH, in [80].
Thus, given two states (v1, h1,H1) and (v2, h2,H2), the latter is considered
a refinement of the former iff they agree on their v, h-components and the
latter’s ignorance of h is at least as much as the former’s. This is formally
captured as:(v1, h1,H1) ⊑ (v2, h2,H2) ≜ v1 = v2 ∧ h1 = h2 ∧H1 ⊆H2
Notice the intuition behind the last conjunct in the definition above (i.e.,
H1 ⊆ H2) is that the larger the shadow of the variable h, the more difficult
it becomes to learn the value of h in the program. Lifting this notion of re-
finement to sets of states S1, S2, Morgan concluded that S2 is an ignorance
preserving refinement of S1 whenever every state s2 ∈ S2 is a refinement of
some state s1 ∈ S1, i.e.:
S1 ⊑ S2 ≜ (∀s2 ∈ S2 ⋅ (∃s1 ∈ S1 ⋅ s1 ⊑ s2)) (2.42)
In effect, the Formula 2.42 holds that S1 ⊑ S2 whenever it is that for each
initial (v, h,H), every possible outcome (v2, h2,H2) in S2 satisfies
v1 = v2 ∧ h1 = h2 ∧H1 ⊆H2 for some outcome (v1, h1,H1) of S1.
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In the following section, we discuss the benefits and limitations of existing
confidentiality-preserving refinement frameworks.
2.3.5.5 Existing Confidentiality-Preserving Refinement
Frameworks - Benefits and Limitations.
It is worth noting that Mantel [99] shed much light on how the notorious
problem of the refinement paradox could be resolved. However, since defi-
nitions presented in [99], are based on deletion of traces, it follows that the
flows actually occurred, but are removed to prevent the adversaries from
learning they occurred. We reckon it is much better to prevent insecure
flows in the first place.
Jan Ju¨rjens in [82] pointed out one of the limitations of definitions of secrecy
properties based on equivalences. The notion of equivalence-based security
properties may be summed up as follows. Given a specification P param-
eterised over a secret variable x, P is said to preserve the secrecy of x if
for any change in the value of x, e.g. from x0 to x1, the resulting processes
P (x0) and P (x1) are indistinguishable to any adversary. While secrecy
properties of this type yield a high degree of security, [82], argued that for
them to be preserved by the traditional refinement relation, they require a
rather fine-grained model. Another limitation pointed out by the author is
that dropping nondeterministic components during refinement may break
the equivalence relation on which such security properties depend, resulting
in the well-known problem of refinement paradox.
To overcome this propensity towards a refinement paradox, a number of
authors in the literature proposed a differentiation between underspecifi-
cation and unpredictability [96], [108], [109], [82], [129], and then a refin-
ing away of underspecification, while preserving property unpredictability.
Many authors who followed this approach provide different theoretic frame-
works for modifying the traditional refinement relation, while preserving
unpredictability with respect to the adversary’s view of hidden or secret
aspects of a specification. What is not very clear, however, is how these var-
ious frameworks can be implemented without introducing new languages,
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but using existing specification and programming languages. We believe a
flow-logic approach for analysing information flow between program parts
within well-established languages such as the B Method, could be employed,
without necessarily redefining the existing notion of nondeterminism in the
industry.
Ju¨jens pointed out a limitation of stepwise development of secure systems
where no distinction is made between underspecification and unpredictabil-
ity, namely: the need to “redo security proofs at each refinement step”[82].
The author then proposed an approach that involve the use of cryptographic
operations to overcome this problem. A prerequisite for this proposed frame-
work is the author’s proposal of complete removal of the capability for pro-
viding unpredictability through underspecification from the formal model.
We do not subscribe to this idea. For one thing, many specification and
programming languages in the industry do not make a distinction between
underspecification and unpredictability. Hence rather than overhaul the
whole method of specifying nondeterminism in the industry, we believe the
problem of the intensive labour involved in checking the security proofs at
every refinement step can be surmounted by automating the process via
static analysis. One advantage of this approach is that it allows for the de-
velopment of automated tools for analysing information flow that can easily
plug into existing CASE tools. What is more, this approach that we sub-
scribe to is simpler and do not involve the use of complicated cryptographic
operations.
A limitation of [82], even as acknowledged by the author himself and as
remarked by Alur et al [6], is that the framework may not prevent im-
plicit information flow. The framework ignores information flow leaks, i.e.
cases when the adversary can infer something about the secret (either via
termination behaviour or other implicit flows) without explicitly seeing it
[6]. The approach we present in chapter 3 of this thesis is more fine-grained,
termination-sensitive and able to deal with some other implicit flows as well.
Seehusen and Stølen in [129] acknowledged that while their approach is sim-
ilar to Ju¨rjens’ [82], their formalisms differ. They claimed that while Ju¨rjens
distinguishes between underspecification and unpredictability in their defi-
nition of secrecy-preserving refinement, he does not rely on this distinction
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in the definition of his information flow property. While [129] claimed there
is no need to propose conditions with which to check that a given refinement
preserve security, they failed to provide tangible examples to illustrate how
their proposed secrecy-preserving refinement framework can be employed in
practice. One would have hoped to see how they propose to implement the
preservation of distinct unpredictability employed in maintaining secrecy,
while refining away underspecification. They also acknowledged that they
considered only one notion of refinement, behaviour refinement.
Morgan’s work in [108], [109] helps recognise the need to formalise infor-
mation flow security under the assumption that the adversary has strong
capabilities including perfect recall of program steps that have occurred and
the visible variable values after each step; ability to observe program flow
and knowledge of program text. To our knowledge the author is one of the
few who employed a language-based approach, albeit his model is limited
to a basic sequential programming language. The author did not consider,
for example loops, and thus possible divergence (or nontermination) and it’s
effects on information flow security. The author also specialised severely to
two basic security levels: hidden and visible, hence did not consider multi-
level security lattices. Like Banks and Jacob in [19] where the notion of cover
stories is used to preserve unpredictability, [109] added shadow variables to
the language semantics in a somewhat similar way to what Joshi and Leino
[80] did with their notion of havoc on h. While notions of security based on
definitions of security such as these clouds the adversary’s knowledge so he
cannot determine, to a high level of certainty, that some secret activity has
taken place, it does not actually prevent secret information from flowing to
an adversary. Hence [109] acknowledged that they lay no claim to “abso-
lute” security of a program by means of their framework. To our knowledge,
it remains to be shown how distinguishing between underspecification and
unpredictability, a crux of the secrecy-preserving refinement definitions in
[19], [108], [109], [129] and [82], is to be implemented in real specification
and programming languages in practice.
Alur et al in [6] argued that an advantage of their framework over Mantel’s
[99], is that while Mantel assumes some fixed, strong information-flow prop-
erties are enforced and his notion of refinement preserves those properties,
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their approach is more flexible in that it permits the specification of arbi-
trary secrecy requirements. Thus [6] claimed that if a specification does not
maintain secrecy of a certain property, the implementation does not need to
either. Following the stepwise development in our framework, we argue there
is no need to implement (or refine) a specification that does not satisfy the
security property of interest in the first place. Our automatic information
flow analyser will flag the specification as insecure, needing modification be-
fore the developer can proceed to the next step in the development process.
2.4 Introduction to the B-Method
Apart, perhaps, from the most elementary software programs, most systems
are so large and complex that to be able to fully understand and/or guaran-
tee the consistency, security and other desirable properties of the information
manipulated, a system is usually broken into structured components that
when synthesised yields the desired functionalities. Thus, breaking the sys-
tem down into smaller components greatly simplifies the problem domain.
This “divide and conquer” approach makes the task of formally specifying
software systems, using for example the B Method, much more manageable.
The specification of the required functionalities of a software system is de-
fined as an abstract mathematical model, which acts as though it were a
hardware machine carrying out the specified tasks. Hence such models are
termed Abstract Machines, and like real hardware machines they are com-
prised of states and operations. The format and representation used to de-
scribe such machines is known as Abstract Machine Notation (AMN). The
operations part of an abstract machine modifies the machine state by means
of Generalised Substitutions, which are like the engines of the abstract ma-
chine in that they define (“do”) the actual computations of the system. The
Generalised Substitution Language (GSL), introduced by Abrial in [1], is the
method used to describe and ‘assign meaning to’ generalised substitutions
based on Dijkstra’s weakest precondition semantics. The following section
deals with the structures or clauses used to build an AMN.
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2.4.1 Abstract Machine Notation (AMN) structures
An abstract machine, like any hardware machine is itself made up of various
parts, namely:
à MACHINE - a clause used to specify the machine’s identifier, so it
could be referenced by other components of the system;
à PARAMETERS - (optional) provided with the machine where the
user is required to provide some input on which the machine will work.
Specifying a machine with parameters makes it more general than it
otherwise would be. In line with convention, parameters cannot be
changed within a machine, i.e., they can only appear on the right hand
side of an assignment operator. Parameters could be finite elementary
values or sets of values, which, by default, must not be empty.
à CONSTRAINTS - In the case where parameters are provided with
a machine specification, the CONSTRAINTS keyword is mandatory,
since it is used to provide, as the name implies, constraints on the
values that the machine accepts as parameters, i.e., the data types of
the parameters.
à VARIABLES - provide all the variables to be manipulated locally
by the machine, and sometimes, by another machine (via the native
machine’s operations). The set of values of the variables in a particu-
lar instance of the machine defines the ‘state’ of the machine in that
instance.
à INVARIANT - gives such mandatory unchangeable information about
the machine variables as their data types (e.g., set of natural numbers)
and other possible constraints on their values. The invariant must al-
ways hold for any value assigned to the variables to be acceptable.
à INITIALISATION - mandatory clause used to describe the initial
state of the machine by assigning initial values to all variables, such
that the invariant is preserved. This guarantees that the machine is
feasible, i.e., there is always some state in which the machine works.
à SETS - as the name implies is used to describe a collection of scalar
values or constants or other structured types that satisfies certain logi-
cal properties, which are appropriately specified in the PROPERTIES
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clause. Examples include set of positive natural numbers, NAT1, set
of numbers between 0 and 100, written in ASCII24 notation as 0..100.
à CONSTANTS - Like parameters, constants are read-only entities
used within the operations of an AMN and these could be elementary
values or structured types such as a maplet25 of variables to values.
à PROPERTIES - this keyword is used to describe the types and log-
ical properties exhibited by constants and sets defined in the machine
or other machines accessible to the machine. Machine parameters may
also be referenced here. An important point to note here is that for
consistency of the context of the machine, it must be the case that
there are some sets and constants that satisfy the PROPERTIES of
the machine, for all possible values of the PARAMETERS [128].
à OPERATIONS - provide a list of substitutions that can be per-
formed by the machine or component, along with a precise descrip-
tion of what they each do. A machine interacts with its environment
through its operations, collectively referred to as its interface.
Apart from the basic parts of an abstract machine enumerated above, some
structures may be added to describe the visibility and/or compositionality
of the machines in a development. These structuring mechanisms include:
SEES, USES, INCLUDES, EXTENDS, IMPORTS, . . . and their function-
alities are explained below.
SEES: This clause allows machines in which it is declared (the seeing ma-
chines) to have limited shared read-only access to the variables, sets and
constants of the seen machine(s). Hence, the seeing machines are not al-
lowed to put additional constraints on the variables and constants of the
seen machine(s) - i.e., seen variables can only be used in operations of the
seeing machines, and on the right hand side of simple substitutions, but
not in the invariant. Because SEES grants read-only access, only enquiry
operations are visible in seeing machines.
24ASCII denotes American Standard Code for Information Interchange
25Maplet - an ordered pair, i.e., a pair of identifiers ordered by some property or relation
that binds them together.
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USES: In addition to the access granted by the SEES clause, the USES
clause allows the variables of the used machine to be used in the invariant
of using machines. Nevertheless, the USES clause also grants read-only ac-
cess to variables of the used machine, so only enquiry operations of the used
machine are visible in the using machines.
NOTE: To avoid access blocking and inconsistency, update operations of ac-
cessed machines are not visible to accessing machines with only shared read
access to the variables, sets and constants of the accessed machines. Further-
more both SEES and USES clauses are not transitive, i.e., given three ma-
chines denoted Mach1, Mach2, Mach3 and using ∢ to denote either SEES
or USES clauses, whereby Mach1 ∢Mach2 means Mach1 SEES Mach2
or Mach1 USES Mach2, we state formally that:
Mach1 ∢ Mach2 and Mach2 ∢ Mach3 ⇏ Mach1 ∢ Mach3
INCLUDES: the key difference between the two preceding clauses and IN-
CLUDES is that the latter grants the including machine exclusive access
to the variables, sets and constants of the included machine - hence, one
machine cannot be included by two or more machines, i.e., no shared access
is permitted. Hence, all operations of the included machine, while not au-
tomatically becoming operations of the including machine, could be used in
the including machine.
PROMOTES Where some of the operations of an included machine are
to be promoted to become operations of the including machine, the PRO-
MOTES clause is declared, following an INCLUDES clause. This clause
(PROMOTES) lists all the operations to be thus promoted.
EXTENDS: this clause goes one step further than the INCLUDES / PRO-
MOTES clause combination in that all (rather than some) operations of the
extended machine are automatically promoted to become operations of the
extending machine.
IMPORTS: this keyword/clause, used only in implementations roughly
maps to the INCLUDES keyword used only in machine specifications. How-
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ever unlike the INCLUDES, USES and EXTENDS clauses, the IMPORTS
clause provides full hiding for the abstract variables of the imported ma-
chine in that it does not allow even a read-only access to these variables in
operations of the importing machine.
It is noteworthy, however, that while some of these existing structures may
be skillfully used to provide a measure of security through partial or full-
hiding mechanisms or by obscurity via underspecification, the absence of a
clause for specifying confidentiality of secret system variables and operations
makes it difficult to guarantee or prove that these properties are preserved
through refinement.
2.4.1.1 AMN in Refinements
Much has been said about refinements in Section 2.3.5 above, so in this
section we will only focus on the linking constraints imposed on refinements
by the B AMN. As expected the format of refinement is similar to that
of the abstract machine specification except for a few structural differences
enumerated below:
à Rather than using the MACHINE keyword, a refinement uses the RE-
FINEMENT keyword followed by an identifier, which is immediately
followed by a new keyword (not used in abstract machine specifica-
tions) REFINES, which specifies the name of machine or intermediate
refinement being refined;
à The identifier in the refinement header must be different from that of
the system being refined. For example, if the machine to be refined
has the header “MACHINE MyMachine”, then the refinement header
could be “REFINEMENT MyMachineR”, but cannot be “REFINE-
MENT MyMachine”;
à While machines could employ composition structures like SEES, USES,
INCLUDES or EXTENDS, refinements are not allowed to use the
USES clause. This follows from the semantics that a refinement is
not allowed to modify the state invariant of a machine but only the
internal design of the operations and the introduction of further con-
straints on the context predicates. For this reason a machine with the
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USES clause cannot be independently refined, but must be included
along with the using machine in another machine, which can then be
refined;
à Whereas a machine specification may involve parameters, such pa-
rameters must by omitted in the refinement, and the variables of the
machine being refined can only be used on the right hand side of a
generalised substitution, i.e., they are read only;
à In addition to an AMN refinement being able to use the parallel com-
position operator, ‘∥’, allowed at the machine level, a refinement can
also employ the sequential composition operator, ‘;’, not allowed in a
machine.
Another important point to note about AMN refinements is that a refine-







2.4.1.2 AMN in Implementations
An AMN implementation is the last step in the step-wise refinement pro-
cess in B, and as in the case of machines and refinements, it starts with a
header, IMPLEMENTATION, and follows with a REFINES clause as in a




As in the case of refinements, there are some structural differences between
an implementation and a machine, yes, even some differences between an
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implementation and a refinement as itemised below:
à Unlike machine and refinement components where the parallel com-
position operator is allowed, the only composition operator allowed in
an implementation is the sequential composition operator. This fol-
lows from the fact that an implementation must provide the needed
functionality for the system, and no further refinement is possible af-
terward. And for the same reason . . . ;
à WHILE loops may only be used in implementation. Loops are not
allowed in abstract machine specifications and refinements. The LET
keyword on the other hand may only be used in abstract machines
and refinements. It is not allowed in implementations, but the VAR
keyword is.
à Local sets that up till now could be abstractly defined (aka deferred
sets) must be enumerated, i.e. fully defined in terms of its elements
via the VALUES clause. And similarly all constants of the refined
component must be precisely defined, hence constants of structured
types such as a maplet of variables to values are not allowed in an
implementation. Rather, only constants of elementary values are al-
lowed;
à The only structuring mechanism common to all three is the SEES
clause. Neither the INCLUDES nor the EXTENDS clauses are al-
lowed in an implementation. Rather, the IMPORTS is used here and
this corresponds to the INCLUDES clause in abstract machine speci-
fications and refinements.
à The VARIABLES clause is not allowed in implementations, except for
concrete variables; hence if (abstract) variables defined in refined com-
ponents are to be used in an implementation, such machines must be
imported into the implementation using the IMPORTS clause. Fol-
lowing from that, it is not mandatory to have the INITIALISATION
clause as is the case in machines and refinements.





















































Figure 2.15: Summary of the B AMN Clauses and their Use
2.4.2 Refinement Proof Obligations in the B Method
For a machine and any subsequent refinement thereof to satisfy the require-
ments for which they are designed, they have to meet a number of proof
obligations. Hence, we briefly discuss the proof obligations for standalone B
Machines and their refinements in this section. (A more detailed discussion
of this concept by Abrial can be found in [1].) Suppose we have a machine
M(p) described as follows, where p ranges over parameters, constr denotes
constraints, STM ranges over sets, kM are constants, TM denotes properties,
vM ranges over variables, IM , initM are invariants and variable initialisa-
tions respectively, xx, aa are output and input variables respectively, PM is
















The first crucial proof obligation in a B machine is to prove that there is at
least one valid state that satisfies the machine invariant, thus indicating that
the machine is feasible. This minimal feasibility condition requires that the
machine is executable in its initial state defined in the initialisation clause.
For M(p), this obligation is:
constr ∧ TM ⇒ [initM ]IM
Notice that initM is guaranteed to preserve IM only in the context where
the parameters satisfy the constraints constr and the sets and constants
satisfy the property TM . The next important obligation we need to prove
for machine M(p) is that the body of the operation oper(aa) establishes the
invariant IM . This obligation extends the context of the preceding one by
adding the requirement that the precondition PM holds for subst to estab-
lish IM as shown below:
constr ∧ TM ∧ PM ⇒ [subst]IM
Given that MR(p), described below, is a refinement of M(p), we can now
begin to explore the B refinement proof obligation for the development.
Here STR, kR denote sets and constants respectively; TR denotes properties
defined on the sets and constants; vR, IR denote variables and invariant re-
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spectively, while initR denotes substitutions used to initialise variables; PR
is a predicate and substR is the body of the substitution defined in oper(aa)















The first crucial refinement proof obligation for MR(p) is that the local
states of the refinement relates to some states of the machine being refined
[1], [68]. This describes the refinement requirement that some states of the
refinement are also valid states of the original machine, i.e.:
constr ∧ TM ∧ TR ⇒ ∃(vM , vR) ⋅ (IM ∧ IR)
Following from this, we need to show that the initialisation initR of MR(p)
refines the initialisation initM of M(p), i.e.:
constr ∧ TM ∧ TR ⇒ [initR]¬[initM ]¬IR
This initialisation obligation requires that: whenever the initialisation of the
machine, initM , establishes the invariant of the refinement, IR, it must be
the case that the initialisation initR of the refinement also does. Thus initR
is a refinement of initM .
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Similarly, the proof obligation for the operation of the refinement requires
that every possible execution of the refinement operation correspond to some
valid execution of the related machine operation, i.e.:
constr ∧ TM ∧ TR ∧ IM ∧ IR ∧ PM⇒ PR ∧ [substR]¬[subst]¬(IR ∧ xx = yy)
Having discussed Refinement Proof Obligations in the B Method, we present
in Section 2.4.3 situations whereby a machine and its refinement, while sat-
isfying necessary refinement proof obligations, may leak some information
between the variables of the machine.
2.4.3 Confidentiality Refinement Paradox in the B Method
In this section, we present two examples showing that the use of a formal
specification method in itself does not automatically resolve the problem of
confidentiality refinement paradox discussed earlier in Section 2.3.5.2.
The idea behind the first example is to specify a system that records student
registration numbers, coursework marks and exam marks. However, the
lecturer (the power user) desires to permit his teaching assistant to enter and
read only coursework marks, while preventing him from learning the exam
marks of the students. Thus, the state variable holding the exam marks
(exam H) is classified as secret or high-security, whereas the state variable
holding the coursework marks (cw L) is classified public or low-security. The
Abstract Machine specifying this requirement, StudentRecords, is given in
Table 2.6.





maxInteger ∈ NAT1 ∧ maxMark ∈ NAT1
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6 – continued from previous page
SETS






stId, exam H, cw L, cwMarkPair,
examMarkPair
INVARIANT
stId ∈ NAT1 ∧ stId <=maxInteger ∧
exam H ∈ NAT ∧ exam H <=maxMark ∧
cw L ∈ NAT ∧ cw L ≤maxMark ∧
cwMarkPair ∈ NAT1→NAT ∧
examMarkPair ∈ NAT1→NAT
INITIALISATION
stId, exam H, cw L, stMarkPair ∶=
1, 0, 0, {}, {}
OPERATIONS
mm←Ð update Cw(regNum,mark) =
PRE
regNum ∈ NAT1 ∧
regNum <=maxInteger ∧





nn←Ð update Exam =
ANY ss, hh WHERE
ss ∈ NAT1 ∧ hh ∈ NAT ∧
hh <=maxMark
THEN
Continued on next page
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exam H ∶= hh ∥
examMarkPair(ss) ∶= hh ∥
nn ∶= exam H
ELSE




Notice in Table 2.6 that the high security variable exam H is updated
with an arbitrary value between 0 and maxMark within the operation
nn ←Ð update Exam. Similarly, the low security variable cw L is updated
with any value within the same range by the operation mm←Ð update cw.
Notice also that due to the nondeterminism introduced by the underspeci-
fication (with the ANY clause) in nn ←Ð update Exam, it is not possible
for cw L to learn the initial value arbitrarily assigned to exam H. Hence,
the machine trivially satisfies GNI.
However, we give, in Table 2.7, a refinement, which while itself is a valid
refinement by the classical refinement semantics, makes the initial value of
exam H r flow implicitly into cw L r within the operation
mm←Ð update Cw (due to the precondition mark = exam H r) thereby
making the refinement fail to satisfy NI. (We highlight in red the substitu-
tions and constraints that yield the insecure flow.) Yet, by the semantics of
B GSL the refinement is valid, and the insecure implicit flow of information
from exam H r to cw L r escapes detection by tools like the B Toolkit,
Atelier B, etc. Figure 2.16 shows that both machine and refinement satisfy
all required proof obligations and commit successfully in Atelier B. This ex-
ample clearly illustrates that rigorous formalism does not in itself guarantee
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Figure 2.16: Atelier B PO Screen for StudentRecords
information flow security.







stId r, exam H r, cw L r, cwMarkPair r,
examMarkPair r
INVARIANT
cw L r ∈ NAT ∧ stId r ∈ NAT1 ∧ exam H r ∈ NAT ∧
stId r = stId ∧ exam H r = exam H ∧ cw L r = cw L ∧
cw L r = exam H r ∧ cwMarkPair r = cwMarkPair ∧
examMarkPair r = examMarkPair
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
INITIALISATION
stId r, exam H r, cw L r, cwMarkPair r,
examMarkPair r ∶= 1,0,0,{},{}
OPERATIONS
mm←Ð update Cw(regNum, mark) =
PRE
regNum ∈ NAT1 ∧ regNum <=maxInteger ∧
mark ∈ NAT ∧ mark <=maxMark ∧
mark = exam H r
THEN




nn←Ð update Exam =
ANY ss , hh WHERE
ss ∈ NAT1 ∧ hh ∈ NAT ∧ hh ≤maxMark ∧





exam H r ∶= hh ∥
nn ∶= examMarkPair r(ss) ∶= hh
END ∥ nn ∶= hh
END
END
We next present a second example showing that formalism in itself is not
sufficient to assure secure information flow between program variables. Here
we write h, l to denote secret and public boolean variables respectively, with
0 denoting the value ‘false’ and 1 denoting ‘true’. We then construct three
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operations, S1, S2, and S3 as follows:
S1 ≜ CHOICE h ∶= 1 OR h ∶= 0 END
S2 ≜ CHOICE l ∶= 1 OR l ∶= 0 END
S3 ≜ BEGIN l ∶= h END
We illustrate all possible transitions of S2 in Figure 2.17, wherein we high-
light transitions that correspond to all possible transitions of S3 (compare
with Figure 2.18).
l h l′ h′









Figure 2.17: Possible transitions of S2
l h l′ h′









Figure 2.18: Possible transitions of S3
Notice that Figure 2.17 illustrates the set of transitions:{(0,0)→ (0,0), (0,0)→ (1,0), (0,1)→ (0,1), (0,1)→ (1,1),(1,0) → (1,0), (1,0) → (0,0), (1,1) → (0,1), (1,1) → (1,1)},
whereas Figure 2.18 illustrates the set of transitions:
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{(0,0)→ (0,0), (0,1)→ (1,1), (1,0)→ (0,0), (1,1)→ (1,1)}.
Thus, in the presence of underspecification, both S1 and S2 trivially satisfy
GNI. For example, from the transitions of S2 illustrated in Figure 2.17, an
adversary is unable to conclusively deduce whether information flows from
h to l or not. When the underspecification in S2 is refined away, however,
we get S3 (transitions illustrated in Figure 2.18), which is admissible by the
semantics of classical refinement. It is clear from the foregoing that all the
transitions in S3 are possible transitions of S2. Yet, although being a valid
refinement of S2, S3 is not secure, as it allows the initial value of the secret
variable h to explicitly interfere with the final value, l′, of the public vari-
able l. Also, a comparison of Figures 2.17 and 2.18 shows that S2 masks the
possibility of insecure flows, which is exposed when the underspecification in
S2 is refined away as in S3. Hence the two examples presented in this section
show that the use of a formal method in itself does not guarantee secure in-
formation flow through refinement. This observation corroborates the point
noted earlier in Sections 2.3.5.1 and 2.3.5.4 about the lack of distinction
between nondeterminism used for underspecification and nondeterminism
used for unpredictability in traditional refinement frameworks.
In the following subsection, we review some existing work wherein formal
developments using the B Method is imbued with some notions of confiden-
tiality.
2.4.4 Existing Security Frameworks using The B Refinement
Process
A number of authors have introduced frameworks for modeling security
properties using the B refinement process in the areas of computer networks
[120], authentication protocols [24], [25], contractual obligations and data
sharing agreements [9], [14], [10] and [11]. Since many of the authors used
Event-B, we give a brief introduction to the Event-B method in Subsection
2.4.4.1 and thereafter we prec´ıs some of the security frameworks using the
B refinement process.
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2.4.4.1 A Brief Introduction to Event-B
Event-B is a simplification and extension of the B Method whereby abstract
machines and refinements are described by events, instead of operations. An-
other major difference between the B Method and Event-B is that Event-B
is specialised for action systems whereas the B Method is a general-purpose
formal development method. The Event-B method is semantically a simple
or guarded discrete transition system using the language of classical logic
and set theory whereby states, represented as valuations of sets of variables,
are manipulated by actions defined in events which are described by gener-
alised substitutions [2], [3], [119], [120], [9]. Formal developments in Event-B
are based on the concept of models constituted of two types of components,
namely: machines and contexts. An Event-B machine describes the model’s
dynamic behaviour by means of state and events, while Event-B contexts
define constants that are either numeric or sets [124], [2]. A machine may
see one or more contexts, and whereas a machine may be refined, a context
may only be extended.
Event-B allows three kinds of substitutions namely: the empty substitution,
the deterministic substitution, and the nondeterministic substitution [3].
Given that x denotes a list of variables ranging over Ide; E(Ide) denotes
a number of set-theoretic expressions corresponding to each of the variables
in x in the deterministic case, while, in the nondeterministic case, t denotes
a collection of distinct fresh variables which are local to the generalised
substitution; P (t, Ide) denotes a conjoined list of predicates, and F (t, Ide)
denotes a number of set-theoretic expressions corresponding to each of the
variables in x. We summarise the kinds of generalised substitutions for ex-
pressing the transitions associated with events in EBNF notation below:
S ≜ SKIP - empty substitution∣ x ∶= E(Ide) - deterministic substitution∣ ANY t WHERE - nondeterministic
P (t, Ide) THEN substitution
F (t, Ide) END∣ S1 ∥ S2 - parallel substitution
Thus given that G denotes a guard defined as a formula in classical first
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order logic, S denotes a generalised substitution, e ranges over events, an
event model, ev, is defined as:
ev ≜ EVENT e WHEN G THEN S END
2.4.4.2 Security Frameworks of Interest
With respect to the enforcement of security policies in networks, Stouls
and Potet in [120] argued that rather than the common separation between
policies and the mechanisms for their implementation, a formal link can be
built between the abstract and concrete systems that integrates the security
policy of interest into the mechanism for its implementation. Thus they
proposed that specifications be pitched at the same level of abstraction as
security policies and then refined down to the concrete mechanism for en-
forcing the policies, which the authors then built into the Event-B models.
The authors modeled network communications using the TCP/IP protocol
suite26, with sub-protocols for communicating between corresponding layers
in the protocol stack. Traditionally, network security policies are defined
in terms of access control rights whereby access policies are defined on sets
of actions by a closed set of rules. Policies are either defined as forbidden
actions (negative authorisations), aka. open policies, or authorised actions
(positive authorisations), aka closed policies, or a combination of both [120].
As a follow-up to [25], Bieber and Boulahia-Cuppens in [24] introduced
an application of the B Method to the formal development of authentica-
tion protocols and a systematic refinement of the protocols from abstract
to concrete. The authors followed a top-down (rather than the commonly
used bottom-up) approach in their study of authentication protocols, start-
ing with a very abstract specification, which they progressively refined to
implementation. This necessitates the abstraction of authentication primi-
tives27, the logic of which is embedded within the INVARIANT clause of B
26The TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol) suite is a four
level protocol stack consisting of the Application, Transport, Network, and Link (or Net-
work Access) layers.
27Authentication primitives are atomic elements required to guarantee authentic and
secure communication, e.g., ‘only authorised participants may send message on communi-
cation channel’, ‘unauthorised players may not read message on communication channel’,
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machines using classical first order logic and set theory. The authors illus-
trated attestation of identity (i.e. entity authentication28) [103] to prevent
masquerading or forging and data origin (i.e., message authentication 29)
[103], [142], which deals with the prevention of listening or eavesdropping
as well as blocking whereby the adversary receives message and prevents
intended recipient from receiving it.
The authentication framework introduced by Bieber and Boulahia-Cuppens
in [24], [25] used two approaches to implement data origin (message) au-
thentication. The first involves Envelopes, which are messages that can be
transmitted on a channel with the presence of adversaries. As the name
implies, an envelope is modeled with three attributes, namely: content, ad-
dress, source, where content is the clear-text message to be sent securely,
the address is the intended receiver’s identity and the source is the sender’s
identity. The other approach involves the modeling of data origin authen-
tication with cryptographic keys rather than envelopes. Here, the sender
encrypts the clear-text message before sending it on the channel and the
receiver decrypts it with an agreed key.
Aziz et al in [9] introduced a syntactic extension to constrain Event-B events
such that they may only execute when defined obligations are met. An event
is permitted whenever the guard holds in a given state, but the event may
or may not execute. The authors [9] introduced a dual of guards, termed
triggers, which expresses an obligation on when permitted events must be
executed. The authors did this by putting extra constraints on each of the
other permitted events in a nondeterministic setting, prohibiting their im-
mediate execution, i.e., if any event is to execute next, it must be the one
not prohibited by the trigger. To accomplish this the authors introduced
new constructs ‘NEXT’, ‘EVENTUALLY’, and ‘WITHIN . . .NEXT’
to replace the THEN part of the event model, as shown below, where T
denotes the trigger, a predicate, and n ∈ NAT is a natural number:
ev ≜ EVENT e WHEN T NEXT S END (2.43)
etc.
28Entity authentication deals with the verification of an entity’s claimed identity [67].
29Message Authentication certifies message integrity and source.
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ev ≜ EVENT e WHEN T EVENTUALLY S END (2.44)
ev ≜ EVENT e WHEN T WITHIN n NEXT S END (2.45)
Model 2.43 indicates that the next event to execute when the trigger T holds
is e. Model 2.44 shows that while the number of events that may execute
before e is not specified (unbounded nondeterminism), e will eventually be
executed. Model 2.45 defines bounded nondeterminism meaning that the
event e must be executed within n number of events. To demonstrate how
[9] employed triggers, consider the example of a system with two events e and
f where G denotes guard, T denotes trigger, and S1, S2 denotes generalised
substitutions:
ev1 ≜ EVENT e WHEN G THEN S1 END - regular Event-B
ev2 ≜ EVENT f WHEN T NEXT S2 END - modified Event-B
The system specification given above requires that whenever T is true, the
next event to be executed must be f . This in turn requires that e be pro-
hibited as shown in the refined specification given below.
ev1 ≜ EVENT e WHEN G ∧ ¬T THEN S1 END - regular Event-B
ev2 ≜ EVENT f WHEN T NEXT S2 END - modified Event-B
Using the notion of obligations introduced in [9], the authors in [11], [14]
introduced an Event-B framework for modeling Data Sharing Agreements
(DSA)30, parameterised on obligation, authorisation and prohibitions. [11]
presented DSA clauses as guarded actions, where the guard constitutes the
context in which the DSA holds. Writing p, an, d to denote the princi-
pal, an action name, and data of interest respectively, the authors defined
an action as a tuple ⟨p, an, d⟩ indicating that p performs an action, an, on
some data, d. DSA clauses are defined by four types. Given that n is an
integer and a = ⟨p, an, d⟩, the clause types are: permissions (denoted P(a)),
prohibitions (denoted F(a)), bounded obligations (denoted On(a)), and un-
bounded obligations (denoted O(a)). Hence [11] defined the syntax of DSA
clauses, C as
30A Data Sharing Agreement is a contract designed to regulate the sharing of data
among multiple participants or principals in several specific domains and contexts, which
is a predicate characterising environment conditions such as location and time [136], [11].
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C ≜ IF G THEN P(a) ∣ IF G THEN F(a) ∣
IF G THEN On(a) ∣ IF G THEN O(a)
Bounded obligations are defined in the INVARIANT of the Event-B model
using the ‘WITHIN . . .NEXT ’ trigger clause introduced in [9], while the
guard is defined in the CONTEXT clause of the Event-B model. When a
number of events are permitted within a context, any one of them could
be nondeterministically selected. It may be the case, though, that two or
more events perform conflicting actions, and need to be safely resolved. For
example, a system modeling a train station as a shared resource between
a train company (denoted TC) and emergency services (denoted ES) may
have the following conflicting operational goals:
1. TC: Always open station between 05.00hrs and 23.59hrs
2. ES: In the event of a fire alert, evacuate and close station
Using the framework introduced in [9], [10], [11] and [14], the station events
above can be semi-formally rewritten as follows, given that fireAlert is a
predicate (trigger), time is a predicate (guard), and openStation, closeStation
are both generalised substitutions:
1. TC ∶ EVENT e WHEN time ∈ 05.00..23.59 ∧ ¬(fireAlert)
THEN openStation END
2. ES ∶ EVENT f WHEN fireAlert NEXT closeStation END
Another scenario where two or more events may perform conflicting actions
that require resolution can the seen in the development of a telephone system
where call waiting and call forwarding functionalities are required (when line
is busy) as loosely specified below. Here, we assume lineBusy is a boolean,
callWaiting is a GSL substitution that specifies that incoming call be kept
on hold, and the GSL forwardTo(NAT) specifies the phone number the
incoming call is to be forwarded to.
3. CallWaiting: EVENT eWHEN lineBusy THEN callWaiting END
4. CallForwarding: EVENT f WHEN lineBusy THEN
forwardTo(07828123456) END
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Again, following a similar approach to the one used in the train station
example, we can resolve the conflict apparent in the specifications 3 and
4 above as shown below, where we assume waitingT ime ∈ NAT1 and
waitingT ime ≤ 60 denotes number of seconds calls may be kept waiting.
3. CallWaiting: EVENT eWHEN lineBusy NEXT callWaiting END
4. CallForwarding: EVENT f WHEN lineBusy ∧
waitingT ime > 60 THEN
forwardTo(07828123456) END
Aziz et al in [10] introduced a framework for extending Event-B machines
to manage conflicts of interest in the context of collaborating virtual organ-
isations31 in Grid Computing.
While all the frameworks ([120], [24], [25], [9], [10], [11] and [14]) discussed
in this section apply some notions of security to software models developed
using the B refinement process, none, to our understanding, dealt with the
analysis of information flow such as between variables within a develop-
ment. One thing all the frameworks have in common is that they all intro-
duced modalities for constraining the INVARIANT clause within B models
as necessary. At an early stage of the research leading up to this thesis,
we considered a similar approach, i.e., extending the B GSL syntax with
clauses for checking information flow security, using the security conditions
derived from our information flow analysis framework. The reasons we did
not develop this intuition further are discussed below:
à Unlike DSAs, which are generally static and can readily be represented
using linear temporal logic, information flow security is a property of
multiple runs of a system and has been shown by Alur et al in [6] as
not expressible in linear temporal logic.
à Trying to build information flow constraints into B machines will com-
pound the proof obligations, with the prospect that industry practi-
tioners may not be readily inclined to adopt the approach. This will
conflict with one of our motivations for this research work, namely:
simplicity, as discussed in Section 1.2.
31A virtual organisation is a group that shares the same computing resources
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à Another reason for not modifying the B language is that most B and
Event-B tools are Ecclipse-based, which makes it easy to develop an
analyser, external to the core B tool, and then plug it into Ecclipse
rather than implement a hardcore approach such as extending the
language kernel.
à Furthermore, trying to build information flow constraints into B ma-
chines will require extending existing tools like the B Toolkit, Atelier
B, proB, etc, to recognise the necessary additional keywords / clauses
that would result. Conversely, having the analyser as an external stan-
dalone tool that takes B machines as input does not require extending
existing tools, and works just as well. Furthermore, legal and copy-
right issues will be an unwelcome distraction to our task of analysing
information flow in B developments if we seek to extend the existing
tools mentioned.
à Having our information flow analyser external to B machine mod-
els makes it easier to adapt the analyser to deal with models devel-
oped using other formal methods. If, on the other hand, information
flow constraints are built into individual B machines, the flow analysis
framework will be less portable.
Having presented existing work in the literature with respect to information
flow security, programs and their refinements, and the B Method, we use this




Standalone B Machines and
Generalized Noninterference
3.1 Introduction
In Section 2.4, we presented a brief informal introduction to the B Method.
In this chapter, we present the formal framework for developing B Machines
that satisfy Generalized Noninterference in the presence of underspecifica-
tion, and on implementation can be guaranteed to satisfy, correspondingly,
Noninterference. The approach we introduce here involves a program anal-
ysis framework for the abstraction and certification of secure information
flow within B machines and refinements, in the presence of nondeterminism
and corresponding B implementations in the absence of nondeterminism.
First, we discuss our approach, which involves a separation of concerns,
whereby, we divorce the problem of preservation of the security properties
of interest from the traditional problem of refinement of B machines. We
follow this with a definition of the abstract syntax and semantics of the
abridged version of the B Generalised Substitution Language (GSL) used in
this thesis. Next, we present some of our main contributions in this chapter,
namely:
à An information flow analysis of standalone B Machines;
à Introduction of security conditions that ensure the preservation of se-
curity properties through refinement; and
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à Examples illustrating how our framework could be used to ensure se-
cure information flow within a development.
We show that the syntactic security conditions imply the semantic one de-
rived from the information flow analysis.
Later, in Chapter 4, we discuss the extension of our flow analysis framework
to structured developments in B. We thereby develop an analysis framework
for information flow in B Machines within a development in the presence of
structuring mechanisms. In Chapter 5, however, we present a case-study
that illustrates our implementation of the flow analysis framework, using
C++; and we conclude Chapter 6 with our intuitions on how our information
flow analysis framework may be extended further.
3.2 Security Properties and Refinement
In Chapter 2, we discussed the problem of the infamous refinement para-
dox, and the fact that many approaches (such as Mantel’s and Ju¨rjens’)
that sought to solve this problem by adding constraints to the classical re-
finement relation have, at best, had limited success [99],[100], [82], [23] (see
Section 2.3.5.5). To the best of our knowledge, there is no framework within
the B Method designed to deal with the problem of preservation of confi-
dentiality properties through refinement; neither are we aware of any claim
that existing tools like the B Toolkit, ProB, etc. deals with this problem.
To overcome this problem and bridge the gap between theory and practice,
we decompose the problem of preservation of security properties through re-
finement into two separate manageable problems: the problem of refinement
and the problem of preservation of the security properties of interest. We use
the traditional B development method involving proof obligations to check
the validity of B machines and their refinements, after which we use the
constraints developed using our program analysis framework to automati-
cally check the B machines and their refinements for possible insecure flows
of information at every step of the B development process. If a B machine,
passes both tests, then we conclude that we have a valid refinement that
preserves the security property of interest.
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The main advantage of automating the information flow analysis part of
our solution is that it removes the extra human labour that would otherwise
be involved in checking for insecure flows at every step of the refinement
process, a problem alluded to by Ju¨rjens in [82]. Other reasons motivating
against manually carrying out the information flow analysis part of our so-
lution include the increased likelihood of human error; needless delays due
to the extra work required; and increased cost due to the need for more
technically capable people to manually do the analysis.
We reason that: if the wheel works, why reinvent it? Since the classical
refinement relation captures other (other than security, that is) desirable
properties like safety, we conclude that it is sufficient to enhance the devel-
opment process with information flow constraints, via our program analysis
approach, for example, rather than overhaul an already well-known and
effective refinement framework. Hence, we use existing tools like the B
Toolkit, AtelierB, ProB, etc. to validate B machines and their refinements,
while we employ our proposed information flow analysis tool to validate the
preservation of defined security policies on the checked machines and their
refinements. We illustrate our decomposition approach in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: Problem decomposition: Information Flow and Refinement
In the following section, we discuss the syntax and semantics of the abridged
B GSL on which our information flow analysis framework presented in Sec-
tion 3.4 is based.
141
3.3 Abstract Machines and Generalised
Substitutions
We present in this section a formal definition of abstract machines; our
slightly modified syntax and semantics of generalised substitutions and the
basic theories behind the definitions, as introduced by Abrial in [1].
3.3.1 Syntax and Semantics of Generalised Substitutions
We present a formal introduction to the grammatical rules and form or lay-
out (aka. syntax ) of the B GSL as well as the semantics, i.e., the behaviour
of the program based on meanings assigned to the defined syntax. Recall
from Section 2.3.4 that [S]Q is an alternative notation for the weakest pre-
condition semantics. And [S]Q collects the largest set of initial states from
which the substitution S is guaranteed to establish the postcondition Q on
termination of S. For example, given that S ≜ x ∶= x− 1 and Q ≜ x > 0, then[S]Q collects the initial set of states from which x ∶= x − 1 is guaranteed
to establish x > 0 on termination, i.e., the set of states where x > 1 holds
initially. Writing x′ to be a fresh variable denoting the final value of x after
the substitution, we have:
[x′ ∶= x − 1](x′ > 0)
(Substituting x − 1 for x′ in (x′ > 0), we have)
x − 1 > 0
i.e., x > 1 ◻
Hence the weakest precondition that x ∶= x − 1 satisfies x > 0 is x > 1.
The notion of simple substitution illustrated above is what Abrial [1] gener-
alised to the formal specification of all abstract machine operations. Before
we present the formal syntax and semantics of abstract machine operations,
we introduce in Table 3.1 the following notational conventions which are
used throughout the rest of this thesis.
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Symbol Meaning
Exp Finite set of expressions
in program
E ∈ Exp A single expression
Lab A finite set of labels
` ∈ Lab An individual label
Statement Set of labeled substitutions
in program
S ∈ Statement A labeled substitution
Subst A set of substitutions
aC ∈ Subst A substitution allowed in
MACHINEs only⋆C ∈ Subst A substitution allowed in
IMPLEMENTATIONs only
C ∈ Subst A substitution allowed in
machines and implementations
P,Q,R Predicates over state variables
U A set of defined items
pred(U) Predicate defining set U
Ide A finite set of variables
x ∈ Ide An individual variable
b A boolean expression
● A special metavariable,
denotes ‘Abort’ possible
Îde Set of all variables
val(S) Values of variables in S,
in a particular state
trm(S) Predicate that holds when
S terminates
abt(S) S never terminates
FV (E) Set of free variables in E
z A fresh variable
Table 3.1: General notations
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We follow the convention in [1], [128], [68] of expressing trm(S) in terms of
the negation of an abort substitution, abt(S). Given that ¬ denotes nega-
tion, and [S]Q denotes the weakest precondition that the substitution S
satisfies the predicate Q on termination, abt(S) and trm(S) are defined as:
abt(S)⇔ ¬[S]Q and
trm(S)⇔ ¬abt(S).
We adopt the general understanding in computer science that expressions
refer to syntactic combinations of variables, constants and/or functions -
combined by arithmetic, relational or other symbols. The standard mean-
ing of free variables in an expression is a collection of variables (unbound by
any quantifier) in the expression. Free variables are basically place-holders
in an expression where values can be substituted to evaluate the expression.
Hence, the value of an expression depends on the free variables within it.
This explains the intuition behind the need to consider the free variables in
expressions in order to determine variables whose values may interfere with
the values of the variables updated by the expressions. Using the Backus-
Naur Form (BNF) [4], [5], [140], we formally define an expression E ∈ Exp
as follows:
d+ ∈ digit; d+ ∶∶= “1”∣“2”∣“3”∣“4”∣“5”∣“6”∣“7”∣“8”∣“9”;
d ∈ digit; d ∶∶= “0” ∣ d+;
n ∈ number; n ∶∶= d ∣ d+ d;




w ∈ word; w ∶∶= c c ∣ c n ∣ w c ∣ w n;
b ∈ binaryOP ; b ∶∶= “ − ”∣“ + ”∣“ = ”∣“ ∗ ”∣“/”∣“ ≠ ”∣“ <′′ ∣“ <= ”∣
“ > ”∣“ >= ”∣“ ∧ ”∣“ ∨ ”∣“⇒ ”∣“ ∪ ”∣“ ∩ ”∣“ ∈ ”∣“ /∈ ”∣“ ⊂ ”∣“ ⊆ ”;
E ∈ Exp;
E ∶∶= w ∣ E b n ∣ E b E;
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FV ∈ (Exp)→ P(Ide)
FV (E) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{w}, if E ≡ w{w}, if E ≡ w b n{w1,w2}, if E ≡ w1 b w2
FV (E1) ∪ FV (E2), if E ≡ E1 b E2
Other notations used in this chapter include Q[E/x], which denotes the
substitution of expression, E, for all occurrences of x in Q; n, which ranges
over values of type NAT [1], which in B Method parlance stands for a set of
natural numbers. ff denotes a function, while <+ represents function up-
date. Following convention, we write ∶∈ to denote assignment of a member
of a set (written on the RHS) to a variable (written on the LHS), e.g., n ∶∈ N
means a member of the set N is assigned to the variable n.
We distinguish between abstract and concrete substitutions1 in our nota-
tion to capture the fact that certain substitutions allowed in abstract B
machines are not allowed in implementations, and vice versa. For exam-
ple, protected assignments (or preconditioned substitutions), PRE; nonde-
terministic substitutions like CHOICE, [], and ANY; SELECT, LET and
multiple substitutions, ∥, are not permitted in implementations, whereas se-
quential composition, “;”, V AR and WHILE substitutions are not allowed
in abstract B machines [68], [1]. Following standard practice, we use x to
range over read-write variables updated in a substitution, whereas we use z
to range over read-only variables.
We now present the syntax of the GSL.
1abstract substitutions, aC - allowed only in machines;
concrete substitutions, ⋆C - allowed only in implementations;
a mix of some of both allowed in refinements.
Substitutions allowed in machines, refinements, and implementations, denoted C.
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S ∶∶= C ∣ aC ∣ ⋆C; - - (labelled substitutions)
C ∶∶= skip ∣ x ∶= E ∣ ff(x) ∶= E ∣
IF b THEN S END ∣
IF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 END ∣
IF b1 THEN S1 ELSIF b2 THEN S2 ...
ELSE Sn END;
aC ∶∶= x1 ∶= E1 ∥ x2 ∶= E2 ∣ PRE P THEN aC END
ANY z WHERE Q THEN aC END ∣
CHOICE aC1 OR aC2 END ∣∣ SELECT Q THEN aC1 WHEN R THEN aC2 ...
ELSE aCn END ∣ x ∶∈ U ∣
LET x BE x = E IN aC END ∣ C;
⋆C ∶∶= VAR x IN ⋆C END ∣ C;
(3.1)
Having introduced our specialised syntax of GSL we now present the corre-
sponding GSL semantics using Dijkstra’s weakest precondition (wp) seman-
tics. While Clark et al [36] used big-step semantics in their framework, we
elect to use wp semantics in our work for the following reasons:
à Most existing work in the literature involving the B method define
GSL semantics using wp semantics, so we reckon it fits more naturally
with related literature to use wp semantics here.
à For the same reason, our information flow analysis framework will be
more understandable and attractive to practitioners trained in the B
Method.
à wp semantics is sufficiently robust and expressive for our definitions
and proofs.
We present now the semantics of GSL in Table (3.2), followed with expla-
nations of some of the main entries in the table.
Since skip is a substitution that does nothing, it follows that a predicate,
P , holds after skip is called if and only if P holds before the call, thus,
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Name (or AMN Statements) wp Semantics
skip P ⇔ [skip]P
x ∶= E P [E/x]
ff(x) ∶= E [ff ∶= {x↦ E}]P ≡ P [ff<+ {x↦ E}/ff]
x1 ∶= E1 ∥ x2 ∶= E2 [x1 ∶= E1] [x2 ∶= E2]P
SELECT Q THEN aC1 WHEN R [QÔ⇒ aC1 [] RÔ⇒ aC2 []...[] aCn]P
THEN aC2 ... ELSE aCn END ≡ Q⇒ [ aC1]P ∧ R⇒ [ aC2]P ∧ ...∧ ¬(Q ∨R ∨ ...) ⇒ aCn
CHOICE aC1 OR aC2 END [ aC1 [] aC2]P ≡ [ aC1]P ∧ [ aC2]P
ANY z WHERE Q [@z ⋅ (QÔ⇒ aC)]P
THEN aC END ≡ ∀z ⋅ (Q⇒ [ aC]P ) z/Q
x ∶∈ U [@z ⋅ ((z ∈ U) Ô⇒ (x ∶= z))]P ≡∀z ⋅ ((z ∈ U) ⇒ [x ∶= z]P ) z/pred(U)
PRE R THEN aC END [R ∣ aC]P ≡ R ∧ [ aC]P
LET x BE x = E IN aC END [@x ⋅ ((x = E)Ô⇒ aC)]P ≡∀x ⋅ ((x = E) ⇒ [ aC]P ) x/E
IF b THEN S END [IF b THEN S ELSE skip END]P≡ (b ⇒ [S]P ) ∧ (¬b ⇒ P )
IF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 END [(bÔ⇒ S1) [] (¬bÔ⇒ S2)]P ≡(b⇒ [S1]P ) ∧ (¬b⇒ [S2]P )
IF b1 THEN S1 ELSIF b2 [(b1 Ô⇒ S1) [] (b2 Ô⇒ S2) [] ⋅ ⋅⋅
THEN S2 . . . ELSE Sn END (¬(b1 ∨ b2 ∨ . . . )Ô⇒ Sn)]P ≡
b1 ⇒ [S1]P ∧ b2 ⇒ [S2]P . . .(¬(b1 ∨ b2 ∨ . . . )⇒ [Sn]P )
VAR x IN ⋆C END [@x ⋅ ⋆C]P
Table 3.2: Semantics of GSL
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P ⇔ [skip]P correctly defines this meaning. We illustrate the meaning of
function update, ff(x) ∶= E, with an example. Suppose we define a func-
tion drivers mapping members of a set DRIV ERS to a set TRAINS, i.e.,
drivers ∈ DRIV ERS → TRAINS. Then, given that tj ∈ DRIV ERS and
T201 ∈ TRAINS, we can update the fact that tj is the driver on train T201
by writing driver(tj) ∶= T201, meaning that all members of function drivers
remain unchanged, except for ‘tj ↦?’ (? denotes any member of TRAINS),
which is now updated to tj ↦ T201. Hence [drivers ∶= {tj ↦ T201}]P ≡
P [drivers <+ {tj ↦ T201}/drivers].
The bounded choice substitution, aC1 [] aC2, allows the implementer the
freedom to choose between a fixed number of alternative substitutions. Each
alternative substitution must therefore satisfy the specified postcondition, P ,
hence [ aC1 [] aC2]P ≡ [ aC1]P ∧ [ aC2]P . This conjunction over each alter-
native substitution is generalised to a universal quantifier, ∀z ⋅Q⇒ [ aC]P ,
to define the semantics of unbounded choice substitution by Abrial [1].
Guarded substitutions have the meaning that the guard must hold for the
substitution to be feasible, otherwise the substitution can establish anything,
i.e., [QÔ⇒ aC1]P ⇔ Q⇒ [ aC1]P . The semantics of SELECT describes
bounded choice over guarded substitutions, hence for the substitution to be
feasible all the guards must hold on some values. Preconditioned (or pro-
tected) substitution has the meaning that the precondition must hold for
the substitution to successfully terminate, otherwise the substitution can-
not establish anything, i.e., it aborts. x1 ∶= E1 ∥ x2 ∶= E2 describes multiple
substitutions (unlike sequential substitutions), in no particular order, but
with the requirement that updated variables are unique. The IF . . .THEN
substitutions are reducible to bounded choice over guarded substitutions.
Recall that to solve the problem of preservation of confidentiality properties
through refinement we proposed a decoupling of the problem into:
à The problem of preservation of the refinement relation, and
à The problem of preservation of confidentiality properties of interest.
Our contribution deals with the problem of preservation of confidentiality
properties using our information flow analysis framework, which is discussed
in Section 3.4. We do not make any modification to the traditional notion of
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refinement in the literature, thus we expect all B machines, refinements and
implementations to satisfy the machine consistency and refinement condi-
tions in the literature. For this reason, we do not discuss these conditions
here, but refer the interested reader to Abrial [1]. In the following section,
though, we discuss the axioms, and theorems we will employ later in proving
the correctness of our information flow analysis framework.
3.3.2 Axioms and Theorems
In this section, we present the normalised form of generalised substitutions,
introduced by Abrial [1], which forms the core of the axioms and theorems
relating to the correctness of GSL semantics. We start with an extension of
the notations given earlier in Section 3.3.1. Here, we write x and x′ whereby
x is a (list of) state variable(s) in the abstract machine under consideration.
x′ is a (list of) fresh variable(s) distinct from x (and not free in the predicate,
P , used to define the precondition in Theorem 1 below). Note that x′ holds
the final value(s) of x after execution of S; P gives the states on which S
is guaranteed to terminate, while Q relates the initial state x of S with the
final state x′, i.e., Q holds in exactly those final states x′ reachable by S.
Since Theorem 1 is a well-known result in the literature [1], [128], and the
correctness of the theorem is well documented by Abrial in [1], we simply
introduce and use it here.
Theorem 1. [Normalised Form of Generalised Substitutions] - All gener-
alised substitutions, S, updating some (list of) variable(s) x, can be expressed
in the form
S ≜ P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′), x′/P
We now present axioms relating to the conditions required for a substitu-
tion to establish a predicate. The minimal of these conditions is that the
substitution terminates [41], [1]. As noted earlier, trm(S) is defined indi-
rectly in terms of its negation, an aborting substitution, abt(S), which is a
substitution that cannot establish any predicate (Table 3.1). Even the most
obvious of predicates, x = x, cannot be established by abt(S). Formally,




trm(x ∶= E) variable update, ”
trm(ff(x) ∶= E) function update, ”
trm(x ∶∈ U) set choice, ”
trm(P ∣ aC) ⇔ P ∧ trm( aC)
trm(QÔ⇒ aC) ⇔ Q⇒ trm( aC)
trm( aC1[] aC2) ⇔ trm( aC1) ∧ trm( aC2)
trm(@z ⋅ (QÔ⇒ aC)) ⇔ ∀z ⋅ (Q⇒ trm( aC))
trm(@x ⋅ (x = E Ô⇒ aC)) ⇔ ∀x ⋅ ((x = E)⇒ trm( aC))
trm(@x ⋅ ⋆C) ⇔ ∀x ⋅ trm( ⋆C)
trm(P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′)) ⇔ P
Table 3.3: Termination Property on shape of GSL
i.e., abt(S) ⇔ ¬[S](x = x),
hence, trm(S) ⇔ ¬abt(S)
i.e., trm(S) ⇔ [S]R , for some predicate R
thus, trm(S) ⇔ [S](x = x)
Consequently, we summarise in Table 3.3 the shape of trm(S) with respect
to the semantics of GSL presented earlier in Table 3.2. Notice that the
preconditioned substitution, P ∣ aC, requires that P holds, otherwise the
substitution aborts, hence the conjunction P ∧ trm( aC) is the termination
condition. For guarded substitution, Q Ô⇒ aC, though, the fact that Q
(the predicate that relates the initial state of the substitution with the final
state) holds implies that the guarded substitution is not only feasible, but it
also terminates, otherwise there can be no final state. Hence Q⇒ trm( aC).
Another important axiom introduced by [1] is the representation of GSL
substitutions in terms of before-after predicates. This semantic notion along
with trm(S) was then used by the author to show the identity of generalised
substitutions. This throws more light on the meaning of the normalised form
of GSL presented earlier in Theorem 1. Given that x is a variable in the
machine where the substitution S is defined, and the before-after predicate
depends on x, we follow the convention in [1] and write prdx(S) to denote
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the predicate which relates the value of x before S is executed to its after-
value, denoted x′, which is assumed to be a fresh variable. The before-after
predicate notion is captured by the formula given below, which literally
reads: it is not the case that the substitution S establish that x and x′ are
not equal after execution.
prdx(S) ⇔ ¬[S](x′ ≠ x) (3.2)
Given, for example, that S ≜ x ∶= E, then we will expect the substitution
to terminate in a state satisfying the predicate x′ = E. But if S ≜ y ∶= E,
then we expect prdx,y(S) to hold if and only if x′ = x and y′ = E, since
x is not updated in the substitution. We present the proofs of before-after
predicates with respect to the semantics of GSL as follows:
Skip:
skip = x ∶= x
prdx(skip) ⇔ ¬[x ∶= x](x′ ≠ x)⇔ ¬([x ∶= x](x′ ≠ x))⇔ ¬(x′ ≠ x)⇔ (x′ = x)
Simple Substitution (x:=E):
prdx(x ∶= E) ⇔ ¬[x ∶= E](x′ ≠ x)⇔ ¬([x ∶= E](x′ ≠ x))⇔ ¬(x′ ≠ E)⇔ (x′ = E)
Simple Substitution (x:=E) - Multiple variables in Machine:
prdx,y(x ∶= E) ⇔ ¬[x ∶= E](x′, y′ ≠ x, y)⇔ ¬([x ∶= E](x′, y′ ≠ x, y))⇔ ¬(x′, y′ ≠ E,y)⇔ (x′, y′ = E,y)⇔ (x′ = E) ∧ (y′ = y)
Since only x is updated in S, we correctly have the before- and
after-values of y equal, i.e., y = y′.
151
Multiple Substitution (x ∶= E1 ∥ y ∶= E2) - Multiple variables updated:
prdx,y(x ∶= E1 ∥ y ∶= E2) ⇔ ¬[x, y ∶= E1,E2](x′, y′ ≠ x, y)⇔ ¬([x, y ∶= E1,E2](x′, y′ ≠ x, y))⇔ ¬(x′, y′ ≠ E1,E2)⇔ (x′, y′ = E1,E2)⇔ (x′ = E1) ∧ (y′ = E2)
From the foregoing, it is a simple thing to extend the proof by induction, to
other GSL constructs.
We now discuss the notion of variable state comprehension predicate, which
requires that whenever x is assigned any value such that a postcondition
predicate, P , is satisfied, it must be the case that there is a relationship
between the before state and the after state of the variable(s) referenced in
the substitution that satisfies P . Given that the before state of the variable
x in comprehension is denoted x0, and the after state is x
′. Let P be
a predicate. Then the variable state comprehension predicate is formally
written as:
@x′ ⋅ [x0, x ∶= x,x′]P Ô⇒ x ∶= x′ (3.3)
This predicate statement, abbreviated x ∶ P , basically states that x is up-
dated to its after-value thereby moving the system from its before state, x0,
to the after state, x′, which subsequently becomes the next before state.
We present in Table 3.4 the shape of prdx(S) for the GSL semantics defined
in Table 3.2. Notice here that the definition of prdx( P ∣ aC) for precondi-
tioned substitutions indicates that whenever aC is feasible, i.e., prdx( aC)
holds, then it must be the case that P holds too (since P ⇒ prdx( aC)).
For guarded substitutions, Q Ô⇒ aC, though, since Q relates the before-
value to the after-value, Q must always hold for aC to be feasible, i.e.,
Q ∧ prdx( aC).
Another important theorem proved by Abrial in [1], which we will employ
in this thesis is stated below (Theorem 2).
Theorem 2. [Predicate Normalised Form of Generalised Substitutions] - All
generalised substitutions, S, can be presented in terms of the termination and
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prdx(S) Shape Meaning
prdx(skip) ⇔ x′ = x
prdx(x ∶= E) ⇔ x′ = E
prdx,y(x ∶= E) ⇔ x′, y′ = E,y
prdx(ff(x) ∶= E) ⇔ ff ′ = ff<+ {x↦ E}
prdx(x ∶∈ U) ⇔ x′ ∈ U
prdx(P ∣ aC) ⇔ P ⇒ prdx( aC)
prdx(QÔ⇒ aC) ⇔ Q ∧ prdx( aC)
prdx(x = E Ô⇒ aC) ⇔ (x = E) ∧ prdx( aC)
prdx( aC1[] aC2) ⇔ prdx( aC1) ∨ prdx( aC2)
prdx(@z ⋅ (QÔ⇒ aC)) ⇔ ∃z ⋅ (Q ∧ prdx( aC))
prdx(@z ⋅ (z = E Ô⇒ aC)) ⇔ ∃z ⋅ ((z = E) ∧ prdx( aC))
prdx(@z ⋅ ⋆C) ⇔ ∃z ⋅ prdx( ⋆C)
prdx(P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′)) ⇔ P ⇒ Q
prdx(x ∶ P ) ⇔ [x0, x ∶= x,x′]P
Table 3.4: Before-After Predicate on shape of GSL
before-after predicate as
S = trm(S)∣@x′ ⋅ (prdx(S)Ô⇒ x ∶= x′)
We supply the proof of Theorem 2 given in [1], which we simplify and an-
notate here, since we will be employing the theorem later in Section 3.4 to
prove the correctness of our information flow analysis framework with re-
spect to the semantics presented in Tables 3.3, and 3.4.
To prove Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that any postcondition estab-
lished by the LHS is also established by the RHS [1], i.e., given a postcondi-
tionR, [S]R holds if and only if [trm(S)∣@x′.(prdx(S)Ô⇒ x ∶= x′)]R holds.
Proof:
LHS = [S]R⇔ [P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′)]R - (writing S in normal form)⇔ P ∧∀x′ ⋅ (Q⇒ [x ∶= x′]R), x′/P - (PRE in Table 3.2)⇔ P ∧ ∀x′ ⋅ ((P ⇒ Q)⇒ [x ∶= x′]R) - (distributive law)
(recall from Table 3.4, prdx(P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′)) = P ⇒ Q)
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⇔ P ∧ ∀x′ ⋅ (prdx(P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′))⇒ [x ∶= x′]R)⇔ P ∧TRUE ∣ ∀x′ ⋅ (prdx(S)⇒ [x ∶= x′]R) - (contracting)⇔ [trm(S)∣@x′ ⋅(prdx(S)Ô⇒ x ∶= x′)]R = RHS -(Table 3.3)
As noted by Abrial in [1], the consequence of Theorem 2 is that both trm(S)
and prdx(S) characterise completely the generalised substitution S defined
on x. The author, [1], also noted that this corresponds to saying that trm(S)
and trm(S) ⇒ prdx(S) characterise the generalised substitution S. We
present in Section 3.4 our flow analysis framework for GSL.
3.4 Information Flow Analysis of Generalised
Substitutions
In this section, we extend the flow logic approach to information flow analysis
developed by Clark et al [36], [118], [7] to the flow analysis of GSL. Recall
that we introduced a special metavariable ● in Table 3.1. We now define
Îde ⊇ Ide ∪ {●}. In addition to the notations introduced in Table 3.1, we
define the three key functions required for our analysis, respectively named
‘Assign’, ‘Global’, and ‘Dep’ as follows:
X̂ ∈ Assign = Lab→ P(Ide)
Ĝ ∈ Global = Lab→ P(Îde)
D̂ ∈ Dep = Lab→ P(Îde × Îde)
For any given label, `:
X̂(`) returns the superset of all variables that may be assigned to. This
corresponds to the notion of write frame in Bicarregui’s work [23];
Ĝ(`) returns the superset of variables whose values may affect termination
of the statement with label `;
Note: A pair (x, y) is a dependency in a substitution S, if a change in the
value of y in the state before execution of S can result in different values for
x after termination of S.
D̂(`) returns the superset of pairs of variables which constitute dependencies
for the statement with label `.
Id denotes an identity relation on Îde, e.g., given that the variable x depends
only on itself (i.e. D̂ = (x,x)), we write D̂ ⊇ Id.
We write (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ S to denote the notion that (Ĝ, D̂) is an acceptable
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information flow analysis of S, and inductively define X̂ on the semantics
of GSL as follows.
X̂(`) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∅, C` ≡ skip{x}, C` ≡ x ∶= E{ff}, C` ≡ ff(x) ∶= E
X̂(`1) ∪ X̂(`2), aC` ≡ (x1 ∶= E1)`1 ∥ (x2 ∶= E2)`2
X̂(`1), aC` ≡ QÔ⇒ aC`11
X̂(`1) ∪ X̂(`2), aC` ≡ aC`11 [] aC`22
X̂(`1), aC` ≡ P ∣ aC`11
X̂(`1), aC` ≡ @z ⋅ (QÔ⇒ aC`11 )
X̂(`1), aC` ≡ @z ⋅ ((z ∈ U)Ô⇒ aC`11 )
X̂(`1), aC` ≡ @x ⋅ ((x = E)Ô⇒ aC`11 )
n⋃
i=1 X̂(`i), aC` ≡ QÔ⇒ aC`11 [] R Ô⇒ aC`22 []...[] aC`nn
n⋃
i=1 X̂(`i), S ≡ b1 Ô⇒ S1 [] b2 Ô⇒ S2 []...[] Ô⇒ Sn
X̂(`1), ⋆C` ≡ @ x ⋅ ⋆C`11
We now extend the information flow analysis presented in ([36], [118], [7])
to the substitutions defined in our specialised GSL. As in [36], we employ
the special character ● to denote the notion that there is the possibility of
nontermination, e.g., when a precondition fails in a protected substitution.
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ skip` ⇔ D̂(`) ⊇ Id(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (x ∶= E)` ⇔ D̂(`) ⊇ Id[x↦ FV (E)]
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (ff(x) ∶= E)` ⇔ D̂(`) ⊇ Id[ff(x)↦ FV (E)]
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ ((x1 ∶= E1)`1 ∥ (x2 ∶= E2)`2)`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (x1 ∶= E1)`1 ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (x2 ∶= E2)`2 ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ Id[x1 ↦ FV (E1)] ∪ Id[x2 ↦ FV (E2)]
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (QÔ⇒ C`11 )`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (Q))
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(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (P ∣C`11 )`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧ (● ∈ Ĝ(`)⇒ Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (P )) ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (P ))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (@z ⋅ (z ∈ U)Ô⇒ C`1)`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`1 ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (pred(U)))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (@z ⋅ (z = E)Ô⇒ C`1)` ⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`1 ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (E))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ ( aC`11 [] aC`22 )`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ aC`11 ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ aC`22 ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∪ Ĝ(`2) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ D̂(`2)
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (SELECT Q THEN aC`11 WHEN R THEN aC`22
... ELSE aC
`n
n END)`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ aC`11 ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ aC`22 ∧ ... ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ aC`nn ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ n⋃
i=1 Ĝ(`i) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ n⋃i=1 D̂(`i) ∪ (X̂(`)× (n−1⋃i=1 FV (bi)))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (@z ⋅QÔ⇒ C`11 )`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧ Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × (FV (Q) ∪ {z}))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (IF b1 THEN C`11 ELSIF b2 THEN C`22 ...ELSE C`nn END)`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`22 ∧ ... ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`nn ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ n⋃
i=1 Ĝ(`i) ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ n⋃i=1 D̂(`i) ∪ (X̂(`)× (n−1⋃i=1 FV (bi)))∧ (● ∈ Ĝ(`)⇒ Ĝ(`) ⊃ (n−1⋃
i=1 FV (bi))
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (VAR x IN ⋆C`11 )`⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧ D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∧ Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1)
Table 3.4b: Information Flow Analysis for GSL.
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Notice from Table 3.4b that the information flow analysis for skip is accept-
able only if the dependencies in the substitution after execution remains the
same as before execution. Hence, D̂(`) ⊇ Id. In x ∶= E, only x is updated,
hence X̂ ⊇ {x}, and throughout this thesis, we abbreviate {x}→ FV (E) to
x ↦ FV (E), meaning that x maps pointwise to each variable in FV (E).
Information flows from FV (E) into x, i.e., given that def= denotes ‘is de-
fined as’, D̂(`) ⊇ Id[x ↦ FV (E)], where x ↦ FV (E) def= {(x, y) ∣ (∃y ∈
FV (E)) x ↦ y}. The analysis of multiple substitutions yield the union of
the dependencies of each substitution. Ditto the set of variables assigned to.
The flow analysis of guarded substitution, (Q Ô⇒ aC`11 )`, demands that
the free variables of the guard, Q, flow into the variable(s) assigned to in
the body of the substitution, aC
`1
1 , since the guard must hold for the sub-
stitution to be feasible. Hence, D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (Q)). Similarly,
for SELECT substitution, information flows from the free variables of the
conditional(s) into the variable(s) updated in the body of the substitution.
The same is also true for the ANY GSL substitution.
The analyses of the GSL substitutions discussed thus far do not contain any
global flow, reason being that global flows are only possible in preconditioned
substitutions and loops. In the remaining part of this section, we discuss the
substitutions wherein global flows may occur. Clark et al in [36] showed that
a program may not terminate if a while loop is encountered in the body of
the program. Since Abrial’s definition of GSL in [1] does not include loops
and sequential compositions (not permissible in specifications), we do not
include these substitutions in our specialised syntax of GSL. Hence, readers
interested in how our analysis framework deals with these substitutions are
referred to [36].
We also note that Clark et al [36] introduced and proved the flow analy-
sis for standard IF statements, but provided no definition for the B GSL
IF-ELSIF statement. Hence, we extend [36]’s language to include the
B GSL IF-ELSIF statement. We note that a loop may be encountered
in the body of the IF-ELSIF substitution (if used in implementations),
in which case the ‘IF-ELSIF conditions’ may affect the termination of
157
the substitution and all subsequent substitutions, if any. Hence, we add● ∈ Ĝ(`) ⇒ Ĝ(`) ⊃ (FV (b1) ∪ FV (b2) ∪ ...) to our analysis for global flows.
In Section 3.3 we pointed out that a preconditioned (or protected) substitu-
tion fails to terminate (i.e., aborts) if the precondition does not hold prior
to execution of the substitution, in which case the program in which the
substitution is defined may simply crash. Hence, in Table 3.4b, we define
the notion that a preconditioned substitution (and other subsequent sub-
stitutions) may not terminate by adding ● ∈ Ĝ(`) ⇒ Ĝ(`) ⊃ FV (P ) to the
analysis, since the free variables of P determines whether the substitution
terminates or not.
Example: Information Flow Analysis of PRE Substitution.
We provide here an information flow analysis of the update Cw operation de-
fined earlier in Table 2.7. A labelled version of this operation is re-presented
below for ease of reference:
mm←Ð update Cw(regNum, mark) =(PRE
regNum ∈ NAT1 ∧ regNum <=maxInteger ∧
mark ∈ NAT ∧ mark <=maxMark ∧
mark = exam H r
THEN(cw L r ∶= mark)`1 ;(cwMarkPair r(regNum) ∶= mark)`2 ;(mm ∶= mark)`3
END)`0
We illustrate in Table 3.5 the collection of the information flow constraints
for each of the labelled substitutions in terms of our X̂, Ĝ, D̂ abstraction.
Now, suppose the variable exam H r is a high security variable whereas
all other variables in the substitution update Cw are low security variables,
then the fact that mark = exam H r is used in the precondition means
that an adversary with access to the program text can implicitly deduce the
“secret” value of exam H r by simply observing the output on the low secu-
rity variable mm on animation of the machine containing the substitution.
Although, at this juncture, we are yet to introduce the security conditions
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used in our information flow analysis, it is clear from this simple example
that both explicit and implicit flows of information can be detected by our
analysis framework.
Information Flow Analysis: Constraints Computation
ConstraintsCollectors
Labels X̂ Ĝ D̂
`0 {cw L r, mm, {regNum, {cw L r ↦ regNum,
cwMarkPair r} maxInteger, cw L r ↦maxInteger,
mark, cw L r ↦mark, cw L r ↦maxMark,
maxMark, cw L r ↦ exam H r, mm↦ exam H r,
exam H r} mm↦ regNum, mm↦maxINteger,
mm↦mark, mm↦maxMark,




cwMarkPair r ↦ exam H r}
`1 {cw L r} ∅ {cw L r ↦mark}
`2 {cwMarkPair r} ∅ {cwMarkPair r ↦mark}
`3 {mm} ∅ {mm↦mark}
Table 3.5: Information Flow Constraints Computation Example
3.4.1 Abstraction and Correctness Analysis of GSL
To analyse information flow security in GSL substitutions, we abstract GSL
semantics as an over-approximation over the sets X̂, Ĝ, D̂ defined in Table
3.4b. Hence we formalise our notion of secure flow analysis as a mapping
of the abstraction to a two-valued (boolean) range as shown in Formula 3.4,
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for any substitution, S.
secure(S) ≜ (X̂, Ĝ, D̂)Ð→ {true, false} (3.4)
We illustrate our abstraction framework with the GSL construct, S, below:
(IF p = q THEN(x ∶= y +w)`2
ELSE(z ∶= 0)`1
END)`0
Using Table 3.4b, we over-approximate the semantics of S in terms of X̂, Ĝ,
and D̂ as follows:
X̂(`0) = X̂(`1) ∪ X̂(`2) = {x, z}
D̂(`0) = D̂(`1) ∪ D̂(`2) ∪ (X̂(`0) × FV (p = q))= {(z,∅)}∪{(x, y), (x,w)}∪{(z, p), (z, q), (x, p), (x, q)}.= {(x, y), (x,w), (x, p), (x, q), (z, p), (z, q)}, and
Ĝ(`0) = ∅
Using the foregoing approximation, we conclude that our (X̂, Ĝ, D̂) abstrac-
tion of S is secure (or evaluates to true) if all variables, v2, on which the
variables, v1, in X̂ depend in all possible runs of the program have security
classification(s) lower than or equal to the security classification of v1.
Suppose Val denotes a set of integer values, and σ denotes stores (or states),
where σ ∈ Ide→Val, i.e.:
σ = {(x↦ σ(x)) ∣ x ∈ Ide}
Given that Σ denotes a set of stores, i.e., Σ ∈ P(Ide→Val), it follows that
for all σ1, σ2, ..., σn ∈ Σ,
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Σ = {σ1, σ2, ..., σn}
Given a set of variables X, Clark et al [36] defined equivalence on stores
with respect to X, denoted ≈X , to mean that two stores agree on all x ∈X,
i.e., writing σ(x) to denote the value of variable x in state σ:
σ1 ≈X σ2 ⇔ ∀x ∈X ⋅ σ1(x) = σ2(x) (3.5)
We extend this notion of equivalence on stores to equivalence on sets of
stores. We say that two sets of stores Σ1, Σ2 are equivalent with respect to
a set of variables X, written Σ1 ≈X Σ2 if and only if:
∀σ1 ∈ Σ1, ∃σ2 ∈ Σ2 ⋅ σ1 ≈X σ2 and ∀σ2 ∈ Σ2, ∃σ1 ∈ Σ1 ⋅ σ1 ≈X σ2 (3.6)
It is easy to see that our extended definition of equivalence on sets of stores
subsumes the definition by Clark et al [36] on stores, for the reason that ap-
plication of the former to singleton sets of stores transparently corresponds
to an application of the the latter to stores. That is, given that Σ1 = {σ1}
and Σ2 = {σ2}, then Σ1 ≈X Σ2 is equivalent to σ1 ≈X σ2.
Note: Clark et al in [36] provided proofs relating to three aspects of cor-
rectness with respect to their imperative (While) language based analysis
framework, namely that:
à Their analysis is well-defined;
à Their analysis results are a proper abstraction of the semantics; and
à Every program has an acceptable information flow analysis and the
constraints have solutions.
We note that it is not necessary to show that our analysis in this thesis
is well-defined, since it is an extension of the structure already proved to
be well-defined by Clark et al [36]. However, we prove the remaining two
aspects of correctness itemised above with respect to the application of our
information flow analysis framework to GSL semantics. The authors [36]
showed, by structural induction on the abstract syntax tree, that their anal-
ysis results are a proper abstraction of the semantics of their core imperative
language. In this section, we also use structural induction to develop the
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correctness proofs on the predicate normalised form presented in Theorem 2
since all generalised substitutions have been shown to be expressible in this
form [1].
NOTE: We first translate the predicate normalised form of GSL to a form
amenable to our proof method.
Recall from Section 3.3, Theorem 2 that, for any substitution, C`:
C` = trm(C`) ∣ @x ⋅ (prdx(C`)Ô⇒ x ∶= x′)
Abrial [1] showed that this corresponds to:
trm(C`) ∧ trm(C`)⇒ prdx(C`) (3.7)
But we know that:
trm(C`)⇒ prdx(C`) ≡ ¬trm(C`) ∨ prdx(C`) - material implication
Hence Formula 3.7 becomes:
trm(C`) ∧ (¬trm(C`) ∨ prdx(C`))
(trm(C`)∧¬trm(C`)) ∨ (trm(C`)∧prdx(C`)) - distributive law
FALSE ∨ (trm(C`) ∧ prdx(C`)) - simplification
trm(C`) ∧ prdx(C`)
We therefore use trm(C`) ∧ prdx(C`) to prove Theorems 3 and 4 that are
intended to show that our information flow analysis framework is a correct
and proper abstraction of the semantics of our abridged GSL. In both cases,
we assume trm(C`) holds, so we are only left to show that prdx(C`) also
holds in their respective contexts.
We use the conventional ‘primed’ notation on sets of stores, Σ′1, to denote
the set of variable-value mappings corresponding to the after-states of the
system after multiple animations (or runs) of a substitution.
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Theorem 3 (Assignment Freedom (GSL)). Whenever a substitution ter-
minates, the after-values of the set of variables not assigned to equals the
before-values of the same set of variables. Suppose (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C` and let
Xc = {y ∈ Ide ∣ y /∈ X̂(`)}. Given that Dx ≜ D̂(`)(x) denotes, for all
x ∈ X̂(`), the set of variables on which x depends at ` (i.e., read frame by
Bicarregui’s definition in [23]), then:
For any sets of before and after states Σ,Σ′ respectively of a machine C`
where x is a (list of) variable(s) updated,
y is a (list of) variable(s) independent of x (i.e., y ∈Xc), and⊲ denotes domain restriction,
we need to show that, with respect to x:
(1). if prdx,y(C`) then Σ ≈Xc Σ′
(2). Xc ⊲ D̂(`) = Id
PROOF: Assume C` ranges over the GSL syntax tree, we employ struc-
tural induction to prove Theorem 3 as follows:
Part 1:
Case C` ≜ skip: It trivially follows that both parts hold.
Case C` ≜ x ∶= E, then:
prdx,y(x ∶= E) ⇔ ¬[x ∶= E](x′, y′ ≠ x, y) - from Formula 3.2⇔ ¬([x ∶= E](x′, y′ ≠ x, y))⇔ ¬(x′, y′ ≠ E,y)⇔ (x′, y′ = E,y)⇔ (x′ = E) ∧ (y′ = y)
Hence, Σ ≈Xc Σ′ since y ranges over Xc and y′ = y.
Part 2: It follows from part 1 that the after-value of y, i.e., y′, depends
only on the before-value of y for all y ∈Xc. Hence, Xc ⊲ D̂(`) = Id holds.
Note: Since x is either a variable or a list of variables in X̂(`), the proof
given above also covers the case where C` ≜ x1 ∶= E1 ∥ x2 ∶= E2, where
x1, x2 are simply items within the list x ∈ X̂(`).
Part 1:
Case C` ≜ x1 ∶= E1 [] x2 ∶= E2, then:




2 are members of list x and x
′ respectively.)
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prdx,y(x1 ∶= E1[]x2 ∶= E2) ⇔ ¬[x1 ∶= E1[]x2 ∶= E2](x′, y′ ≠ x, y)⇔ ¬([x1 ∶= E1 [] x2 ∶= E2](x′, y′ ≠ x, y))⇔ ¬([x1 ∶= E1](x′1, y′ ≠ x1, y) ∧ [x2 ∶= E2](x′2, y′ ≠ x2, y))⇔ ¬((x′1, y′ ≠ E1, y) ∧ (x′2, y′ ≠ E2, y))⇔ (x′1, y′ = E1, y) ∨ (x′2, y′ = E2, y)⇔ (y′ = y) ∧ ((x′1 = E1) ∨ (x′2 = E2))
Again, we see in this case that for all y ∈Xc, Σ ≡y Σ′ holds.
Part 2: By induction on part 1, part 2 trivially holds.
The foregoing proof of Theorem 3 shows that whenever a variable y is not
updated in a substitution S, then y is independent of any updated variable
x in all stores of S. Thus y must be equivalent in all stores of S, i.e.,
∀x ∈ X̂(`), ∀y ∈Xc, ∀σ1 ∈ Σ, σ2 ∈ Σ′, xD̂(`)y ⇒ σ1(y) = σ2(y).
Since it is straightforward to extend the proofs given above to other GSL
constructs by structural induction, we now look at a related aspect of cor-
rectness of our information flow analysis framework, the semantic signifi-
cance of which is that stores equivalent with respect to the set of variables
on which an updated variable(s) depend(s) in a machine are also equivalent
with respect to the updated variable(s) on termination of the machine. That
is, the after-values of the updated variable(s) are the same in both stores
if the sets of variables the updated variable(s) depend on are equivalent in
both stores.
This semantic essence is recorded in Theorem 4 below. (Note: we write ≈x
to abbreviate ≈{x}):
Theorem 4 (Store Independence (GSL)). Suppose (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`, given that
Dx = D̂(l)(x) denotes the set of variables upon which x depends at l, and≈x denotes equivalence on sets of stores wrt x, then, for all x ∈ X̂(`):
if (σ1 ≈Dx σ2) then ∀y ∈ (Dx ∪Xc), prdx,y(C`) ⇒ σ′1 ≈x σ′2
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PROOF:
Given that x ranges over the variables updated in the substitution C`, i.e.,
x ∈ X̂(`); and y ranges over independent variables in C`, i.e., y ∈ Xc.
Note that since x ∈ X̂(`) and Xc are mutually exclusive, clearly ∀y ∈ Xc
if Σ1 ≈Xc Σ2 then Σ′1 ≈x Σ′2 with respect to Xc. Hence, it suffices to
prove Theorem 4 with respect to y ∈ Dx as shown below. Now, assume∀σ1 ∈ Σ, σ2 ∈ Σ, xD̂(`)y ⇒ σ1(y) = σ2(y). We prove Theorem 4 by cases
on the shape of C`.
Case skip ∶ Trivially holds since Dx ⊇ Id - - Table 3.4b
Case (x ∶= E)` ∶ Trivial since Dx ⊇ Id[x↦ FV (E)] and∀y ∈ FV (E), Σ1 ≈FV (E) Σ2 ⇒ σ1(y) = σ2(y) - - Table 3.4b
Case ( aC`11 [] aC`22 )` ∶ Let C` ≡ ( aC`11 [] aC`22 )`
Now, suppose by contradiction that:
xD̂(`)y ⇒ σ1(y) ≠ σ2(y) and prdx,y(C`) ⇏ σ′1 ≈x σ′2.
From Table 3.4b, we recall that our flow analysis of ( aC`11 [] aC`22 )` yields
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ D̂(`2). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n ranging over labels, we generalise this
over a finite (bounded) choice between n substitutions, i.e., D̂(`) ⊇ n⋃
i=1 D̂(`i).
Given that σ′1, σ′2 ∈ Σ′. It follows that for all aC`ii ∶
xD̂(`i)y ⇒ σ′1(y) ≠ σ′2(y). Contradiction, by Theorem 3.
Also, recall that prdx,y(C)⇔ ¬[C](x, y ≠ x′, y′).
Now if prdx,y(C`) ⇏ σ′1 ≈x σ′2, it follows that:
prdx,y(C`) ⇒ [C](x, y ≠ x′, y′).
This too is a contradiction by the definition of prdx,y(C`) - - Formula 3.2
Thus ∀y ⋅ xD̂(`)y, if (σ1 ≈Dx σ2) then prdx,y(C`) ⇒ σ′1 ≈x σ′2
Case (IF b1 THEN C l11 ELSIF b2 THEN C`22 ...ELSE C`nn END)`:
If x /∈ X̂(`), the result follows by assignment freedom (Theorem 3).
If x ∈ X̂(`): Recall that D̂(`) ⊇ (X̂(`) × (n−1⋃
i=1 FV (bi))). Hence,
for all y ∈ FV (bi), If x ∈ X̂(`), then xD̂(`)y. That is, the values
of y in σ1 and σ2 are equal (i times, derivations for prdx,y(C`)).
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Note: It is straightforward to extend the proofs given here to other GSL
constructs by structural induction on the abstract syntax tree.
Our analysis framework also prevents termination-sensitive flows, which are
often caused when the termination of a substitution is conditioned on a
high security variable such as when a high security variable is used in the
precondition of a protected substitution (or in the while condition, in im-
plementations). The proof of correctness of this aspect of our analysis, by
cases where substitutions executed in some sets of states can be shown to
always terminate, is presented in Theorem 5. First, though, we introduce
Lemma 3, which we use in the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 3 (Termination of Flow Analysis Framework). For all C` such that(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`, there is always a least fixed point.
As noted in Section 3.4, the information flow analysis framework presented
in this thesis is parametric on the collection of finite variables that may be
assigned to (i.e., X̂(`)), the collection of finite variables that may affect ter-
mination of the statement with label ` (i.e., Ĝ(`)), and a collection of finite
dependency pairs in a substitution S (i.e., D̂(`)). Consequently, the analysis
always has a least fixed point, which implies our analysis terminates always
and yields a result, a set of dependency pairs or constraints. We illustrate
this lemma with the following example:
(PRE p ≠ 0 THEN(IF p = q THEN(x ∶= y +w)`3
ELSE(z Ô⇒ x ∶= 0)`2
END)`1
END)`0
We present in Table 3.6 the finite set of constraints (using Table 3.4) with
respect to our (X̂, Ĝ, D̂) abstraction of the example.
Notice that no matter how many times we iterate over the example as we
collect the constraints, the least fixed point of our information flow analysis
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Lab X̂ Ĝ D̂
`3 {x} ∅ {x↦ y, x↦ w}
`2 {x} ∅ Id[x↦ ∅]
`1 {x} Ĝ(`3) ∪ Ĝ(`2) = ∅ D̂(`3) ∪ D̂(`2) ∪ FV (p = q) ∪ z= {x↦ y, x↦ w,x↦ p, x↦ q, x↦ z}
`0 {x} FV (p ≠ 0) = {p} {x↦ y, x↦ w,x↦ p, x↦ q, x↦ z}
Table 3.6: GSL Abstraction of Example Flow Analysis (Ĝ)
is defined by the finite set of constraints on `0, i.e.,(X̂, Ĝ, D̂) ≜ ({x}, {p}, {x↦ y, x↦ w,x↦ p, x↦ q, x↦ z}).
Theorem 5 (Termination Independence (GSL)). Given that(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`, and writing trm(C`),Σ to mean that C` executed in any state
σ ∈ Σ always terminates, i.e., Lemma 3 holds, then:
(1) If ● /∈ Ĝ(`), then trm(C`),Σ.
(2) If Σ1 ≈Ĝ(`) Σ2 then trm(C`),Σ1 ⇔ trm(C`),Σ2
PROOF:
Note that part 1 indicates that no preconditioned substitution (or iteration
in implementation) is encountered in the substitutions of interest. Hence
proof of part 1 is trivial and straightforward from the semantics, since for
all sets of stores, Σ.(Ĝ(`) = ∅) ⇒ (trm(C`),Σ)
For part 2, we assume ∀y ∈ Ĝ(`) ⋅ (Σ1 ≈y Σ2). By symmetry, it suffices to
prove that trm(C`),Σ1 ⇒ trm(C`),Σ2. We provide the proof for precondi-
tioned substitution and “if-elsif” substitutions here.
Assume trm(C`),Σ1. Then it is left to show that trm(C`),Σ2.
Case (IF b1 THEN C l11 ELSIF b2 THEN C`22 ...ELSE C`nn END)`:
If ● /∈ Ĝ(`), the result is immediate by part 1.
If ● ∈ Ĝ(`), then for 1 ≤ i < n, Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (bi). Hence bi
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evaluates to the same value in both sets of stores, Σ1, Σ2. That is,
given that Σ1 ≈Ĝ(`) Σ2 (from definition), it follows from Theorem 3
that ∀y ∈ Ĝ(`) ⋅ ∀(σ1 ∈ Σ1 ∧ σ2 ∈ Σ2) ⋅ σ1(y) = σ2(y).
Thus the effect of y on all states in both Σ1 and Σ2 is the same.
Since y determines termination of C`, and given that trm(C`),Σ1,
it follows that trm(C`),Σ2 also. Hence trm(C`),Σ1 ⇔ trm(C`),Σ2.
Case (PRE P THEN aC
`1 END): Let C` ≡ (PRE P THEN aC`1 END)`
Since Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (P ), P evaluates to the same value in both sets of
stores. If P evaluates to false, then C` may or may not terminate.
By structural induction on the abstract syntax tree, part 2 either
holds or fails in both sets of stores. If P evaluates to true, then,
by structural induction, part 2 holds in both sets of stores. Now
suppose by contradiction (in either case) that
trm(C`),Σ1 ⇔ ¬trm(C`),Σ2.
This will mean that, for some σ1 ∈ Σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ2, σ′1 ∈ Σ′1,
and σ′2 ∈ Σ′2, ∃z ∈ Ĝ(`) such that σ′1(z) ≠ σ′2(z).
(Note: Recall that Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (P ) )
This implies, by Theorem 4, that there must be some y such that:
xD̂(`)y ∧ σ1(y) ≠ σ2(y)
But since D̂(`) ⊇ X̂(`) × FV (P ), we expect for all y ∈ FV (P ) that:
xD̂(`)y ∧ σ1(y) = σ2(y). (Contradiction indeed)
To prove the last aspect of correctness with respect to our information flow
analysis, namely: every program has an acceptable information flow analysis
and that the constraints have solutions, we first discuss the notion of Model
Intersection Property (MIP), which we will employ in the proof.
Model Intersection Property (aka. Moore Family)
One of the desirable properties of equivalent sets is the Model Intersection
Property, which basically states that a new model can be generated as an
intersection of two known models. That is, given two models M1 ⊧ A and
M2 ⊧ A, then there is a model M3 such that M3 ⊧ A. Simply put, the inter-
section of a set of models of a system is itself also a model of the system. In
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effect, if P denotes predicate symbols, i range over natural numbers between
1 and a finite number n, and ti are terms, then, formally, we have:
M3 ⊧ P (t1, . . . , tn) ⇔ M1 ⊧ P (t1, . . . , tn) ∧M2 ⊧ P (t1, . . . , tn)
Expressed in terms of complete lattices, a subset Y of a complete latticeL = (L,≤) is a Moore family (i.e., satisfies the model intersection property)
if and only if
∀Z ⊆ Y ⋅ ⊓Z ∈ Y
This shows that there is a least subset of Y that satisfies the properties of
complete lattices. This is a useful property that we will use to show that we
can always get a least analysis that satisfies our information flow analysis
framework for GSL.
Given that D1,D2,D3 denote, the finite domains of the models M1,M2,M3,
respectively, an important property of the model intersection property is
that if M3 = M1 ∩M2, then D3 = D1 × D2. This yields the interesting
conclusion that models generated using the model intersection property tend
to be more efficient due to the fact that they cover a larger domain than the
individual component models2 [64]. Thus, whenever it is that a framework
has the model intersection property, then one can be confident that there,
always, is an acceptable model for the framework [36].
Theorem 6 (Model Intersection Property (GSL)). Given (Ĝ1, D̂1) ⊧ C`,
and (Ĝ2, D̂2) ⊧ C`, we assert that (Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C` and for all
substitution, S, the set {(Ĝ, D̂) ∣ (Ĝ, D̂ ⊧ S} is a Moore family, i.e.:
(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C` ⇔ (Ĝ1, D̂1) ⊧ C` ∧ (Ĝ2, D̂2) ⊧ C`
Notice that Theorem 6 basically states that the greatest lower bound of a
set of acceptable models is itself also an acceptable model.
2It is a well known fact that models with larger domains give better guidance in theorem




Using Ĝ⊺ and D̂⊺ to denote the top elements for the components of our
analysis and employing the approach in [36], we define these components as
follows:
Ĝ⊺ = λx ⋅ Ide
D̂⊺ = λx ⋅ Ide × Ide
Note: Since Clark et al has given the model intersection property proofs for
the commands in their imperative While language in [36], we concentrate
our proofs here only on those substitutions that do not correspond to any
of the ones defined in [36].
By straightforward structural induction on Theorem 6, we can see that(Ĝ⊺, D̂⊺) ⊧ C`, since for all substitution, C`, we have{(Ĝ, D̂) ∣ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`}.
Now, it is sufficient to show in all cases, without loss of generality, that
(Ĝ1, D̂1) ⊧ C` ∧ (Ĝ2, D̂2) ⊧ C` ⇒ (Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`
In a number of the following cases we will be employing the set-theoretic
property of distributivity of some symbol, e.g., union (∪) over intersection
(∩). For clarity, we illustrate in Figure 3.2 the correctness of the axiom
(where ∩ denotes ⊓):
A1 ∪B1 ∩A2 ∪B2 ⊇ (A1 ∩A2) ∪ (B1 ∩B2),
We now begin with the proof case for multiple substitution.
Case ((x1 ∶= E1)`1 ∥ (x2 ∶= E2)`2)`: By induction hypothesis, for i = 1,2
(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`ii




A1 ∪B1 ∩A2 ∪B2
A1 B1
A2 B2
A1 ∩A2 B1 ∩B2
(a) : A1 ∪B1 ∩ A2 ∪ B2 (b) : A1 ∪B1 ∩ A2 ∪ B2 ≡ A1 ∩A2 ∪ B1 ∩ B2
Figure 3.2: Model Intersection Illustration
we have:
D̂1(`) ∩ D̂2(`) ⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∪ D̂1(`2)) ∩ (D̂2(`1) ∪ D̂2(`2))
(by distributivity of union over intersection)⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∩ D̂2(`1)) ∪ (D̂1(`2) ∩ D̂2(`2)) ◻
à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à
Next, we give the proof case for guarded substitution.
Case (QÔ⇒C`11 )`: By the induction hypothesis, for i = 1, 2(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`11
Recall that from Table 3.4b, for multiple substitution, Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1). Hence,
we have:
Ĝ1(`) ∩ Ĝ2(`) ⊇ (Ĝ1(`1) ∩ Ĝ2(`1)) - trivially holds
Similarly, since from Table 3.4b, D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) ×FV (Q)), we have:
D̂1(`) ∩ D̂2(`) ⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (Q))) ∩(D̂2(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (Q)))
(by distributivity of union over intersection)⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∩ D̂2(`1)) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (Q)) ◻
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à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à
We now give the proof case for protected substitution, which has the poten-
tial to abort.
Case (P ∣ C`11 )`: By the induction hypothesis, for i = 1, 2(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`11
In the case when ● /∈ Ĝ(`), then from Table 3.4b, Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1). Hence, we
have:
Ĝ1(`) ∩ Ĝ2(`) ⊇ (Ĝ1(`1) ∩ Ĝ2(`1)) - trivially holds
Also, from Table 3.4b, D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (P )), so by induction
from case QÔ⇒ C`1 , we have:
D̂1(`) ∩ D̂2(`) ⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∩ D̂2(`1)) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (P ))
However, in the case when ● ∈ Ĝ(`), then, by Table 3.4b,
(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2) ⊇ FV (P )
Thus:
(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2)(`1) ⊇ {●}
Ĝ1(`1) ⊇ {●} or Ĝ2(`1) ⊇ {●}, or both.
Now, if
Y = {(Ĝ, D̂) ∣ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`},
Then, for all i = 1, 2:
Y = {(Ĝi, D̂i) ∣ (Ĝi, D̂i) ⊧ C`} ◻
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à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à
We follow with the proof case for bounded choice.
Case (C`11 []C`22 )`: By the induction hypothesis, for i = 1,2(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`ii
Since from Table 3.4b, for the choice operation, Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`1) ∪ Ĝ(`2), we
have:
Ĝ1(`) ∩ Ĝ2(`) ⊇ (Ĝ1(`1) ∪ Ĝ1(`2)) ∩ (Ĝ2(`1) ∪ Ĝ2(`2))
(by distributivity of union over intersection)⊇ (Ĝ1(`1) ∩ Ĝ2(`1)) ∪ (Ĝ1(`2) ∩ Ĝ2(`2))
Similarly, since from Table 3.4b, D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`1) ∪ D̂(`2), we have:
D̂1(`) ∩ D̂2(`) ⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∪ D̂1(`2)) ∩ (D̂2(`1) ∪ D̂2(`2))
(by distributivity of union over intersection)⊇ (D̂1(`1) ∩ D̂2(`1)) ∪ (D̂1(`2) ∩ D̂2(`2)) ◻
à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à
Case (IF b1 THEN C`11 ELSIF b2 THEN C`22 . . . ELSE C`nn END)`:
Since our Ĝ and D̂ components operate on GSL, and hence Ĝ and D̂ are
finite, it is safe to restrict Ide and Lab to the identifiers and labels appear-
ing in the program. Hence, we assume some finite natural number n where
i range over {1..n}. By the induction hypothesis, for i such that 0 < i ≤ n,(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2, D̂1 ⊓ D̂2) ⊧ C`ii
In the case when ● /∈ Ĝ(`), then from Table 3.4b, Ĝ(`) ⊇ n⋃
i=1 Ĝ(`i)
For all i such that 1 < i ≤ n,
Ĝi−1(`) ∩ Ĝi(`) ⊇ (Ĝi−1(`i−1) ∪ Ĝi−1(`i)) ∩ (Ĝi(`i−1) ∪ Ĝi(`i))
(by distributivity of union over intersection)⊇ (Ĝi−1(`i−1) ∩ Ĝi(`i−1)) ∪ (Ĝi−1(`i) ∩ Ĝi(`i))
Also, from Table 3.4b, D̂(`) ⊇ n⋃
i=1 D̂(`i) ∪ (X̂(`) × n−1⋃i=1 FV (bi))
By induction on the case for Ĝi−1(`) ∩ Ĝi(`), we can safely conclude that
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D̂i−1(`)∩ D̂i(`) also holds for all i such that 1 < i < 2n - (since total D̂ pairs
= 2n − 1).
However, in the case when ● ∈ Ĝ(`), then, by Table 3.4b,
(Ĝ1 ⊓ Ĝ2) ⊇ n−1⋃
i=1 FV (bi), and for all i such that 1 < i ≤ n:
(Ĝi−1 ⊓ Ĝi)(`i−1) ⊇ {●} ∨ (Ĝi−1 ⊓ Ĝi)(`i) ⊇ {●}
Thus, either:
Ĝi−1(`i−1) ⊇ {●} ∨ Ĝi(`i−1) ⊇ {●}
or
Ĝi−1(`i) ⊇ {●} ∨ Ĝi(`i) ⊇ {●}
or both. Now suppose
Y = {(Ĝ, D̂) ∣ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`},
Then, for all i such that 1 < i ≤ n:
Y = {(Ĝi, D̂i) ∣ (Ĝi, D̂i) ⊧ C`},
i.e.,
n⊓
i=1Y = {(Ĝi, D̂i) ∣ (Ĝi, D̂i) ⊧ C`}
And this we can rewrite as:
n⊓
i=1Y = (Ĝ⊺, D̂⊺) ⊓ (Ĝ1, D̂1) ⊓ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊓ (Ĝn, D̂n) ◻
à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à
Note: The SELECT . . .WHEN substitution can be translated into an
IF . . .ELSIF substitution, hence there is no need to prove the model in-
tersection property with respect to the SELECT . . .WHEN substitution.
Also, the proof case for other substitutions defined in our GSL semantics,
such as unbounded choice (ANY) substitutions, can be derived as a com-
bination of some of the proofs already given here.
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With the foregoing, we have proved, using the model intersection property,
that a least analysis exists for our information flow analysis framework for
GSL, hence, it is always possible to derive acceptable information flow anal-
ysis solutions to any well-formed GSL3. The fact that a least analysis exists
for our analysis framework also proves that the analysis terminates. Clark
et al [36] suggested for further investigation the matter of whether more
efficient solutions could be found for their information flow analysis frame-
work. We suggest one such efficient solution in Section 3.5 where we enhance
our information flow analysis framework for GSL with a variant of Reaching
Definitions Analysis that we term Reaching Dependencies Analysis. In the
following subsection, though, we extend the flow analysis given for the while
command in [36] to the substitution in B implementation.
3.4.2 Flow Analysis of Implementation Substitutions
We adopt the information flow analysis of sequential commands given by
Clark et al in [36], since it is analogous to the flow analysis of sequential sub-
stitutions in B implementations. The same is true for IF. . . ELSE. . . END
substitutions. However, since the definition of a while substitution in B im-
plementation is slightly different from the while command defined in [36],
we present below a B while substitution and its flow analysis.
The definition of B while substitution differs from the one given by [36]
only in that two additional keywords: INVARIANT and VARIANT are
added to the syntax. The only extra work required to analyse B while substi-
tutions is the addition of flows from the free variables in the INVARIANT,
J, and the VARIANT, V, to our flow constraints, as shown below. Hence,
using the notation given in Table 3.1, we simply present without proof the
flow analysis for B while substitutions, since the proof given by Clark et al
in [36] is sufficient.
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (WHILE b DO C`11 INV ARIANT J V ARIANT V )`
3Notice in the given derivations that the conclusion in each case of the GSL constructs
shown above, the resulting constraints definition is an acceptable model. (Compare deriva-
tion results with corresponding entries in Table 3.4b for each construct.)
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⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`11 ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ {●} ∪ FV (b) ∪ Ĝ(`1) ∪ Ĝ(`); D̂(`1) ∪
FV (J) ∪ FV (V ) ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ Id ∪ (D̂(`); D̂(`1)) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (b))(X̂(`) × FV (J)) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (V ))
3.5 Optimisation of GSL Flow Analysis with
Reaching Dependencies Analysis
There are often cases where a variable x ∈ X̂ is redefined within a program.
For example, in the program: x ∶= 7; y ∶= 1;while(x > 1) do y ∶= x ∗ y ; x ∶=
x − 1 end, which calculates the factorial of x, on first entry into the loop, y
takes the value 1, whereas on subsequent iterations, the value of y carried
over from the assignment y ∶= 1 is redefined as x∗y. In such cases, whenever
we determine during the parsing of the substitution’s abstract syntax tree
that a variable x ∈ X̂ is redefined (or updated) within a sequence of sub-
stitutions, we can optimise our information flow analysis for GSL by only
collecting the last of such redefined pairs of dependencies in the D̂ compo-
nent of our framework. This will enable us to still correctly analyse secure
programs, but without collecting redundant constraints in D̂. Notice that
this approach, rather than being an alternative, is an enhancement of the
flow analysis framework introduced in this thesis.
We pointed out in Section 2.2.2.10 that the flow analysis approach intro-
duced by Clark et al [36], on which we base our framework in this thesis,
is flow sensitive, i.e., programs that could otherwise be judged insecure by
many security type systems are correctly judged secure. For example, given
a lattice ordering where y /⊑ x, the substitution x ∶= y + 1;x ∶= 0 will be
correctly analysed as secure, since the secret flow from y into x has been
overwritten by a subsequent substitution to x, which is secure. Now, rather
than collect the D̂ constraint for x ∶= y+1, only to overwrite it later with the
D̂ constraint for x ∶= 0, our proposed optimisation approach will make the
analysis leaner, by ignoring the dependencies of overwritten variables and
only collecting the D̂ for the last instance where the variable is redefined.
Hence, in this example, without loss of the flow-sensitivity property of our
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flow analysis framework, we will simply collect only the D̂ constraint for
x ∶= 0. For another example, suppose we have a two-level security lattice,L = ⟨L,⊑⟩, where H,L ∈ L ⋅H /⊑ L, and x, y, z ∈ Ide ⋅ {x ↦ L, y ↦ L, z ↦ H}.
Again, notice that, based on this security classification, the following pro-
gram is secure although the subprogram y ∶= z + 1 is insecure.
x ∶= 7;
y ∶= z + 1;
while(x > 1) do
y ∶= y ∗ x;
x ∶= x − 1
end;
y ∶= 0
(Note: A high security variable, z, flows into a low security vari-
able, y, in the second assignment, and this value can be deduced
by backtracking the final value of y on termination of the loop,
if there is no further assignment to y. However, the value of y
is later overwritten by the assignment y ∶= 0, hence the output
of y in all runs of the program, in an imperative, noninteractive
uniprocessing setting, is always 0. Thus, the overall program is
secure.)
Notice, though, that the variable y is updated three times in the program:
once before the while loop, once within the while loop, and once after.
Clearly, whatever insecure information might have interfered with y in the
first two redefinitions of y will have been overwritten by the last substitu-
tion to y before the program terminates. So, in our setting where parallel
processing of subprograms is not allowed, we can save some work by only
collecting the D̂ constraint for y ∶= 0 in this example, which is ∅ (provided
that y has not been saved internally or copied to another variable). Notice
here, too, that the removal of redefined X̂ members from our D̂ constraints
does not limit the flow-sensitivity functionality of our analysis framework.
This approach of removing D̂ pairs for overwritten variables, termed Reach-
ing Dependencies Analysis, relates closely to the notion of Reaching Defini-
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tions Analysis4 as discussed by Hankin and the Nielsons in [64]. Reaching
Definitions Analysis is built on the notions of elementary program blocks
and program points. The term ‘elementary blocks’ refer to assignments,
tests, and skip statements [64], which constitute the most elementary build-
ing blocks of programs. These elementary program blocks are individually
labeled, and written within square brackets. Hence, Listing 3.8 below shows
a program broken into its elementary program blocks:
[x ∶= 7]`1 ; [y ∶= 1]`2 ; while[x > 1]`3 do [y ∶= x∗y]`4 ; [x ∶= x−1]`5 end (3.8)
In our formalism of Reaching Dependencies Analysis, however, we use the
term semantic program blocks to refer to the GSL semantics defined in Table
3.2 earlier. The motivation for this is because the GSL semantic blocks in
Table 3.2 constitute the smallest blocks for analysing possibilistic informa-
tion flow in the GSL setting. Further, we aim to develop an optimisation
of our information flow analysis framework, not an alternative framework,
hence it is necessary to use the same semantic blocks used in developing our
information flow constraints in Table 3.4b. Thus, for example, Listing 3.8,
above could be re-written in terms of its semantic program blocks as shown
in Listing 3.9 below:
[x ∶= 7]`1 ; [y ∶= 1]`2 ; [while(x > 1) do [y ∶= x ∗ y]`4 ; [x ∶= x − 1]`5 end]`3
(3.9)
The authors [64] used the notion of program point to refer to the entry or
exit to/from an elementary program block since ‘Definitions’ means ‘assign-
ments’ (or in GSL terminology: Simple substitutions). Correspondingly, in
our framework, a program point refers to the entry or exit to/from a se-
mantic program block. The intuition here is to, without loss of generality,
be able to collect flow constraints in terms of the semantic program blocks
of the GSL. Thus, whereas reaching definitions analysis collects, for each
program point, assignments (or simple substitutions) that may have been
made and not overwritten when program execution reaches that point, our
extension of this concept to the notion of reaching dependencies analysis
collects, for each program point, the sets of pairs of variable dependencies,
D̂, where the assigned variable(s) have not been overwritten, thereby cap-
4An information flow analysis which statically determines which definitions (or assign-
ment) may reach (i.e., not overwritten up to) a given point in a program.
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turing only live dependencies up to that point. Hence we build the reaching
dependencies analysis enhancement of our original framework on the core
notion that:
A semantic program block of the form [P ∣@x′ ⋅ (QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′)]`
may reach a certain program point if there is an execution of
the program where x was last assigned a value at ` when the
program point is reached [64].
This can be semi-formally expressed in terms of two functions, namely:
à overwrite(x), which collects all variables x ∈ X̂ that are subsequently
overwritten within the program, and
à killRedef(x), which removes all redefined variables, leaving only those
variables x ∈ X̂ not redefined in the program for analysis with respect
to D̂, provided the redefined variable(s) have not been stored first,
e.g., as in the swap/overwrite sequence x ∶= a + 1; y ∶= x;x ∶= b − 1, in
which case the variable a indirectly flows into y before x is overwritten,
hence we need to collect D̂ with respect to the first update of variable
x also.
Given that Blocks is a set of all semantic program blocks in the system,
spb1, spb2 ∈ Blocks are individual semantic program blocks where spb1 ap-
pears before spb2 (denoted spb1 ò spb2) in the execution sequence, and x
′, x′′
are fresh variables, we define overwrite(x) in normal form as follows:
Given that ò∗ denotes 1 or more sequence(s) of semantic blocks over
which i ranges:
spb1 = P1∣@x′ ⋅ (Q1 Ô⇒ x = x′), and
spb2 = P2∣@x′′ ⋅ (Q2 Ô⇒ x = x′′),
if
spb1 ò
∗ spb2 ∧ (∀spbi ∈ Blocks ⋅spb1 ò spbi∧∄y ∈ X̂ ⋅(y, x) ∈ D̂)
then
overwrite(x) ≜ {x ∣ spb1 ò spb2}
To define killRedef(x), for all x ∈ X̂, we suppose there is a function last(x)
that records the last occasion the variable x is rewritten in the sequence
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of blocks spb1 ò
∗ spb2. Although we do not provide a formal definition
for last(x) here, in practice, while parsing the abstract syntax tree of the
program using C++ for example, it is a simple thing to reference the last
element in a vector used to incrementally record redefined variables in X̂.
Thus we simply define killRedef(x) here as yielding one of the two cases
below:
∀x ∈ X̂, killRedef(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∅, if overwrite(x) = ∅
last(x), if overwrite(x) ≠ ∅
The second case basically records only the dependency pairs D̂ in the last
semantic block wherein a variable is overwritten for the last time in a se-
quence of blocks.
Consequently, writing RD(`) to denote the reaching dependencies of the
program labeled `, we semi-formally express the notion of reaching depen-
dencies analysis in terms of the functions overwrite(x) and killRedef(x) as
follows:
RD(`) = D̂(`), where P ∣@x′ ⋅ ((QÔ⇒ x ∶= x′′) ∧ killRedef(x))
For example, in our running example, we say that [x ∶= 7]`1 reaches the entry
to [y ∶= 1]`2 . This notion is formally captured as an abstraction, mapping
labels to dependencies, i.e., for all ` ∈ Lab, RD ∈ Lab → D̂. Thus, we more
formally write ‘(`1, D̂(`1)) reaches the entry to `2’.
Let Blocks denote the set of semantic program blocks in a sequence of
substitutions S; and let “?” denote uninitialised variables. We introduce
some constructor functions for use in the reaching dependencies analysis,
but first, we define Blocks in terms of S as follows:
Blocks ⊆ P(S)
The functions we introduce here include:
à An initialisation function, initRD, which is used to record the set of
dependencies at the beginning of a semantic program block. In the
case where there are no preceding blocks (or where x ∈ X̂ is assigned
a constant), the initRD of the current block defaults to ∅, otherwise,
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if unknown or uninitialised, (e.g. where S is a sub-program of a larger
system whose D̂ is unknown to S), it defaults to the special character
“?”. Formally, we define initRD as follows:∀B` ∈ Blocks, initRD ∈ Lab→ P(Ide × Ide)
(since D̂ ∈ Ide × Ide)
i.e., initRD(`) = P(Ide × Ide)
à The next function, KillRD, records overwritten (or destroyed) substi-
tutions as a powerset of variable dependency pairs for every x ∈ X̂
overwritten in the labeled program block of interest, thus,∀B` ∈ Blocks, killRD ∈ Lab→ P(Ide × Ide)
i.e., killRD(`) = P(Ide × Ide)
Notice that in our context, the subscript RD refers to reaching depen-
dencies, and not reaching definitions as in [64]. The intuition behind
our definition is that whenever a new substitution is made to a variable
in a block, then we do not need to consider earlier flows to that vari-
able within the program in our analysis, since these dependencies do
not propagate to the output of the program, provided the earlier flows
to the said variable(s) have not been stored elsewhere. The removal
of such overwritten variables and their dependencies, D̂, streamlines
our analysis. Formally, given that B`1 ,B`2 ∈ Blocks denote semantic
program blocks whereby `1, `2 ∈ Lab; B`1 initially assigns a value to
x, and this value was later overwritten within B`2 , we express killRD
as follows:
Given that S = . . .B`1 ∪B`2 ∶
killRD(`2) = {(x, ?)} ∪ D̂(`1)
à We also introduce a function, genRD, which collects all dependency
pairs that are generated by the block under consideration. This func-
tion has the same signature as killRD defined earlier, hence, formally,
genRD is defined as follows:∀B` ∈ Blocks, genRD ∈ Lab→ P(Ide × Ide)
i.e., genRD(`) = P(Ide × Ide)
Given, for example, that S = [x ∶= y + z]`1 ; [w ∶= v − 1]`2 , then
genRD(`1) = {(x, y), (x, z)}, and genRD(`2) = {(w, v)}.
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Table 3.7 summarise killRD and genRD in terms of GSL semantic
program blocks.
à The next function on labels that we introduce here, finalRD, records
the set of all possible dependencies after execution of a semantic pro-
gram block, and this is formally defined, in similar fashion to initRD,
as follows:∀B` ∈ Blocks, finalRD ∈ Lab→ P(Ide × Ide)
i.e., finalRD(`) = P(Ide × Ide)
The function finalRD is computed from the preceding functions as
shown below
finalRD = (initRD − killRD) ∪ genRD
We present a summary of the application of both initRD() and finalRD()
to GSL semantic blocks in Table 3.8
To complete our information flow analysis we require a transfer func-
tion, which will need to operate on flows between GSL statements
(or, more specifically, semantic program blocks). Given that Stmt
denotes a set of GSL statements, such that for all GSL substitutions,
S, S ∈ Stmt; and writing flow(S) to denote the transfer function
between sub-statements of the GSL S, we model the function flow as:∀S ∈ Stmt, flow ∈ Stmt→ P(Ide × Ide)
i.e., flow(S) = P(Ide × Ide)
It must be acknowledged that further work is required to hone our proposed
reaching dependencies analysis optimisation of the information flow frame-
work discussed in this thesis. However, the intuition behind the approach
and the initial work reported in this thesis is promising. In the meantime, we
focus in the next section on the development of security conditions for GSL




Semantic Block killRD() genRD()
[skip]` ∅ ∅
[x ∶= E]`2 {(x, ?)} ∪ D̂(`1) {(x, v) ∣ v ∈ Ide∧
v ∈ FV (E)}[QÔ⇒ C]` killRD(`) genRD(`)
[P ∣ C]` killRD(`) genRD(`)
[@z ⋅ (z ∈ U)Ô⇒ C]` killRD(`) genRD(`)
[@z ⋅QÔ⇒ C]` killRD(`) genRD(`)
[IF b THEN C`11 ELSE C`22 ]` killRD(`1) ∪ killRD(`2) genRD(`1) ∪ genRD(`2)
[C`11 []C`22 ]` killRD(`1) ∪ killRD(`2) genRD(`1) ∪ genRD(`2)
Table 3.7: Killed and Generated Dependencies
3.6 Security Conditions for GSL Specifications and
Refinements
We discussed noninterference and its extension to generalised noninterfer-
ence (to deal with secure information flow in nondeterministic and/or non-
terminating systems) in Section 2.2.2. In this section, we introduce secu-
rity conditions that guarantee generalised noninterference in the presence
of underspecification, and correspondingly, noninterference in deterministic
systems. We present here our derived semantic and syntactic security con-
ditions and show how each relates to the other.
We introduce a security lattice, L = ⟨L,≤⟩, which we view as having a weak
ordering attribute on non-empty sets of security classes, i.e., an ordering
that is transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric, while also containing both a
minimal5 and a maximal6 element. For example, writing {} to denote the
minimal element and {⊺} the maximal element, with intermediate classes
5Minimal element,  ∈ L: ∀l ∈ L, (l ≤ ) ⇒ (l = ).
6Maximal element, ⊺ ∈ L: ∀l ∈ L, (l ≥ ⊺) ⇒ (l = ⊺).
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Initial/Final Dependencies
Semantic Block initRD() finalRD()
[skip]` ∅ or ? initRD(`)
[x ∶= E]` ∅ or ? initRD(`) ∪ D̂(`)
[QÔ⇒ C`1]` ∅ or ? initRD(`1) ∪ D̂(`)
[P ∣ C`1]` ∅ or ? initRD(`1) ∪ D̂(`)
[@z ⋅ (z ∈ U)Ô⇒ C`1]` ∅ or ? initRD(`1) ∪ D̂(`)
[@z ⋅QÔ⇒ C`1]` ∅ or ? initRD(`1) ∪ D̂(`)
[IF b THEN C`11 ELSE C`22 ]` ∅ or ? initRD(`) ∪ finalRD(`1) ∪
finalRD(`2)[C`11 []C`22 ]` initRD(`1) ∪ initRD(`) ∪ finalRD(`1) ∪
initRD(`2) finalRD(`2)
Table 3.8: Initial and Final Dependencies
denoted {a} and {b}, a security lattice on these elements, as illustrated in
Figure 3.3, can be written as ⟨{ {},{a},{b},{⊺} }, ≤⟩. Basically, L is a
powerset lattice. (Note: we write an ordered pair between angled brackets.)
Thus, formally:
Assuming existence of a minimal and a maximal element in a collection
C of sets of security classes, we define the security lattice L and the
(binary) ordering relation, ≤, on C as:
L = P(C)
≤ = {⟨X,Y ⟩ ∣ (X ∈ C ∧ Y ∈ C) X ⊆ Y }
We then define a multilevel secure system by adding security tags to program
variables in the manner introduced by Denning and Denning [50], [51]. This
we do by defining function mappings from Ide to L such that variables with





Figure 3.3: Lattice ⟨{ {},{a},{b},{⊺} }, ≤⟩ Illustration
allow for the possibility of some variables not being mapped to any security
level, hence, this security mapping function is a partial function. Suppose
classify denotes such a function and ? denotes unclassified, we formally
define classify ∈ Ide→ L, as:
classify = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
{(x, l) ∣ (x ∈ Ide ∧ l ∈ L) x↦ l}, if x is classified{(x, ?) ∣ (x ∈ Ide ∧ ? /∈ L) x↦?}, if x is unclassified
It is easy to see that classify induces an ordering on Ide, hence the mul-
tilevel secure system causes a partitioning of Ide. This point is illustrated,
for example, in Figure 3.4, where we assume the variables v,w, x, y, z are
mapped to the security classes illustrated earlier in Figure 3.3 as shown in
Figure 3.4. Formally, suppose the set of all mappings from Ide to L is de-
noted SC, i.e., SC = Ide × L. Given that x1 ∈ Ide, x2 ∈ Ide, l1 ∈ L, and
l2 ∈ L, we write flowOrder to denote the induced ordering on the domain
of SC, i.e., Ide. First, we define a binary relation, “securely flows into”, on
the domain of SC, denoted ≤L, as follows:
≤L = {(x1, x2) ∣ ((x1, l1) ∈ SC ∧ (x2, l2) ∈ SC) l1 ≤ l2} (3.10)




{x, y} 7→ {a} v 7→ {b}
Figure 3.4: (Induced) Partitioning of Ide by ⟨{ {},{a},{b},{⊺} }, ≤⟩
Intuitively, flowOrder describes the notion that information may flow from
x1 to x2, since x1 is adjudged lower than or equal to x2 by the ≤L ordering.
That is, information in x1 “securely flows into” x2 if and only if the security
class of x1 is lower than or equal to the security class of x2 (i.e., l1 ≤ l2).
Applying this to the example illustrated in Figure 3.4, we have:
Ide = {v,w, x, y, z}, and L = ⟨{ {},{a},{b},{⊺} }, ≤⟩.
Thus flowOrder = {(z, v), (z, x), (z, y), (z,w), (v,w), (x,w), (y,w)}
(Note: We use ≰L to denote the contrapositive ordering relation (i.e., dual)
of ≤L wherefor we write, for example, x ≰L y to mean that “x does not se-
curely flow into y”.)
Given an arbitrary set X ⊆ Ide that satisfies flowOrder, and given that
x ∈ X ranges over updated variables, we define ∀x ∈ X a downward inclu-
sion ordering ↓X, which collects all variables that may “securely flow into”
x as:
↓X = {y ∈ Ide ∣ (∃x ∈X) y ≤L x}
Note: We write ↓ x to abbreviate the downward inclusion defined on the
singleton set {x}, i.e. ↓{x}.
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We also define a ‘downward inclusion complement’, denoted ↓Xc. In con-
trast to ↓X, this corresponds to some {z ∈ Ide ∣ z /∈ ↓X}. This collects all
variables z ∈ Ide mapped to security classes higher than classify(x) as well
as all z ∈ Ide incomparable with x ∈X by the ≤L relation. Thus,
↓Xc = Ide - ↓X
Using these definitions, we now present two syntactic security conditions
based on our GSL abstraction (X̂, Ĝ, D̂) that, if true, guarantees that all
substitutions are secure.
Theorem 7 (Dependency Freedom). We assert that the set of variables
on which x depends, written Dx, is free of any variable(s) with a security
classification higher than classify(x).
Formally, given that X ⊆ Ide, y ∈ ide and y ∈ ↓Xc, then:∀x ∈X ⋅ (Dx ∩ y = ∅) - - C1
Note: Theorem 7 only takes into account, for all x ∈ X̂, flows collected
in D̂. It does not deal with implicit global flows collected in Ĝ that
may affect program termination. Theorem 8 deals with that.
PROOF:
Given that X ⊆ Ide has the ordering flowOrder, we assume (by contradic-
tion) that ∃y ∈ Ide such that y ∈ ↓Xc and y ∈Dx.
By definition of ≤L, for some x1 ∈X and x2 ∈X such that (x1, l1) ∈ SC
and (x2, l2) ∈ SC:
x1 ≤L x2 implies l1 ≤ l2, hence
x1 ≤L x2 implies x1 ∈ ↓x2
Now, if x1 ∈ ↓x2, then x1 /∈ ↓xc2.
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Thus, if y ∈Dx and y ∈ ↓Xc, then:
∃x ∈X ⋅(y ≰L x), i.e., classify(y) ≰ classify(x) - - By definition
Hence our assumption y ∈Dx and y ∈ ↓Xc ia a contradiction!
i.e, ∀x ∈X ⋅ (Dx ∩ y = ∅)
This ends the proof of C1.
Theorem 8 (Termination Freedom). Given that  ∈ L is the minimal el-
ement of L, X ⊆ Ide, and ∀x ∈ X ⋅ (x ↦ ), we assert that whenever
x ∈ (X ∩ X̂), then no variable with a security classification higher than ,
may affect termination.
Formally, given that Xc = {y ∈ Ide ∣ y /∈X}, we have
∀x ∈ (X∩ X̂) ⋅ (Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅) - - C2
Note: Since variables that may affect program termination implicitly flow
into updated variables, Theorem 8 defines the condition that the security
classification of variables that may affect termination (i.e., variables in Ĝ)
must be lower than or equal to the minimal security class of updated vari-
ables, (i.e., ).
PROOF:
Assume x ∈ (X ∩ X̂),
i.e., classify(x) =  and x ∈ X̂ - - by definition
It remains to prove that Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅
Now, suppose (by contradiction) that ∃y ⋅ (y ∈ (Xc ∩ Ĝ)).
If y ∈Xc, it follows that classify(y) ≰ , since y /∈X
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i.e. y ≤L x
Hence if y ∈ Ĝ, it cannot be the case that y ≰L x - - by Theorem 7.
A contradiction indeed!
Hence if x ∈ (X ∩ X̂), then
Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅.
And this ends the proof of C2.
From the foregoing, for any substitution of interest to be adjudged secure, it
has to satisfy both security conditions C1 and C2. The additional benefit of
C2 is that it ensures our information flow analysis framework is termination
sensitive, i.e., it does not leak secret information implicitly as a result of the
termination condition of the substitution.
To develop a semantic security condition that corresponds to GNI, we first
specialise our characterisation of GNI introduced in Definition 2, Section
2.2.2.2 using GSL semantic notation. Recall from Section 2.2.2.2 that the
GNI characterisation given basically means: the set of observable outputs
after the insertion of a secret input into an input sequence is consistent with
the observable output, without the insertion of any secret input. An alter-
native way of stating this is that: given any set of before values of some
low security variables, any modification of the input stream by insertion of
a high security variable (i.e., another set of before values with some high
security variables) must yield some set of after-values that are equivalent to
the after-values of the former. We write Σ1 to denote a set of before states
involving only low security variable inputs, Σh denotes a set of before states,
involving some high security variables, σ1 ∈ Σ1 ranges over Σ1, while σh ∈ Σh
ranges over Σh. Thus, we need to show in our semantic security condition
that given a set L ⊆ Ide of variables,
Σ1 ≈L Σh ⇔ (∀x ∈ L, ∀σh ∈ Σh, ∃σ1 ∈ Σ1 ⋅ (σ1(x) = σh(x)))
Theorem 9 (Generalised Noninterference for GSL). Given that variables
are mapped to the members of a security lattice, L = ⟨L,≤⟩, by the function
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classify introduced earlier and given two sets of states Σ1,Σh, with Σh in-
volving high security variable inputs, we state that a substitution C` satisfies
GNI if,
∀x ∈ X̂ ∧ ∀y ∈ Ide,
if xD̂(`)y then prdx,y(C`)⇒ ((Σ1 ≈y Σh) ∧ (y ≤L x))
Theorem 9 captures the notion that whatever before-state we start from,
there will always be some low security after-state that is feasible and whose
after-values are consistent with that of any set of high security variable after-
values (since the (list of) variable(s) impacting x, i.e., y is/are equivalent
in all states). Hence the observer cannot deduce with certainty that a high
level event has (or has not) occurred.
We provide a proof of our semantic security condition below:
PROOF:
From Theorem 4, we know that ∀y ⋅xD̂(`)y, prdx,y(C`) ⇒ (Σ1 ≈y Σh)
Hence, we are left to show that:∀y ⋅ xD̂(`)y, prdx,y(C`) ⇒ (y ≤L x)
Theorem 7 requires that the set of variables on which x depends be free of
any variable(s) with a security classification higher than that of x. Hence
the observer cannot deduce with certainty that a high level event has (or has
not) occurred. It follows therefore that xD̂(`)y ⇒ (y ≤L x). Recall, too
that prdx,y(C`) basically relates the before values of x and y with their after
values, and the existence of this relation shows that C` terminates. Hence,∀y ⋅ xD̂(`)y, prdx,y(C`) ⇒ (y ≤L x). This ends the proof of Theorem 9.
At this juncture, we desire to show that the syntactic security conditions C1
and C2 imply the semantic security condition (Theorem 9).
PROOF:
Suppose C1 and C2 holds, it remains to prove that Theorem 9 holds, i.e.,
We need to show, given notations defined earlier, that:
(1) ∀x ∈X, ∀z ∈ Ide, if (Dx ∩ z = ∅) then
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(z ≰L x) ∧ (Σ1 ≈x Σ2);
(2) ∀x ∈ (X ∩ X̂), if (Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅) then∀y ∈ Ide ⋅ (y ≤L x), Σ1 ≈y Σ2;
Part 1: We assume ∀x ∈X, ∀z ∈ Ide, Dx ∩ z = ∅ holds. - - Theorem 7:
It follows therefore that: z ∈ ↓Xc.
It also follows from Formula 3.10 that: z /≤L x
Hence ∀x ∈X, ∀z ∈ Ide, if (Dx ∩ z = ∅) then z /≤L x
We are now left to show that:∀x ∈X, ∀z ∈ Ide, if (Dx ∩ z = ∅) then Σ1 ≈x Σ2;
But if Dx ∩ z = ∅, then whatever value x is mapped to, ∀σ ∈ Σ, is
independent of z. Hence:∀σ ∈ Σ1, ∃σ2 ∈ Σ2 ⋅ (σ1(x) = σ2(x)) - - Formulae 3.5, 3.6∴ ∀x ∈X, ∀z ∈ Ide, if (Dx ∩ z = ∅) then (z ≰L x) ∧ (Σ1 ≈x Σ2).
This ends Part 1 of proof, which indicates that the syntactic security con-
dition C1 implies the semantic security condition articulated in Theorem 9.
Part 2: ∀x ∈ (X ∩ X̂), we assume (Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅) holds
We are left to show that:∀y ∈ Ide ⋅ (y ≤L x), (Σ1 ≈y Σ2) holds
Suppose x ∈ Ĝ, then by Theorem 5, Σ1 ≈Ĝ(`) Σ2, thus Σ1 ≈x Σ2
Recall that X collects the variables mapped to the minimal element
of the security lattice L - - Theorem 8
And ∀x ∈X, if y ≤L x, it follows that y ∈X - - Formula 3.10
Hence Σ1 ≈y Σ2
Also since x ∈X, then x /∈Xc. (Ditto y). And since x ∈ Ĝ (by our
assumption), clearly: Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅∴ if (Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅) then∀y ∈ Ide ⋅ (y ≤L x), Σ1 ≈y Σ2
This ends Part 2 of proof, which indicates that the syntactic security con-
dition C2 implies the semantic security condition articulated in Theorem 9.
191
Note: As discussed in Section 3.4.1, our information flow analysis frame-
work collects all possible flows of information between variables in a B devel-
opment. As we have just discussed here, applying both security conditions
C1 and C2, ensures that both explicit flows (captured by C1; applied to D̂)
and termination-sensitive implicit flows (captured by C2; applied to Ĝ) are
prevented, and only machines with flows satisfying defined security policies
are committed. The most critical safety concern with respect to information
flow is adjudging an insecure program secure, often termed: false negative.
Since, as noted, our X̂, Ĝ, D̂ abstraction is an over-approximation over all
possible flows (Section 3.4.1), which are then checked by C1 and C2, it is
inconceivable that any false negative case could arise within our analysis.
Hence, on the basis of this safety condition, our information framework is
okay. A somewhat less critical safety condition is adjudging a secure pro-
gram insecure, termed: false positive. This leads to false alarms that may
result in lost time and effort trying to fix a non-existent problem. Since
both C1 and C2 ensure that only the values of variables with security classi-
fication lower than or equal to the security classification of some x ∈ X̂ may
flow into x, only variables outside that set are adjudged insecure. Hence, a
false positive case cannot arise.
Having discussed the relationship between the semantic and syntactic secu-
rity conditions of GSL, we present in the following section a hypothetical
example of how our optimised information flow analysis works.
3.7 Example Information Flow Analysis for GSL
In this section we present an example showing how our analysis framework
detects flows within program constructs, and determines whether such flows
are secure or insecure.
Given that z is a predicate; p, q,w, x, y are integer variables,
Ide = {p, q,w, x, y, z}, and the variables are mapped to a two-point lattice,⟨L,≤⟩ =H /≤ L, as follows f(p) = f(w) = f(x) = f(z) = L, and F (q) = f(y) =




y ∶= 0 ;
while(w < 5) do
if(p = q) then
x ∶= y +w
else
z Ô⇒ x ∶= 0
end;
w ∶= w + 1
end;
x ∶= 1
We start our analysis by labeling the various substitutions that make up our
program construct. Thus the program could be re-written as follows:
((w ∶= 0)`1 ;(y ∶= 0)`2 ;(while(w < 5) do((if(p = q) then(x ∶= y +w)`8
else(z Ô⇒ x ∶= 0)`9
end)`6 ;(w ∶= w + 1)`7)`5
end)`3 ;(x ∶= 1)`4)`0
Our first task is to construct D̂(`0), using reaching dependencies analysis.
The procedure for this analysis is detailed in Table 3.9.
We then construct Table 3.10 to derive X̂, and Ĝ of the generalised substi-
tutions for all ` ∈ Lab.
From the results given in Tables 3.9, and 3.10, we get the following abstrac-
tions of the example program and its sub-constructs, using the abstraction
schema (X̂, Ĝ, D̂):
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Blocks Functions Evaluation
`1 initRD(`1) {(w, ?), (y, ?), (x, ?)}
killRD(`1) {(w, ?)}
genRD(`1) {(w,∅)}
finalRD(`1) (initRD(`1) − killRD(`1)) ∪ genRD(`1)= {(w,∅), (y, ?), (x, ?)}
`2 initRD(`2) finalRD(`1) = {(w,∅), (y, ?), (x, ?)}
killRD(`2) {(y, ?)}
genRD(`2) {(y,∅)}
finalRD(`2) (initRD(`2) − killRD(`2)) ∪ genRD(`2)= {(w,∅), (y,∅), (x, ?)}
`3 initRD(`3) finalRD(`2) ∪ finalRD(`3)= {(w,∅, ), (y,∅), (x, ?)} ∪ finalRD(`3)
killRD(`3) killRD(`5) = killRD(`6) ∪ killRD(`7)
killRD(`6) = killRD(`8) ∪ killRD(`9) = {(x, ?), (z, ?)}, and
killRD(`7) = {(w,∅)}, i.e.,
killRD(`5) = {(w,∅), (x, ?), (z, ?)}
genRD(`3) genRD(`5) = genRD(`6) ∪ genRD(`7)
genRD(`6) = genRD(`8) ∪ genRD(`9)
genRD(`8) = {(x, y), (x,w), (x, p), (x, q)}, and
genRD(`9) = {(x, z), (x, p), (x, q)}, hence
genRD(`6) = {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q)}. Also,
genRD(`7) = {(w,∅)}, therefore,
genRD(`5) = {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅)}
finalRD(`3) (initRD(`3) − killRD(`3)) ∪ genRD(`3)= ({(w,∅), (y,∅)} − {(w,∅)}) ∪= {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅)}= {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅),(y,∅)}
`4 initRD(`4) finalRD(`5) = {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅),(y,∅)}
killRD(`4) {(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q)}
genRD(`4) {(x,∅)}
finalRD(`4) (initRD(`4) − killRD(`4)) ∪ genRD(`4)= {(w,∅), (y,∅), (x,∅)}
`0 initRD(`0) initRD(`1) = {(w,∅), (y,∅), (x,∅)}
finalRD(`0) finalRD(`4) = {(w,∅), (y,∅), (x,∅)}





`3 {x,w} Ĝ(`5) ∪ FV (w < 5) = (Ĝ(`6) ∪ Ĝ(`7); D̂(`6)) ∪ FV (w < 5)= ((Ĝ(`8) ∪ Ĝ(`9)) ∪ (Ĝ(`7); D̂(`6)) ∪ FV (w < 5)= ∅ ∪∅ ∪∅ ∪ {w} = {w}
`4 {x} ∅





`0 {w,x, y} Ĝ(`3) ∪ Ĝ(`4); D̂(`3) = {w} ∪ ∅ = {w}
Table 3.10: GSL Abstraction of Example Flow Analysis (Ĝ)
FA(C`) αÐ→ (X̂, Ĝ, D̂)
We have:
FA(`1) ≜ ({w},∅,{(w,∅), (y, ?), (x, ?)})
FA(`2) ≜ ({y},∅,{(w,∅), (y,∅), (x, ?)})
FA(`3) ≜ ({w,x},{w},{(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅), (y,∅)})
FA(`4) ≜ ({x},∅,{(w,∅), (y,∅), (x,∅)})
FA(`5) ≜ ({w,x},∅,{(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q), (w,∅), (y,∅)}})
FA(`6) ≜ ({x},∅,{(x,w), (x, y), (x, z), (x, p), (x, q)})
FA(`7) ≜ ({w},∅,{(w,∅)})
FA(`8) ≜ ({x},∅,{(x,w), (x, y)})
FA(`9) ≜ ({x},∅,{(x, z)})
FA(`0) ≜ ({w,x, y},{w},{(w,∅), (y,∅), (x,∅)})
The last stage of our flow analysis is to check whether `0 satisfies the security
conditions C1 and C2 (in which case the program is secure) or not (in which
case the program is insecure). From the given security classification of the
variables, we can deduce the following with respect to X̂(`0):
Recall that X̂(`0) = {w,x, y}, f(y) =H and f(w) = f(x) = L. Hence
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Low security variables :: ↓{w,x} ⊂ X̂(`0) = {w,x}, and
High security variables :: ↓{w,x}c = {y}
Checking C1 with respect to {a ∈ X̂(`0) ∣ a ∈ classify−1(L)}:∀a ∈ {w,x} ⋅ (Da ∩ ↓{w,x}c) = {w,x} ∩ {y} = ∅
Therefore C1 holds for all a ∈ {w,x}.
Similarly,↓{y} ⊂ X̂(`0) = {w,x, y}, and↓{y}c = ∅
Checking C1 with respect to {b ∈ X̂(`0) ∣ b ∈ classify−1(H)}:∀b ∈ {y} ⋅ (Db ∩ ↓{y}c) = {y} ∩ ∅ = ∅
Therefore C1 holds for all b ∈ {y}.
Conclusion: Since {w,x}∪{y} = X̂(`0), and C1 holds for all a ∈ {w,x}, and
C1 also holds for all b ∈ {y}, it follows that C1 holds for all variables in X̂(`0).
Again, from the security classification, with respect to X̂(`0), X = {w,x},
and Xc = {y}. Thus,
Checking C2:∀a ∈X ⋅ (Xc ∩ Ĝ) = {y} ∩ {w} = ∅
Conclusion: C2 holds.
The results therefore show that the program block labeled `0 is secure since
both C1 and C2 holds.
Discussion:
Our analysis is flow-sensitive and more robust than type-based frameworks
like the Volpano and Smith [130], [76] type system in the literature. Most
type-based systems will reject the program block labeled `0 as insecure,
whereas with the notion of security under consideration being that the ‘ini-
tial value of high security variables may not interfere with the final value of
low-security variables’ (i.e., no intermediate reading of variables is allowed),
`0 is clearly secure although some of its subconstructs are not secure.
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For example, notice from our application of the security conditions to `6
below that `6 on its own is insecure.
X̂(`6) = {x}↓X̂(`6) ⊂ Ide = {x,w, z, p},↓X̂(`6)c = {y, q}, and∀a ∈ X̂(`6), Da = {y,w, z, p, q}
Checking C1:
Da ∩ ↓X̂(`6)c = {y,w, z, p, q} ∩ {y, q} = {y, q}.
i.e., Da ∩ ↓X̂(`6)c ≠ ∅
Conclusion: `6 fails C1.
Since both security conditions must be satisfied for secure information flow
to be guaranteed, there is no need to check for C2. Thus, we conclude that
`6 is insecure since it fails C1.
When `6 is embedded within the program block `0, as in our example, how-
ever, the insecurity implicit in `6 does not impact on what an adversary
is able to learn about the initial value of any high security variable after
multiple runs of the program. The reason for this is that the alternation
condition p = q does not propagate to the output, i.e., an adversary cannot
deduce which branch of the conditional is taken, since `4 overwrites what-
ever insecure update `6 might have made to x (thus for all runs of `0, the
final value of x is always 1). Hence an adversary is unable to infer either that
p = q or p ≠ q, or whether y flows into x or not when `6 is embedded within `0.
Having illustrated with an example how information flow is analysed using
our reaching dependencies framework, we now follow in Section 3.8 with a
generic distributive analysis framework.
3.8 Analysing Information Flow for GSL using a
Monotone Framework
The reaching dependencies analysis introduced in Section 3.5 can be re-
presented using a generic framework that is unchanging whatever the anal-
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ysis type used. This framework is referred to as monotone framework in the
literature (see Hankin and the Nielsons, [64]). The benefit of such a frame-
work is that it enables the development of generic algorithms independent of
the information flow analysis method used, thereby making the algorithms
more portable. The monotone framework introduced here is designed to
handle forward analysis7, but it can easily be adapted to deal with its dual,
backward analysis,8 as well. We state below the notation used in our mono-
tone framework.
L denotes the complete lattice spanned by the information flow
property space, and is defined as L ∈ P(Ide × Ide).
This property space defines, for each label ` ∈ Lab:
the finite set of all dependency pairs, i.e. P(X̂ × (Dx ∪ Ĝ));
E collects extremal labels, i.e., initial and final sub-labels in a composite
program. Hence, given that S denotes a GSL substitution, E is either
init(S) or final(S); ⊔ means ⋃, ⊔ is ∪ and ⊑ means ≤;
ι ∈ L is an extremal value for the extremal label ` ∈ E;
F collects the flow of information between two labeled semantic program
blocks, i.e., given that S denotes a GSL substitution with two or
more semantic program blocks, then F is flow(S);
f` collects the transfer functions
9 associated with semantic program
blocks, B` ∈ blocks(S), in GSL substitution S, i.e., f` ∈ L→ L;F denotes the set of all monotone functions of interest over L, the
identity function inclusive;
f denotes a mapping from the labels Lab of F and E to dependency
pairs, i.e., transfer functions in F , i.e., f ∈ Lab→ D̂;
Analysiso defines entry conditions to a semantic block, while
Analysis● defines exit conditions to a semantic block.
The monotone framework gets its name from the requirement that the trans-
fer functions are monotone, i.e., given l1, l2 ∈ L, ordered by ⟨L,⊑⟩, then
l1 ⊑ l2 ⇒ f`(l1) ⊑ f`(l2). The ⊑ ordering describes the property that the lhs
precedes the rhs (when used as an infix operator as in l1 ⊑ l2) in L. We have
7The properties of program inputs are used to determine the properties of outputs.
8The properties of program inputs are determined using the properties of outputs.
9In the context of our work, transfer functions capture the cumulative information flow
(dependencies) at each semantic program block.
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the choice of (1) developing either the general iterative algorithm for Mono-
tone Frameworks, termed Maximal Fixed Point (MFP), which computes
the least fixed point of our flow analysis, or (2) using a Meet Over all Paths
(MOP) solution. A MOP solution directly propagates analysis information
from entry point along all possible program paths up to the program point
of interest. We have chosen to use the MFP approach because the property
space satisfies the Ascending Chain Condition10, making the MFP always
computable, whereas the MOP solution does not satisfy this condition, since
generally, there are infinite number of possible paths to a program point,
hence it (MOP) is undecidable [64].
A MFP instance of a monotone framework is defined with the schema:
MFP ≜ (L,F , F,E, ι, f)
Before we can develop a MFP information flow analysis, however, we need
definitions for both Analysiso and Analysis●, and these we present below:
We define the unit of our property set with respect to the least upper bound,⊔, as . This effectively is the least element of the ordered set ⟨L,⊑⟩. Thus
for any l ∈ L, l ⊔  = l, i.e.,  corresponds to the identity for ⊔.
Given that:
ι`E = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ι if ` ∈ E, if ` /∈ E.
We have
Analysiso(`) = ⊔{Analysis●(`′)∣(`′, `) ∈ F} ⊔ ι`E
and
Analysis●(`) = f`(Analysiso(`))
From the foregoing, it follows that if ` /∈ E, then the extremal value, ι`E = .
Intuitively, this indicates that there is no extremal value to add into the
10Defined on a partially ordered set, the ascending chain condition requires that all
increasing sequences of the set eventually become constant, i.e, in a1 ⊑ a2 ⊑ . . . ,∃n ⋅ (an = an+1 = an+2 = . . . ).
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flow analysis, so the analysis defaults to the cumulative analysis up to that
program point, as shown formally below:
Analysiso(`) = ⊔{Analysis●(`′)∣(`′, `) ∈ F} ⊔ = ⊔{Analysis●(`′)∣(`′, `) ∈ F}
Information flow analysis using a monotone framework requires a worklist
algorithm. A worklist, denoted W , is a list of pairs of the elements of the
flow relation F , which indicates a change to the analysis on exit from the
block labeled by the first element of the pair, and hence need to be recalcu-
lated on entry to the block labeled by the second element of the worklist pair
[64]. Given that W = [(`1, `2), (`2, `3), . . . (`n−1, `n)], we define the head of
the list in psuedocode as head(W ) = (`1, `2) and the tail, denoted tail(W ),
means W − head(W ). We write fst(head(W )) to refer to the first element
of the pair in the head, i.e., `1; and snd(head(W )) refers to the second
element in the head, i.e., `2. Adopting a c++ vector
11 data structure, we
write vect(W ) to denote the store for the worklist elements. We also assume
that, like c++ vectors, vect(W ) has no predetermined size, but that it can
be expanded to include any number of pairs of worklist elements, depending
on the number of semantic blocks in the substitution. We assume a built-in
method for updating elements in a worklist, again like in C++, this is writ-
ten for vect(W ) for example, as vect.pushback(. . . ), where ‘ . . . ’ denotes the
element to be added to the vector. The basic intuition behind the worklist
algorithm is to iterate through the list, starting from the start (extremal)
label and capturing the dependency pairs cumulatively until the least fixed
point is reached in the dependency collections.
Now, given that S ≜ C` is a labeled GSL substitution, we present, in pseu-
docode below, an algorithm to solve the information flow equations for S.
Notice that we present the results in a form similar to the flow analysis,
thus MFPo denotes the MFP for the entry to a semantic program block,
whereasMFP● denotes the MFP for the exit from a semantic program block.
11Like arrays, a vector is a container that holds a strictly linear sequence of elements
indexed in much the same way as arrays. The main advantage of vectors over arrays is
that the former is elastic - it can be expanded and contracted as necessary, whereas the
latter is rigid.
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Worklist Algorithm for solving Information Flow Equations
INPUT: An instance of a monotone framework, i.e., (L,F , F,E, ι, f)
OUTPUT: MFPo, MFP●
METHOD: Step 1: Initialisation of W and Analysis
W ∶= nil;
for all (`, `′) ⋅ flow(C`′) in F do
W ∶= vect((`, `′),W );
i.e.,W ∶= vect.pushback((`, `′); //builds vector
for all ` in E or ` ⋅ flow(C`) in F do
if ` ∈ E then Analysis[`] ∶= ι
else Analysis[`] ∶= ;
Step 2: Iteration (updating W and Analysis)
while W ≠ nil do
` ∶= fst(head(W )); `′ ∶= snd(head(W ));
W ∶= tail(W );
if f`(Analysis[`] /⊑ Analysis[`′] then
// ‘⊔’ implicitly removes duplicate dependencies
Analysis[`′] ∶= Analysis[`′]⊔ f`(Analysis[`]);
for all `′′ with (`′, `′′) ∈ F do
W ∶= vect((`′, `′′),W );
Step 3: Presenting the result (MFPo and MFP●)
for all ` in E or ` ⋅ flow(C`) in F do
MFPo(`) ∶= Analysis[`];
MFP●(`) ∶= f`(Analysis[`])
Using the monotone framework described in this section, we can solve the set
of information flow equations derived from the example program discussed
earlier in Section 3.7. The result, presented in Table 3.11, shows the same
conclusion we derived in Section 3.7 (where reaching dependencies analysis
was used), that the program is secure. For convenience, we re-present the
example here, with a slight change to the labeling, and in Table 3.11, we
write ‘?’ to denote undefined value. Notice that iterations 8 and 11 in Table
3.11 show that our analysis satisfies the ascending chain condition.
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[ [w ∶= 0]`1 ;[y ∶= 0]`2 ;[while(w < 5) do[if(p = q) then[x ∶= y +w]`3
else[z Ô⇒ x ∶= 0]`4
end]`5 ;[w ∶= w + 1]`6
end]`7 ;[x ∶= 1]`8 ]`0
3.9 Analysing the Computational Complexity of
GSL Flow Analysis
In this section we analyse the efficiency and scalability of our GSL infor-
mation flow analysis framework in terms of notions of computational com-
plexity, which, counter-intuitively, have no bearing on how complicated (or
complex ) a computational process is, but rather means ‘the amount of work
done’ (or amount of resources used) by a computational process or algo-
rithm [15] [44]. This notion of ‘amount of work done’ can be measured in
terms of speed, memory usage, transmission size (e.g. bandwidth), etc. The
most commonly used complexity measure is the relative speed of an algo-
rithm. This is the measure of the order of growth of the running time of an
algorithm relative to variations in the input size (i.e., performance changes
as the size of input data set increases). Thus, the complexity measure we
employ in this thesis is relative speed. We do not lose any generality by
doing this, because the same principles employed in the order of growth
of running time can be easily modified for order of growth of memory (or
bandwidth) usage, or other metrics [44]. We will also be analysing the ‘rate
of growth’ relative to increased data size to determine the scalability of our
information flow analysis.
The metrics that we used to capture the precise time for our GSL flow anal-
ysis to complete its tasks include input size, number of basic operations
based on particular inputs, number of steps within operations, etc. To cal-
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Flow ANALYSIS USING MONOTONE ∶ FRAMEWORK
Iter Analysis[`] for ` i.e., FA(C`)
W `1 `2 `3 `4 `5 `6 `7 `8 `0
1 nil ∅ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2 ((`1, `2),W ) ∅ ∅ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
3 ((`2, `3),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ? ? ? ? ? ?(x,w)]
4 ((`2, `4),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ ? ? ? ? ?(x,w)]
5 ((`2, `5),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), ? ? ? ?(x,w)] (x,w)]
6 ((`5, `6),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), ? ? ?(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
7 ((`2, `7),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), [(x, y), ? ?(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
8∗ ((`7, `2),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), [(x, y), ? ?(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
9 ((`7, `8),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), [(x, y), ∅ ?(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
10 ((`8, `0),W ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), [(x, y), ∅ ∅(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
11∗ ( ) ∅ ∅ [(x, y), ∅ [(x, y), [(x, y), [(x, y), ∅ ∅(x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)] (x,w)]
Table 3.11: Information Flow Analysis using Monotone Framework
culate the computational complexity of our GSL flow analysis, we seek to
capture the ‘worst-case’ time complexity. Once this is done, we can then
confidently conclude that, based on a series of large input values, it is not
the case that any instance of our GSL flow analysis, f(n), will perform
any worse than the worst-case instance, g(n). Hence, since for all possible
inputs, the computational complexity is always less than or equal to (i.e.,
‘tends to’ or ‘approaches’) the worst-case complexity, the worst-case com-
plexity constitutes an asymptotic upper bound to the function on all possible
input values. The notation in the literature for capturing this asymptotic
behaviour of functions, attributed to P. Bachmann in his book Analytische
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Zahlentheorie (“Analytical Number Theory”) in 1892, is termed the ‘ Big-O’
Notation [122] [139]. We present below the formal definition of the Big-O
notation.
Definition 14 (Big-O). Given that n is the size of the input; c, k are positive
integer constants. Let f(n) and g(n) denote two distinct asymptotically non-
negative functions12. Then f(n) ∈ O(g(n)) is defined as ...
O(g(n)) = {f(n) ∣ (∀n ≥ k ∧ c > 0 ∧ k > 0) 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ c.g(n)}
It is worth noting that although the Big-O notation is often written either
as f(n) = O(g(n)), or f(n) ∈ O(g(n)), the notion does not mean either
equality of values or set membership of values as the notation appear to
suggest. An examination of the formal definition given above shows that
what we have is more appropriately described as an approximation of a set
of functions, and not a set of values. The Big-O notation could be graphi-
cally depicted as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Big O Growth Graph
12Asymptotically non-negative functions are functions that are non-negative for all suf-
ficiently large input, n. We consider only ⌊f(n)⌋ here, i.e., f(n) rounded down to the
nearest lower integer value.
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Before we proceed with the measurement of the efficiency and scalability of
our GSL flow analysis, we discuss the model of computation used for our
complexity analysis. This is the subject of Section 3.9.1.
3.9.1 The Random Access Machine (RAM) Model
Recall that our objective is to measure the ‘order of growth’ and the ‘rate of
growth’ of our GSL flow analysis. Hence our primary concern with the choice
of the model of computation used in the complexity analysis is simply that
the estimated amount of work done be roughly proportional to the actual
amount of work done in the GSL flow analysis. To ensure the generality
of our complexity analysis, we also desire that the model be independent
of hardware, operating system, or programming language used. Thus, we
employ an abstract model of computation, somewhat similar to the Turing
machine model. This model is termed the ‘Random Access Machine (RAM)
Model ’. The RAM is a generic uni-processor machine on which instructions
can only be executed sequentially (not concurrently) [44] [15]. Another com-
ponent of the RAM is an unbounded bank of numbered memory cells that
can store some arbitrary data. Retrieving data from any memory cell is
assumed to take one unit of time. Meulen et al in [105] noted that the pro-
cessor here can be likened to the Turing machine’s transition function and
register, whereas the bank of memory cells is akin to the ‘scratch pad’ in
Turing machines.
The RAM is an input-output processing system in that it takes an input
(usually a large input), processes the instructions defined by the algorithm
under analysis, and outputs the cost of the analysis. While it is important
to capture the amount of work done as precisely as necessary, too much
precision will bog down our analysis of the costs of the computation. At the
other extreme, we do not want to be too general either, as the resulting costs
would not be proportional to the actual processing done by the algorithm
[4] [85], [135]. Without loss of generality, we assume that our RAM model
takes as input a semantic program block, which is modified by increasing
the number of primitive instructions involved in the block, and outputs an
integer expression (or value) corresponding to the time cost of the particular
GSL flow analysis under consideration. For ease of comparison, we consider
the input size to be the number of primitive instructions in the semantic
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block under consideration. For example, for a simple substitution, the input
size is the number of variables on the right hand side of an assignment (since
we need to capture these variables in our analysis), whereas for a while
GSL construct, the input size is the number of iterations until the program
terminates. We are now ready to introduce the instructions required to
execute our GSL flow analysis on a RAM, but first, we present below the
notations used here, viz:
à Recall that we write X̂ for variables assigned to, and Dx denotes the
set of variables on which a variable x ∈ X̂ depends. Here, we introduce
Dx Array, which as the name implies, denotes an array in RAM stor-
ing all variables in Dx. Thus, given that i is a non-negative integer
variable, we write Dx Array[i] to denote the variable stored at the(i + 1)th position in the array Dx Array.
à Recall, too, that we write FV (E) to denote the free variables in the
expression E. In addition to that we here use FV (E)0 to denote the
first free variable in E, i.e., the variable at the front of the list
à We write parse(E) to denote a command to read the expression E
à Recall also that we write D̂, Ĝ to denote the set of pairs of variables,
dependencies, and the set of variables that may affect termination,
‘Globals’ respectively. We write D̂(`) Array to denote an array of
pairs of dependencies, whereas, we write Ĝ(`) Array for the array of
the variables that may affect termination.
With the notation given above we now re-present our information flow anal-
ysis, given earlier in Table 3.4b, as a class of RAM algorithms. We then use
this to compute the time complexity of our analysis of the example.
Simple Substitution (x ∶= E)`:
Recall that D̂(`) ⊇ Id[x↦ FV (E)]
The work done to capture the dependencies for this simple substitution in
our GSL flow analysis framework is given by the following semi-formal al-
gorithm.
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Input: (x ∶= E)`, where input size = n
Output: the total number of instructions in (x ∶= E)`
Initialisation: i ∶= 0, Dx Array ∶= {} output ∶= {}
The RAM Algorithm:
parse(E) - - 1
while(FV (E) ≠ ∅) - - 2
do
begin
Dx Array[i] ∶= FV (E)0 - - 3
output ∶= output ∪ {(x,Dx Array[i])} - - 4
FV (E) ∶= FV (E) − FV (E)0 - - 5
i++ - - 6
end
return output - - 7
To compute the complexity for the simple substitution algorithm, we at-
tribute 1 cost unit to each instruction in the algorithm. Thus, we detail in
Table 3.12 how we arrive at the total number of instructions in our GSL flow
analysis of (x ∶= E)` by a summation of the individual instructions within
the algorithm.
From Table 3.12, we compute the total running time of our GSL flow anal-
ysis of (x ∶= E)` to be 5n + 3, i.e., f(n) = 5n + 3. Now assume this yields a
complexity of the order of n, i.e., 5n+3 ∈ O(n). For this to be correct, there
must be some constant, c where c > 0, and some integer constant, k, where
k > 0 and n ≥ k such that 0 ≤ 5n + 3 ≤ c.g(n) (from Definition 14).
Now, take c = 9, and k = 1, then when n = k, we have:
0 ≤ 5(1) + 3 ≤ 9.g(1) –by substitution
i.e., 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 9g(1)
Recall that g(n) is asymptotically non-negative. Hence g(1) ≥ 1, and by
implication, 9g(1) ≥ 9. Thus, 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 9g(1) evaluates to TRUE. We can
therefore conclude that 5n + 3 ∈ O(n), for all n ≥ 9. The factor, 5, and the
constant, 3, do not depend on n, hence the time complexity of our GSL flow
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OVERALL RUNNING TIME ∶ (x ∶= E)`
Instructions Running Time Comments
1 1 Executes only once
2 n + 1 Loop condition executed until false,
i.e., once more than loop body
3 n Executes n times
4 n Executes n times
5 n Executes n times
6 n Executes n times
7 1 Executes only once
Total running time = 5n + 3
Table 3.12: Computing overall running time of GSL Analysis of (x ∶= E)`
analysis for simple substitutions is O(n).
Observation.
We observe from our complexity analysis above that any value of c greater
than or equal to 8, and any value of k greater than 0 will also satisfy the
inequality 0 ≤ 5n + 3 ≤ c.g(n). Also, the coefficient, 5, of the variable n
and the constant, 3, does not impact the complexity of the analysis, hence
the reason why we assumed the initialisations were done outside the generic
algorithm for simple substitutions, because even if they were done within,
the complexity would still remain unaffected. From this observation, we
can safely conclude that the complexity for multiple substitutions will also
be O(n) since O(n) +O(n)... = O(n). Note that for the semantic program
block, skip, we do not need to compute any complexity, since there is ‘no
work done’.
Before considering other GSL semantic program blocks, we first consider
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the time complexity of our GSL flow analysis on iterations, since iterations
sometimes occur within some of the other program blocks. We use the fol-
lowing generic algorithm for iterations defined in semi-formal pseudocode.
Iteration (WHILE b DO C`11 INV ARIANT J V ARIANT V END)`:
Recall that Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (b) ∪ Ĝ(`1) ∪ Ĝ(`); D̂(`1), and
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`); D̂(`1) ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (b))
Hence the work done to capture the dependencies and termination behaviour
of iterations in our GSL flow analysis is shown by the following semi-formal
algorithm. First, we assume the body of the loop contains a simple substi-
tution, and then consider the case when the loop itself contains an internal
loop. To indicate that the variant decrements as required, we write v−− in
the body of the loop as shown below.
D̂(`) Array denotes the container, an array, where all dependency pairs are
stored, while
Ĝ(`) Array denotes the container where all variables that may affect pro-
gram termination are stored.
Input: Assume input size of x ∶= E, i.e., number of variables in FV (E),
is n, and m denotes input size of loop, i.e., number of iterations.
(Notice here that we write D̂(`1) Out to denote the output of(x ∶= E)`1 and loopOut denotes the output of the while GSL)
Output: The total running time cost of loop, denoted loopOut.






D̂(`) Array ∶= D̂(`) Array ; D̂(`1) Out
Ĝ(`) Array ∶= Ĝ(`) Array ; D̂(`1) Out
end
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D̂(`) Array ∶= D̂(`) Array ∪ (X̂(`) × FV (b))
Ĝ(`) Array ∶= Ĝ(`) Array ∪ (FV (b) ∪ Ĝ(`1))
return loopOut
This general computational analysis of work done simply indicates:
(1) The work done to iteratively capture the D̂(`) Array from
FV (E), and thereafter append the result of X̂(`) × FV (b)
to D̂(`) Array, and
(2) The work done to capture Ĝ(`) Array for the while GSL.
However, this RAM analysis is too general to relate sufficiently to the work
done in our information flow analysis of (x ∶= E)`1 . To be able to fully
capture the time complexity of this algorithm, we need to expand the work
done on (x ∶= E)`1 as shown below (Note that we use FV (E)0 to denote
the first (or front) variable in FV (E) at each pass of our analysis over E.
FV (E)0 is then appended to an array, Dx Array[i], before being removed
from FV (E) by the task FV (E) ∶= FV (E) − FV (E)0):
The Expanded RAM Algorithm:
while b - - 1
do
begin
while(FV (E) ≠ ∅) - - 2
do
begin
Dx Array[i] ∶= FV (E)0 - - (i)
D̂(`1) Out ∶= D̂(`1) Out∪{(x,Dx Array[i])} (ii)
FV (E) ∶= FV (E)−FV (E)0 - - (iii)
i++ - - (iv)
end
return D̂(`1) Out - - (v)
v−− - - (a)
D̂(`) Array ∶= D̂(`) Array ; D̂(`1) Out - - (b)
Ĝ(`) Array ∶= Ĝ(`) Array ; D̂(`1) Out - - (c)
end
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D̂(`) Array ∶= D̂(`) Array ∪ (X̂(`)×FV (b)) - - 3
Ĝ(`) Array ∶= Ĝ(`) Array ∪ (FV (b)∪ Ĝ(`1)) - - 4
return loopOut - - 5
Assigning 1 cost unit to each instruction in the algorithm, we compute the
time complexity of our GSL flow analysis of a generic while loop and tabu-
late the results in Table 3.13. It is worth pointing out, however, that given
that 0 < i ≤m, for every iteration i of the while loop, C`, there are n itera-
tions of the inner loop that capture FV (E). Thus, for m iterations of C`,
we have altogether m.n units of work done.
We now consider the time complexity of our GSL flow analysis of alternations
using the following generic algorithm for alternations defined in semi-formal
pseudocode. Here we assume S1 is an r-deep while loop, where r range
over natural numbers, whereas S2 is any substitution with less number of
embedded loops (if any) than S1. Hence the worst-case time complexity for
the alternation corresponds to the time complexity of S1. So, to simplify
the analysis, we only need to compute the time complexity of analysis of S1.
From Table 3.13, the time complexity of a single iteration is m.n. Hence,
without loss of generality, we assume the time complexity of r-iterations
within S1, denoted S1RAM , is (m.n)r. We use b Array to denote a collec-
tion of free variables (FV (b)) in the alternation’s condition, b; while FV (b)0
denotes the front element in FV (b) at each parse of the free variables.
Alternation (IF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 END)`:
Input: (IF b THEN S1 ELSE S2 END)`:
Output: The total running time cost of alternation, denoted altOut.
Initialisation: i ∶= 0, b Array ∶= {}, output ∶= {}
The RAM Algorithm: (assume p ∶ NAT = number of free variables in b)
parse(b)
while (FV (b) ≠ ∅) - - 1
do
begin
b Array[i] ∶= FV (b)0 - - (i)
FV (b) out ∶= FV (b) out ∪ {(x, b Array[i])} - - (ii)
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OVERALL RUNNING TIME ∶ Iterations
Instructions Running Time Comments
1 m + 1 loop condition executed until false, i.e., once
more than loop body
2 n + 1 Loop condition executed until false, i.e., once
more than loop body
(i) m.n Executes m.n times
(ii) m.n Executes m.n times
(iii) m.n Executes m.n times
(iV) m.n Executes m.n times
(v) m Executes m times
(a) m Executes m times
(b) m Executes m times
(c) m Executes m times
3 1 Executes only once
4 1 Executes only once
5 1 Executes only once
Total running time =
4m.n + 5m + n + 5
Table 3.13: Computing overall running time of GSL Analysis of Iterations
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FV (b) ∶= FV (b) − FV (b)0 - - (iii)
i++ - - (iv)
end
return FV (b) out - - (v)
parse(S1)
S1RAM = (m.n)r - - 2
return altOut - - 3
Assigning 1 cost unit to each instruction in the algorithm, we compute the
time complexity of our GSL flow analysis of an alternation with an r-deep
embedded while loop and tabulate the results in Table 3.14. The estimated
total running time is (m.n)r+5p+3, hence the time complexity of alternation
corresponds to the term with the largest growth, i.e., (m.n)r. We can safely
conclude therefore that (m.n)r + 5p + 3 = O( (m.n)r ). This result shows
that the higher the depth of while loops embedded within an alternation,
the slower our analysis performs in computing the information flow between
variables in the substitution. We note, however, that most algorithms fare
poorly in the presence of deeply-embedded recurring iterations so it is gen-
erally not good programming practice to write programs that behave like
that unless the very nature of the problem makes it imperative.
NOTE: Since B GSL sequential substitutions, S1;S2, may also contain an
arbitrary number of embedded while loops within the body of either S1 or
S2, or both, it is a simple thing to conclude that the time complexity of our
analysis of S1;S2 (worst case) is the same as that of alternation (computed
in Table 3.14), i.e., O( (m.n)r ).
Next, we consider the time complexity of our GSL flow analysis of pro-
tected (or preconditioned) substitutions, PRE P THEN S END, using
the following generic algorithm defined in semi-formal pseudocode. Since
iterations are not allowed in B machine specifications, we assume the body
of the substitution, S, is a simple substitution. (Note: It makes no differ-
ence to the complexity analysis if the body is multiple substitution.) This
allows us to simply insert the time complexity of simple substitutions, de-
noted SRAM , which we already estimated to be O(n), into our complexity
analysis of protected substitutions.
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OVERALL RUNNING TIME ∶ Alternations
Instructions Running Time Comments
1 p + 1 FV (b) parsed until FV (b) = ∅, i.e.,
(i) p Executes p times
(ii) p Executes p times
(iii) p Executes p times
(iV) p Executes p times
(v) 1 Executes once
2 (m.n)r Executes (m.n)r times
3 1 Executes only once
Total running time =(m.n)r + 5p + 3
Table 3.14: Computing overall running time of GSL Analysis of Alternations
Protected Substitution (PRE P THEN S END)`:
Input: (PRE P THEN S END)`:
Output: The total running time cost of protected substitution, denoted
preOut.
Initialisation: i ∶= 0, p Array ∶= {}, output ∶= {}
The RAM Algorithm: (let m ∶ NAT = number of free variables in P )
parse(P )
while (FV (P ) ≠ ∅) - - 1
do
begin
p Array[i] ∶= FV (P )0 - - (i)
FV (P ) out ∶= FV (P ) out ∪ {(x, p Array[i])} - - (ii)
FV (P ) ∶= FV (P ) − FV (P )0 - - (iii)
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i++ - - (iv)
end
return FV (P ) out - - (v)
parse(S)
SRAM = n - - 2
return preOut - - 3
Assigning 1 cost unit to each instruction in the algorithm, we compute the
time complexity of our GSL flow analysis of a protected substitution and
tabulate the results in Table 3.15. The estimated total running time is(5m+n+ 3). Assuming that n ≥m, the time complexity of our information
flow analysis of protected substitution is O(n), otherwise it is O(m). Sim-
ilarly, the time complexity of B GSL substitutions like ANY, SELECT,
etc. is similar to that of protected substitutions considered here, so we do
not include the details for the former.
We observe that other than GSL substitutions that could contain arbitrarily
large recursive iterations, our information flow analysis is very efficient, as
the time cost is generally linear.
Up till this point we have been dealing with information flow between vari-
ables defined within standalone machines, refinements and implementations.
In Chapter 4, we present our framework for analysing information flow be-
tween variables in different machines within a B structured development
environment.
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OVERALL RUNNING TIME ∶ Protected Substitutions
Instructions Running Time Comments
1 m + 1 FV (P ) parsed until FV (P ) = ∅, i.e.,
(i) m Executes m times
(ii) m Executes m times
(iii) m Executes m times
(iV) m Executes m times
(v) 1 Executes once
2 n Executes n times
3 1 Executes only once
Total running time =(5m + n + 3)






Mechanisms in B Machines
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we presented a rigorous analysis of intra-machine flows, i.e.,
flows between the static1 parts of the same machine. In this chapter, how-
ever, we shall be dealing with inter-machine flows, i.e. flows between the
static parts of different machines due to modular development via structur-
ing mechanisms and refinement / implementation in the B Method. We be-
gin by discussing existing structuring mechanisms and their visibility rules,
and then proceed to show how this could be exploited by an adversary to
leak secret information. Finally we conclude the chapter with an analysis
and formulation of security conditions that guarantee secure flows between
machines within a development.
4.2 Structuring Mechanisms and Visibility of B
Machines
It is worth noting that like many other programming / specification lan-
guages in Computer Science the Generalised Substitution Language is pri-
1In this thesis we only consider the machine variables as the static parts of B machines.
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marily concerned with the prevention of unauthorised ‘writes’ 2. By this we
mean that a lot of effort is put into ensuring that data within a module is
modified in a controlled and assured way. Also, languages are concerned
with providing shared access to assets where possible, so long as the in-
tegrity and safety of the assets are not jeopardised. Information hiding and
access control mechanisms are often used to control how parts of a mod-
ular software system are modified. However, little has been done from a
language-based perspective to prevent unauthorised ‘reads’, i.e., to prevent
unauthorised persons from learning secret information within the system
via legitimate observations of low security object input and output. For
example, a B refinement is not allowed to call update operations of the re-
fined machine, whereas, it is allowed to call inquiry operations of the refined
machine wherefor information could be read. Through such reads, there is
the possibility of information flow from high security variables in the refined
machine to low security variables in the refining machine. Similar insecure
flows are possible also with structuring mechanisms. This point will be
clearly seen as we discuss the structuring mechanisms in the B Method in
this chapter.
We organise our presentation of structuring mechanisms in the B Method
into two primary parts, namely: read-only structuring mechanisms (termed
RSM), and read-write structuring mechanisms (termed RWSM).
4.2.1 Read-Only Structuring Mechanisms (RSM)
The RSMs in the B Method are the SEES and USES structuring mecha-
nisms introduced via clauses bearing their respective names. Both RSMs
allow shared access to sets, constants, variables and inquiry operations of
the seen (or used) machine(s). The main difference between both RSMs
is that while a seeing machine may only read variables either directly or
via inquiry operations of the seen machine, a using machine goes one step
further. In addition to ability to read variables in a used machine, a us-
ing machine may impose additional constraints on the variables of the used
machine, thus these variables are visible in the INVARIANT clause of the
using machine. Other notable differences include:
2Some variable reads could be prevented by data-hiding / encapsulation mechanisms
in some languages, but this does not guarantee secure information flow between variables.
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à The USES RSM can only be used in abstract machines, whereas the
SEES RSM can be used in machines, refinements, and implemen-
tations, albeit with slight variations in it’s visibility in the different
frameworks. Table 4.13 shows the visibility rules of the SEES RSM in
both machines and refinements, whereas Table 4.2 shows the visibility
rules of the SEES RSM in implementations.
à A used machine along with the machine using it must be included in
one machine to guarantee consistency of data within the development.
This is not a requirement for a seen machine, since each seen machine
provides it’s own proof obligations. A used machine on the other hand
does not discharge its own proof obligations.
à As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, inquiry operations of the seen machine
can be called within the operations of a seeing machine, refinement,
or implementation. To the contrary, the operations of a used machine
are not visible from within the using machine as shown in Table 4.3
à The formal parameters of the used machine are fully visible to the using
machine, but this is not the case for the seen machine, refinement or
implementation.
4.2.2 Read-Write Structuring Mechanisms (RWSM)
To deal with read and write dependencies within large developments, the B
abstract machine notation provides two RWSMs, namely, the INCLUDES
and IMPORTS clauses. The IMPORTS clause is only allowed within an im-
plementation framework, whereas the INCLUDES clause can only be used
in either a machine or a refinement framework. Thus the visibility rules for
the INCLUDES clause is the same in both frameworks where they could
be employed, as depicted in Table 4.4. Notice, though, that the visibility
rules for the IMPORTS clause is different, as shown in Table 4.5. The main
difference between the visibility of the two clauses is that the variables of
included machines are visible to the operations of the including machine,
whereas, the abstract variables of imported machines are NOT visible to the
3Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 are adapted from [1].
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y INCLUDES PROPS INVARIANT OPERS
Parameters
Sets × × × ×
Constants × × × ×
Variables read − only
Operations inquiry
Table 4.1: Visibility of objects of Seen machine in a machine and refinement
operations of an importing implementation.
Note that if the imported machines are parameterised, then the actual pa-
rameters must be provided in the VALUES clause of the implementation,
and these must satisfy the imported machines’ CONSTRAINTS. Similarly,
deferred sets must be fully defined in the VALUES clause of the implemen-
tation and must satisfy the PROPERTIES clause of the refined or imported
machine or refinement.
4.2.3 Composite Read-Write Structuring Mechanisms
In this subsection, we describe the PROMOTES and EXTENDS clauses
of B abstract machines. The PROMOTES clause can only be used in the
presence of either an INCLUDES clause (when used within a machine or re-
finement), or in the presence of an IMPORTS clause (when used within an
implementation). In either case, the PROMOTES clause lists the operations
of the included (or imported) machines that the developer desire to upgrade
to become full-fledged operations of the including machine / refinement (or
importing implementation). Note, however, that promoted operations re-
main native operations of the included (or imported) machines, and hence
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s IMPORTS VAL PROPS INIT OPERS
Parameters
Sets × × × × ×
Concrete
Constants × × × × ×
Abstract loop invariant






Table 4.2: Visibility of objects of Seen machine within an Implementation
















s INCLUDES PROPS INVARIANT OPERS
Parameters × ×
Sets × × ×
Constants × × ×
Variables × read only
Operations
Table 4.3: Visibility of objects of Used machine within a Using Machine
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s INCLUDES PROPS INVARIANT OPERS
Parameters
Sets × × ×
Constants × × ×
Variables × read only
Operations ×
Table 4.4: Visibility: Included machine objects in a Machine or Refinement
must satisfy their corresponding preconditions. Thus, PROMOTED opera-
tions do not appear again within the OPERATIONS clause of the including
machine (or importing implementation).
In the case where all the operations of an included or imported machine
are to be promoted, the more concise construct, EXTENDS could be used
to replace the construct pair INCLUDES and PROMOTES (or IMPORTS
and PROMOTES ). Hence, the EXTENDS clause automatically includes
(or imports) a machine(s) as well as promotes all the operations of the
machine(s) listed within the clause. Thus it (the EXTENDS clause) does
not require a PROMOTES clause within its framework. Hence, the EX-
TENDS clause could be described as a composite RWSM. As was the
case with the operations involved in the INCLUDES/PROMOTES (or IM-
PORTS/PROMOTES ) pair, all the operations in an EXTENDed machine
remain native operations of the machine(s) wherein they are defined, hence
do not appear again within the OPERATIONS clause of the extending ma-






















s IMPORTS VAL PROPS INIT OPERS
Parameters
Sets × × × ×
Concrete
Constants × × × ×
Abstract loop invariant
Constants × × only
Concrete
Variables × read only
Abstract × loop invariant
Variables only
Operations ×
Table 4.5: Visibility: objects of an Imported machine in an Implementation
4.3 Security Limitations of existing Structuring
Mechanisms
One of the reasons it is particularly difficult to guarantee secure information
flow using existing structures and constraints within the B Method is be-
cause, as is the case in traditional specification and programming languages,
there is no built-in constraint on either standalone machines or machines
within a structured development to prevent the flow of secret information
to public objects or components of a development. As in many languages,
more effort has been concentrated on ensuring that state data is not modified
by unauthorised persons.
To illustrate this problem, we present in Table 4.6 an example of a machine
that trivially satisfies Generalised Noninterference, Separability, and a cou-




VARIABLES pV ar, sV ar
INVARIANT pV ar ∈ 0..1 ∧ sV ar ∈ 0..1
INITIALISATION pV ar, sV ar ∶= 0,0
OPERATIONS
update pV ar ≜
pV ar ∶= 0 [] pV ar ∶= 1
END;
update sV ar(in sV ar) ≜
PRE in sV ar ∈ 0..1 THEN
sV ar ∶= in sV ar
END
END;
ss ← get sV ar ≜




Table 4.6: Simple secure abstract machine
of this machine, illustrated in Table 4.7 clearly fails Noninterference due to
the fact that the B Method provides no explicit mechanism for controlling
the reading of variables based on security classification within a machine or
refinement. We assume in examples shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 that pV ar
and pV arR are both intended to be public variables, whereas the variables
sV ar and sV arR are intended to be secret variables, hence data is passed to
them (the secret variables) only via operation parameters to prevent them
from being read from program text. The output variable ss is a secret vari-
able and can only be read in the normal way in B via calls to the operation
ss← get sV ar. All variables are assumed to be boolean variables with value
0 denoting ‘false’ and value 1 denoting ‘true’. Notice that the operation
that updates the public variable update pV ar in the refinement implicitly
leaks the value of the secret variable sV arR by using it in the test condi-
tion of the IF statement. If, however, we run both the machine and the
refinement through Atelier B, the B-Toolkit, or other B tools, they will both





VARIABLES pV arR, sV arR
INVARIANT pV arR = pV ar ∧ sV arR = sV ar
INITIALISATION pV arR, sV arR ∶= 0,0
OPERATIONS
update pV ar ≜
IF sV arR = 0 THEN pV arR ∶= 0 ELSE pV arR ∶= 1 END
END;
update sV ar(in sV ar) ≜
PRE in sV ar ∈ 0..1 THEN
sV arR ∶= in sV ar
END
END;
ss ← get sV ar ≜




Table 4.7: Insecure DEMONIC Refinement of RefPardx
ment relation notwithstanding the insecure flow.
While Table 4.7 illustrates a classic case of the refinement paradox with re-
spect to security properties, discussed in Section 2.4.3, the extension of this
example shown in Table 4.8 illustrates information flow leaks due to struc-
turing mechanisms in the B Method. In this example we assume pV arStr is
a public variable. It can be seen clearly that due to the composition of the
machine StructPardx with RefPardx via the USES clause, the variables
of RefPardx becomes visible, albeit read-only, within the OPERATIONS
clause of StructPardx. Thus, it is a simple matter to copy the secret stored
in sV ar of the used machine RefPardx into the public variable pV arStr
of the using machine StructPardx.
As shown by the visibility rules presented in Section 4.2 above, wherever a






INVARIANT pV arStr ∈ 0..1
INITIALISATION pV arStr ∶= 0
OPERATIONS
ss ← update pV arStr ≜
ss ← get sV ar ∥




Table 4.8: Information flow due to USES clause
either directly or indirectly through inquiry operations of the accessed ma-
chine, no further constraint exists between the two machines, except that
such accessed variables cannot be modified outside the update operations
in the native machine. This is a limitation of the B Method whenever there
is a need to provide assurance that secret information is not read by unau-
thorised observers. Hence the example presented in Table 4.8 illustrates the
need to analyse possibilistic information flow leaks between structured B
machines, refinements and implementations to the end of detecting and pre-
venting insecure inter-machine flows. This is the subject of the next section
of this thesis.
4.4 Flow Analysis of Structured B Machines
We use the expression ‘structure flow analysis’ to refer to our analysis of
information flow between B Machines (i.e., inter-machine flows) due to the
structuring mechanisms discussed earlier in Section 4.2. Before we present
our formal structure flow analysis, though, it is worth noting that we are
only concerned here with the possible reading of state variables (either via
RSMs or RWSMs). Even where INCLUDES or IMPORTS clauses are used
whereby update (write) operations of the included (or imported) machines
may be called, included (or imported) variables cannot be modified out-
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side the local machine within which it is defined. Hence we need not be
concerned about secure information ‘write-downs’ ( i.e., the writing of se-
cret information down to a public variable) with respect to the variables
of included (or imported) machines. The information flow analysis of the
included (or imported) machines at the local level is sufficient to detect flows
within any included (or imported) machine(s). Since variables of a refined
machine are also visible within the refining machine, we treat the REFINES
clause here along with B structuring mechanisms. We summarise below the
visibility rules relating to structure state variables, i.e., state variables across
a structured development in B.
à SEES: Variables of seen machines may only be read within the OPER-
ATIONS clause of seeing machine(s) or refinement either directly or
through inquiry operations of seen machines. Within an implementa-
tion, though, concrete variables of seen machines may be read within
the OPERATIONS clause of seeing implementation(s) either directly
or through inquiry operations of seen machines, and in the case of
abstract variables, only within the loop invariant of seeing implemen-
tation(s).
à USES: Variables of used machine(s) may only be read within the OP-
ERATIONS and INVARIANT clauses of the using machine. The
USES clause is only allowed in machines;
à INCLUDES: Variables of included machines may be read within the
OPERATIONS clause of including machine or refinement either di-
rectly or through inquiry operations of included machines, and within
the INVARIANT clause of including machine or refinement;
à IMPORTS: Concrete variables of imported machines may be read
within the OPERATIONS clause of importing implementation either
directly or through inquiry operations of imported machines, and in
the case of abstract variables, within the loop invariant of import-
ing implementation. Imported variables may also be read within the
INVARIANT clause of importing implementation.
à EXTENDS: The visibility rules that apply to INCLUDES in machines
and refinements (and IMPORTS in implementations) apply also to
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the visibility of variables of an extended machine within the extending
machine, refinement or implementation.
à REFINES: Variables of a refined machine or refinement are visible
within the INVARIANT clause of the refining refinement or imple-
mentation. They are also visible (read-only) within the operations
of a refinement, but not within the operations of an implementation.
Only concrete variables are visible within the operations of an imple-
mentation.
With the summary of visibility of structure state variables given above we
now present our formalisation of the structure flow analysis as a layer over
the static intra-machine flow analysis presented in Section 3.4. First, we
introduce some extra notation to be used in our structure flow analysis.
Additional Notation:
Given that A and B denote either machines, refinements, or implementa-
tions, we generalise the notion that B SEES or USES or INCLUDES, or
IMPORTS or EXTENDS A by saying: ‘A is visible to B’. Semantically,
this means that B is able to read the variables defined in A. Notationally,
we write B ∢ A to mean, literally, ‘B has visibility of A’, or ‘A is visible to
B’. We also make a distinction between the variables occurring in A and
those occurring in B. IdeA denotes the set of variables occurring locally in
A, whereas we use IdeB to denote the set of variables native to B, and Ide⋆
denotes the composite variable space within the development. Given that
B ∢ A, information flow due to structuring mechanisms allow IdeA to be
visible within, say, operation C`22 defined in B. Given that C
`i
B ranges over
operations of B, where i ranges over natural numbers, we write this notion
of visibility as C`iB ∢ IdeA. To ensure secure information flow within the
structured machines in the development, we require that the security classi-
fication of the variables in Ide⋆ map to a complete lattice, which subsumes
the security lattices to which both IdeA and IdeB are mapped, since . . .
IdeA ∪ IdeB ⊆ Ide⋆
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Given that B ∢ A, and writing Ide∢B to denote the set of all variables visible
within B in the development, we have:
Ide∢B ⊇ IdeA ∪ IdeB (4.1)
Theorem 10 (Transitivity of Structure Dependency Relation (GSL)). Given
two machines A and B such that B ∢ A, IdeA denotes the set of variables
in A, X̂A denotes the set of variables assigned to in operation C
`i
A which
ranges over operations of A and X̂B denotes the set of variables assigned to
in operation C
`j
B , which ranges over operations of B. Then∀(xA ∈ X̂A, y ∈ IdeA) ⋅ xA D̂(`i) y,(xB ∈ X̂B) D̂(`j) xA ⇒ xB D̂(`j) y
Note: Since the variables defined in machine A are visible to the opera-
tions in machine B (Formula 4.1), we over-approximate (in Theorem 10)
over variable dependencies in C`iA (i.e., xA D̂(`i) y) that may transitively
affect updated variables xB ∈ X̂B in operation C`jB of machine B. Hence it
is conceivable that D̂(`j) ⊇ D̂(`i).
PROOF:
Given a set of variables {x, y, z} on which a relation ‘depends on’, denoted
R, is defined, we write ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ R to mean ‘x depends on y’. By the tran-
sitivity of relations, ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ R and ⟨y, z⟩ ∈ R implies that ⟨x, z⟩ ∈ R. That
is, ‘x depends on y and y depends on z implies that x depends on z. This
corresponds to Theorem 10. Theorem 10 informs our formulation of the
information flow analysis of structured B machines below. But, first, we
introduce more notation.
As in Section 3.4, we write (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C` to denote the notion that the analy-
sis (Ĝ, D̂) is adequate for the GSL substitution C`. We write M⋆ to denote
a machine (or refinement or implementation) that has visibility of other ma-
chine(s); and C`⋆⋆ ranges over operations of M⋆. Thus C`⋆⋆ could be any of
the substitutions defined in our GSL semantics (Table 3.2). The label `⋆
refers to the body of C⋆, and we use this in our framework to identify flows
within the local body of C⋆. To collect all possible flows, i.e., local flows as
well as flows due to structuring mechanisms, we add an extra label, `, to
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C⋆. Thus we have (C`⋆⋆ )` as our composite labeling strategy for collecting
all possible flows in C⋆. We use Mi to range over the machines visible to
M⋆, with C`ii ranging over the operations of Mi. We write X̂⋆ to denote the
set of variables updated within M⋆. If the substitution in a visible machine
is a protected substitution, then we write Pi∣C`ii to denote the substitution,
where Pi is the protecting predicate. We now develop in Table 4.4 below the
information flow analysis of structured B machines. Given that M⋆ ∢ Mi:
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (C`⋆⋆ )` in M⋆ ∢Mi - (unprotected substitutions)⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`ii ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`⋆⋆ ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`⋆) ∪ Ĝ(`⋆); D̂(`i) ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`i) ∪ D̂(`⋆) ∪ (D̂(`⋆); D̂(`i)).
(Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ (C`⋆⋆ )` in M⋆ ∢ Mi - (protected substitutions)⇔ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ Pi∣C`ii ∧ (Ĝ, D̂) ⊧ C`⋆⋆ ∧(● ∈ Ĝ(`i)⇒ Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (Pi)) ∧
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`⋆) ∪ Ĝ(`i) ∪ Ĝ(`⋆); D̂(`i) ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`i) ∪ D̂(`⋆) ∪ (D̂(`⋆); D̂(`i)) ∧
D̂(`) ⊇ (X̂⋆ × FV (Pi)).
Table 4.4: Information flow analysis of structured B machines
Notice that our structure flow analysis framework for unprotected substitu-
tions in Table 4.4 collects the variables local to C⋆ that may affect termi-
nation (i.e., Ĝ(`⋆)) as well as flows arising from visible dependencies that
may affect those variables that affect termination of C`⋆⋆ , i.e., Ĝ(`⋆); D̂(`i).
In addition, the framework collects the dependencies local to Ci and C⋆ as
well as transitive structure dependencies, (i.e., D̂(`⋆); D̂(`i)). In the case of
protected substitutions, though, we define the scenario where the operation
of the visible machine is a protected substitution, i.e., Pi∣C`ii . Here, the free
variables in Pi are collected along with other variables that may affect ter-
mination of (C`⋆⋆ )`, (i.e., Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (Pi)). Consequently, there is an implicit
flow from FV (Pi) to all updated variables in C`⋆⋆ , i.e., D̂(`) ⊇ (X̂⋆×FV (Pi)).
NOTE: As is common practice in B, we assume unique variable naming in
all machines within the development. Note, too, that the flow analysis for
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EXTENDS corresponds to either INCLUDES or IMPORTS, depend-
ing on whether it is employed in a machine, refinement or implementation.
The information flow analysis framework presented above yields the superset
of all possible flows of information between the variables in a development
where a machine has visibility of another machine. We now present a sim-
ple example below to illustrate how our structure flow analysis enhances the
traceability of information flow within a machine that has visibility of an-
other machine. Hence if the security classification of a variable is changed,
we can easily track other machines that may need to be modified, as flows
(due to structuring mechanisms) from the variable may no longer be secure.
The analyser thus developed will also enable the developer to review the
flow to see if he/she desires the security classification of the variable(s) con-
cerned to ‘float ’ up in the manner introduced by Hunt and Sands in [75]
(see subheading ‘Flow-Sensitive Type-Based Approach to Confidentiality’
in Section 2.2.2.10).
In the example below, we have a machine, SeenMachine, which updates two
machine variables. We also have another machine, SeeingMachine, which has
visibility of SeenMachine, and updates a third variable. Notice in SeenMa-
chine that the operation uu ← update yy(mm) simply assigns an arbitrary
natural number to the variable yy, and outputs the value on uu, whereas the
operation oo← update xx(nn) adds an arbitrary (non-zero) natural number
to yy, assigns the sum to xx and then outputs the value on oo. To analyse
the information flow in SeenMachine, we apply the information flow anal-
ysis rule for multiple substitution presented in Table 3.4b to the body of
oo ← update xx(nn). Thus, without loss of generality, oo ← update xx(nn)
corresponds to aC
`, xx ∶= yy + nn corresponds to aC`11 and oo ∶= xx corre-
sponds to aC
`2
2 . Hence, with a slight abuse of notation to enhance clarity,
we have
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(xx ∶= yy + nn) ∪ Ĝ(oo ∶= xx) = ∅, and
Since we have the precondition nn ∈ NAT1, then ● ∈ Ĝ(`)
Thus, Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (nn ∈ NAT1), i.e.,
Ĝ(`) = {nn}
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(xx ∶= yy + nn) ∪ D̂(oo ∶= xx) ∪ (X̂ × FV (nn ∈ NAT1))= {(xx, yy), (xx,nn), (oo, xx), (oo, yy), (oo, nn)}
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Next, we apply the same information flow analysis rule for multiple substi-
tution in Table 3.4b to the body of uu ← update yy(mm). In this case,
uu ← update yy(mm) corresponds to aC`, yy ∶= mm corresponds to aC`11 ,
and uu ∶= yy corresponds to aC`22 . Hence, this time, we have
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(yy ∶=mm) ∪ Ĝ(uu ∶= yy) = ∅, and
Since we have the precondition mm ∈ NAT1, then ● ∈ Ĝ(`)
Thus, Ĝ(`) ⊇ FV (mm ∈ NAT1), i.e.,
Ĝ(`) = {mm}
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(yy ∶=mm) ∪ D̂(uu ∶= yy) ∪ (X̂ × FV (mm ∈ NAT1))= {(yy,mm), (uu, yy), (uu,mm)}
It follows from the foregoing therefore that the flow analysis of
oo← update xx(nn) yields the set of dependencies:{(xx, yy), (xx,nn), (oo, xx), (oo, yy), (oo, nn), (xx,mm), (oo,mm)}
We present the definition of SeenMachine below
MACHINE SeenMachine
VARIABLES xx, yy
INVARIANT xx ∈ NAT1 ∧ yy ∈ NAT ∧ xx >= yy
INITIALISATION xx, yy ∶= 1,0
OPERATIONS
oo← update xx(nn) =
PRE nn ∈ NAT1 THEN
xx ∶= yy + nn ∥ oo ∶= xx
END;
uu← update yy(mm) =
PRE mm ∈ NAT THEN








INVARIANT ww ∈ NAT ∧ zz ∈ NAT1
INITIALISATION ww, zz ∶= 0,1
OPERATIONS
ss← update ww(pp) =
PRE pp ∈ NAT THEN
ww ∶= pp ∥ ss ∶= ww
END;
rr ← update zz(qq) =
PRE qq ∈ NAT1 THEN
zz ∶= xx +ww ∥ rr ∶= zz
END
END
We follow with a structure flow analysis of both machines. Notice that
rr ← update zz(qq) uses the variable xx defined in SeenMachine on the
right hand side of the assignment operator. This is acceptable since Seeing-
Machine has visibility of SeenMachine, i.e., SeeingMachine ∢ SeenMachine.
Also notice that xx itself depends on other variables defined within Seen-
Machine. The use of our structure flow analysis enables us to trace this
dependency trail, as shown below.
Without loss of generality, we only analyse the dependency flow within
operation rr ← update zz(qq) of SeeingMachine for illustrative purpose.
SeeingMachine corresponds to M⋆, SeenMachine corresponds to Mi, rr ←
update zz(qq) corresponds to C`⋆⋆ , and oo ← update xx(qq) corresponds to
Pi∣C`ii in Table 4.4. Hence,
For global flows, we have:
Ĝ(`) ⊇ Ĝ(`⋆) ∪ Ĝ(`i) ∪ Ĝ(`⋆); D̂(`i) ∪ FV (Pi)= {qq} ∪ {nn} ∪ ({qq} ; {(xx, yy), (xx,nn), (oo, xx),
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(oo, yy), (oo, nn)}) ∪ {nn}= {qq, nn}
For dependency flows, we have:
D̂(`) ⊇ D̂(`⋆) ∪ D̂(`i) ∪ (D̂(`⋆); D̂(`i)) ∪ (X̂⋆ × FV (Pi))= {(zz, xx), (zz,ww), (zz, nn), (zz, qq), (rr, zz), (rr, xx),(rr,ww), (rr, qq), (rr, nn)} ∪{(xx, yy), (xx,nn), (oo, xx), (oo, yy), (oo, nn)} ∪{(zz, xx), (zz,ww), (zz, nn), (zz, qq), (rr, zz), (rr, xx),(rr,ww), (rr, qq), (rr, nn)} ;{(xx, yy), (xx,nn), (oo, xx), (oo, yy), (oo, nn)}
= {(zz, xx), (zz,ww), (zz, nn), (zz, qq), (rr, zz), (rr, xx),(rr,ww), (rr, qq), (rr, nn), (xx, yy), (xx, qq), (oo, xx),{(oo, yy), (oo, nn)} ∪{(zz, yy), (zz, nn), (rr, xx), (rr, yy), (rr, nn)}
= {(zz, xx), (zz,ww), (zz, nn), (zz, qq), (rr, zz), (rr, xx),(rr,ww), (rr, qq), (rr, nn), (xx, yy), (xx, qq), (oo, xx),(oo, yy), (oo, nn), (zz, yy), (zz, nn), (rr, xx), (rr, yy),(rr, nn)}
4.5 Security Conditions of GSL Structuring
Mechanisms
Using the information presented in Section 4.4, we now extend the security
conditions C1 and C2 given in Definitions 7 and 8 in Section 3.6 to capture
secure information flow due to structuring mechanisms in GSL developments
as follows:
In the context of a structured development where B ∢ A, given that:
↓X = {y ∈ Ide∢B ∣ (∃x ∈X ⊆ IdeB) classify(y) ≤ classify(x)}
and
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↓Xc = Ide∢B− ↓X
Consequently, our structure security conditions become:
∀z ∈ ↓Xc,
B ∢ A ⇔ Ide∢B ⊇ IdeA ∧ ∀x ∈ X̂B ⋅ (Dx ∩ z = ∅) - - C3
(extension of C1)
and given that L is the security lattice space spanned by the variables in
Ide∢B such that there exists a  ∈ L, then X is the set of variables such that
∀l ∈ L ⋅ (classify(X) =  ≤ l)
We then derive Xc = {y ∈ Ide∢B ∣ y /∈X}
hence we have:
B ∢ A ⇔ ∀x ∈X ⋅ (Xc ∩ Ĝ = ∅) - - C4
(extension of C2)
Having presented our extension of the information flow analysis of stan-
dalone B machines to inter-machine flows induced by B structuring mech-
anisms, we present in Chapter 5 a case study, which we analyse with our
information flow analyser (a C++ implementation of our information flow






In The Origin Of Life, Five Questions Worth Asking [134], Christopher
Sykes was quoted as reporting in [132] that the famous scientist Richard
Feynman left this note on a blackboard shortly before his death (in 1988
[146]): “What I cannot create, I do not understand.” This thought per-
fectly articulates the intuition behind the need to “create” an information
flow analyser based on our information flow analyses framework, the intent
of which is to get a better understanding of how the theoretic framework
discussed in Sections 3.4, 4.4 and 4.5 works in practice. In this chapter we
present a detailed case-study of a B development and we use our informa-
tion flow analyses framework to check for insecure information flow between
machine variables. We define an information flow policy on the flow rela-
tionships between the variables within the development. We then propose a
flow-respecting development methodology for stepwise formal developments
in B (illustrated in Figure 5.2). The case study shows how abstract B ma-
chines may mask the possibility of insecure refinements and how information
leakage due to B structuring mechanisms may be prevented in practice us-
ing our proposed flow-sensitive development methodology. The case study
is developed in the following section.
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5.2 IT Reseller Business Monitor: A Case-Study
We make a start here of defining the scope of the case-study used to demon-
strate the functionality of the information flow analysis presented in Sections
3.4 and 4.4 of this thesis.
5.2.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of the case-study presented in this chapter is not to provide a les-
son in formal development of software systems using the B Method. Rather,
the case study is intended to serve as a proof of concept to demonstrate the
feasibility and usability of the information flow analysis framework intro-
duced in Sections 3.4 and 4.4 of this thesis. This we intend to accomplish
by running the hypothetical B machines, refinements and implementations
derived from the case study along with defined information flow policies
through the automatic information flow analyser we developed, using C++,
to determine whether flows between variables are secure or not.
The objective of the case study is to contrive a software system that includes
at least the following B GSL constructs:
à Underspecification, e.g., by means of the ANY construct;
à Conditioned substitutions to varying levels of depth, e.g., by means of
the SELECT and IF constructs.
à Protected substitutions to varying levels of depth, e.g., by means of
the PRE construct
à Refinements of defined B machines
à Implementation of defined B machines or refinements.
à Structuring mechanisms, e.g., by means of the SEES clause.
We then pass the contrived system to our information flow analyser to
demonstrate how information flow between variables can be automatically
tracked at every step of the B development cycle and the developer alerted
to insecure flows in the different scenario investigated. We now provide a
brief background information to the case study in Subsection 5.2.2.
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5.2.2 Background
I was born in Okitipupa, a small town in the south-western region of Nige-
ria, which transliterated into English, means ‘mound red ’. Hence we employ
the hypothetical name Redmound-IBM to refer to the IT reseller Business
Monitor. An IT reseller is a retail enterprise that deals in computers and
associated equipments, components, off-the-shelf applications, and PC main-
tenance and upgrades. Some well known IT Resellers in the UK are Mesh
Computers, PC World, MacWorld, Gultronics, and Micro Anvika. An IT
hardware and/or software vendor is an enterprise that produces hardware
and/or software tools for sale generally through a distribution channel. Well-
known hardware vendors include Toshiba, Sony, HP, Samsung, Apple etc.,
and well-known software vendors include Microsoft, Adobe, Sage, Apple
etc. IT resellers obtain their wares mostly from distributors and sometimes
directly from vendors. The vendors also organise training events and pro-
motions for IT Resellers’ staff.
The core business of the IT Reseller could be broadly divided into three
departments, namely: Administration, Accounts, and Sales/Technical. The
Administration department handles general administrative, personnel and
training duties. The Accounts department deals with salaries, payments,
purchases, client accounts and taxation and corporate reports. The Sales/
Technical department deals with shop floor sales, IT support, computer up-
grades and builds, online/mail order sales and distribution, network and
application support, vendors and distributors liaison, stock management,
adverts and promotions.
Most IT Resellers store some of their business data in bespoke database sys-
tems, commonly developed using Microsoft Access or Microsoft SQL. Some
other data are retrieved from web forms and processed sometimes manually
and sometimes by the database. Other data, e.g., telephone order details,
are paper-based. We present here an informal list of the business processes
by department within the IT Reseller enterprise, and stipulate whether they
are database-driven (dBD) and/or manual (Mnl):
Administration:
Personnel Records (dBD): stores and manipulates the personal records of
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employees, e.g., name, position, start date, home address, holidays, etc.
Inventories and Overheads (Mnl): records and monitors company assets,
e.g., servers, pcs, printers, stationeries, etc.
Training and management (Mnl): identifies training needs and organises
staff training, deals with commendation and promotion, attendance, and
general management tasks.
Accounts:
Salaries and loans (dBD): tracks and monitors attendance, salaries and loans
to employees, NI, PAYE and other deductions.
General Accounting (dBD and Mnl): manages corporate accounts and re-
ports, e.g., VAT, Profit and Loss accounts, etc.; tracks purchases for stock
replenishment and internal company use, reviews and meets staff payment
orders.
Client Accounts (dBD and Mnl): registers and monitors client credit and
debit accounts, processes credit/debit card orders, etc.
Sales/Technical:
Sales (dBD and Mnl): deals with all shop floor, mail order and online sales.
Organises and delivers promotional sales events in association with product
vendors and distributors.
Stock Management (dBD and Mnl): contacts vendors and/or distributors
for orders when stock is low. Recommends alternative products to customers
when requested product is discontinued.
Technical (Mnl): provides before- and after-sales service to customers; main-
tains local network and provides application support.
With the hierarchical free-flow diagram in Figure 5.1, we illustrate a sum-
mary of the conceptual top level system behaviour described in this section,
which sets out the scope of the case study.
To keep track of the business data within the IT Reseller enterprise, we aim
to interact with the different data storage and processing systems within the
enterprise, and monitor business rules and performance standards that need
to be met. Redmound-IBM is the software tool we aim to develop, using the
B Method, to meet this need. We will then employ our Information Flow
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Figure 5.1: Redmound-IBM: Top Level Departmental Hierarchy
Analyser, developed using C++, to automatically check for the possibility
of insecure flow of information between different variables within the devel-
opment.
We propose a methodology for information flow sensitive developments using
the B Method. This methodology involves iteratively running B machines
and defined information flow policies through our flow analyser and modi-
fying the machines1 and/or information flow policy files as necessary until
machines with the desired secure information flow are realised. Thereafter
the developer can proceed to the next level in the development cycle with
the assurance that all possible information flow between variables at the
current level are secure. The schematics in Figure 5.2 depicts our proposed
approach to information flow sensitive development in B. (NOTE: In princi-
ple, the methodology illustrated in Figure 5.2 can be applied to other formal
methods of software development.)








Figure 5.2: An Approach to Flow-Sensitive Development in B
Having introduced the scope of the case-study, we present an Informal Spec-
ification of Redmound-IBM in the following subsection.
5.2.3 Redmound-IBM: An Informal Specification
In this section we present a top level description of system behaviour.
Redmound-IBM monitors the data generated from business activities and
reacts to ensure safe and secure standards are met. Business rules are defined
to control critical business operations, and these rules are triggered by data
input to the application. Operations monitored by Redmound-IBM include
product stock levels, customer credit accounts, transactions and product
release, staff salaries and loans, administrative overheads, employee perfor-
mance and training, corporate reports and taxation. We describe each of
these core operations below.
Product Stock Levels
Redmound-IBM receives information about current stock level of each prod-
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uct at the end of each business day and applies one of the following business
rules:
à For products costing less than £50, if stock level is less than 8, order
8 more items;
à For products costing between £50 and £100, if stock is less than 5,
order 5 more items;
à For products costing more than £100, if stock is less than 3, order 3
more items.
Customer Credit Accounts
The IT Reseller makes a 30-day interest free credit facility available to pre-
mium customers, subject to the following business rules to be monitored by
Redmound-IBM:
à Premium customers are allowed a 30-day interest free facility of not
more than £100 on purchases;
à Premium customers must fully pay up before the expiry of the 30-
day interest-free period. Otherwise, interest will be charged daily at
a rate of 30% APR; further interest-free facilities will be suspended
and customer’s name will be added to the list of customers with credit
default.
Transactions and Product Release
For cash and debit/credit card transactions on the shop floor, goods pur-
chased may be released to the customers on successful completion of transac-
tion. If customer desires product to be shipped to any UK address provided,
this will be subject to a shipping surcharge based on bulk and/or weight of
item. Online orders and mail orders have to meet additional requirements
before product can be released. The business rules guiding product release
for all transactions are itemised below:
à Where shipping to any UK address is required, a shipping surcharge of
£5 must be paid, if product weighs less than 2kg; £8 shipping surcharge
if product weighs 2kg or more but less than 5kg, and £10 shipping
surcharge applies to products weighing 5kg or more, but not more
than 10kg; special shipping arrangements will be made for products
weighing more than 10kg;
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à For shop-floor cash and debit/credit card transactions where client
requests shipping to any UK address, the product may be released only
on payment of appropriate shipping surcharge as described above;
à For online and mail order transactions, allow up to 5 working days for
completion of debit and/or credit card transactions;
à For online and mail order transactions, product may only be released
on verification of payment for goods and appropriate shipping costs as
described above.
Staff Salaries and Benefits
Staff salaries are paid four-weekly in arrears of work done. A four-weekly
payment period is termed a payment cycle. One week is constituted of
five work days and two rest days. Staff benefits include interest-free loans
and discounts on products purchased by staff members for personal use.
Employees may be given a loan facility up to 25% of four weekly salary.
Repayments are spread over a period of 6 salary payment cycles. Redmound-
IBM monitors staff salaries, loans and discounts, and enforces the following
business rules:
à Where an employee requests a loan facility, the total of outstanding
loan, if any, and amount currently requested must not exceed 25% of
four-weekly salary. Otherwise reject request;
à Repayments of any outstanding loan to employees must be made with
every payment cycle;
à A discount of 5% is applied to all products purchased by staff members
for personal use.
Administrative Overheads
The IT Reseller operates a petty cash imprest system, whereby £100 is
placed in a petty cash float at the beginning of each month towards sta-
tioneries and other sundry business expenses. At the end of the month,
any amount spent from the float is replenished. Redmound-IBM checks the
amount in petty cash float at the end of every month and replenishes float
according to the following business rules:
à Set petty cash float at the beginning of every month to £100;
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à Check petty cash float at the end of the month, and if amount in float
is less than £100, add more cash to make it up to £100.
Employee Performance and Training
A thirteen payment cycle period is termed a payment year. Employees are
allowed four weeks paid annual leave, hence one payment year contains 240
(i.e., (13×4×5) - 20) work days. Employee performance measurement metrics
and training needs, tracked by Redmound-IBM, are defined in the business
rules below:
à An employee is adjudged “outstanding” if an absence record of not
more than 3 days is achieved in the payment year preceding the end of
the business year. Salary will be increased by 3% for the next payment
year (npy);
à An employee is adjudged “okay” if an absence record of not more than
4 or 5 days is achieved in the payment year preceding the end of the
business year. Salary will be increased by 2% for the npy;
à An employee is adjudged “Underachieved” if an absence record of 6
or 7 days is achieved in the payment year preceding the end of the
business year. For absence record of 6 or 7 days in the payment year,
salary will be increased by 1% for the npy and warning given;
à For any absence record more than 7 days in the payment year, there
will be no salary increase for the npy, and disciplinary action must be
taken;
à Employees are required to attend one training/refresher session in one
payment year.
Corporate Reports and Taxation
Corporate reports such as profit and loss accounts annual tax returns, value
added tax (VAT) returns and claims, etc., are checked to be sure they are
correctly completed and submitted by the due date.
à A VAT of 20% shall be added to all sales and service charges. The
cumulative amount received as VAT shall be remitted to the Inland
Revenue at the end of every payment cycle.
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à Ensure all tax and National Insurance contributions deducted from
employee salaries are remitted to the Inland Revenue at the end of
each payment cycle;
à Ensure annual tax returns are completed before the October 31 dead-
line.
In Section 5.2.4, we analyse further the intra- and inter-departmental flows
as well as the Business-to-Business (B2B) interactions between Redmound-
IBM and its customers, vendors and distributors by means of a business
process model. We thereby develop a more granular representation of the
system and relationships (visibility) between the different participants2 in
the business process.
5.2.4 Redmound-IBM: Business Process Model Analysis
In this section, we add more detail to the top level description of the system
introduced in Section 5.2.3. To this end, we employ a diagrammatic busi-
ness process modelling and specification approach using a current industry-
standard Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN 2.0)3. This diagram-
matic approach is simple, yet sufficiently precise to make understanding
of the internal business processes (within Redmound-IBM) and interaction
with external participants clear to business users and software developers
alike. Broadly speaking, the BPMN notation comprises the following ele-
ments:
à Activities (or Tasks): a process activity is a specified unbroken piece
of work performed within a process. We present the different types of
BPMN 2.0 tasks in Figure 5.3;
à Events: an event is a significant occurrence, i.e., something that hap-
pens, within a process. Events are generally classified into three types,
namely: Start Events, Intermediate Events, and End Events, which by
their respective names are self-explanatory. We present further subdi-
visions of events in the tables in Figures 5.3 and 5.4;
2“Participants” in the context of this thesis refers to those roles, departments or or-
ganisations that play a part in the performance of the overall process.
3BPMN is used to create a standardised bridge for the gap between conceptual business
process design and process implementation [117].
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Figure 5.3: BPMN 2.0 Notation: Tasks and Start Events.
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Figure 5.4: BPMN 2.0 Notation: Intermediate and End Events.
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Figure 5.5: BPMN 2.0 Notation: Gateways and Artifacts.
à Decisions (or Gateways): Gateways are like forks in a road. They
are locations within a business process where decisions have to be
made between alternative (multiple) sequence flow paths. The types
of Gateways defined in the BPMN 2.0 Specification are summarised
in the table in Figure 5.5;
à Artifacts: an artifact is a non-flow object designed to add useful in-
formation (e.g., textual or graphical information) to BPMN diagrams.
Figure 5.5 shows some commonly used artifacts in BPMN;
à Swimlanes: used to visually distinguish the various sub-processes within
a business a process, e.g, by department or function. Swimlanes (par-
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Figure 5.6: BPMN 2.0 Notation: Swimlanes and Connectors.
ticularly, pools) are also used to distinguish B2B participants in a
process. Further details of swimlanes are given in Figure 5.6;
à Flow Connectors: as the name implies, are used to link other BPMN
elements together in a meaningful way. The types of flow connectors
defined in BPMN 2.0 are illustrated in Figure 5.6.
Using the BPMN 2.0 notations summarised in Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and
5.6, we are now ready model the architecture of Redmound-IBM, from the
informal specification given in Section 5.2.3. We will begin with a top-level
collaboration model showing Sequence Flows as well as Message Flows. We
will then refine the top-level diagram further to show details of the embedded
sub-processes. Finally we will produce a System Catalogue, which we will
use as the basis of our work in Section 5.2.5. Notice in the collaboration
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diagrams to follow that we adopt the convention of representing sequential
flows between process elements with horizontal connectors, whereas message
flows between participants are represented with vertical connectors between
pools.
5.2.4.1 Top-Level Business Process Collaboration Analysis.
Recall that our information flow analysis framework is concerned with the
flow of information between machine variables in a B development. Conse-
quently, in modelling the case study to be analysed by our information flow
analyser, we are keen to track both sequence and message flows between the
elements and participants respectively of Redmound-IBM.
Thus, we model a generic Customer as a participant in Redmound-IBM
business process, i.e., we provide a dedicated pool to the activities, events
and decisions typical of a customer’s interaction with the IT Reseller busi-
ness monitor. Similarly, we model distributors, vendors and other suppliers
collectively as a participant with one pool representing this group. To facil-
itate the analysis of inter-departmental message flows, we also model each
of the three core departments in Redmound-IBM as participants in the sys-
tem. Hence we have five pools, and are able to develop a collaboration
diagram showing the (vertical) message flows between the various partic-
ipants as shown in Figure 5.7. For example, the Sales/Technical process
is triggered by the Order Product task in the Customer process, while the
Distributors/Vendors/Suppliers process is triggered by the Manage Stock
sub-process in the Sales/Technical process. On the other hand, the Trans-
action and Product Release sub-process within the Sales/Technical process
provides feedback to the Make Payment and Contact Reseller tasks within
the Customer process.
Notice that we leave the General Accounting function within the Accounts
department out to streamline the model and avoid the need for an addi-
tional participant (pool) for interaction with the Inland Revenue. This does
not in any conceivable way affect the case study. Communication between
the elements within each pool is by means of (horizontal) sequence flows.
For example, the Administration process, on being triggered when a new
employee starts and at the end of the business year, passes sequence flow
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Figure 5.7: Redmound-IBM: Process Collaboration Diagram.
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to either the Overheads, Training and Management, or Personnel Records
sub-processes.
5.2.4.2 Second-Level Business Process Analysis.
In this section, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the sub-processes
introduced in the collaboration diagram in Figure 5.7. These sub-processes
are listed below, viz:
à Select Product
à Manage Stock





à Training and Management
à Personnel Records
To begin with, we illustrate the Select Product sub-process in Figure 5.8.
The sub-process starts with the customer searching the product database
via a client interface for availability of product. He then makes a selection,
if product sought is available, otherwise the system recommends an alterna-
tive, which the customer could accept or reject. Hence there are two possible
termination events to the sub-process.
We now present the next sub-process, Manage Stock in Figure 5.9. The
Manage Stock sub-process checks the vendor database for discontinued prod-
ucts, and updates the local database accordingly. The Monitor Local Stock
Database business rule task then updates product stock according to the
decision logic described in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.8: Redmound-IBM: Select Product Sub-Process Diagram.
Figure 5.9: Redmound-IBM: Manage Stock Sub-Process Diagram.
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Monitor Local Stock Database: Decision Table
Cost < £50 £50 ≤ Cost ≤ £100 Cost > £100 Decision
and Stock < 8 and Stock < 5 and Stock < 3
Yes No No Order 8 more
No Yes No Order 5 more
No No Yes Order 3 more
Table 5.1: Monitor Local Stock Database: Decision Table
Figure 5.10 illustrates the Transaction and Product Release sub-process.
Whether the customer decides to collect product from store or have it deliv-
ered, the product needs to be prepared, hence we use an Inclusive Gateway
to ensure the Pick and Pack task is always executed. The Ship Product
business rule task is used to determine shipping cost based on the decision
logic in Table 5.2.
Ship Product: Decision Table
Weight < 2kg 2kg ≤ Weight 5kg ≤ Weight Weight > 10kg Decision< 5kg ≤ 10kg (Postage)
Yes No No No £5
No Yes No No £8
No No Yes No £10
No No No Yes Arrange cost
Table 5.2: Ship Product: Decision Table
The next sub-process we expand on here is the Staff Salaries sub-process of
the Accounts participant. We present this in Figure 5.11. The business rule
task Update Loan checks that (outstanding Loan + Loan Request) ≤ 25%
of Salary, and based on the outcome, the requested loan is either granted
or refused. Hence we use an Exclusive Event-Based Gateway following the
business rule task. If the loan is granted, then the new repayment amount
must be recalculated based on the new outstanding loan. Any outstand-
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Figure 5.10: Transaction and Product Release Sub-Process Diagram.
ing loan repayment is then deducted before the final salary is paid out to
the employee concerned. If, however, an employee has no outstanding loan,
then the process ensures no deductions are taken from his/her salary. (Note:
We pointed out in Section 5.2.4.1 that we do not model the interaction be-
tween Redmound-IBM and the Inland Revenue. Hence, we assume the Staff
Salaries sub-process is run only after all taxes (PAYE) and National Insur-
ance contributions have been deducted.)
Table 5.3 describes the decision logic used to model the staff loans func-
tionality of Redmound-IBM. The decision logic is based on the informal
specification described earlier in Section 5.2.3.
We next expand the Performance Related Pay sub-process of the Staff
Salaries sub-process as illustrated in Figure 5.12. Notice that we use a Timer
Start for the sub-process, reason being that the performance related pay is
calculated once a year; hence the associated activities are time-triggered at
the end of the business year.
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Figure 5.11: Redmound-IBM: Staff Salaries Sub-Process Diagram.
The business rule task Calculate PRP is determined by the decision logic
presented in Table 5.4.
The next sub-process of the collaboration diagram in Figure 5.2.4.1 that we
expand here is the Client Accounts sub-process, and this we illustrate in
Figure 5.13. Notice that only Premium Customers are allowed to request
credit in line with our informal specification in Section 5.2.3.
The business rule Request Credit monitors the criteria for granting / refusing
credit request to customers based on the policy described in Section 5.2.3.
We summarise the decision logic behind Request Credit in Table 5.5.
We now expand the sub-process Loans/Credit Accounts as shown in Fig-
ure 5.14. The feedback to employee and customer is dependent on the
decision logic within the business task rules Check loan from Staff Salaries
Sub-Process and Check Customer Credit from Client Accounts Sub-Process
respectively. We combine the decisions based on both business task rules in
Table 5.6.
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Figure 5.12: Performance Related Pay Sub-Process Diagram.
Figure 5.13: Client Accounts Sub-Process Diagram.
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Staff Salaries: Decision Table
(OL + LR)
Outstanding Loan Request OL + LR ≤ 25% of Decision
Loan (OL) (LR) Salary
Yes No Yes Yes Deduct repayment
Yes Yes Yes Yes Grant Loan
Yes Yes Yes No Refuse Loan
No No No - No Deduction
Table 5.3: Staff Salaries: Decision Table
Calculate PRP: Decision Table
Okay Underachieved
Outstanding (Absence (Absence Critical Decision
(Absence ≤ 3) = [4∣5]) (= [6∣7]) (Absence > 7)
Yes No No No 3% increment
No Yes No No 2% increment
No No Yes No 1% increment
(Warning)
No No No Yes No Increment
Disciplinary
Action
Table 5.4: Calculate PRP: Decision Table
Redmound-IBM checks the requirement that administrative overheads be
covered by a monthly petty cash imprest of £100. Hence, we assume the
Overheads sub-process is triggered once every 30 days. We also model the
requirement that the sub-process executes only if some event(s) cause(s) the
imprest account to be less than £100, as depicted in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.16 illustrates the Training and Management Sub-Process of the
Administration participant. This sub-process follows one of two possible
paths. The first path records employee attendance, logs employee absence
and then sends a message to the sub-process end. The other path ensures
a training course is offered to every member of staff at least once a year,
and on completion of course, sends a message to sub-process end. However
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Figure 5.14: Loans / Credit Accounts Sub-Process Diagram.
Figure 5.15: Overheads Sub-Process Diagram.
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Request Credit: Decision Table
(OC + CR)
Outstanding Credit Request OC + CR ≤ £100 and days Decision
Credit (OC) (CR) credit taken ≤ 30
Yes Yes Yes Yes Grant Credit
No Yes Yes Yes Grant Credit
Yes Yes Yes No Refuse Credit,
add 30% interest
and Blacklist.
No Yes Yes No ... Ditto ...
Table 5.5: Request Credit: Decision Table
Check Loan / Credit Accounts: Decision Table
Check Check Decision
Loan OK Credit OK
Yes - Notify employee
No - Advise employee
- Yes Notify customer
- No Advise customer
Table 5.6: Check Loan / Credit Accounts: Decision Table
because more than one course may be taken within a year, there is a loop-
back to the Offer Training service task. We elect to use a service task to
automate the offer of available training options here to free users for other
important business tasks. But either way, our information flow analysis is
not affected.
Finally, we illustrate the Personnel Records sub-process in Figure 5.17. No-
tice that there are three possible flow paths here. One simply records the
employee name, assigns an employee ID, stores records in Employee Records
dB and terminates. Another path, taken on request, uses the business rule
task Monitor Employee Status to check whether a person is an employee or
not. This yields two paths, the first of which removes (former) employee’s
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Figure 5.16: Training and Management Sub-Process Diagram.
records from the database (in the case where employee resigns or is sacked)
and sends feedback to Sub-Process end. The other path only sends feedback
to Sub-Process end in the case where the person is confirmed as a current
employee.
We summarise in Table 5.7 the decision logic used to determine the flow
path by the business rule task Monitor Employee Status.
Monitor Employee Status: Decision Table
Employee ID Employed? Employee Records dB Decision
Yes No Remove Records Negative
Yes Yes - Positive
No No No Negative
Table 5.7: Monitor Employee Status: Decision Table
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Figure 5.17: Personnel Records Sub-Process Diagram.
5.2.4.3 System Catalogue
In this section, we present the system catalogue (aka. Data Dictionary)
which is basically a precise and organised repository (or catalogue) of the
metadata pertaining to all the components and objects defined in the system
[133], [144], [147], [141], [143]. The system catalogue comprise the inputs,
outputs, intermediate calculations and data storage objects defined in the
context of Redmound-IBM. We use the common notation described in
Table 5.8 in our system catalogue:
We group the data elements defined in our system catalogue according to
the process wherein they are defined, as illustrated in Figure 5.18.
Redmound-IBM:
Redmound-IBM = SelectProduct + ManageStock + Ts ProductRelease+
StaffSalaries + ClientAccounts + Loan CredAccounts +
Overheads + Training Mgt + PersonnelRecords
*IT Reseller Application*
Select Product:
SelectProduct = productID + selectedProduct +




= “is defined as” or “is composed of” or “means”
+ AND
() optional, i.e., “occurs 0 or 1 time”
{} iteration, i.e., “may or may not include”
[] selection, i.e., “select one of several choices”
∗ ∗ comment enclosure; ∗∗, with no text, means null comment
∣ OR, i.e., partitions choices in []
Table 5.8: System Catalogue Notation
selectOptions + optionSelected
*components and data elements in process*
productID = VALID PID
VALID PID = 1{[0 − 9]}5 *range: 55550 − 99999*
*valid product identifiers in catalogue*
selectedProduct = VALID PID
altProduct = VALID PID
suggestAlt = *checks product list and suggests alternative*
OPTIONS = {Red, Blue, Green, Black, Pink}
selectOptions = *prompts customer to choose options*
optionSelected = VALID PID
po = VALID PID *output variable*
op = OPTIONS *output variable*
ss = VALID PID *output variable*
Manage Stock:
ManageStock = PRODUCT LIST + stockID +
OPTION LIST + checkStockList + checkVendor +
discontinued + updateStockList +
price + priceList + updatePriceList
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Figure 5.18: Redmound-IBM System Catalogue Structure.
PRODUCT LIST = {VALID PID} *Lists all products on the market*
stockID = VALID SID
VALID SID = 1{[0 − 9]}5 *range: 55550 − 99999*
stockList = {VALID SID} *lists products held in stock*
OPTION LIST = {VALID OPTIONS} *lists available options*
VALID OPTIONS = [Red ∣ Blue ∣ Green ∣ Black ∣ Pink]
checkStockList = *checks product in local productList*
checkVendor = *checks product with vendors*
discontinued = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
updateStockList = *removes discontinued products from productList*
price = ** *units: £ range: 1 − 10000 precision: nearest £*
priceList = { ( + stockID + , + price + ) }
updatePriceList = *updates priceList as necessary*
bb = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
cc = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
vv = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
ww = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
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Transaction and Product Release:
Ts ProductRelease = confirmPayment + releaseByShipping +
shippingCost + addPaperwork
confirmPayment = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
releaseByShipping = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
shippingCost = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999 *
*precision: nearest £*
addPaperwork = *ensures receipt and delivery note added*
*values: [0 ∣ 1]*
pr = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
uu = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
Staff Salaries:
StaffSalaries = loanStatus + outstandingLoan + requestedLoan
updatedLoan + grantLoan + repaymentAmount +
salaryB4Deduction + salaryAfter
loanStatus = * boolean: 0 = clear, and 1 = in arrears values: [0 ∣ 1]*
outstandingLoan = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
requestedLoan = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
updatedLoan = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
grantLoan = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
repaymentAmount = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
salaryB4Deduction = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
salaryAfter = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 999*
*precision: nearest £*
ee = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
gg = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
Performance Related Pay:
PerfRelatedPay = calculatePRP *calls operation calculatePRP*
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calculatePRP = *calculates PRP* *input: employeeID*
*output units: £ range: 0 - 999*
outstanding = [0 − 3] *days absent* *units: days range: 0 − 3*
okay = [4 ∣ 5] *days absent* *units: days range: 4 − 5*
underachieved = [6 ∣ 7] *days absent* *units: days range: 6 − 7*
critical = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 *days absent* *units: days range: 8 − 365*
issueWarning = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
takeDisciplinaryAction = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true*
*values: [0 ∣ 1]*
pp = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *output* Range: 0 - 200*
Client Accounts:
ClientAccounts = registered + premiumAccount
*manages client accounts*
registered = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
purchaseTarget = 1{ [0 − 9] }4 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 9999*
targetMet = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
premiumAccount = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
requestCredit = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
grantCredit = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
outstandingCredit = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 100*
interest = 1{ [0 − 9] }3 ** *units: £ range: 0 − 100*
addToBlacklist = *adds customerID to bad creditors’ list*
*input: customerID output units: list*
customerID = 1{ [0 − 9] }6 ** *range: 330001 − 339999*
tt = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
cc = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
rr = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
bb = *output* * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
aa = VALID PID *output variable*
Loan / Credit Accounts:
Loan CredAccounts = [checkLoanAccount ∣ checkCreditAccount]
checkLoanAccount = *checks status of employee loan account*
checkCreditAccount = *checks status of customer credit account*
employeeFeedback = ** *values: [0 ∣ 1]*
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customerFeedback = ** *values: [0 ∣ 1]*
ll = *output* * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
mm = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *output* *Range: 0 - 999*
dd = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *output* *Range: 0 - 999*
xx = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
yy = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
Overheads:
Overheads = **
pettyCash = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *holds monthly petty cash imprest*
*units: £ range: 0 − 100*
monthCounter = 1{[0 − 9]}2 *counts up to 30* *range: 1 − 30*
balance = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *units: £ range: 0 − 100*
updatePettyCash = *updates petty cash imprest to £100*
Training and Management:
Training Mgt = **
attendanceRecords = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *units: days range: 0 − 240*
absence = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *units: days range: 0 − 240*
coursesCompleted = [0 − 9] *range: 0-5*
offerTraining = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
getCoursesCompleted = *returns number of courses completed*[0 − 9] *range: 0-5*
getAbsenceRecords = *returns absence in business year*
1{[0 − 9]}3 *units: days range: 0 − 240*
maxAttendance = 1{[0 − 9]}3 * parameter* *units: days
range: 0 − 240*
maxCourses = [0 − 9] * parameter* *range: 0-5*
yearCounter = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *units: days range: 0 − 365*
ii = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
jj = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *output* *Range: 0 - 240*
kk = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
qq = [0-5] *output* *Range: 0 - 5*
ff = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
hh = 1{[0 − 9]}3 *output* *Range: 0 - 240*
nn = 1{[0 − 9]}6 *output* *Range: 111100 - 111199*
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mz = [0-5] *output* *Range: 0 - 5*
Personnel Records:
PersonnelRecords = *registers new employee and updates employee records*
employeeName = **
employeeID = 1{ [0 − 9] }6 ** *range: 111101 − 111199*
isEmployee = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
removeEmployee = *removes employee records* *input: employeeID*
employeeStatus = * boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
zz = *output* *boolean: 0 = false, and 1 = true values: [0 ∣ 1]*
For ease of reference, especially with respect to the security classification
of system variables, which we will present in Section 5.3, we tabulate the
technical elements defined in Redmound-IBM is Table 5.9. Notice the table
is organised by processes, which we later develop into B machines. Vari-
able names (e.g., parameters) that appear in more than one process (or
machine) have the same type and are defined only at first occurrence in the
table. Notice also that we list the output variables separately at the end
of the table. This is to draw attention to the variables we need to check
with our information flow analyser to ensure no variable(s) with a higher
security classification flow(s) into any output variable with a lower security
classification.
Table 5.9: Technical Elements and Types.
Technical Elements
SelectProduct
Element Name Element Type Comments
productID Variable Identifier. Value: 55550 - 99999
selectedProduct Variable Identifier. Value: 55550 - 99999
altProduct Variable Identifier. Value: 55550 - 99999
optionSelected Variable [Red ∣ Blue ∣ Green ∣ Black ∣ Pink]
VALID PID Set Set of Values: 55550 - 99999
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
OPTIONS Set {Red, Blue, Green, Black, P ink}
prod Parameter Element of Values: 55550 - 99999
option Parameter [Red ∣ Blue ∣ Green ∣ Black ∣ Pink]
sAlt Parameter Element of Values: 55550 - 99999
color Parameter [Red ∣ Blue ∣ Green ∣ Black ∣ Pink]
Vendors
Element Name Element Type Comments
PRODUCTS Set Deferred set of products
PRICE Set Element of 1..10000
products Variable Subset of PRODUCTS
salePrice Variable Element of PRICE
stocked Variable Value: products→ PRICE
prc Parameter Element of PRICE
item Parameter Element of PRODUCT
ManageStock
Element Name Element Type Comments
OPTION LIST Set {Red, Blue, Green, Black, P ink}
VALID SID Set Set of Values: 55550 - 99999
PRICE RANGE Set Set of Values: 1 - 10000
stockID Variable Element of Values: 55550 - 99999
stockList Variable Element of Values: 55550 - 99999
discontinued Variable Element of BOOL
price Variable Set of Values: 1 - 10000
priceList Variable Value: stockList→ PRICE RANGE
product Parameter Element of VALID SID
option Parameter Element of OPTION LIST
ClientAccounts
Element Name Element Type Comments
CUSTOMERID Set Set of Values 330001 - 339999
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
default CustID Constant Value: 330001
purchaseTarget Constant Value: 5000
maxCredit Constant Value: 100
maxDays Constant Value: 30
registered Variable Subset of CUSTOMERID
customerID Variable Element of CUSTOMERID
premiumAccount Variable Element of BOOL
outstandingCredit Variable Element of NAT
interest Variable Element of NAT
grantCredit Variable Element of BOOL
custID Parameter Element of CUSTOMERID
purchase Parameter Element of NAT
dy Parameter Element of NAT
cId Parameter Element of CUSTOMERID
amount Parameter Element of NAT
Customer
Element Name Element Type Comments
ITEMID Set Set of Values: 55550 - 99999
wares Variable Subset of ITEMID
return Variable Element of BOOL
returnItem Variable Element of wares
faulty Variable Value: wares→ BOOL
PersonnelRecords
Element Name Element Type Comments
EMP ID RANGE Set Set of Values 111100 - 111199
employees Set Subset of EMP ID RANGE
employeeName Variable Element of BOOL
employeeID Variable Element of EMP ID RANGE
employeeStatus Variable Element of BOOL
empID Parameter Element of EMP ID RANGE
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
maxAttendance Parameter Element of NAT
maxCourses Parameter Element of NAT
ANNUAL Set Values: 0 - 240
ATTENDANCE
attendanceRecords Variable Element of Values: 0 - 240
absence Variable Element of NAT
coursesCompleted Variable Element of NAT
emp Variables Values: 111100 - 111199
offerTraining Variables Element of BOOL
PerfRelatedPay
Element Name Element Type Comments
abs Parameter Element of NAT
crsComp Parameter Element of NAT
outstanding Variable Element of NAT
okay Variable Element of NAT
underachieved Variable Element of NAT
critical Variable Element of NAT
warning Variable Element of BOOL
discipline Variable Element of BOOL
prp Variable Element of NAT
salary Variable Element of NAT1
StaffSalary
Element Name Element Type Comments
LOANSTATUS Set Values: {Owing, NotOwing}
EMPID Set Values: 111100 - 111199
identifier Set Subset of EMPID
loanStatus Variable Values :
identifier → LOANSTATUS
outstandingLoan Variable Element of NAT
requestedLoan Variable Element of NAT
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
repaymentAmount Variable Element of NAT
salaryB4Deduction Variable Element of NAT
salaryAfter Variable Element of NAT
grantLoan Variable Element of BOOL
Loan CredAccounts
Element Name Element Type Comments
loanSts Variable Element of LOANSTATUS
creditStatus Variable Element of NAT
Accounts
Element Name Element Type Comments
GUESTACCOUNTS Set {ga11001, ga11002, ga11003,
ga11004, ga11005}
guestAccount Variable Element of GUESTACCOUNTS
guestID Variable Element of GUESTACCOUNTS
Ts ProductRelease
Element Name Element Type Comments
paymentConfirmed Variable Element of BOOL
toShip Variable Element of BOOL
weight Variable Element of NAT1
shippingCost Variable Element of NAT
documentsAdded Variable Element of BOOL
Sales Technical
Element Name Element Type Comments
pID Variable Element of NAT1
stockState Variable Element of BOOL
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
Overheads
Element Name Element Type Comments
limit Constant Values: 30
monthCounter Variable Values: ≤ limit
balance Variable Element of NAT
pettyCash Variable Values: ≤ PETTYCASH
Administration
Element Name Element Type Comments
counter Parameter Element of NAT1
Output Variables
Element Name Element Type Comments
aa Variable Element of VALID PID
bb Variable Element of BOOL
cc Variable Element of BOOL
dd Variable Element of NAT
ee Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
ff Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
gg Variable Element of BOOL
hh Variable Values: 0 - 240
ii Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
jj Variable Values: 0 - 240
kk Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
ll Variable Element of BOOL
mm Variable Element of NAT
nn Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
pp Variable Element of NAT
qq Variable Values: 0 - 5
rr Variable Element of BOOL
ss Variable Element of VALID PID
Continued on next page
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Table 5.9 – continued from previous page
Element Name Element Type Comments
tt Variable Element of BOOL
uu Variable Element of BOOL
vv Variable Element of BOOL
ww Variable Element of BOOL
xx Variable Values: 111100 - 111199
yy Variable Element of BOOL
zz Variable Element of BOOL
po Variable Element of VALID PID
op Variable Element of OPTIONS
pr Variable Element of BOOL
mz Variable Values: 0 - 5
Following from our system analysis in Sections 5.2.4.1 and 5.2.4.2, we sum-
marise, in Section 5.2.5, the visibility relationships arising from the struc-
tural relationship between the processes and sub-process in Redmound-IBM.
5.2.5 Redmound-IBM: The System Synthesis
In this section, we present the visibility relationships between the processes
and sub-processes introduced in Sections 5.2.4.1 and 5.2.4.2, which forms
the bases for the B Machine subsystems we use later in our formal specifica-
tion in Section 5.4. We begin with a text listing of the visibility relationships.
à ManageStock SEES Vendors
à Customer SEES SelectProduct
à Training Mgt SEES PersonnelRecords
à PerfRelatedPay SEES PersonnelRecords, Training Mgt
à StaffSalaries SEES Training Mgt, PersonnelRecords, PerfRelatedPay
à Loan CredAccounts SEES StaffSalaries, ClientAccounts
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à Accounts EXTENDS StaffSalaries, ClientAccounts, Loan CredAccounts
à Ts ProductRelease SEES Customer, Loan CredAccounts, ManageStock
à Sales Technical INCLUDES ManageStock, Ts ProductRelease
à Administration INCLUDES Overheads, Training Mgt,
PersonnelRecords
We further elaborate on the structure of the formal B specification of our
Redmound-IBM reseller monitor in Figure 5.19. In this figure we use rounded
rectangles to represent B Machine subsystems within Redmound-IBM. We
use labeled directed lines between two machines to indicate visibility (struc-
turing) links between connected machines via B structuring mechanisms,
with the arrow pointing at the machine that has visibility of the other con-
nected machine. With respect to our information flow analysis, the arrow in
effect points at the machine into which information may flow from the static
parts of connected (visible) machine(s) by virtue of structuring mechanisms
in B. The label on a directed line indicates the type of visibility rule that
exists between the connected machines.
Using the structural relationships described in this section, we present the
formal specification and design of the B Machine subsystems used to build
Redmound-IBM IT Reseller Monitor in Section 5.4.1. In the following sec-
tion, though, we introduce our definition of the information flow policy de-
fined on the variables in the development.
5.3 Information Flow Policy
In this section, we present the information flow policy definitions for
Redmound-IBM. The definitions given here are used in subsequent
sections for the flow analysis of the machines, refinements and
implementations.
5.3.1 Redmound-IBM: Policy Definitions
We specify in this section the information flow policy for Redmound-IBM.
The variables are mapped to security classes on the security flow lattice de-
275
Figure 5.19: Structure of B Machine Specifications
picted in Figure 5.20, where the security classes are denoted ∅, [A], [B],[C], [AB], [AC], and [ABC]. The representation is purely syntactic; it is
intended only to provide a visual image of secure information flow, for ex-
ample, variables mapped to [A] could be seen to securely flow into variables
mapped to [AB]. The greatest lower bound of all elements of the security
flow lattice is ∅, whereas the least upper bound is [ABC]. We employ the
following notation, with variables grouped in sets by security classification:
∅ denotes the set {productID, selectedProduct, altProduct,
optionSelected, prod, option, sAlt, color, po, op,
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ss, products, item, stockList, stockID, pId,
discontinued, price, PRODUCT LIST, weight,
OPTION LIST, cc, paymentConfirmed, toShip,
shippingCost, documentAdded, VALID PID,},
i.e., the set of public variables with security classification ∅
A denotes {salePrice, stocked, prc, bb, PRICE RANGE, SID,
product, zz},
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [A], or the
domain of the set of variable mappings to the security class [A].
B denotes {CUSTOMERID, purchaseTarget, maxCredit, maxDays,
registered, customerID, custID, purchase, tt, OPTIONS,
cId, dy, amount, wares, faulty, returnItem, PRODUCTS,
return, GUESTACCOUNTS, guestAccount, dd},
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [B].
C denotes {EMP ID RANGE, employeeName, employeeStatus,
empID, ANNUAL ATTENDANCE, emp,
maxCourses, abs, jj, identifier, LOANSTATUS, ee, gg,
maxAttendance, employees}
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [C].
AB denotes {default CustID, premiumAccount, outstandingCredit,
interest, grantCredit, rr, creditStatus, mm,
stockState, vv, ww, uu},
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [AB].
AC denotes {attendanceRecords, absence, coursesCompleted,
offerTraining, ii, kk, qq, crsComp, outstanding, okay,
underachieved, critical, warning, discipline, prp, pp},
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [AC]
ABC denotes {salary, loanStatus, outstandingLoan, requestedLoan,
repaymentAmount, salaryB4Deduction, salaryAfter,
grantLoan, loanSts, ll, limit, PETTY CASH, pettyCash,
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balance, monthCounter, counter, xx},
i.e., the set of variables with security classification [ABC].
Each of the variables in the above sets is pointwise mapped to the corre-
sponding security class, for example each of the variables in AB maps to
the security class [AB]. We illustrate this by writing AB Ð→ [AB] in the
security flow lattice shown in Figure 5.20. Furthermore, we write:
Figure 5.20: Redmound-IBM Security Policy Lattice
↓A to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications lower
than or equal to [A] on the security flow lattice (sfl).
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↓B to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications lower
than or equal to [B] on the sfl.↓C to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications lower
than or equal to [C] on the sfl.↓AB to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications
lower than or equal to [AB] on the sfl.↓AC to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications
lower than or equal to [AC] on the sfl.↓ABC to denote the set of variables mapped to security classifications
lower than or equal to [ABC] on the sfl.
Using the notation given above, we itemise our defined pointwise security
mappings in terms of what information may be read by individual variables.
à A may read ↓A;
à B may read ↓B;
à C may read ↓C;
à AB may read ↓AB;
à BC may read ↓BC;
à ABC may read ↓ABC;
à All variables may read ∅.
In the following sections, we use the security definition here to check Redmound-
IBM for secure information flow. First, we introduce the formal B machines
used to model Redmound-IBM in Section 5.4.
5.4 Redmound-IBM: The B Components
Following the structured development approach illustrated in Figure 5.19,
we present in this section the formal B Machine specifications of the sub-
systems used in our development of Redmound IT reseller Business Mon-
itor (aka Redmound-IBM). Following the development approach in the B
Method, we structure this section by Machines (Specifications), Refinements
and Implementations. We then apply our information flow analyser to each
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machine, refinement and implementation to check whether flows between
system variables respect the security flow lattice defined in Figure 5.20.
5.4.1 Redmound-IBM: Formal Specification and Design
In this subsection, we present the B Machines used in our development of
Redmound-IBM. All the B Machines discussed here have been checked and
proved for proof obligation consistency using Atelier B. A screenshot of the
Redmound-IBM project in Atelier B showing the proof obligations automat-
ically generated and proved is given in Figure 5.21.
Figure 5.21: Redmound-IBM: Proof Obligations Consistency Check
We discuss, first, the SelectProduct machine which is visible to the Cus-
tomer machine via the SEES structuring mechanism. We include in the
INVARIANT clause the non-trivial requirement that productID, altProd-
uct, and selectedProduct must not accept any natural number that is not a
valid identifier. The SelectProduct machine presents three client interfaces
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through the following operations:
à po ←Ð selectProduct(prod): This operation takes as input data of
type VALID PID, updates the selectedProduct state variable and out-
puts the value on po.
à op ←Ð selectOptions(option): This operation updates the optionSe-
lected state variable with the input passed via the operation parameter,
and outputs the value on op.
à ss←Ð suggestAlternative(sAlt, color): This operation takes two pa-
rameters of types VALID PID and OPTIONS respectively, updates
the productID, altProduct and optionSelected state variables, and out-
puts the first parameter on ss.





Figure 5.22: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE SelectProduct
The following formal listing is the B Machine component SelectProduct,
which defines the client interfaces described above.
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MACHINE SelectProduct
SETS OPTIONS = {Red,Blue,Green,Black,P ink}
PROPERTIES OPTIONS ≠ ∅
DEFINITIONS V ALID PID ≜ 55550..99999
VARIABLES
productID, selectedProduct, altProduct, optionSelected
INVARIANT
productID ∈ V ALID PID ∧ selectedProduct ∈ V ALID PID ∧
altProduct ∈ V ALID PID ∧ optionSelected ∈ OPTIONS ∧∀pId ⋅ (pId ∈ NAT ∧ pId /∈ V ALID PID⇒
pId ≠ productID) ∧∀altProd ⋅ (altProd ∈ NAT ∧ altProd /∈ V ALID PID⇒
altProd ≠ altProduct) ∧∀selProd ⋅ (selProd ∈ NAT ∧ selProd /∈ V ALID PID⇒
selProd ≠ selectedProduct)
INITIALISATION productID, selectedProduct, altProduct,
optionSelected ∶= 55550, 55550, 99999, Red
OPERATIONS
po < − − selectProduct(prod) ≜
PRE prod ∶ V ALID PID THEN
selectedProduct ∶= prod ∣∣
po ∶= prod
END;
op < − − selectOptions(option) ≜
PRE option ∶ OPTIONS THEN
optionSelected ∶= option ∥
op ∶= option
END;
ss < − − suggestAlternative(sAlt, color) ≜
PRE sAlt ∈ NAT1 ∧ sAlt ∈ V ALID PID ∧
color ∶ OPTIONS THEN
productID ∶= sAlt ∥
altProduct ∶= sAlt ∥
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We now present the formal B machine component Vendors, which is seen
by the ManageStock machine. MACHINE Vendors defines the operations:
à setProduct: Sets product pricing for stocked items.
à bb ←Ð itemStocked(item): Checks for items in stock, and returns
TRUE if found.











products ⊆ PRODUCTS ∧ salePrice ∈ PRICE ∧
stocked ∈ productsÐ→ PRICE
INITIALISATION
products, salePrice, stocked ∶= ∅, 1, ∅
OPERATIONS
setProduct ≜
ANY prod, prc WHERE









We discuss next the ManageStock machine, which sees MACHINE Vendors.
We define in the INVARIANT clause the added requirement that any
natural number used as stockID must be a valid identifier (i.e., value between
55550 and 99999). MACHINE ManageStock has four interfaces, namely:
à bb ←Ð checkStockList(product, option): Checks for availability of
product in local stock list. The operation returns TRUE if product
is in stock, otherwise, it returns FALSE.
à cc ←Ð checkV endor(product, option): Checks product list with ven-
dors and returns TRUE if in stock, otherwise, it returns FALSE and
sets the discontinued flag to TRUE.
à updateStockList(prod): The operation does some housekeeping by
removing discontinued products from local stock list.
à updatePriceList(prod, prc): Updates the price list when called.
Both machines ManageStock and Vendors are depicted in Figure 5.23
The following listing shows the B Machine component ManageStock, viz:
MACHINE ManageStock
SEES V endors
SETS OPTION LIST = {Red,Blue,Green,Black,P ink}
PROPERTIES OPTION LIST ≠ ∅
DEFINITIONS V ALID SID ≜ 55550..99999 ;
PRODUCT LIST ≜ 55550..99999 ;
PRICE RANGE ≜ 1..10000
VARIABLES stockID, stockList, discontinued, price, priceList
INVARIANT stockID ∈ V ALID SID ∧ stockList ⊆ PRODUCT LIST ∧










Figure 5.23: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE ManageStock
priceList ∈ stockListÐ→ PRICE RANGE ∧∀sId ⋅ (sId ∈ NAT ∧ sId /∈ V ALID SID⇒ sId ≠ stockID)
INITIALISATION stockID, stockList, discontinued, price, priceList∶= 55550, 55550, FALSE, 1, 55550↦ 1
OPERATIONS
bb←Ð checkStockList(product, option) ≜
PRE product ∈ V ALID SID ∧ option ∈ OPTION LIST
THEN






cc←Ð checkV endor(product, option) ≜
PRE product ∈ V ALID SID ∧ option ∈ OPTION LIST
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THEN
IF product ∈ PRODUCT LIST THEN
cc ∶= TRUE
ELSE





PRE prod ∈ V ALID SID ∧ prod ∈ stockList ∧
prod /∈ PRODUCT LIST THEN
stockList ∶= stockList − {prod}
END;
updatePriceList(prod, prc) ≜
PRE prod ∈ V ALID SID ∧ prod ∈ stockList ∧




We present below the ClientAccounts machine, which has four interfaces,
namely:
à tt ←Ð targetMet(custID, purchase): This operation determines if
the purchase target set is met by customers, whereupon such cus-
tomer is upgraded to the premiumAccount status and thus eligible for
customer credit allowance. The operation returns TRUE or FALSE to
indicate whether target (specified in the CONSTANTS clause) is met
or not.
à setCustomerID(cId): This operation adds a customerID to the list
of registered customers when called, after ensuring that input value is
valid. It has no return value.
à cc ←Ð getCustomerID(cId): This operation checks the list of reg-
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istered customers for a specified customerID and returns TRUE if
customer is registered; else, it returns FALSE.
à rr ←Ð requestCredit(cId, amount): This operation checks that the
business rules defined with respect to customer credit is met and re-
turns TRUE or FALSE to indicate whether the customer is eligible or
not.





default CustID, purchaseTarget, maxCredit, maxDays
PROPERTIES
CUSTOMERID ≠ ∅ ∧ default CustID = 330001 ∧





registered ⊆ CUSTOMERID ∧ customerID ∈ CUSTOMERID∧ premiumAccount ∈ BOOL ∧ outstandingCredit ∶ NAT ∧
interest ∈ NAT ∧ grantCredit ∈ BOOL
INITIALISATION
registered, customerID, premiumAccount,
outstandingCredit, interest, grantCredit ∶=∅, default CustID, FALSE, 0, 0, FALSE
OPERATIONS
tt←Ð targetMet(custID, purchase) ≜
PRE custID ∈ CUSTOMERID ∧ purchase ∈ NAT ∧
purchase ≤ 9999 THEN
IF purchase ≥ purchaseTarget THEN









PRE cId ∈ CUSTOMERID THEN
registered ∶= registered ∪ {cId}
END;
cc < − − getCustomerID(cId) ≜
PRE cId ∈ CUSTOMERID ∧ cId /∈ registered THEN






rr ←Ð requestCredit(cId, amount) ≜
PRE cId ∈ CUSTOMERID ∧ amount ∈ NAT ∧
amount + outstandingCredit ≤ 100 THEN
ANY dy WHERE dy ∈ NAT THEN
SELECT dy <maxDays THEN
outstandingCredit ∶= outstandingCredit + amount∥ grantCredit ∶= TRUE ∥
rr ∶= TRUE
WHEN dy ≥maxDays ∧
outstandingCredit ∗ 30/100 ∈ NAT THEN
grantCredit ∶= FALSE ∥
interest ∶= outstandingCredit ∗ 30/100 ∥
rr ∶= FALSE
ELSE







The next machine we present here is the Customer machine, which sees the
SelectProduct and ClientAccounts machines described earlier. We add the
invariant that wares is a non-empty subset of ITEMID. We describe below
the interfaces of MACHINE Customer, viz:
à aa←Ð isCustomer(custID): Checks a valid customerID input to see
if the number relates to a registered customer, and returns the number
to indicate it does.
à bb←Ð afterSalesSupport(prod): Checks if product is faulty, and sets
output to TRUE if it is. Otherwise, it does nothing.






Figure 5.24: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Customer
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VARIABLES wares, returnItem, faulty, return
INVARIANT
wares ⊆ ITEMID ∧ returnItem ∈ wares ∧
faulty ∈ waresÐ→ BOOL ∧ return ∈ BOOL ∧
wares ≠ ∅
INITIALISATION
wares, returnItem, faulty, return ∶={55550}, 55550, {55550↦ FALSE}, FALSE
OPERATIONS
aa←Ð isCustomer(custID) ≜




PRE prod ∈ ITEMID THEN
IF faulty(prod) = TRUE THEN
return ∶= TRUE ∥




We next present the PersonnelRecords, which monitors some personnel records
of employees. Since any company must have at least one employee, we add
the invariant that employeeID is not NULL. We describe below the interfaces
to MACHINE PersonnelRecords, viz:
à zz ←Ð isEmployee(empID): Checks input data relates to a valid
employee and returns TRUE, if so. Otherwise, the operation returns
FALSE.
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à removeEmployee(empID): Removes details if input data relates, for
example, to a former employee.
We detail the listing of MACHINE PersonnelRecords below:
MACHINE PersonnelRecords
DEFINITIONS
EMP ID RANGE ≜ 111100..111199
VARIABLES employees, employeeName, employeeID,
employeeStatus
INVARIANT employees ⊆ EMP ID RANGE ∧
employeeName ∈ BOOL ∧
employeeID ∈ EMP ID RANGE ∧
employeeStatus ∈ BOOL ∧ employeeID /∈ ∅
INITIALISATION employees, employeeName, employeeID,
employeeStatus ∶= ∅, FALSE, 111100, FALSE
OPERATIONS
zz ←Ð isEmployee(empID) ≜
PRE empID ∈ EMP ID RANGE THEN
IF empID ∈ employees THEN
employeeStatus ∶= TRUE ∥
zz ∶= TRUE
ELSE





PRE empID ∈ EMP ID RANGE THEN
IF empID /∈ employees THEN






The next machine we discuss here is the Training Mgt, which monitors the
attendance and training records of employees. We provide the additional
invariant that emp is a natural number in the range 111100 to 111199, as
described in the System Catalogue (Section 5.2.4.3). We describe below the
interfaces to MACHINE Training Mgt, viz:
à ii, jj ←Ð getAbsenceRecords(empID, abs): Sets the absence records
of employee and returns employee number and corresponding absence
records.
à kk, qq ←Ð getCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp): Checks to en-
sure employees undertake at least one training course in the year, and
returns employee number and corresponding number of courses com-
pleted. If no course has been completed to date, the operation then
sets the offerTraining flag to TRUE, indicating the need for a train-
ing course to be arranged.
We detail the listing of MACHINE Training Mgt below:
MACHINE Training Mgt(maxAttendance, maxCourses)
CONSTRAINTS
maxAttendance = 240 ∧ maxCourses = 5
SEES PersonnelRecords
DEFINITIONS
ANNUAL ATTENDANCE == 0..240
VARIABLES
attendanceRecords, absence, coursesCompleted, emp,
offerTraining
INVARIANT
attendanceRecords ∈ ANNUAL ATTENDANCE ∧ absence ∈ NAT ∧
absence ≤maxAttendance ∧ coursesCompleted ∈ NAT ∧
coursesCompleted ≤maxCourses ∧ emp ∈ NAT1 ∧
emp ≥ 111100 ∧ emp ≤ 111199 ∧ offerTraining ∈ BOOL
INITIALISATION
attendanceRecords, absence, coursesCompleted, emp,
offerTraining ∶= 240, 0, 2, 111101, FALSE
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OPERATIONS
ii, jj ←Ð getAbsenceRecords(empID, abs) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ≥ 111100 ∧
empID ≤ 111199 ∧ abs ∈ NAT ∧
abs ≤maxAttendance THEN
emp ∶= empID ∥
absence ∶= abs ∥
ii ∶= empID ∥
jj ∶= abs
END;
kk, qq ←Ð getCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ≥ 111100 ∧
empID ≤ 111199 ∧ crsComp ∈ NAT ∧
crsComp ≤maxCourses THEN
IF crsComp < 1 THEN
offerTraining ∶= TRUE ∥
emp ∶= empID ∥
coursesCompleted ∶= crsComp + 1 ∥
kk ∶= empID ∥
qq ∶= crsComp + 1
ELSE
emp ∶= empID ∥
coursesCompleted ∶= crsComp ∥
kk ∶= empID ∥




The next machine we discuss here is the PerfRelatedPay, which uses the at-
tendance records of employees to calculate their Performance Related Pay,
i.e., the amount by which their annual salaries will be increased in the next
business year. Machine PerfRelatedPay sees machines PersonnelRecords
and Training Mgt. We describe below the singular interface to PerfRelated-
Pay, viz:
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à pp←Ð calculatePRP (salary, abs)









































Figure 5.25: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE PerfRelatedPay
We detail the listing of MACHINE PerfRelatedPay below:
MACHINE PerfRelatedPay
SEES PersonnelRecords, Training Mgt
VARIABLES
outstanding, okay, underachieved, critical,
warning, discipline, prp
INVARIANT
outstanding ∈ NAT ∧ okay ∈ NAT ∧ underachieved ∈ NAT ∧




outstanding, okay, underachieved, critical,warning,
discipline, prp ∶= 0, 0, 0, 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0
OPERATIONS
pp ←Ð calculatePRP (salary, abs) ≜
PRE salary ∈ NAT1 ∧ abs ∈ NAT ∧ abs ≤ 240 ∧
0 ≤ salary ∗ abs/100 THEN
SELECT abs ≤ 3 ∧ 0 ≤ salary ∗ 3/100 ∧
salary ∗ 3/100 ≤ 2147483647 THEN
prp ∶= salary ∗ 3/100 ∥
pp ∶= salary ∗ 3/100
WHEN abs = 4 ∨ abs = 5 ∧ 0 ≤ salary ∗ 2/100 ∧
salary ∗ 2/100 ≤ 2147483647 THEN
prp ∶= salary ∗ 2/100 ∥
pp ∶= salary ∗ 2/100
WHEN abs = 6 ∨ abs = 7 ∧ 0 ≤ salary ∗ 1/100 ∧
salary ∗ 1/100 ≤ 2147483647 THEN
prp ∶= salary ∗ 1/100 ∥









We now discuss the StaffSalaries machine, which has just the one inter-
face used to monitor staff loans and post-tax deductions. This interface,
ee, gg ←Ð requestLoan(amount) accepts a loan request input parameter,
and checks defined business rules to determine if loan is to be granted or
rejected. If loan is granted, then repayment amount and salary after deduc-
tion of monthly repayment amount is calculated.
To the INVARIANT clause of MACHINE StaffSalaries we added the re-
quirement that employees may only be granted loan up to 25% (i.e., a quar-
295
ter) of their salaries. We illustrate the MACHINE StaffSalaries, with its










































Figure 5.26: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE StaffSalaries
Note that the output variable gg is intended to indicate whether the em-
ployee in question is credit-worthy or not. We detail the listing of MACHINE
StaffSalaries below:
MACHINE StaffSalaries
SEES Training Mgt, PersonnelRecords, PerfRelatedPay
SETS











identifier ⊆ EMPID ∧
loanStatus ∈ identifier Ð→ LOANSTATUS ∧
outstandingLoan ∈ NAT ∧ requestedLoan ∈ NAT ∧
repaymentAmount ∈ NAT ∧ salaryB4Deduction ∈ NAT ∧
salaryAfter ∈ NAT ∧ grantLoan ∈ BOOL ∧
outstandingLoan ≤ salaryB4Deduction/4
INITIALISATION
identifier, loanStatus, outstandingLoan, requestedLoan,
repaymentAmount, salaryB4Deduction, salaryAfter,
grantLoan ∶={111100}, {111100↦ NotOwing}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, FALSE
OPERATIONS
ee, gg ←Ð requestLoan(empID) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ identifier THEN
ANY amount WHERE amount ∈ NAT ∧
outstandingLoan + amount ≤ 2147483647 ∧
salaryB4Deduction/4 ≤ 2147483647 ∧
0 ≤ outstandingLoan/6 ∧
0 ≤ salaryB4Deduction −
repaymentAmount THEN
IF outstandingLoan = 0 ∧ amount = 0 THEN
loanStatus(empID) ∶= NotOwing ∥
ee ∶= empID ∥
gg ∶= TRUE
ELSIF outstandingLoan > 0 ∧
outstandingLoan+amount ≤ salaryB4Deduction/4
THEN
loanStatus(empID) ∶= Owing ∥
grantLoan ∶= TRUE ∥
outstandingLoan ∶= outstandingLoan+amount∥ repaymentAmount ∶= outstandingLoan/6 ∥
salaryAfter ∶= salaryB4Deduction −
repaymentAmount ∥
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ee ∶= empID ∥
gg ∶= TRUE
ELSE
loanStatus(empID) ∶= Owing ∥
grantLoan ∶= FALSE ∥
salaryAfter ∶= salaryB4Deduction −
repaymentAmount ∥






The next sub-component we discuss here is the Loan CredAccounts machine,
which sees the StaffSalaries and ClientAccounts machines. We describe
below the interfaces to Loan CredAccounts, viz:
à ll ←Ð checkLoanAccount(empID): This operation checks StaffSalaries
machine to determine if employee has any outstanding loan, and out-
puts the loan status, i.e., whether the employee is owing the company
or not.
à mm←Ð checkCreditAccount(custID): The operation checks
ClientAccounts machine to determine if the customer has any out-
standing credit, and outputs the credit status, i.e., whether the cus-
tomer is owing the company or not.
We illustrate the MACHINE Loan CredAccounts, with its interfaces, in
Figure 5.27.



































Figure 5.27: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Loan CredAccounts
loanSts ∈ LOANSTATUS ∧ creditStatus ∈ NAT
INITIALISATION
loanSts, creditStatus ∶= Owing, 1
OPERATIONS
ll ←Ð checkLoanAmount(empID) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ identifier THEN
IF loanStatus(empID) ∈ LOANSTATUS THEN




mm ←Ð checkCreditAccount(custID) ≜
PRE custID ∈ NAT1 ∧ custID ∈ registered THEN





We next present the Accounts machine, which extends the StaffSalaries,
ClientAccounts and Loan CredAccounts machines. We describe below the
interfaces to the Accounts machine, viz:
à xx, yy ←ÐmonitorLoanAccounts(empID): The operation checks
StaffSalaries machine and calls the xx, yy ←Ð requestLoan(empID)
operation.
à dd←ÐmonitorClientAccounts(custID): The operation checks
ClientAccounts machine to determine if the customer is registered or
not. If customer is registered control is passed to the
dd ←Ð checkCreditAccount(custID) of machine Loan CredAccounts.
If customer is not registered, then a temporary guestAccount is opened
for the customer.
We illustrate the MACHINE Accounts, with its interfaces and included
machines, in Figure 5.28.
The listing of the Accounts machine is detailed below:
MACHINE Accounts
INCLUDES
StaffSalaries, ClientAccounts, Loan CredAccounts
SETS
















Figure 5.28: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Accounts
OPERATIONS
dd←ÐmonitorClientAccounts(custID) ≜
PRE custID ∈ NAT1 THEN
SELECT custID ∈ registered THEN
dd←Ð checkCreditAccount(custID)
WHEN custID /∈ registered THEN
ANY guestID ∈ GUESTACCOUNTS THEN








xx, yy ←ÐmonitorLoanAccounts(empID) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ identifier THEN
xx, yy ←Ð requestLoan(empID)
END
END
The next machine we discuss here is the Ts ProductRelease machine, which
provides the singular interface, pr ←Ð productRelease(pID), for monitoring
the business rules for releasing purchased products to customers.
We illustrate the MACHINE Ts ProductRelease, with its interface and seen























































Figure 5.29: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Ts ProductRelease
We define within the INVARIANT clause of Ts ProductRelease a num-
ber of additional requirements, for example, that a customer must not be
charged shipping cost whenever he has opted to collect product from the
store (i.e., toShip = FALSE), and that whenever the weight of the product
is over 10kg, the shipping cost must be over £10 (subject to special delivery
arrangements to be made with courier). The listing of the Ts ProductRelease
machine is detailed below:
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MACHINE Ts ProductRelease
SEES Customer, Loan CredAccounts, ManageStock
VARIABLES
paymentConfirmed, toShip, weight, shippingCost,
documentsAdded
INVARIANT
paymentConfirmed ∈ BOOL ∧ toShip ∈ BOOL ∧
weight ∈ NAT1 ∧ weight ≤ 10 ∧
shippingCost ∈ NAT ∧ documentsAdded ∈ BOOL ∧
!ts ⋅ (ts = toShip ∧ ts = FALSE ⇒ shippingCost = 0) ∧
!ww ⋅ (ww = weight ∧ww > 10 ⇒ shippingCost > 0) ∧
not(paymentConfirmed = TRUE ∧ toShip = FALSE) ∧
not(paymentConfirmed = TRUE ∧ toShip = TRUE) ∧
weight ≤ 10
INITIALISATION
paymentConfirmed, toShip, weight, shippingCost,
documentsAdded ∶= FALSE, FALSE, 1, 0, FALSE
OPERATIONS
pr ←Ð productRelease(pID) ≜
PRE pID ∈ NAT1 ∧ pID ∈ stockList ∧
not(paymentConfirmed = FALSE ∧
toShip = TRUE) THEN
IF paymentConfirmed = TRUE ∧
toShip = FALSE THEN
shippingCost ∶= 0 ∥
documentsAdded ∶= TRUE ∥
pr ∶= TRUE
ELSIF
paymentConfirmed = TRUE ∧
toShip = TRUE THEN
SELECT weight > 0 ∧weight < 2 THEN
shippingCost ∶= 5 ∥
documentsAdded ∶= TRUE ∥
pr ∶= TRUE
WHEN weight ≥ 2 ∧weight < 5 THEN
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shippingCost ∶= 8 ∥
documentsAdded ∶= TRUE ∥
pr ∶= TRUE
WHEN weight ≥ 5 ∧weight ≤ 10 THEN
shippingCost ∶= 10 ∥
documentsAdded ∶= TRUE ∥
pr ∶= TRUE
ELSE
shippingCost ∶= 10000 ∥
pr ∶= FALSE
ELSE





Next, we discuss here the Sales Technical machine, which includes the
ManageStock and Ts ProductRelease machines. Further, the
Sales Technical machine promotes the operations checkStockList,
checkVendor, and productRelease to full-fledged operations of the including
machine. We describe below the interfaces to the Sales Technical machine,
viz:
à vv ←ÐmonitorLocalStock(product, option): The operation checks
ManageStock machine and calls the checkLocalStock operation.
à ww ←ÐmonitorV endorStock(product, option): The operation checks
ManageStock machine and passes control to the checkV endor opera-
tion.
à uu←ÐmonitorProductRelease(pID): This operation checks
the Ts ProductRelease machine, and passes control to the
productRelease operation of the Ts ProductRelease machine.







Figure 5.30: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Sales Technical
The listing of the Sales Technical machine is detailed below:
MACHINE Sales Technical
INCLUDES ManageStock, Ts ProductRelease
PROMOTES
checkStockList, checkV endor, productRelease
VARIABLES stockState
INVARIANT stockState ∈ BOOL
INITIALISATION stockState ∶= BOOL
OPERATIONS
vv ←ÐmonitorLocalStock(product, option) ≜
PRE product ∈ NAT1 ∧ product ∈ stockList ∧
option ∈ OPTION LIST ∧ vv ∈ BOOL THEN
vv ←Ð checkStockList(product, option) ∥
stockState ∶= vv
END;
ww ←ÐmonitorV endorStock(product, option) ≜
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PRE product ∈ NAT1 ∧ product ∈ stockList ∧
option ∈ OPTION LIST THEN
ww ←Ð checkV endor(product, option)
END;
uu←ÐmonitorProductRelease(pID) ≜
PRE pID ∈ NAT1 ∧ pID ∈ stockList ∧





The next machine component we present here is the Overheads machine,
which monitors the petty cash imprest account and updates it according to
the defined business rules every 30 days.
The detailed listing of the Overheads machine is given below:
MACHINE Overheads
CONSTANTS limit
PROPERTIES limit = 30
DEFINITIONS PETTY CASH == 100
VARIABLES monthCounter, balance, pettyCash
INVARIANT
monthCounter ≤ limit ∧ balance ∈ NAT ∧
pettyCash ∈ NAT ∧ pettyCash ≤ PETTY CASH
INITIALISATION
monthCounter, balance, pettyCash ∶= 1, 0, 0
OPERATIONS
setPettyCash(counter) ≜
PRE counter ∈ NAT1 ∧ counter = limit THEN
IF pettyCash < PETTY CASH THEN
balance ∶= pettyCash ∥





The last sub-component discussed here is the Administration machine, which
includes the Overheads, Training Mgt and PersonnelRecords machines. Fur-
ther, the Administration machine is parameterised with the same parameters
that the Training Mgt machine receives. We describe below the interfaces
to the Administration machine, viz:
à monitorPettyCash(counter): The operation checks the
Overheads machine and calls the setPettyCash operation.
à ff, hh←ÐmonitorAbsenceRecords: The operation checks
Training Mgt machine and passes control to the
getAbsenceRecords(empID,abs) operation.
à nn,mz ←Ð monitorCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp): This op-
eration checks the getCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp) operation
of the Training Mgt machine.
We illustrate the MACHINE Administration, with its interfaces, in
Figure 5.31.
The listing of the Administration machine is detailed below:
MACHINE Administration(maxAttendance, maxCourses)
INCLUDES
Overheads, Training Mgt(maxAttendance, maxCourses),
P ersonnelRecords
CONSTRAINTS
maxAttendance = 240 ∧ maxCourses = 5
OPERATIONS
monitorPettyCash(counter) ≜







Figure 5.31: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Administration
ff, hh←ÐmonitorAbsenceRecords(empID, abs) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ employees ∧
abs ∈ NAT ∧ abs ≤maxAttendance THEN
ff, hh←Ð getAbsenceRecords(empID, abs)
END;
nn,mz ←ÐmonitorCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp) ≜
PRE empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ employees ∧
crsComp ∈ NAT ∧ crsComp ≤maxCourses THEN
nn,mz ←Ð getCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp)
END
END
Having presented the formal B Machine specification of the subsystems of
Redmound-IBM, we discuss in Section 5.4.2 below the results of analysing
the flow of information between machine variables, using our information
flow analyser, with respect to the security flow lattice defined in Section 5.3.
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5.4.2 Redmound-IBM Machines: Information Flow Analysis
In this section, we run the formal B machines defined in Section 5.4.1 through
our information flow analyser, BMethalizer.exe, developed using C++. To
make the analysis even more interesting, we assume that some of the vari-
ables, for example, yy, guestID, nn, aa, . . . are not classified in the security
flow lattice. This will enable us to check if flows non-public4 variables to
such variables are regarded ‘insecure’, as they should. We will also review
our analysis results to see if flows to/from incomparable variables are cor-
rectly captured by the flow analyser. Our Information Flow Analyser takes
two input files. The first file contains the ascii version of the B Machines
described earlier in Section 5.4.1. The second file contains the text version
of the security flow policy defined in Section 5.3. This security flow policy
we define on a single flow lattice, as illustrated in Figure 5.20. For simplicity
in this text version of the security flow policy, we write 0 to denote the ∅
security class; A for the [A] security class; B for [B]; C for [C]; AB for[AB]; AC for [A]; and ABC for [ABC].
Now suppose we have two variables var1 and var2 such that var2 depends
on var1, i.e., information flows from var1 into var2. The output of our in-
formation flow analyser writes var2↦ var1 to denote that var2 depends on
var1. Any flow adjudged insecure by our information flow analyser is high-
lighted in bold red, to enhance visibility of parts of the system (or security
flow policy) that may need to be modified. Note that all screenshot figures
referenced in this section are presented in Appendix D. The first machine
we analyse is ‘Accounts’.
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B ma-
chine Accounts and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow anal-
yser is presented in Figure 1 in Appendix D. Figure 2 shows some of the flows
between variables in the dd←ÐmonitorClientAccounts(custID) operation
of Accounts. Notice that the flow from guestID into guestAccount is ad-
judged insecure. This is the case because we intentionally leave the variable
guestID undefined in Section 5.3, hence the two variables are incomparable.
Similarly, since yy is also undefined in Section 5.3, all flows between yy and
4Variables with security classification higher than ∅.
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other non-public variables in the xx, yy ←ÐmonitorLoanAccounts(empID)
operation are incomparable and hence insecure, as shown by the screenshot
in Figure 3 of Appendix D. The case of flows within Accounts is also very
informative as they entail flows due to B structuring mechanisms via the
EXTENDS clause, which made it possible for operations of extended ma-
chines to expose variables of the visible machines as read-only to operations
of the machine Accounts. The EXTENDS clause also made variables (e.g.,
registered and identifier) of the visible machines directly visible as read-
only within operations of the machine Accounts.
On passing the ascii version of the B machine Administration and the secu-
rity policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, we get the screenshot
displayed in Figure 4 of Appendix D. Figures 5 and 6 are relatively straight-
forward as they show that all the flows concerned are secure. However, as
depicted in Figure 7 of Appendix D, the flow from crsComp into nn is ad-
judged insecure as we expect since crsComp has the security classification[AC], whereas the security classification of nn is not defined in Section 5.3.
Figure 8 shows the screenshot on passing the ASCII version of the B ma-
chine ClientAccounts and the security flow policy file secPol RIBM.txt to
our information flow analyser. Notice that the screenshots shown in Fig-
ures 10 and 11 are straightforward since all flows displayed therein are se-
cure. Notice, however, that the screenshot showing the analysis of operation
cc ←Ð getCustomerID(cId) of ClientAccounts indicates all flows into the
output variable cc are insecure. This is expected because cc is a public vari-
able with the least security classification, ∅, whereas registered, cId, and
CUSTOMERID all have a higher security classification, [B]. Thus for
secure flows, the operation may be redesigned so that none of the variables
with a higher security classification are used in the PRE condition or the
IF condition (to prevent implicit flows into cc). Alternatively, the variable
cc may be reclassified to a security level at least as high as [B].
On passing the ascii version of the B machine Customer and the security
policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, we get the screenshot dis-
played in Figure 12 of Appendix D. The screenshot showing the analysis
of operation aa←Ð isCustomer(custID) of the Customer machine, Figure
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13, shows that implicit flows from custID and registered into the output
variable aa are insecure. This is because whereas custID and registered
both have a security classification of [B], the variable aa is unclassified in
our security flow lattice in Section 5.3. A close examination of Figure 14
of Appendix D, our security flow analysis output with respect to operation
bb←Ð afterSalesSupport(prod) of the Customer machine, reveals:
i. The flow from ITEMID into bb is insecure because ITEMID is un-
defined;
ii. The flow from faulty(prod) into bb is insecure because faulty has a
security classification of [B], whereas bb has a security classification
of [A], hence are incomparable;
iii. The flow from prod into bb is secure because prod has classification ∅
whereas bb has security classification [A], which is higher than ∅;
iv. For the same reason as 1 above, flows from ITEMID into return and
returnItem are insecure;
v. It is easy to see why other flows in the screenshot are adjudged secure
because they are either flows between variables with the same security
classification, or flows from variables with lower security classification.
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B
machine Loan CredAccounts and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to
the flow analyser is presented in Figure 15 in Appendix D. Figures 16 and 17
show that all flows within both operations of the machine are secure. This
is expected, because a close examination of the machine and the defined
security policy shows that all flows into updated variables of the machine
are from variables with security classification lower than or equal to that of
the variables being updated.
When we passed the ascii version of the B machine ManageStock and the
security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to our flow analyser, the output is as
shown in Figure 18 of Appendix D. Figure 19 captures the fact that the flow
from V ALID SID into bb is insecure, as expected, because V ALID SID is
undefined in our security policy file whereas bb has a security classification
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of [A], hence both variables are incomparable. The same is true of the
flow from V ALID SID into cc (and the flow from V ALID SID into the
variable discontinued) in Figure 20. However, because product has a security
classification of [A] whereas cc has a lower security classification of ∅, the
flow from product into cc is correctly adjudged insecure as shown in Figure
20. For the same reason, the flow from product into discontinued is correctly
adjudged insecure too. Figure 21 yields some interesting results, namely:
i. Because both priceList and V ALID SID are undefined in our secu-
rity policy file, our analyser discounts the analysis of information flow
between them and other similarly unclassified variables, yielding the
default assumption in such cases that the flow is secure. We Do Not
Care about flows between these variables.
ii. Because prod is defined as a public variable (i.e., ∅ classification), any
flow from prod is always secure. Hence the flow into the unclassified
variable stockList is correctly adjudged secure. The intuition behind
this is that it is acceptable for a public variable to be stored in any
variable of the user’s choice - even into an unclassified variable.
iii. Because both prc and PRICE RANGE are mapped to the non-public
security class [A], and priceList is unclassified, flows from the former
variables into the latter are correctly adjudged insecure.
On passing the ascii version of the B machine Overheads and the security
policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, we get the screenshot dis-
played in Figure 22 of Appendix D. And Figure 23 shows all flows within this
machine are secure, hence there is nothing very interesting to discuss further.
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B
machine PerfRelatedPay and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the
flow analyser is presented in Figure 24 in Appendix D. Figure 25 of Appendix
D shows that flows from salary into each of the variables discipline, pp, prp,
and warning are insecure. This is because salary has a higher security clas-
sification, [ABC], than these other variables, which have a security classi-
fication of [AC]. On the other hand, flows from abs into each of the same
variables are correctly adjudged secure because abs has a lower comparable
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security classification, [C].
We next discuss the screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii
version of the B machine PersonnelRecords and the security policy file
secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, presented in Figure 26 in Appendix
D. Figure 27 shows that our flow analyser adjudged flows between
EMP ID RANGE and zz; from empID into zz; and from employees into
zz as insecure. This is the expected result since EMP ID RANGE, empID,
and zz all have security classification of [C] whereas zz has a security clas-
sification of [A], hence they are incomparable. The screenshot depicted in
Figure 28 needs no further discussion; all flows there are adjudged secure.
On passing the ascii version of the B machine Sales Technical and the se-
curity policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, we get the screen-
shot displayed in Figure 29 of Appendix D. As noted earlier, for the reason
that V ALID SID is undefined in our security policy file, the flows from
V ALID SID into stockState and vv respectively are correctly adjudged in-
secure by our flow analyser as shown in Figure 30. The same is true of the
flows from V ALID SID into discontinued and ww respectively within the
operation ww ←ÐmonitorV endorStock(product, option) of Sales Technical
as depicted in Figure 31. In addition since product has a security clas-
sification of [A], whereas discontinued has a classification of ∅, our flow
analyser correctly adjudge the flow from product into discontinued as inse-
cure. Also since pID5 is undefined in our security flow policy file, the flow
from pID into uu in the operation uu←ÐmonitorProductRelease(pID) of
Sales Technical is adjudged insecure as shown in Figure 32.
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B
machine SelectProduct and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the
flow analyser is presented in Figure 33 in Appendix D. Figure 34 shows that
all the flows between variables in operation po←Ð selectProduct(prod) are
secure. In operation op ←Ð selectOptions(option), flows from OPTIONS
to op and selectedOptions respectively are judged insecure, as shown in Fig-
5Note: because we designed our flow analyser to do case-sensitive tokenisation of vari-
able names in B GSL, the variable pId, which is defined in our security flow policy file
will be seen as different from pID, which is undefined.
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ure 35, for the reason that op and optionSelected are both public variables,
whereas OPTIONS has a security classification of [B] in our security flow
policy file. For the same reason, flows from OPTIONS into productID and
ss respectively are shown to be insecure in Figure 36.
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B ma-
chine StaffSalaries and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow
analyser, presented in Figure 37 in Appendix D, is the next subject of our
discussion. In Figure 38, we see that our analyser adjudged the flow from
amount (security class [B]) into ee (security class [C]) as insecure because
both variables are incomparable. The same is true of the flow from amount
into gg. However, the flows from outstandingLoan, repaymentAmount,
and salaryB4Deduction into ee are adjudged insecure because the former
variables have higher security classification, [ABC], than the latter. The
screenshot shown in Figure 39 is straightforward, as all flows therein are
correctly adjudged secure.
On passing the ascii version of the B machine Training Mgt and the security
policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser, we get the screenshot dis-
played in Figure 40 of Appendix D. Figures 41 and 43 are straightforward,
because all flows therein are correctly adjudged secure, however, Figure 42
shows the flow from crsComp into emp in operation
kk, qq ←Ð getCoursesCompleted(empID, crsComp) is insecure because
crsComp has a higher security classification, [AC], than emp, which has a
security classification [C].
The screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of the B
machine Ts ProductRelease and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to
the flow analyser is presented in Figure 44 in Appendix D. For the reason
that pID (as discussed earlier) is undefined in our security policy file, Fig-
ure 45 shows the flow from pID into shippingCost to be correctly adjudged
insecure.
And finally, the screenshot showing the output on passing the ascii version of
the B machine Vendors and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the
flow analyser is presented in Figure 46 in Appendix D. In our security policy
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file, stocked has a security classification [A] whereas PRICE is undefined.
Hence Figure 47 shows our flow analyser adjudged the flow from PRICE
into stocked in operation setProduct to be insecure. Similarly, the flow from
PRODUCTS into bb is adjudged insecure as shown in Figure 48 because
PRODUCTS is unclassified, whereas bb has a security classification of [A].
From our discussion of the analysis of information flow within the B ma-
chines used in the development of Redmound-IBM, we have seen that our
information flow analysis framework is able to successfully identify:
i. Insecure explicit flows due to direct substitutions;
ii. Insecure implicit flows through dependency on variables used in con-
ditional predicates of IF, PRE, etc. substitutions;
iii. Insecure flows due to variable visibility through structuring mecha-
nisms in B; and
iv. Insecure flows between incomparable variables, with respect to defined
security policy.
In Section 5.5, we will explore information flow between variables in the B
Refinements of some of the machines discussed in section 5.4.1.
5.5 Redmound-IBM: The Refinements
We present in this section the B Refinements of some of the machines
defined in Subsection 5.4.1. The refinements (i.e., ManageStock r and
StaffSalaries r respectively) of the machines ManageStock and
StaffSalaries have been selected because they are arguably among the
least trivial choices we could make. To satisfy the refinement relation, both
refinements have the same number of interfaces and functionality as the cor-
responding machines being refined (i.e., ManageStock and StaffSalaries
respectively). Also, because the variables in the refinements are linked with
the variables in the corresponding machines (via linking invariants), we as-
sume the same security classification for the linked variables. The B Refine-
ment listings are presented in Subsection 5.5.1, whereas the analysis results
using our information flow analyser are discussed in Subsection 5.5.2.
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5.5.1 Redmound-IBM: Formal B Refinements
A screenshot of the Redmound-IBM project in Atelier B showing the proof
obligations automatically generated and proved (with the added refinements
highlighted) is given in Figure 5.326.
Figure 5.32: Redmound-IBM: Proof Obligations Consistency Check
We begin our discussion here with a listing of ManageStock r refinement
of the ManageStock machine.
REFINEMENT ManageStock r
REFINES
6We encountered some difficulty proving one of the twenty-five proof obligations gener-
ated for the refinement StaffSalaries r, as you can see from the figure. However, this does
not adversely impact the primary objective of the case-study, which is (in this instance)





VARIABLES stockID r, stockList r,
discontinued r, price r, priceList r
DEFINITIONS
V ALID SID ≜ 55550..99999;
PRODUCT LIST ≜ 55550..99999;
PRICE RANGE ≜ 1..10000
INVARIANT
stockID r = stockID ∧ stockList r = stockList ∧
discontinued r = discontinued ∧ price r = price ∧
priceList r = priceList
INITIALISATION stockID r, stockList r,
discontinued r, price r, priceList r ∶=
55550, {55550}, TRUE, 1, {55550↦ 1}
OPERATIONS
bb←Ð checkStockList(product, option) ≜
PRE product ∈ PRODUCT LIST ∧ option ∈ OPTION LIST
THEN






cc←Ð checkV endor(product, option) ≜
PRE product ∈ PRODUCT LIST ∧ option ∈ OPTION LIST
THEN
IF product ∈ PRODUCT LIST THEN
cc ∶= TRUE
ELSE
cc ∶= FALSE ;





PRE product ∈ stockList r ∧ prod /∈ PRODUCT LIST
THEN
stockList r ∶= stockList r − {prod}
END;
updatePriceList(prod, prc) ≜
PRE product ∈ stockList r ∧ prod ∈ PRODUCT LIST ∧
prc ∈ PRICE RANGE
THEN
priceList r(prod) ∶= prc
END
END
In the INVARIANT clause of StaffSalaries r, we defined the additional
requirement that the sum of any loan outstanding and any loan being re-
quested must always be a positive natural number (NAT1). We show below
the listing of StaffSalaries r refinement of the StaffSalaries machine.
REFINEMENT StaffSalaries r
REFINES StaffSalaries
SEES Training Mgt, PersonnelRecords, PerfRelatedPay
ABSTRACT VARIABLES identifier r, loanStatus r,
outstandingLoan r, requestedLoan r, repaymentAmount r,
salaryB4Deduction r, salaryAfter r, grantLoan r
INVARIANT identifier r = identifier ∧
loanStatus r = loanStatus ∧ outstandingLoan r = outstandingLoan∧ requestedLoan r = requestedLoan ∧
repaymentAmount r = repaymentAmount ∧
salaryB4Deduction r = salaryB4Deduction ∧
salaryAfter r = salaryAfter ∧ grantLoan r = grantLoan ∧∀amt⋅(amt ∈ NAT1 ∧ outstandingLoan r+amt ≤ 2147483647 ⇒
outstandingLoan r + amt ≤ 2147483647 ∧
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identifier r, loanStatus r, outstandingLoan r,
requestedLoan r, repaymentAmount r, salaryB4Deduction r,
salaryAfter r, grantLoan r ∶={111100}, {111100↦ NotOwing}, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, FALSE
OPERATIONS
ee, gg ←Ð requestLoan(empID) ≜
PRE
empID ∈ NAT1 ∧ empID ∈ identifier r
THEN
ANY amount WHERE
amount ∈ NAT ∧ not(amount = 0) ∧
outstandingLoan r + amount ≤ 2147483647 ∧
salaryB4Deduction r/4 ≤ 2147483647 ∧
0 ≤ salaryB4Deduction r/4 ∧
0 ≤ outstandingLoan r/6 ∧
0 ≤ salaryB4Deduction r − repaymentAmount r
THEN
IF outstandingLoan r = 0 THEN
loanStatus r(empID) ∶= NotOwing ;
ee ∶= empID ; gg ∶= TRUE
ELSIF outstandingLoan r > 0 ∧
outstandingLoan r+amount ≤ salaryB4Deduction r/4
THEN
loanStatus r(empID) ∶= Owing ;
grantLoan r ∶= TRUE ;
outstandingLoan r ∶= outstandingLoan r+amount ;
repaymentAmount r ∶= outstandingLoan r/6 ;
salaryAfter r ∶= salaryB4Deduction r −
repaymentAmount r ; ee ∶= empID ; gg ∶= TRUE
ELSE
loanStatus r(empID) ∶= Owing ;
grantLoan r ∶= FALSE ;
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salaryAfter r ∶= salaryB4Deduction r −





5.5.2 Redmound-IBM Refinements: Information Flow
Analysis
Here in Subsection 5.5.2, we run the formal B refinements defined in Subsec-
tion 5.5.1 through our information flow analyser. As noted in Section 5.5,
since the local variables defined in the refinements are linked via the
INVARIANTS clause to the variables defined in the respective machine
specifications being refined, the security classifications of the linked variables
must agree. Consequently, without loss of generality, we employ the same
security lattice defined in Subsection 5.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 5.20 for
the variables native to the refinements presented in Subsection 5.5.1.
Following an approach similar to the one used in Subsection 5.4.2, we be-
gin with a discussion of the results of analysing the refinement of Manage-
Stock machine, i.e., ManageStock r. The screenshot showing the output on
passing the ascii version of the B refinement ManageStock r and the secu-
rity policy file secPol RIBM.txt to the flow analyser is presented in Figure
49 in Appendix D. Figure 50 shows our flow analyser adjudged all flows
between the variables in operation bb ←Ð checkStockList(product, option)
to be secure, whereas Figure 51 shows that the flows from product into cc
and discontinued r respectively in cc←Ð checkV endor(product, option) are
both insecure, as expected. This is because product has a security classi-
fication of [A], while both cc and discontinued r are public variables with
security classification ∅. And Figure 52 shows that all flows between the
variables in operation updatePriceList(prod, prc) are correctly adjudged se-
cure by our flow analyser.
On passing the refinement StaffSalaries r of machine StaffSalaries and the
security policy file secPol RIBM.txt to our flow analyser, we get the screen-
shot depicted in 53 of Appendix D. Figures 54 and 56 are relatively straight-
320
forward since all the flows between the variables are adjudged secure by our
information flow analyser. However, Figure 55 shows that the flow from
amount into ee is insecure. This is because ee has a security classification of[C] whereas amount has security classification [B], hence both variables are
incomparable. Similarly gg also has a security classification of [C], hence the
flow from amount into gg is correctly adjudged insecure by our security flow
analyser. On the other hand, outstandingLoan r, repaymentAmount r and
salaryB4Deduction r all have security classification [ABC], hence flows
from each of these variables into ee (and, similarly, into gg), which has a
lower security classification of [C], are correctly flagged as insecure by our
flow analyser.
Having discussed the B refinements in Redmound-IBM and the information
flow analysis thereof, we now shift our focus in Section 5.6 to the B Imple-
mentations in the development.
5.6 Redmound-IBM: Implementation
In this section, we present the B Implementations of some of the machines
defined in Subsection 5.4.1 above. The implementations have the same num-
ber of interfaces and functionality as the corresponding machines/refinements
being refined. The B Implementation listings are presented in Subsection
5.6.1, whereas we discuss the results of analysing the implementations with
our information flow analyser in Subsection 5.6.2.
5.6.1 Redmound-IBM: B Implementations
We develop, firstly, the ManageStock machine through the ManageStock r
refinement to the ManageStock i implementation. To build the implemen-
tation, however, we have decided to introduce a utility machine StockDat7,
which will provide all the operations to be called by ManageStock i. Con-
sequently, ManageStock i EXTENDS StockDat. And, secondly, we will be
7Note: The introduction of StockDat machine into the development necessitated some
modifications to the earlier versions of ManageStock and ManageStock r, but as shown by
Figure 5.33, the modified versions satisfy required proof obligations.
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implementing the machine Sales Technical straightaway without any inter-
mediate refinement. Figure 5.33 is a screenshot of Atelier B highlighting the
consistency checks carried out on the implementations ManageStock i and
Sales Technical i, as well as the machine StockDat extended by the
ManageStock i implementation.
Figure 5.33: ManageStock i ∶ Consistency Check
Before presenting the listing of the implementations ManageStock i and




PRODUCT LIST ≜ 55550..99999
PRICE RANGE ≜ 1..10000
VARIABLES stockList, priceList, currentList
INVARIANT stockList ⊆ PRODUCT LIST ∧
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priceList ∈ stockListÐ→ PRICE RANGE ∧
currentList ⊆ PRODUCT LIST
INITIALISATION stockList, priceList, currentList∶= {55550,55551}, {55550↦ 1,55551↦ 10}, {55550}
OPERATIONS ≜
mp←Ð getPrice r(prod) ≜




sl ←Ð inStockList(prod) ≜




PRE prod ∈ PRODUCT LIST ∧ prod ∈ stockList ∧
prod /∈ currentList ∧ stockList−{prod} = dom(priceList)
THEN
stockList ∶= stockList − {prod}
END;
updatePrice(prod, prc) ≜
PRE prod ∈ PRODUCT LIST ∧ prod ∈ stockList ∧




vs←Ð inV endorStock(prod) ≜





We now present the code listing of the ManageStock i implementation.
IMPLEMENTATION ManageStock i
REFINES ManageStock r
SEES SelectProduct, V endors
EXTENDS StockDat
DEFINITIONS
PRODUCT LIST ≜ 55550..99999;
Red ≜ 1 ; Blue ≜ 2;
Green ≜ 3 ; Black ≜ 4;
Pink ≜ 5
VALUES
OPTION LIST = Red..P ink
OPERATIONS
bb←Ð checkStockList(product, option) ≜
bb←Ð inStockList(product);







And, finally, we present the code listing for the Sales Technical i implemen-
tation.
IMPLEMENTATION Sales Technical i
REFINES Sales Technical
IMPORTS ManageStock, Ts ProductRelease
PROMOTES checkStockList, checkV endor, productRelease
OPERATIONS
vv ←ÐmonitorLocalStock(product, option) ≜
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vv ←Ð checkStockList(product, option);
ww ←ÐmonitorV endorStock(product, option) ≜




Having presented the implementation of ManageStock i, we now discuss in
subsection 5.6.2 the results of analysing the component with our information
flow analyser tool.
5.6.2 Redmound-IBM Implementation: Information Flow
Analysis
As in the preceding cases with the B machines (Section 5.4) and their refine-
ments (Section 5.5), we pass the ManageStock i and Sales Technical i im-
plementations in the B development of Redmound-IBM (Subsection 5.6.1)
to our information flow analyser tool to track flows between variables vis-
ible within the development. We begin with a discussion of the results of
analysing the ManageStock i.
The screenshot in Figure 57 of Appendix D depicts the output on passing the
ManageStock i implementation and the security policy file secPol RIBM.txt
to our information flow analyser. Figure 58 shows that our flow analyser
correctly adjudged flows from PRODUCT LIST, prod and stockList re-
spectively into the output variable bb within operation
bb ←Ð checkStockList(product, option) secure. This is the case because
PRODUCT LIST, prod and stockList are all public variables with secu-
rity classification ∅, whereas bb has a security classification of [A] in our
security policy file.
Figure 59 shows that all flows within cc ←Ð checkV endor(product, option)
operation are secure for the reason that all the variables involved are pub-
lic variables with security classification ∅. However, in Figure 60, we see
that our security flow analyser adjudged the flows from currentList and
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priceList respectively into stockList within updateStockList(product) to
be insecure. This is because both (former) variables are undefined in our
security policy file, thus they are incomparable with stockList.
And, finally, our analysis of updatePriceList(prod, prc) operation shows
that the flows from PRICE RANGE and prc respectively into priceList
are adjudged insecure. This is because both PRICE RANGE and prc have
security classification [A] whereas priceList is unclassified. However, since
the variables PRODUCT LIST, prod and stockList are public variables,
their flows into priceList are appropriately adjudged secure.
On passing the Sales Technical i implementation coupled with the security
policy file secPol RIBM.txt to our information flow analyser, we get the
screenshot illustrated in Figure 62. Figure 63 shows that the flow from
VALID SID into bb is insecure for the reason that VALID SID is unclassi-
fied, whereas bb has a security classification of [A]. Similarly, since product
is unclassified, the flow from product into bb, as shown in Figure 64, is in-
secure too. For similar reasons, flows from VALID SID and product (and
discontinued as shown in Figure 65) respectively into cc are adjudged inse-
cure by our security flow analyser (Figure 66). And, finally, Figure 67 shows
that the flow from pID into shippingCost is insecure also.
Having used our information flow analyser tool (developed on the basis of the
formal framework introduced in Chapters 3 and 4) to analyse information
flow within Redmound-IBM, a conceptual system developed using the B
Method, we summarise the benefits of this approach in Section 5.7.
5.7 Benefits of Stepwise Flow Analysis
Integration of our information flow analysis framework into the stepwise
software development process is a practical way of applying the theoretic
notions of information flow security in the industry in a manner simple and
efficient enough to be readily adopted by practitioners.
Bruce Potter in [121] pointed out that rather than addressing the security
problem at its heart, which is bad software, “most defensive mechanisms on
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the market . . . operate in a reactive mode: don’t allow packets to this or that
port, watch out for files that include this pattern in them, throw partial pack-
ets and oversized packets away without looking at them.” The information
flow analysis framework we proposed in this thesis deals with the problem of
software security at its heart by building information flow security into soft-
ware systems rather than viewing security as an add-on to software systems.
In addition, using our information flow analyser, a developer will be able to
review the defined information flow policy to determine if there is a need to
modify it, thereby allowing the security classification of variables to float up
or down, as the case may be, in the manner proposed by Hunt and Sands
in [75] (Section 2.2.2.10).
Our information flow analysis framework provides developers with a means
to guarantee only valid and secure refinements are accepted, since informa-
tion flow security properties are integrated into the stepwise development
process. Hence after checking validity of refinement using existing develop-
ment tools, before a system is committed at any stage of the development
process, it can be automatically checked for secure information flow in all
possible interactions between the system variables and other data objects.
Whenever it is that a system satisfies the traditional refinement relation
while at the same time having secure information flow based on a defined
information flow policy, the developer can be assured the system satisfies
possibilistic information flow security.
As noted by Sebastian Hunt in [74], [138], a flow-sensitive information flow
analysis framework that guarantees end-to-end secure information flow can
help with correct formulation of information erasure policies on secure in-
formation. Giving as example a policy that clients’ credit card details be
erased from a data controller’s system after successful completion of a trans-
action, the author gave the following psuedocode, which highlights the need
for a flow-sensitive information flow analysis framework. It is assumed in
this psuedocode fragment that cc denotes credit card details; tt holds the re-
turn value of operation transaction(cc) that manipulates clients’ credit card
information - a return value that we assume leaks some information about cc.
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input cc from user;
tt ∶= transaction(cc);
output tt to bank;
cc ∶= 0
It is obvious that erasing credit card details (cc), by overwriting it with 0,
is not sufficient to assure clients that their details have been removed from
the data controller’s system, since the information has flowed into tt, and
tt has not been erased. Depending on the transformation applied to cc by
tt, there is the possibility that the supposedly secret input cc could be re-
trieved from tt by an adversary. The data controller in the scenario painted
in this example is clearly in breach of The Data Protection Act 1998 [47], in
particular the fifth principle that “Personal data processed for any purpose
or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose
or those purposes”. An information flow analysis framework, like the one
we introduced in this thesis, that overapproximates possibilistic information
flow can help to track all variables that the data to be erased has interfered
with, and hence may leak such secret data. Then an information erasure
policy can be defined on the variable(s) to be erased as well as all variables
subsequently affected by the processing of the data stored in the original
variable(s) to be erased.
Our information flow analysis framework can be readily automated, as demon-
strated in this thesis. This reduces the likelihood of errors resulting from
manual verification of information flow. Automating the information flow
analysis framework also removes the need for high flow-theoretic technical
knowhow, since the developer is provided with a push-button system that
deals with all the information flow analysis logic.
Since verification of information flow security is incrementally conducted at
every step of the software development lifecycle, our information flow secu-
rity framework and secure software development methodology reduces the
need for over-reliance on testing at the end of the development.
With our information flow analysis framework and secure software devel-
opment methodology, possible leaks of secure information can be detected
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early on in the development process. This considerably reduces the overall
cost of development in comparison with traditional development methods,
where such leaks of secure information may go undetected until much later
on in the software development process.
In the final chapter of this thesis, we show how we accomplished the aims
and objectives set out in Section 1.3. We also discuss other research paths




We set out to use existing theories on confidentiality properties to formulate
an automatable information flow analysis framework to enable developers
using the B Method to assure end-to-end secure information flow within
their developments. In this chapter we show how this aim of the thesis has
been met. We also discuss the research methodology used to get this far, as
well as other areas where the work presented in this thesis could be further
developed.
6.1 Need for Confidentiality-Preserving Framework
The existence of legislative deterrents like incarceration does not eliminate
burglary and other crimes. Similarly, legislation like the Data Protection Act
1998 [47], confidentiality disclaimers, access control mechanisms, and the
“penetrate and patch” point solutions to software vulnerabilities are grossly
inadequate in assuring confidentiality properties in software systems. Even
as a prudent householder takes necessary steps to secure his home against
burglars, we have shown that software practitioners need an engineering
approach to software development that takes into account confidentiality
properties at every step of the development process (see Sections 1.1, 1.2,
2.3.5.5, 5.7). In other words, systematically building constraints, or locks
as it were, into the software development process to prevent unwarranted
access to secure information within software systems. The research project
reported on in this thesis provides such an engineering approach whereby
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the theoretic notions of confidentiality properties in the literature are used
to develop a framework for analysing information flow within B Machines
such that only valid machines and refinements satisfying defined security
properties are committed.
A similar point was noted by Benjamin Aziz at the 12th CREST Open Work-
shop [14], [138] while discussing the limitations of access control systems.
He aptly pointed out that “obligations can be forced on a system, but not on
users. You can record the fact that users did not meet obligations and assign
penalties, but you cannot really force users to meet obligations”. Hence our
approach of integrating information flow security into software systems is
much more useful than defining access control constraints on users.
In Section 6.2, we discuss some of the contributions made to the existing
body of knowledge on the application of confidentiality properties to a real-
world programming language. We also discuss in the following section the
limitations of our framework.
6.2 Contributions and Limitations
In Chapter 2, we discussed eighteen different formulations of possibilistic
security properties in the literature (Subsection 2.2.2). For the most part,
we endeavoured to use the same notation to enhance understanding of the
common thread that runs through all these security properties, namely:
the initial value of a secret variable may not be read or learned or
inferred by an adversary on observation of information available
at lower security levels.
We also discussed in Chapter 2 the notions of programs, specifications and
refinement presented in the literature (Section 2.3), including the well-known
fact that confidentiality properties are not preserved by the classical refine-
ment relation. We reviewed in Section 2.3.5.4 five existing confidentiality
refinement frameworks, with their benefits and limitations presented in Sec-
tion 2.3.5.5. We presented an introduction to the B Method (Section 2.4),
which is the core language used later in our information flow analysis in
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Section 3.4. Subsection 2.4.4 dealt with our discussion of five existing secu-
rity frameworks developed using the B refinement process. In Section 4.3,
we presented an example B machine and its refinement, which satisfies the
classical refinement relation, but fails to preserve the generalised noninter-
ference property satisfied by the original machine. This is an example of the
so-called refinement paradox that shows that formalism does not in itself
guarantee the preservation of secrecy properties.
In view of the proliferation of ‘definitions of security properties’, we did not
seek to introduce yet more notions of information flow security. A candid
examination of many so-called new notions of security properties reveal that
they are simply variants of existing properties like Noninterference. Hence,
as described in this thesis, we sought ways of assuring that definitions of
security properties expressible as a MLS system hold through the step-wise
development process. Chapter 3 presents some of our core accomplishments
and contributions in this regard.
In Chapter 3 we extended the flow logic analysis approach in Clark et al,
[36], to the abridged Generalised Substitution language of the B Method -
abridged in the sense that not all the constructs in the language were con-
sidered, rather we focused on the core semantics, sufficient for our analysis
to be useful. We developed and proved the correctness of our information
flow analysis framework, proving also the model intersection property which
guarantees that there is always an acceptable and efficient least analysis for
the framework.
Applying our reflective (Action) research methodology, we then reviewed
the analysis and presented an optimised method for structuring our infor-
mation flow analysis. We termed this novel approach, discussed in Section
3.5, reaching dependencies analysis. We then presented an example in Sec-
tion 3.7 to illustrate how this optimised framework could be used to analyse
B machines. Using the application of Monotone Frameworks, we showed in
Section 3.8 how the analysis can be abstracted away from a specific language
semantics into a corresponding input-output framework. (Note: The devel-
opment of an information flow analyser based on monotone frameworks is
left for further work, while we focused on the development of a flow analyser
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based on our core flow analysis framework presented in Section 3.4.)
A major advantage of our analysis is that although it is formalised on the
GSL semantics, it can be easily modified for other language semantics, since
many of the constructs, e.g. simple substitution, alternation, etc are generic
in semantics though some are syntactically different. Also, separating the
problem of refinement from the problem of preservation of confidentiality
properties of interest (Section 3.2) makes our approach to the problem of
preservation of confidentiality properties through refinement easier than ear-
lier work in the literature, while not sacrificing functionality and scope. An-
other major advantage of our information flow analysis framework is that
an analyser can be developed that can automatically analyse B machines
for secure information flow at every level of the refinement process, as we
showed in Chapter 5. Thus, huge ‘expert’ labour, time and money can be
saved, and the possibility of human error creeping into the analysis process
is minimised.
The analysis presented in Chapter 3 deals with information flow between
variables in standalone B machines. However, developments are generally
structured with multiple machines with various levels of visibility of parts of
other machines through structuring mechanisms such as SEES, INCLUDES,
etc. Hence, we presented in Chapter 4 an extension of the flow analysis
framework to track flows resulting due to these structuring mechanisms,
thereby giving assurance that secrets are not inadvertently leaked to public
variables as a result. The proof-of-concept case-study presented in Chapter
5 illustrates the tracking of intra-machine flows between variables as well
as inter-machine flows between variables due to visibility via B structuring
mechanisms.
Using C++, we have developed an automatic information flow analyser
based on the framework introduced in this thesis. We then constructed
a case study in Chapter 5, which we analysed for secure information flow
using our information flow analyser and an arbitrary non-linear security lat-
tice (Section 5.3). The analysis results discussed in Subsections 5.4.2, 5.5.2,
and 5.6.2 illustrate one of the major contributions of this thesis: ‘static
information flow analysis can be automated to overcome the drudgery and
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potential for human error in manually doing the analysis at every step of
the development process, and it is swift, painless and cost-effective.’ Infor-
mation flow analysis at every step of the development process also enhances
proper and safe handover of contractual responsibilities between multiple
development teams, as each team can be assured their contribution to the
development is confidentiality-safe before handover.
One limitation we are aware of with our work is that it is at present only
specialised to work with Generalised Noninterference (in the Nondeterminis-
tic setting) and Noninterference (in the deterministic setting). However, we
are working to extend the approach to other possibilistic security properties
such as Nondeducibility, Noninference, etc. The primary advantage of our
information flow analysis approach, though, is that once the hard work of
developing the necessary framework and proof obligations for a particular
security property is complete, developers do not need to manually prove
again and again the preservation of security properties at every refinement
step. Rather, all that is required is to use the resulting security conditions
to automatically check that the security property of interest is preserved at
every refinement step. For the developer, using the automated information
flow analysis framework is simply a push-button process.
Some may view the extra labour required to define the information flow
policy lattice used for the analysis as a downside of analysing information
flow at every step of the development lifecycle. We note, however, that even
if this extra labour is not incurred at the development phase, similar labour
will still be expended at some time after the development, if information
flow security is pertinent to the system. It is even as my first supervisor,
David Clark, used to say: “work may be deferred, but cannot be destroyed.”
We opine that the potential huge loss in time, effort, cost and reputation
(and possibly, life) arising from the discovery of security vulnerabilities at
a later stage in the software lifecycle warrants the comparatively minuscule
extra effort, time and cost required for analysing B Machines for information
flow at every step of the development process. Hence, doing this necessary
extra work at the software development phase is a worthwhile tradeoff.
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6.2.1 Future Work
We itemise below some areas where the research work presented in this thesis
can be further extended.
à Environment-based information flow analysis.
à Extension of analysis framework to other possibilistic security
properties in the literature.
à Development of a generic flow analyser (e.g., using the monotone
framework).
à Extension of information flow analysis to probabilistic security prop-
erties.
à Extension of information flow analysis to capture implicit flows other
than those caused by termination behaviour, e.g., implicit runtime
flows such as timing flows, buffer overruns, etc.
à Retrenchment of confidentiality properties.
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss our intuitions on the areas,
itemised above, wherefor we believe our work can be further extended.
Our intuition on environment-based information flow analysis is that an ad-
versary with access to the text of a B machine or its refinements may be
able to deduce something about secure information by studying the logical
relationships between variables defined in the INVARIANT clause. We
conjecture that since all substitutions within a B machine must establish the
machine’s invariant, the simple fact that a machine is committed assures an
adversary with visibility of the text of the machine that the relationships
between variables defined in the invariant holds. Since such a deduction
is made from studying the environment or context in which the machine
executes rather than on animations (or runs) of the machine, we term this
environment-based information flow.
We illustrate this intuition with the following example, which defines a ma-
chine InvDependency with static variables xx, yy, where xx holds a secret
value passed to it via the operation parameters of update xx(zz), and yy is
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a public variable while zz is a secret variable. (Note: with a slight abuse of
notation, we write ‘?’ in update xx(?) to denote the notion that the opera-
tion parameter is secret.)
MACHINE InvDependency
VARIABLES xx, yy
INVARIANT xx ∈ NAT ∧ yy ∈ NAT ∧ xx <= yy
INITIALISATION xx, yy ∶= 0,0
OPERATIONS
update xx(zz) =











An information flow analysis of each operation on their own shows that the
information flow within each operation is secure. For example, from Table
3.4b, an analysis of update xx(zz)` gives D̂(`) ⊇ {(xx, zz), (xx, yy)}, hence
flows within the operation are secure. It is obvious that the flow within
update yy is secure too. Hence the flows within the operation main are also
secure. Notice that, due to the order in which the operations are interleaved
within main, the machine will only be consistent whenever xx <= yy, as re-
quired by the invariant. Hence an adversary can deduce indirectly whether
the secret stored in xx is less than or equal to 7 by observing whether the
machine animates or not. This is so because the fact that the machine ani-
mates is sufficient proof to a keen adversary that the machine commits when
checked with a tool like the B Toolkit or Atelier B; hence, the adversary can
safely conclude that xx <= 7.
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Our initial investigation of this intuition, which we hope to pursue in the
future led us to propose Definition 15, stated below.
Definition 15 (GSL Machine ‘INVARIANT’ Dependency). Given that x
ranges over the list of variables updated in a machine, M , and that y ranges
over the free variables in the invariant, denoted FV (INV ), we assert that
classify(y) is less than or equal to the lower bound of the security classifi-
cation function, classify, with respect to all x.
Formally, recall that we wrote X̂ to denote the set of variables updated
in a substitution. Now, we write ⋃MX̂ to denote the union of all
variables updated within all substitutions of the machine, M . For all
x ∈ ⋃MX̂, we write min(classify(x)) to denote the lower bound of
the security classification of all x ∈ ⋃MX̂. With these, we define our
proposed GSL Machine INVARIANT Dependency for all y ∈ FV (INV )
as follows:
∀y ∈ FV (INV ), classify(y) ≤ min(classify(x)).
The notion captured in Definition 15 is that to prevent environment-based
information flow from a secret variable to a public variable, the security
classification of variables used in the INVARIANT clause of B machines
must not have a higher security classification than any of the variables up-
dated within the machine, otherwise information would indirectly flow from
the secret variable x to the less secure variable y whenever the machine is
animated, notwithstanding whether it terminates or not.
The second area we believe the work in this thesis may be extended in-
volves an extension of our analysis framework to other possibilistic security
properties in the literature. As discussed in Section 3.1, our information
flow analysis framework is designed to assure satisfaction of Generalized
Noninterference, in the nondeterministic case, and correspondingly Nonin-
terference in the deterministic case. Although our framework is reasonably
general enough, since most confidentiality properties in the literature can
be expressed in terms of Noninterference, we conjecture that our framework
can be readily modified to deal with other definitions of secrecy in the liter-
ature. We leave the investigation of such extensions for further work.
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Yet another possible extension to the work presented in this thesis is the
development of a generic flow analyser that is independent of the semantics
of the B Method. The information flow analysis method using monotone
frameworks presented in Section 3.8 of this thesis may serve as the theoretic
foundation for the development of such a generic information flow analyser
using C++ or some other programming language. The advantage of such
an analyser is great in that it can be used for stepwise end-to-end analysis
of information flow notwithstanding whether the system is developed using
the B Method, Z, or some other language. This, however, may require the
translation of the language into the generic format.
The information flow analysis framework introduced in this thesis is ter-
mination sensitive. However, our framework is not guaranteed to prevent
runtime implicit flows such as timing leaks, buffer overruns, etc. Further, our
analysis framework deals with possibilistic, and not probabilistic informa-
tion flow. Hence other possible future work of interest include the extension
of our analysis to capture other implicit (runtime) flows like timing leaks,
buffer overflows, etc., and perhaps, even probabilistic flows of information.
The refinement process entails a notion of correctness with respect to the sys-
tematic substitutivity of some concrete system behaviours for some abstract
system behaviours until an implementable system is reached [16]. As noted
by Banach and Poppleton in [17], [18], [16], and [137], however, develop-
ers generally have a better understanding of what the concrete model looks
like than how the abstract one should look, thereby necessitating a reverse-
engineering of the abstract model from the concrete one. Thus, in reality,
developers often experiment with a number of prototypes until a workable
and refinable one is realised. To help formalise the process of capturing the
abstract model of software systems, [17] introduced the retrenchment tech-
nique by weakening the strict proof obligations of the refinement process so
that all useful models are acceptable even if they cannot be refined to im-
plementation. Hence the proof obligations of retrenchment is more forgiving
than the proof obligations of refinement.
338
As in refinements, a relation (like the linking invariant in B GSL) is defined
between the abstract state space and the concrete state space in the re-
trenchment framework. This relation is termed the retrieve relation in [17].
Using this relation together with what the authors termed the within rela-
tion and the concedes relation, [17] introduced a simulation-based formula
to define the retrenchment proof obligations. Our intuition is that by con-
straining either the after-value of the retrieve relation or the after-value of
the concedes relation with the security conditions introduced in Section 3.6
of this thesis, it may well be possible to develop a confidentiality-respecting
retrenchment technique. In developing such a technique, we conjecture that
caution has to be exercised so that the constraining of the retrenchment
relation does not end up making the resulting proof obligations so strong
that it defeats one of the key aims of retrenchment in the first place, namely:
the weakening of the refinement proof obligations. We consider this another
possible path our research work in this thesis may yet diverge into.
6.3 Conclusion
We have accomplished in this thesis our stated aim to use existing theories
on the subject of confidentiality properties to formulate an automatable in-
formation flow analysis framework that empowers developers using the B
Method to assure end-to-end secure information flow within their develop-
ments, and we have demonstrated how such an information flow analyser
can be used in a practical way.
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Appendix B: Security Typing Rules
(IDENT) λ;γ ⊢ x ∶ τ γ(x) = τ
(VAR) λ;γ ⊢ x ∶ τ var γ(x) = τ var
(ACCEPTOR) λ;γ ⊢ x ∶ τ acc γ(x) = τ acc
(VARLOC) λ;γ ⊢ l ∶ τ var λ(l) = τ
(INT) λ;γ ⊢ n ∶ τ
(R-VAL)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ var
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ
(L-VAL)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ var
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ acc
(SUM)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ, λ;γ ⊢ e′ ∶ τ
λ;γ ⊢ e + e′ ∶ τ
(COMPOSE)
λ;γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd, λ;γ ⊢ c′ ∶ τ cmd
λ;γ ⊢ c; c′ ∶ τ cmd
(LETVAR)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ, λ;γ[x ∶ τ var] ⊢ c ∶ τ ′ cmd
λ;γ ⊢ letvar x ∶= e in c ∶ τ ′ cmd
(ASSIGN)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ acc, λ;γ ⊢ e′ ∶ τ
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶= e′ ∶ τ cmd
(IF)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ, λ;γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd, λ;γ ⊢ c′ ∶ τ cmd
λ;γ ⊢ if e then c else c′ ∶ τ cmd
(WHILE)
λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ, λ;γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd
λ;γ ⊢while e do c ∶ τ cmd
(PROCEDURE)
λ;γ[x1 ∶ τ1, x2 ∶ τ2 var, x3 ∶ τ3 acc] ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd
λ;γ ⊢ proc (in x1, inout x2, out x3) c ∶ τ proc(τ1, τ2 var, τ3 acc)
(APPLY) λ;γ ⊢ e ∶ τ proc(τ1, τ2 var, τ3 acc),
λ;γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1, λ;γ ⊢ e2 ∶ τ2 var, λ;γ ⊢ e3 ∶ τ3 acc
λ;γ ⊢ e(e1, e2, e3) ∶ τ cmd
(LETPROC) λ;γ ⊢ proc(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c ∶ pi,
λ;γ ⊢ [proc(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c/x]c′ ∶ τ cmd
λ;γ ⊢ letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c′ ∶ τ cmd
Summary of Volpano and Smith’s [130], [76] Security Typing Rules.
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Appendix C: Software Tools and IDEs Used in
Research
i. BizAgi: BPMN Process Modeller (http://www.bizagi.com/).
ii. Microsoft Visio Professional 2010: Advanced diagramming tool.
iii. Atelier B : An industrial tool Developed by ClearSy, to efficiently
develop defect-free proven Software using the B Method
(http://www.atelierb.eu/en/).
iv. Code::Blocks: Cross-platform C++ Integrated Development Environ-
ment (IDE) (http://www.codeblocks.org/).
v. Microsoft Windows Visual C++ 2008: C++ IDE.
vi. Microsoft Windows Visual C++ 2010: C++ IDE.
vii. Microsoft Word 2010.
viii. MiKTeX 2.9: A typesetting system for Windows (www.miktex.org).
ix. WinEDT 7.0: Text (LaTeX) editor for Windows
(http://www.winedt.com/).
x. LyX: A document processor (http://www.lyx.org/).
xi. TpX: A drawing tool for TeX (http://sourceforge.net/projects/tpx/).
xii. InstallShield: Microsoft Windows Software Installer
(http://www.flexerasoftware.com/products/installshield.htm).
xiii. Adobe Acrobat 2007 .
xiv. Microsoft Windows 7 Paint.
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Appendix D: Flow Analyser Screenshots: B Ma-
chines
Screenshots of information flow analyser outputs.
Flow analysis of Redmound-IBM Specifications
Figure 1: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE Accounts ∶ Input F iles
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Figure 2: MACHINE Accounts ∶ Flow Analysis
359
Figure 3: MACHINE Accounts ∶ Flow Analysis
360
Figure 4: MACHINE Administration ∶ Input F iles
361
Figure 5: MACHINE Administration ∶ Flow Analysis
362
Figure 6: MACHINE Administration ∶ Flow Analysis
363
Figure 7: MACHINE Administration ∶ Flow Analysis
364
Figure 8: Redmound-IBM: MACHINE ClientAccounts Input F iles
365
Figure 9: MACHINE ClientAccounts ∶ Flow Analysis
366
Figure 10: MACHINE ClientAccounts ∶ Flow Analysis
367
Figure 11: MACHINE ClientAccounts ∶ Flow Analysis
368
Figure 12: MACHINE Customer Input F iles
369
Figure 13: Customer ∶ Flow Analysis
370
Figure 14: Customer ∶ Flow Analysis
371
Figure 15: Loan CredAccounts ∶ Input F iles
372
Figure 16: Loan CredAccounts ∶ Flow Analysis
373
Figure 17: MACHINE Loan CredAccounts ∶ Flow Analysis
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Figure 18: ManageStock ∶ Input F iles
375
Figure 19: ManageStock ∶ Flow Analysis
376
Figure 20: ManageStock ∶ Flow Analysis
377
Figure 21: ManageStock ∶ Flow Analysis
378
Figure 22: Overheads ∶ Input F iles
379
Figure 23: Overheads ∶ Flow Analysis
380
Figure 24: PerfRelatedPay ∶ Input F iles
381
Figure 25: PerfRelatedPay ∶ Flow Analysis
382
Figure 26: PersonnelRecords ∶ Input F iles
383
Figure 27: PersonnelRecords ∶ Flow Analysis
384
Figure 28: PersonnelRecords ∶ Flow Analysis
385
Figure 29: Sales Technical ∶ Input F iles
386
Figure 30: Sales Technical ∶ Flow Analysis
387
Figure 31: Sales Technical ∶ Flow Analysis
388
Figure 32: Sales Technical ∶ Flow Analysis
389
Figure 33: SelectProduct ∶ Input F iles
390
Figure 34: SelectProduct ∶ Flow Analysis
391
Figure 35: SelectProduct ∶ Flow Analysis
392
Figure 36: SelectProduct ∶ Flow Analysis
393
Figure 37: StaffSalaries ∶ Input F iles
394
Figure 38: StaffSalaries ∶ Flow Analysis
395
Figure 39: StaffSalaries ∶ Flow Analysis
396
Figure 40: Training Mgt ∶ Input F iles
397
Figure 41: Training Mgt ∶ Flow Analysis
398
Figure 42: Training Mgt ∶ Flow Analysis
399
Figure 43: Training Mgt ∶ Flow Analysis
400
Figure 44: Ts ProductRelease ∶ Input F iles
401
Figure 45: Ts ProductRelease ∶ Flow Analysis
402
Figure 46: V endors ∶ Input F iles
403
Figure 47: V endors ∶ Flow Analysis
404
Figure 48: V endors ∶ Flow Analysis
405
Flow Analyser Screenshots: Refinements
Figure 49: ManageStock r ∶ Input F ile
406
Figure 50: ManageStock r ∶ Flow Analysis
407
Figure 51: ManageStock r ∶ Flow Analysis
408
Figure 52: ManageStock r ∶ Flow Analysis
409
Figure 53: StaffSalaries r ∶ Input F ile
410
Figure 54: StaffSalaries r ∶ Flow Analysis
411
Figure 55: StaffSalaries r ∶ Flow Analysis
412
Figure 56: StaffSalaries r ∶ Flow Analysis
413
Figure 57: ManageStock i ∶ Input F ile
414
Figure 58: ManageStock i ∶ Flow Analysis
Figure 59: ManageStock i ∶ Flow Analysis
415
Figure 60: ManageStock i ∶ Flow Analysis
Figure 61: ManageStock i ∶ Flow Analysis
416
Figure 62: Sales Technical i ∶ Input F ile
417
Figure 63: Sales Technical i ∶ Flow Analysis
418
Figure 64: Sales Technical i ∶ Flow Analysis
Figure 65: Sales Technical i ∶ Flow Analysis
419
Figure 66: Sales Technical i ∶ Flow Analysis
420
Figure 67: Sales Technical i ∶ Flow Analysis
421
